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
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
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
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
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



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STATEMENTS:
THEOLOGICAL AND CRITICAL.

BY

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AUTHOR OF "THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL," "COMMENTARY ON
THE NEW TESTAMENT," ETC.

COLLECTED AND EDITED BY

HIS SON,

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Gift
Miss Sara Whedon
1-13-1936

P R E F A C E.

IN the summer of 1884, when the late Dr. Whedon was becoming convalescent from a serious illness, adopting the suggestion of a friend, who was familiar with all he had ever written, he proposed to himself the employment of a measure of his recovered strength and lengthened life, in the collection of the more important discussions of his pen, with the possible preparation of such additional new chapters as would give them a somewhat complete and systematic form. The twenty-eight years, then just closed, of his editorship of *The Methodist Quarterly Review* were richly prolific in his contributions to the highest thought—philosophical, theological, critical, and religious—of his time. In this abundant material, sufficient for many volumes, is much of permanent value; but, locked up in the pages of the *Review*, it is largely beyond the reach of the younger thinkers in the ministry and laity of the Church, to whom it might be brought in a separate form.

6-12-33 JWB

In the execution of this project, Dr. Whedon was unable to proceed beyond a partial outline and the indication of a few passages for insertion. What he thus intended, but, from failing strength, could not accomplish, he intrusted to his son and nephew to take up and carry to completion. The plan adopted by them made necessary a few verbal modifications, in no case, however, touching the sentiments of the author. They have found it expedient, with the approval of the publishers, to enlarge the plan to two volumes instead of one, as originally contemplated.

The present volume comprises the briefer discussions, chiefly selected from the *Review*, arranged in appropriate departments. The companion volume, entitled *Essays, Reviews, and Discourses*, is made up of the longer productions of the author, with a biographical sketch.

J. S. W.

D. A. W.

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STATEMENTS: THEOLOGICAL AND CRITICAL.



THEISM.

The Blankness of Atheism.

BÜCHNER is *the* Atheist of Europe. He exhibits in behalf of a still more radical creed the strong, coarse vigor of deistical Thomas Paine.

We promptly reject the doctrine, of which, for a brief period, the *North American Review* was made the organ, that Atheism is not a demoralization and a just ground of personal disapprobation of its advocate. Doubtless an Atheist may have his natural excellences, and yet in the center there is a moral desert. Of this the pitiable Büchner is an illustration. What but a moral perversion at the center—a sad reversal of the deepest and best sensibilities of our nature—can send forth such an utterance as the following in regard to our own personal immortality? “The thought of an *eternal life* is more terrifying than the idea of eternal annihilation. The latter is by no means repugnant to a philosophical thinker. Annihilation, non-existence, is perfect rest, painlessness, freedom from all tormenting impressions, and therefore not to be feared. There can be no pain in annihilation, as little as in profound sleep, but merely in the conception of annihilation. . . . The idea of an eternal life—of not being able to die—is, on the contrary,

the most horrid that human fancy can invent, and its horrors have long been expressed in the legend of the never-dying Ahasuerus."*

And as in his view matter is the sole real existence, and mind, thought, is, like combustion, but one of its incidents, so thought may utterly cease, and the universe hereafter become one mass of irrecoverable unintelligence. "Physics show that, as there was a time when no organic life existed on earth, so will the time arrive—no doubt an infinite and incommensurable period—when the physical forces now existing will be exhausted, and all animated beings plunged into night and death. What are, in the presence of such facts, the pompous phrases of a philosophy about the designs which become accomplished in the creation of man ; the incarnation of God in history ; the history of humanity as the subjective unavailing of the absolute ; the eternity of conscience, liberty, and will, etc. ? What are the life and the efforts of man, and all humanity, compared with the eternal, inexorable, irresistible, half-accidental, half-necessary march of nature ? The momentary play of an ephemeron, hovering over the sea of eternity and infinity."†

In the hearty eagerness with which Büchner riots in hideousnesses like these, it is, that we recognize the truly hateful moral perversion in which Atheism originates and into which it reacts. A poor relief of the blackness here displayed appears in the *courage* with which the moral sentiments of the best of our race are braved ; especially when that courage is contrasted with the paltering cowardice of men like Maudesley, who manifest the wish to produce the conclusions of Büchner covered by shams and ambiguities.

If the perusal of Büchner does not increase our moral respect for the Atheist, if it reveals very clearly to the

* *Force and Matter*, pp. 204, 205.

Ibid., p. 105.

naked eye that he is centrally and intensely a morally detestable man, its argument does not increase our respect for his intuitive or logical intellect. They are a poor, base, brutal set—the very “hogs of Epicurus’s sty”—who are convinced by *such* arguments. From the deep corruption of the heart the effluvium ascends to stultify and madden the brain. Such moral rottenness may and does prove contagious; it seizes on, and rages among, moral constitutions congenial to it; it may, from the stench and racket it makes, seem for a while victorious over the age; but it cannot truly conquer. Not only is there a God in heaven, but there is an assertion of God in the human spirit that will ever reign triumphant in an ever-increasing Church on earth. We must say that we rise from the perusal of Büchner with an intense moral abhorrence of the man, with a deep revulsion against his whole system, and with a profounder, firmer, more exulting conviction that God lives and reigns.

On Büchner’s attempt to refute the argument from Design by showing what absurdities, misarrangements, and cruelties exist in nature, we suggest :

1. Matter and force alone in universal space could never give us a systematized world. Without directive mind, including perception and volition, matter could never be lifted by mere unintelligible force out of chaos. Every divergence, however slight, from pure unmeaning chaos into plan is demonstrative of mind. The clearer the plan, the clearer the design. But we cannot open our eyes without seeing that the world is not chaos. When we contemplate the wide, wide world, we every-where recognize, just as plainly as we recognize visible things, that those visible things have meaning and plan in them.

2. Defects, maladjustments, supernumerary limbs,

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disprove not the *design*, but only impeach the perfect wisdom of the designer. That man has no wings for flying does not disprove that his feet were made for walking. "Contrivances," says Büchner, "apparently purposeless, are numerous in the structure of animals and plants." True, but without design there would be no "contrivance," no "structure," no "animals," no "plants," nothing but chaos. All these disorders are indeed *difficulties* in the way of maintaining the absolute wisdom and goodness of the designing mind ; and, as being mere difficulties and not refutations, are justly and fairly obviated by rational hypotheses so as to form a theodicy.

3. Touching the existence of defects in creation let us note the following points: (1.) Creation, unless the absolutely perfect should create another absolutely perfect—that is, unless God should create solely another God—must be limited and dependent, and therefore imperfect. A universe of archangels would suffer under the evil of limitation, mutual collision, and dependence. (2.) In a complete universe our minds seem to demand an infinite variety of existences and natures, ranks and orders. But in order to such variety there must be those that are lower, who suffer under their inferiority. (3.) In a complete universe there ought to be free beings, able, in a limited area, to act with a little independence and responsibility of their own. The whole should not be a mere machinery. There should be the dignity of liberty and government working out their development and results. But free-agency thus implies the possibility of evil doing, transgression of the perfect law of eternal right. Thus there must be the created capability for sin, the broad area spread for possible sin, the permanent systematic non-prevention of actual sin. The greater the magnitude of this govern-

mental and judicial system, and the higher its worth and dignity, the greater must be the power and possibility of sin on the one hand and of rectitude on the other; the more perfect should be the law under which it exists, and the more wonderful the blending of intense justice with condescending mercy, and the rich results of ultimate glory. (4.) For the development of the activity of living beings, and especially of free moral agents, surrounding evils to be escaped and goods to be attained are necessary. There must be the possible prize of good to bring out the eager putting forth of strength for the attainment. There must be the menacing evil and the shock of danger to arouse the vigorous spring of escape. And, especially in the moral world, for all high unfolding of virtue there must be temptation to vice. Seductions to soft indulgences are necessary for the development of heroic constancy; the fires of persecution are necessary to the most glorious of all spectacles to us known in the universe—the *martyr's crown*. Temptations to the intellect, even to believe a damnable lie, are necessary for the display of a high moral faith. There must be contingencies in the political world to afford possibility for a Jefferson Davis, in the commercial world to afford area for a James Fisk, Jr., in the scientific and moral world to allow plausibility to a Louis Büchner. We do not say that the wicked deeds of these men must by them be performed, but that there must be power and room for their performance. And from their performance God will, with none the less damnation to them, reap his harvest of good results. (5.) What wonder, then, that the physical world should respond in due degree to this quality of the intelligent moral world? There must be in such a world uniformities so that men may calculate and infer, and contingencies by which they must be

left in doubt. There must be pleasures and pains more or less consequent upon conduct. There must be laws and natural processes, which exceptionally cross and defeat each other. Earthquakes, pestilences, malformed limbs, and monstrous births are, in such a system, no inexplicable problems. Yet amid all this mingling of order and disorder, what a cheering point will be the development of *progress*! But no man can disprove that defects are necessary both in and to the best possible universe.

Plotinus on Theism.

NEOPLATONISM, the philosophy of the Alexandrian school of the earlier centuries, was a profoundly thought explication of the mysteries of the universe. It was a deep attempt to answer the questions ever occurring to the human mind: How do we know the outer universe? What is God? How comes creation? What the relation between God and man? What is duty?

First Plotinus finds himself at start awakened by two queries: What is truth, and how is it knowable? All that sense perceives is in motion, perpetually changing—ceasing, and becoming. It has all the characteristics of unreliability and unreality, and is, therefore, mere phenomena and show. At start, then, Plotinus abandoned, as absurd, what the Materialists held as an axiom—that matter is the sole substance, and sense the sole test of truth. On the contrary, beneath this flimsy outer coating of phenomenon, he recognized, by the transcendent reason, the true substance. This is the *permanent* and the *real*.

But how does the mind go out and discover and know this *reality* in full certainty? Plotinus assumes a maxim to explain this, which seems to us neither proved nor self-evident. The maxim is that "*like knoweth like*." We know our thoughts because they are ourselves

thinking. Mind knows its object, because the object is part and identity with itself. Hence the inference that subject and object are the same. And this "bridges the chasm between the soul and the world!" It does so, by identifying the two opposite banks of the chasm into one, and allowing the chasm "to slide."

But by a process of ascending into our higher faculties, we transcend the merely sensible, and with the eye of *pure reason* we look with *direct intuition* upon the *pure reality*, the cause in all causation, the infinite. "This is ecstasy. It is the liberation of your mind from its finite consciousness. Like can only apprehend like; when you thus cease to be finite, you become one with the infinite." Thus with the highest certainty of the highest faculties, we see the surest reality, God; and if we rightly appreciate the philosophy, are pretty much God ourselves.

Still the question remains, thus transcendently beheld, What is God? In the intense white heat of the conceptions which answer this question, our own logical crucible and tongs, we confess, become about melted to uselessness. God is himself the *changeless*, without motion in space; and how can he evolve changes and fluctuating phenomena? In other words, how can he create? Plotinus rejects the thought of ascribing to the changeless the attributes of personality, namely, consciousness, perception, and will; for this is forming *him* or *it* in the image of man. How, then, does the changeless evolve changes, the motionless propel motion? The answer develops the Neoplatonic Trinity. Phenomena can only be explained by supposing that the One is not pure simplicity, but plural. In the one divine nature there are three persons or hypostases. The *first* hypostasis is necessarily conceived as absolute oneness, antecedent to time or space. For absolute

unity negates past and future, motion or extension, thought, and, perhaps, even existence; for we are not sure that existence is not limitation. He is, therefore, the "immanent negative, the inscrutable anonymous." He is to be apprehended in exalted silent ecstasy, as "the NOTHING and the ALL." The second hypostasis proceeded from the first, not by any motion, not by any subtraction, but *raying* forth as eternal splendor from the sun. Thus from inexorable unity we have duality. But this duality is held in synthesis by a third hypostasis, which consists of an intelligence which fuses both into one infinite mind. We have thus plurality—a three one.

From this triune deity, which is neither personal nor pantheistically one with the universe, but which is in its nature necessary causation, arises creation as necessary effect. Matter being its dark shadow, is rather non-being than being, rather negative than positive. It is moved and wrought into phenomena, and lawed by the supermundane soul. Order is the prevalence of law; beauty, the victory of the "idea" over the amorphous; goodness is the conformity to the divine image. Evil is negative; it is the absence of law, order, and goodness, and so impossible to God.

Lastly, what is duty? Duty is possible to the philosopher alone. It consists in mounting above sense, ascending into ecstasy, and dwelling in the vision of the Infinite. Herein was Plotinus's great failure; he made virtue a philosopher's special prerogative, by making it consist in intellectual rather than moral communion with the Deity. Had he accepted the God-man, he would have felt how general humanity, in its secular sphere, was capable of sanctification and perfect virtue. The items of the system are plentifully found distributed through the antimaterialistic systems of all ages;

and especially through the transcendental reactions against Locke and Condillac at the present time. The career of Plotinus's line of thought runs through such successive tracts of beauty and of paradox, as to enchant the fancy while it provokes the ingenuity of lively speculatists.

God's Great Object in Creation is Self-manifestation.

The great object of God in creation would seem to be *manifestation*; as he said to Pharaoh, "for this same purpose have I raised thee up, *to make my power known*." In reading, in our earlier days, the works of Edwards, especially that on *Universal Salvation*, we were often flung into dubious revery on his assumption that God performed great transactions *to show forth his attributes to the universe*. The atonement is a *demonstration* of his hatred of sin yet mercy for the sinner; and hell itself, with its endless misery, is intended for a display of God's justice to the universe. What proof, said we, that the universe knows, or ever will know, any thing about it? Is it, indeed, a fact, that when the scales of mortality fall from our eyes, we forthwith emerge to a full clairvoyance of all the mysteries of the universal republic, and the laws by which it is ruled? But the stupendous pages of geology, laid leaf after leaf, through ages, in the volume of creation, when read by the eye of science, reveal the wonderful fact that Omnipotence has been for long ages *manifesting itself* in the most affluent evolutions, with no eye but its own to appreciate its almost boundless display. Unless invisible critics were surveying these performances, with all our powers of admiration, the Deity has here been, so far as other minds than his own are concerned, but, as it were, wasting an immensity of *miracula speciosa*. So far, we say, as

other than his own mind is concerned; but may it not be somehow that his own mind has its own immediate pleasure in this wreaking itself upon an infinite variety of creation? יֵשֶׁב בַּשָּׁמַיִם יִצְחָק saith the Hebrew bard; "The sitter in the heaven shall laugh at them." And if Jehovah hath this ireful laugh at his foolish foes, may he not have a laughter of a gentler sort? "Flowers are God's smiles," says somebody, worthy to have been held in our memory for the beautiful thought. But further than this laughter, and even these smiles, may we not say that—*Deus seipsum delectat—God amuseth himself?*

And when we see the volume of the book of the vast submundane history unfolded, what find we but a pictorial series of divine sportiveness? a secret play spell of the Creator, all for his own secluded entertainment. What funny little contrivances does Hugh Miller detect in the making and jointing the bones and shells of the primitive testaceæ. What beautiful little architectures, where strength, lightness, and elegance are skillfully calculated, are displayed in the chambers of the primitive animalculæ. And then such brilliant hues, so softly blended, so brilliantly flared, so wittily spotted, so tastefully selected. And these were poured forth with a conscious boundlessness, and a vast yet regulated variety, for no apparent purpose, than *to please himself*, for millions of years, by the unrivaled Lord of Life. Doth God love the cunning fix, the quaint device, the creative joke, as well as we? Is beauty, as it tints the lily, trills in melody, or unfolds in form, a beauty and a "joy forever" to our God? We know that the eagle is an embodiment of grandeur; and the humming bird is a beautiful *jeu d'esprit*. The lion is an epic; and the ape a comedy. And for a perfect burlesque, there was—for he is now extinct—the poor dodo. Upon that

melancholy bird, the Creator heaped every thing to make him an ungainly stupid clown, who was perfectly blameless for being the butt of the company, until he sorrowfully slinks from its notice, by dropping out of existence.. It would seem cruel to pile a certain sort of merciless ridicule upon a thing so innocently half-witted. And yet the Creator has given to every being its compensation. With the universal bribe of conscious *life*, does he hire all animated beings to suffer the ills of their position in the scale, for the sake of conscious life itself? And do you doubt that they all make the bargain with full consent? See how anxiously they preserve and tend the life he gives, with all the means in their power. Attack their life, and they will, if they can, poison you, or assassinate you, or pound you, according as they have fangs, or horns, or hoofs. Or, if they have no weapons, they will run with the best tug of their legs; or finally die in deep pathos, as if they would complain, not for having obtained, but for losing the boon of existence. Of man, guilty man alone, can it ever be said, "Better that he had never been born."

If these remarks are true, then God performs an infinity of exploitations, that might hold a universe in wonder, awe, or amusement, with no eye in the universe to witness but its own. Displays of justice most terrible, of tenderness most sweet, of wisdom most boundless, of taste most exquisite, of quaintness most witty, all may be tied together in the infinite knot. "It takes all sorts to make a world," says the proverb; and it may be true that on the entire scale, variety is the all-comprehending law, on which Τὸ Πᾶν, the great whole, is planned.

If this be so, we need no gazing universe to see that God may deal with man with a mercy just as tender, a justice just as exact, as if a universe were rapt in study

upon it. "For the manifestation of his own glory," and "for his own good pleasure," are phrases of genuine, though not despotic, import. And amid the varieties of possibility, without revelation, it would be in vain for man to conjecture his theodicic future.

Will unredeemed man, in his multiplied millions, as annihilationism teaches, flare out of the scene of being, a blasted bud, an abortive start, a burst bubble, an everlasting failure? Or is development the key, as restorationism teaches; and is all intelligent immortal existence rolling on the waves of billowy centuries, a mighty Amazon, of which damnation is but a backward eddy in the course, from whose curves the wave will, in rolling æons, return to the onward current, toward the sea of perfect life? Or is hell, indeed, the manifestation of the infinite sternness of the divine consciousness, highest in its character, absolute in its form, the serious and forever solemn in the variety, the never-ending tragic line in the comprehensive history, the melting semitone of the eternal anthem of the universe? Religion never fills the soul with its own unspeakable importance, but upon this last presumption.

Intellective Forms impossible without an Intellective Formative Power.

In *The Nineteenth-Century* for 1878 Professor Tyndall re-affirms "the growth of the human body to be mechanical," as maintained by him in his *Fragments of Science*. The argument as by him given takes four steps, and consists in an attempt to show, in very diffuse and variegated style, that, as men built the Pyramids of Egypt, so crystallization can build mechanically a pyramid of molecules, and vegetation can equally mechanically build a kernel of corn, and organization can equally mechanically build a human body. No in-

telligent power is needed in the last three of the afore-said four buildings. Let us trace his four steps, and try to ascertain for ourselves.

1. Mr. Tyndall shows us the Pyramids of Egypt, and describes them graphically as being built by "power," in "a form" which "expressed the thought of the human builder." That is, be it noted, these pyramids were built by blended *force* and *intelligence* incarnated in men. 2. He then tells us that salt and water under evaporation will, by molecular force, form itself into similar pyramids. These molecules are "self-posited," "being fixed in their places by the forces with which they act upon each other." Here creeps in his first fallacy, namely : the assumption which no theist is bound to concede, that these molecules all march into their places without any intellective guidance, insensate matter acting as intelligently as so many soldiers stepping into rank to form a phalanx. The possibility of such action the theist at once declines to grant ; and for that refusal what remedy has Mr. Tyndall ! The very analogy of the Egyptian pyramids warns us that for the building of a salt pyramid there must be the same blend of force and intelligence to put the blocks in place. He, indeed, admits the *force* to produce the motion ; but it is as plain that there is a *selective direction* of the motion as that there is *force*. And it is as plain that there are both a *force* and a *selective direction*, as that there is a molecule at all. Now, as force is a physical factor, so is selective direction an intellective factor. The theist, therefore, is not in the slightest degree bound to concede that the salt pyramid is built without a guiding intelligence any more than the stone pyramid. 3. Mr. Tyndall next takes up a kernel of corn, and, by a polarized light, shows us that the kernel is built by the same sort of molecular action as the salt

pyramid. He then tells us that, if we "have rejected the notion of an external architect" in the case of the salt pyramid, we are bound to reject it now, and hold the molecules of the corn "self-posit." That simply hooks his second fallacy on to his first fallacy. Disregarding the irrelevant phrases about "an external architect," which nobody supposes, our theist refuses to grant that without intelligent direction united with force the molecules can make any movement at all. 4. Mr. Tyndall lastly takes the animal body, and analogically argues with the same inconsequence that the molecules, all without any intelligent guidance, "posit" themselves in places, each one stepping to his post to form with the rest an extended, symmetrical organism !

And that is a self-contradictory and absolutely impossible conception. A brick is a big piece of matter, and a molecule is a little one ; and if, without any intelligence, internal or external, a brick cannot, at the required instant, start up from the ground and fling itself right into the vacant niche formed by the requirement of the rising pyramid, how can the little piece of matter, just as destitute of intelligent direction or self-direction, fling itself at the exact instant into just the exact vacant point, in order to furnish a large and complex organism consisting of a variety of symmetrical and correspondent parts ? Suppose the organism be a huge mastodon, or a devil-fish, with a thousand Briarean arms, we are called upon in vain to believe that an unintelligent molecule, undirected by any intelligence that can comprehend the whole complex organism, can, at the right instant, put itself in the right point ; and that myriads of blind, unguided little pieces of matter can also so combine with reference to each other as to form that contingent and varied whole. Each one particle must, with vast varieties of contingencies, act with perfect

reference to the contingent and varied motions of every other particle, and with exact and perfect reference to the final whole. And if we suppose the whole cosmos to be a symmetrical whole, then an intelligence co-extensive with this cosmos, yet not overlooking one molecule in the whole cosmos, is a logical necessity for the due location of each one of the entire infinities of the molecules. Theology rightly assumes such a cosmos, and so infallibly infers a God.

Cicero's ancient illustration wrought into modern terms, is as decisive an argument as can be selected. Is it not perfectly self-contradictory to claim that solid metallic types could so start into spontaneous action, give themselves self-direction, and among an infinite number of possible points so posit themselves, each at the right point, as to form a Bancroft's *History of America*? First, it is conceded by all physics that every existing molecule is inert; that is, destitute of the power of self-motion; so that the said types could not start into motion. And as every existing molecule is destitute of self-motion, so all the powers of attraction, repulsion, cohesion, and motion belonging to molecules are not intrinsic to the molecule, but are *addenda*, superadded to it from a foreign source; so that even the coherence of the molecules by which the solid type is formed is interpolated from a foreign source. But, *second*, the motion being supposed possible, the *particular* motion, amid an infinity of possible directions, is conceivable only by the assumption of *selective intelligence*. The *problem* is, how can a solid mass of molecules, composing a metallic type, select its place in view to form this American history? And how can this process be repeated so that, say, a million types shall so *posit* themselves as each to assume the point requisite to the formation of this exact whole? The only *solution* that the human mind

can conceive for such a problem is—*selective intelligence*. And it must not be a mere speck of intelligence in each molecule ; but for each molecule there must be a comprehension of the whole history. The position of every type has reference to the whole book. The intelligence that fixes each type to its place must know the whole in order to assign the place for each one. But this book itself has a further system of intellective connections. It is a representation of an external series of facts belonging to the history of the outer world, the great system of events of the founding of this our American nation—a system by which the entire system of human history is remarkably modified. The “positing” of each one metallic type, then, has a reference to the great whole of human history. Now, instead of this book substitute the cosmos. There is in that cosmos an infinity of relations and references just as clearly intellective as the relations of the types to the words of the book, as the relations of the words to the sense, and as the relations of the sense to the great summary of historical externalities. The whole cosmos must, therefore, be comprehended by one all-grasping Intelligence, which takes in at once each molecular item, and the cosmical whole, and holds them a unit. That intelligence can be nothing less than God. To deny it, we submit, is an abdication of common sense.

Mr. Tyndall endeavors to supply the absence of intelligence by such phrases as “structural energies,” “attractions,” and repulsions. But, first, what is a “structural energy?” How does it look? What is it made of? Who made it? And the more steadily we look at it we shall find it to be a nothing in the world. It presupposes a directive intelligence in the molecule, and so we have an infinite number of molecular intelligences. But each molecule, as we have shown, must have more than a mo-

molecular intelligence ; it must know more than enough to crawl to a point, it must know the whole organism in order to know enough to crawl to the point. That is, we must have a practical omniscience in every molecule.

Now, Mr. Tyndall's "structural energy" is a poor edition of the "plastic power" of the grand old philosopher, Cudworth ; a conception that philosophic theologians have, for, perhaps, well-considered reasons, disused. Yet Cudworth's "plastic power" was not, like Mr. Tyndall's "formative energy," unintelligent. It was, as we may say, a *so much deity* as was necessary, set apart for the carrying on of the physical world. Indeed, "the plastic power" has received a new illustration from the old Cartesian doctrine, now adopted by physicists, of the "conservation of force." This doctrine affirms that there is through all ages the same amount of force engaged in the physical cosmos. It is, then, still left with the theologian to assume that this is but a part of omnipotence lying back of or above it in the divine Being. To our physical system God has assigned its fixed amount of force, sufficient to carry it on with all practical completeness, subject to all the interpositions his reserve omnipotence pleases. This would serve to explain the "course of nature," with all its completeness and incompleteness, its fixities and its accidentalities, its goods and its evils. The "plastic power" is omnipotence itself working under self-assigned conditions of finite cause and effect. In every molecular movement the force requires omnipotence, and the directivity requires omniscience ; for without the omnipotence that force could not exist, and without the omniscience that directivity could not exist ; yet only so much force and so much intelligence is added as will accomplish the finite object—an infinitesimal drop from the infinite ocean.

This completes our view of his argument in his *Fragments of Science*, but we have a point or two more to make.

In this same *Nineteenth Century* the professor quotes the following words from Professor Knight, applauding them as "bold words to be spoken before the moral philosophy class of a Scotch university." We think they are as foolish as they are "bold:" "If matter is not eternal, its first emergence into being is a miracle beside which all others dwindle into absolute insignificance. But it has often been pointed out that the process is unthinkable." But, we reply, the creation of matter is no more unthinkable than the eternity of matter. Creation from nothing is just as valid a thought as eternity without beginning or end. And as we know eternity, however unthinkable, to be a valid reality, so the unthinkability of creation, if true, does not destroy the validity of creation. But neither is unthinkable, but only *unpicturable*. That is, we cannot shape them into a conceptual form, as we can a horse or a hand-saw, although they are valid to the higher reason. No more can we think into conceptual form Spirit, or Herbert Spencer's "Unknown Absolute," or Professor Tyndall's "promise and potency in matter" for forming an intellectual cosmos. Nothing transcending the senses can be mentally pictured. And this is so well-known a fact in philosophy that one is amazed at the persistence with which unthinkability, that is, *unpicturability*, is assigned for rejecting creation.

Mr. Tyndall assures us that he discerns a "promise and potency in poor despised matter" capable of evolving all the phenomena of the world. So do we, Mr. Tyndall. And that "promise and potency" is the *causa causarum*, the immanent God, who is in the matter by him created, sustaining it in existence, endowing

it with powers, and carrying it through all its operations. He is the soul of the world, the light of lights, the life of life, the inner substratum of all phenomena. And this answer, assumed as final, leaves to science all her investigations, her theories, and her systems.

Superiority and Priority of Mind to Matter.

On this general topic we jot the following suggestions:

1. One of the most fundamental of all the maxims of both philosophy and theology is Plato's: Mind is prior to matter. Mind is superior and all comprehending; matter is good for nothing, and might just as well be so much vacant space but for its subserviency to mind. One monad of mind, if solely existing, would be worth a whole universe of matter alone. Hence, when the materialist makes mind an appendage to matter, an accident, or property, he commits a *husteron-proteron*, a cart before the horse, a *præ-posterous* proposition.

2. Mind, as before all things, is the producer of all things. It is first cause, the source of causation. All power, all force, resides primally in mind; and all exertion of power, all eventuality, and all motion, come from mind. Mind is the source of motion.

3. When the theologian, ages ago, declared that *God is omnipotent*, he asserted, previous to any philosophy, the indestructibility of *force*. He declared that the amount of force existing is always the same, namely, *infinite*. And there is no objection to saying that the amount of force measured out by the Almighty to our mundane creation is always the same, unless varied by miracle. The infinite mind, with infinite power, controls the universe.

4. When the Materialist affirms that thought is a *property of matter*, we will assent if he will change a term and say, *thought is a property or motion of sub-*

stance. For God is a personal *substance*; and so is *spirit* or *mind*. And so we agree that thought is the motion or action of conscious mind or spirit.

5. Has any physiologist, any embryologist, any morphologist, explained the minute molecular causations why the fœtus in the human womb does not assume the shape of a lizard or tadpole? Do any of the laws of chemistry or natural philosophy constitute, singly or collectively, a *plastic power* by which we can see how the specific human form is molded? We know that soul (of the parent) is a previous condition; and on the principle that the fœtus, patterned to a plan, is truly "mind-molded," we may assume that *the soul* of the fœtus really and truly shapes the body. Mind is prior to matter, and body is soul-shaped and soul-pervaded.

6. If mind or spirit is prior to matter and source of causation, mind is capable of impact and impulse upon matter. This we see demonstrated in the action of the will-power upon body and upon external objects. And mind is consciously susceptible to impact from matter, as is demonstrated from the phenomenon of sensation. Isaac Taylor calls corporeity "an amalgam of mind and matter;" and by that amalgam man is the contact point, the mediation, between the world of matter and the world of spirit. By this means thought appreciates a blow upon the body. So that conscious soul stands in correlation with both antecedent and subsequent material conditions.

7. But the great point with our physicists is, that thought is now demonstrated to be one of the six convertibles of force or motion. *Thought is a mode of motion*. How, then, can there be an immortal soul? We reply: Thought is the motion of conscious spirit; of spirit capable of receiving impulse from, and com-

municating impulse to, matter in correlation with it. But *the soul is, perhaps, immortal only in the conditions of immortality*; and eternally capable of spiritual motion or thought only *in the conditions of thought*. We have no proof that, separate from body, spirit may not be eternally placed by God in the *conditions* of life and thought-motion. We have abundant proof that it is so placed.

Like Maudesley and Louis Büchner, Professor Draper reprobates the exaltation of mind over matter. It is dismal to see their stale scraps reproduced to us as—*science!* They are simply a *nescience*, fabricated in the interests of Atheism. Can Dr. Draper tell us of what value matter is, tried by any conceivable standard, except as it is subservient to mind? If a mass of matter contributed in no respect whatever, mediate or immediate, to the welfare or pleasure of a sentient being, might it not just as well be so much pure space? If immensity of space were completely filled with matter, with not a spark of mind existent, would this infinity of matter possess any superiority over an infinity of pure space? If in that immensity of matter there existed one intelligent being, capable of happiness and misery, would not that entire mass be valuable or worthless as it contributed to his happiness? To all this there can be but one reasonable reply; and that reply declares that this doctrine of Büchner, Maudesley, and Draper is unentitled to any man's moral or intellectual respect.

The Design Argument.

Professor Hicks, in his *A Critique of Design Arguments*, draws a separation in natural theology between the argument from *Order* and the argument from *Design*, leaving to the latter alone the term *Teleology*, and for the former coining the new and euphonious term

Eutaxiology. His main position is that *order* is a mark of *intelligence*, proved to be such by induction, distinctly and independently of all thought of purpose or *end*. The theistic argument, then, is properly divided into two great co-ordinate departments—eutaxiology and teleology. He then brings each leading author to the test of having clearly distinguished the *order* argument from the *end* argument.

Mr. John S. Mill remarks: "The evidence of design in creation can never amount to more than to the inferior kind of inductive evidence called analogy. Analogy agrees with induction in this—that they both argue that a thing known to resemble another in certain circumstances (call those circumstances A and B) will resemble it in another circumstance (call it C). But the difference is, that in induction A and B are known, by a previous comparison of many instances, to be the very circumstances on which C depends, or with which it is in some way connected."

We may reply to Mr. Mill's remark, that our knowledge of any "design" whatever in the universe, outside our individual *consciousness*, is derived through this same *analogy*. I know "design" in my own mind by direct introverted perception; I know "design" in any other being, finite or infinite, only by *inference*. If I could walk into any other being's consciousness, whether human or divine, I could then and there directly know *design*. But the real fact is, that while I see moving organisms around me, performing certain actions and emitting certain sounds, it is only by analogy drawn from my own mind that I can guess that back of such actions and sounds there actually is a mind, and that those complex phenomena are the result of "design." And so it will be found that a large share of this writer's argument would prove for me

that there is no other "design," finite or infinite, except in the consciousness of my own individual I. In other words, the same sort of argument which proves human design proves divine design.

To Paley's argument of design from the instance of the watch, Hume replied in effect that we have seen a watch-maker make a watch, but never saw a world-maker make a world. But, in truth, no one ever saw the real watch-maker more than the world-maker. When we see a watch being made we only see one organism of matter moving under contact of another organism. But what really directs the latter organism in the modifications of its contact upon the former so as to design and form the watch we never saw. From our knowledge of our own minds we infer that back of both organisms there is a designing mind, and we have no conception how the watch can be so made without such designing mind. And so back of the world-making, we infer from our own minds that there is a designing mind, and we have no conception how the world can be made without such mind. It is a *problem* to be solved: *How can a systematic cosmos be formed?* The only solution human thought can furnish is: *By a designing will.* Paley's argument from the watch has been abundantly replied to, but never refuted.

If the human frame with all its adaptations to a determinate end proves no plan, and no mind designing a plan, let us ask, then, what would prove such mind? If the foot was not made to walk with, the hand to manipulate with, the eye to see with, then what proof would demonstrate a purpose in Nature? If it were written in stupendous capitals upon the firmament, THERE IS A SUPREME CREATING GOD, that would prove nothing; for it is just as clear that the marks forming those letters might unite to form those words without design

as it is that the parts of the human frame might unite without design to form a man. If an angel, with a form towering to the skies, should stand on the earth at noonday clothed in glory, and with a voice louder than thunder, yet sweeter than the music of the spheres, should proclaim in the ear of all the inhabitants of the earth, *There is a God*, that would prove nothing; for all those visibilities and audibilities might just as easily combine without any significance or anterior purpose as a human eye could come into existence undesigned. In fine, the man who is not convinced by his own structure as a man, that there is a God, would not be convinced by any possible proof.

If any person chooses to take the worst aspect of things, and hold it as the only aspect, there is such an aspect to be taken. The world may truly and scientifically be viewed as a great mud-ball, alternately baked and frozen, with various consistencies and shapes and hues of mud. And, then, all we animals, such as mammoths, sharks, men, tadpoles, and cats, are so many mud-specks in a highly stimulated state. And then, all such transcendental ideas as religion—sanctity, sacredness, honor—are simply gotten up as conveniences and expediences, having no valid connection with any thing above the mud. And as life is a mere stimulation of the mud-speck, so death is a mere subsidence of the little mud-speck into the big mud-ball. If this is the whole significance of things, then truth, justice, virtue, purity, are phantasms. Even science is nothing more than a specially correct daguerreotype of the composition of the mud-ball upon the stimulated surface or sensorium of the mud-speck. We say, if that is the exhaustive solution of the problem, then the problem is not worth solution. All pretenses of building a moral system or a law of honor on such a base are sham.

Right is expediency. Lie is as holy as truth. And the age that embraces the atheistic hypothesis will surely so conclude, and will seek in brutal sensuality the only solace of a base and brief existence.

The Doctrine of Design versus the Doctrine of Conditions.

An essay by Martins on *Organic Unity in Vegetables and Animals* contains the following: "De Candolle said in his lectures, 'Birds fly *because* they have wings; but a true naturalist would never say, 'Birds have wings in order to fly.'" The distinction seems puerile; it is really profound. In fact, the ostrich has wings which can never sustain him in the air, but which quicken his speed; those of the casoer and the apterix of New Zealand are so little developed that they serve absolutely no purpose. These facts are the condemnation of final causes." From the fact that certain phenomena appear in nature, which plainly serve no purpose of utility, it is inferred that there is no *design* in creation at all; that things are *used* because there are antecedent favorable conditions for *use*; but that *use* is not the *end* or *purpose* for which any thing exists. "So the true naturalist will say that birds fly *because* they have wings, but never birds have wings *in order* that they may fly." The result exists because of the conditions, never the conditions *in order* to the result. Thus universally the doctrine of conditions supplants and abolishes the doctrine of design. It is not clear from Martins's quotation whether De Candolle intended to limit all reasoners by his maxim, or naturalists, as such, only. If the latter, he was only stating the boundaries of natural science. It may indeed be true that such is the only maxim for the naturalist; but that does not settle the question whether the thinker of a wider range may not accept both propositions, and say,

“Not only do birds fly *because* they have wings, but they have wings *in order* that they may fly.”

Our naturalist affords us in this essay a beautiful view of the structural system of living nature. One thing strikes us on a comprehensive glance at its whole. The principle of that system's plan, namely, the blending of *uniformity and variety*, is a *contingent*, not a *necessary* principle. It is not a system of organic *necessity*, originating like the steps of a geometric demonstration, solely possible, self-existent, and rising with a structure, in which every successive step results from the preceding. A system of uniformities with *ad libitum* variations is a system of a *selective* character, picked out of countless other supposably possible systems, formed with an outline and a coherent intellective plan, of which the principles are intellectively detected, and are found to be perfectly in accordance with the laws of volitional thought. The only solution of their *origin*, then, since blind causational necessity is out of the question, is *intelligent choice* ; and intelligent choice, present at and anterior to the selection of the plan, and comprehending the whole, basing it on its actual principles.

What are those principles? The naturalist tells us in this article. They are “uniformity in type and variety in modification.” This is the fundamental law, and the whole system of nature is its fulfillment. But what is the law for? It is for the purpose of regulating the actions of every part of the system, so as to produce its whole. What are the actions of its parts and particles for? To so obey the law as to complete its organic plan. What is the synthesis of law and actions for? To produce the entire system. The very selection of the system, of its laws, and of the action of the elements according to its laws, is inexplicable without the supposition of *design*. So far, then, from furnishing a

refutation of the law of design thus far, the whole scheme of the naturalist seems obliged to illustrate its existence.

But how are these laws by us discovered? By observing the facts. But does not the same observation find out that the *subserviences to use* are quite as numerous as the "varieties in modification?" Are there not infinite multiplicities of curious, wonderful, and use-serving action and operation *attained at least by the way?* The naturalist will tell us that he had nothing to do with these. We reply, then he had nothing to do with, and no right to say any thing about, the existence, or non-existence of the doctrine of ends. If *he* has nothing to do with this, others may belong to a broader and higher school; and over-passing his limits, they may say that *we* have something to do with them. They may claim to find *uniformity in type, variety in modification, and both subservient to infinite varieties of use.*

This subserviency to *use* is no more to be destroyed by the existence of arrangements made to secure other principles, namely, the law sometimes of uniformity, sometimes of variety, than the fact of variety and uniformity is destroyed by the myriads of subordinations to the law of use. The fact, at any rate, of subserviency to *use* is too universal and too overwhelming in amount, and too positive in its character and in its artistic complicated and converging combinations, to be possibly mistaken without a most perverse and inveterate purpose to be mistaken. But in the light of the remarks thus far made, let us survey the exceptions to the law of *use* by which Martins and De Candolle would overthrow its existence.

That the useless nipple is given to man on the law of *uniformity* does not in the least contradict the fact

that the breast is given to the woman for *use*, namely, for the purpose of nourishment ; a purpose without which the race cannot be preserved ; a purpose demonstrated by its pervading character for the female of a large genus of beings, for which it is necessary as a means of generic existence. That the useless wings of the apterix preserve the law of uniformity does not disprove that those of the eagle and the lark preserve the law of use. That the ox hooes because he has horns nobody denies ; but the fact that there are animals not so well provided does not in the least disprove the purpose of fulfilling the law of variety by making the ox an aggressive and self-defensive animal. There may be a variety of variations from the law of use without destroying that law, as well as from the law of uniformity of type without destroying that law. Each law may take its turn, and with due "variety" blend, even in the same case.

There is in this matter a question which both these reasoners overlook. The true question is not, "Why do birds fly?" but, How came this complicated, converging, and most exquisite adjustment of conditions by which birds are able to fly? Nor does Mr. Darwin's "natural selection" at all aid us here ; for the question still recurs, How came this most complex and yet most complete intellectual system, in which "natural selection" has its chances of effective work? "Natural selection" operates with wonderful success ; but it must possess as truly wonderful a synthesis of principles, a frame-work and system within which to work, as genius ever invented or art constructed. What is the solution to this so complicated yet so complete and structural a system?

It is a plain first principle of all reasoning that *an immediate and ample solution of a problem should not be rejected in behalf of a more distant and less ample one;*

still less *for no other whatever*. Of this complicated system we have a complete and ample solution, if it may but be even for a moment tried. The supposition, namely, of an anterior Intellect conceiving the plan, with an executive Will adequate to its execution, does furnish all the conditions necessary for the solution of this question ; and there is not only no better, but there is positively no other whatever. And we might leave it for matter of reflection whether it is not intuitively certain that *Mind* such as, or at least analogous to, the *mind* which we are conscious ourselves of possessing, must not be the cause of plans, of a nature, so purely rational.

Take, for instance, the human tongue, viewed as the organ of speech, and consider what an infinite number of adjustments of the most complex character must precede, in order to its being an articulate organ. And still farther back, consider its connection with the anterior physical frame of man ; then its adjustment to the ear not merely of the individual, but of all other individuals ; requiring another system to match of exquisite adjustments in the ear itself. Then consider the relation of both with sound ; and of sound with thought, in order to its adaptation to be the medium of communicating that thought from mind to mind. Escape if you can, without an abdication of common sense, the perceiving that the ear and the tongue are predictive of human intercourse, society, and a social system. Is it not most plain to every man's reason that all this can have no antecedent solution but the presupposition of an anterior potential Mind, a mind which understands mind, which designs design, which anticipates facts, society, history, and makes the most wonderful provision for such results ? The man who comprehends all these innumerable and infinitesimal requisite complications, and then says, "*Men talk because they have lungs,*

throat, tongues, vocality, ears, and minds, all adjusted harmoniously and converging to this result," and refuses to admit that "these conditions are *designedly* combined *in order* that speech and the social system may exist," disuses his honest common-sense.

We said that living nature is not like a geometric problem of Euclid, whose origin is in necessity, and whose every step follows in the whole structure with an intrinsic adamantine necessity. We will now say that it is like a parable of the divine Lord of nature and teacher from its phenomena—the blessed Jesus. These parables consist of a main outline *designed* for practical illustration, with voluntary finishings designed to complete the narrative or form a natural and touching picture. Who would be such a fool as to say, "This parable has no meaning; for look at that additional and useless detail, which has no practical or illustrative application!" We would tell him that *use* is sometimes attained by the addition of something *useless*—useless, that is, in the sense of not serving the immediate purpose, but more useful in the end just because it postpones the use. So the very law of *uniformity in variety* is not only an intelligential law, but it is a law of *use*; and the whole system with its laws merges into *a system of use*. And thereupon the human mind will ever be impelled and authorized by its own imperative nature to ask of the whole the old question, "What is the end of God in creation?"

Naturalists are doubtless great men, and many of them are good men. It is due, we believe, to the scientific men of our country to say that the great body of them take ground against skepticism. American science is not irreligious. But naturalists are not lords of all discussion. And it is very arrogant for them first to exclude every consideration which does not belong to

their department, and then to issue a ukase to which every other department of the world of thought is expected to bow, requiring all to stop at their terminal point. It is very stupid for them to draw conclusions which may be good for them, but when broader considerations are adduced modifying the universality of their conclusions, to answer, "That does not belong to my department." The exclusive naturalist may never go beyond "birds fly because they have wings." The *philosopher* will say, "Birds fly because they have wings, AND they have wings in order that they may fly."

Design Shown in the Primordial Properties of Matter.

The Atheism of the present day, assuming the eternity of the properties and laws of matter, claims that all the phenomena of our cosmos are explained without the need of an antecedent mind. Professor Cooke, in his *Religion and Chemistry*, shows that it is in the very sum total of these properties and laws that we must recognize plan; the existence of which can be solved by nothing but antecedent mind. And this touches upon the peculiar skeptical effect of the exclusive pursuit of natural science upon the scientific intellect. The scientist's task is to make his deductions solely from premises within the bounds of physical nature. All thought of supernatural interposition is to be excluded. Nay, the assumption of supernatural causation has so often led astray from true natural causation that he has often grown impatient of the thought of a supernatural, and even of a God. Now Professor Cooke's view well works a remedy for this impatience. It finds plan, design, mind, in the *primordial endowing of matter with its laws and properties*, and thus secures the existence of primordial mind and yet leaves the scientist full range for his unobstructed deduction of nat-

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ural phenomena from natural causations. This by no means excludes the recognition of a design in the infinitely varied special adaptations in every part of nature, but rather elucidates and confirms them. When we recognize design in the primordial we will readily see that all the specialties are provided for, and we have a grand view of *the whole* as a sublime unit. So that when we are sarcastically asked, Is india-rubber made for us to rub out pencil marks? Are lamp-black and oil purposely endowed in order to make printer's ink? we reply very promptly, Yes. Divine prescience foreknows the minutest needs of free agents, and divine predestination adjusts the properties of nature by a plan which (as Pope says)

" Binding nature fast in fate
Lets free the human will "

Mathematical Law and Design.

Arithmetic and the higher *mathesis* have heretofore been generally supposed to have no relation to theology. But Dr. Hill (*Geometry and Faith*), ranging through the higher walks of thought, discloses applications in nature of mathematical doctrine, which truly demonstrate the maxim of Plato, that "God geometrizes." The omnipotent Creator was an omniscient mathematician.

So far as the logical sequences of mathematics are intrinsically necessary, they afford no theistic arguments; but it is in bringing things under the control of mathematical law that will and design reveal themselves. Among the varied exhibitions of this designed subjection of nature to mathematical law (we have space for but one) are the phenomena of *Phyllotaxis*, or the position of leaves on a tree. The problem being, so to expose the leaves as to secure the best growth, science has found that they are ranged in a mathematical

order which secures the result; the principle of which was not discovered by mortals until A. D. 1845. Now, three things are here to be noted: first, that a result was evidently aimed at, showing *design*; second, deep mathematical principles were used, showing the profound *intelligence* from which the design issued; third, the arbitrarily selecting and imposing upon the system of leaves this mathematical *plan*, evincing intelligent *will*. The exhibition of these three things through all nature evinces the unity of the designing mind. But here comes a catch. The obedience of the phyllotaxis is not always exact. The law is often transgressed. Does not this refute the theistic argument? Quite the reverse. The *mathesis* is so uniform as to demonstrate that it was fully understood, yet so dispensed with as to show that it could have been rejected, and so was voluntarily adopted. And here opens a grand solution of the inexactnesses, the loosenesses, the evils in the world, all which, unquestionably, for some reason exist, but do not disprove that it is a mind-governed world.

Nature of Space and Infinity.

Martineau, the brilliant defender of theism in England, has made the unfortunate concession to the *scientists* (rather than to any real *science*) that *matter*, as well as *time* and *space*, is increate and eternal. Dr. Cocker, in a former volume, admitted the uncreatability and eternity of time and space; but in view of Martineau's unnecessary concession, he reverses the whole case, and affirms there is nothing increate but God, and time and space are by him caused. Our own view is that space is *vacuity*, absence of all occupant; that it is as truly extended as matter; is optically divisible into parts by imagined lines or walls, but is essentially indivisible and infinite. And as being vacuity and true

nonentity, that is, *nothing*, it is not the subject of creation, and is the limitless back-condition of all occupancy by existence. It is that anterior inexistence which is logically necessary to all existence.

Dr. Cocker amply affirms, in his *The Theistic Conception of the World*, that between two objects, at a distance from each other, with no object intervening, there is "pure empty space;" which he affirms is identical with nothing. Hence we have the equation space= nothing. From this starting-point let us take a glass pump, so perfect that it can be absolutely exhausted of every thing, leaving nothing but empty space=nothing. Now this space=nothing has extension as really as so much water; for it does extend from wall to wall, and from roof to floor, of the glass receiver. If Dr. Cocker here should arrest us and say, "Nonsense, how can non-entity have extension?" we reply, We cannot tell, dear doctor, but you see that it has extension with your own eyes. And you yourself, on page 216, admit the possibility of ninety-two million miles of pure space= nothing. And if there may be ninety-two miles of space=nothing, then there may be half or quarter of that length; so that space, vacuity, nihility, nothingness, is divisible, measurable, and made up of parts. Now we may say that this extent of space within the walls of the receiver is a portion or part of general space, divided by the walls from the outside space; and in that sense we may say that space is "divisible." Or we may say that you cannot cut a piece of space, as an ice-man cuts a cubic piece of ice from a large mass of ice, and remove it; and in that sense space is "indivisible." And this seems to solve that contradiction committed by writers who affirm alternately, that space is "divisible" and "indivisible." If now you smash your glass receiver at a blow, you will remove the optical

division between the interior and exterior space—nothing. And if you in thought remove all limitations, you get, in necessary thought, unlimited space—nothing; that is, you get immensity of space—nothing, in which saying we do not “confound immensity with space.” And this immensity of space—nothing is to us the anterior condition—thought, the absolute precedent to all positive existence. To say that it is “caused,” or made or created, as other philosophers affirm, is as absurd to our thought as the idea of its being annihilated is to Dr. Cocker.

A philosophy like Kant's and Lotze's, that denies the reality of *space*, a reality that is, which is valid, whether there exists mind or not, does to our view lie in a hopeless *reductio ad absurdum*. We hold that any philosophy that abuts against the objective reality of space is at once demolished. Kant and Lotze hold space to be created by mind; and Kant maintains that it is simply a mind-formed *condition* of sensible objects. “We cannot,” he says, “perceive or conceive an object but in space.” What authority, then, have we for believing the reality of the object any more than the reality of space? They are both equally authenticated by the same affirming mind. We do *see* space. I see the space around my table just as clearly and certainly as I see the table itself. I see the space in an empty pail just as truly as I see the water that anon fills it. And so far as my perceptions are concerned, space is as genuine an object of perception as the water or the pail. And yet you recognize that the space in the empty pail is vacuity, a pure absence of positive existence, a room for occupancy. That visible, *real*, actual emptiness—perhaps a painful *reality*—you call indifferently *space* or *nothing*. So that space—nothing. In the pail you see a circular nothing six inches in diameter and

one foot deep. It is a spacial cylinder, just as real as any iron cylinder. And so space—nonentity—vacuity—nothing is extended, measured, and shaped, just as truly as matter. But it is not movable and literally divisible like matter. Annihilate the pail and you at once see that the division and limitation were imaginary. Matter may be cut in two and the parts removed, but not space. Matter may be viewed as transient, vanishing, and non-existent, but not space. Matter we may view as created and then annihilated, but space is uncreatable and unannihilable. For how can nothing be created? How can extended vacuity, absence of all positive existence, be generated, destroyed, or dependent for its reality on any thing finite or infinite? John Stuart Mill defines matter as “the permanent possibility of a sensation.” We might define space as *the permanent possibility of an occupancy*. We know that it is limitless; for, assume any limit, and space is beyond it. And so immensity of space and eternity of time are among the most primitive, indestructible, and certain of all thoughts. And when we see our stalwart philosophers so bravely take immensity of space and twist and tie it into a knot, as a western hunter crumples a piece of brown paper into a wad; and when they thrust immensity of space into their twistified theories, as the hunter rams the wad into his musket, we are overwhelmed with admiration at the dexterity of their manipulations.

And what shall be said of Kant’s famous battle of the Antinomies? In order to show that, when we get up into the supersensible regions, we are involved in contradictions that warn us down, he takes four sets of supersensible propositions and opposes them like contradictory batteries against each other. It is the battle between the phenomena and the noumena, in which

they with great precision annihilate each other, and thereby settle their feud. His first antinomy seems to be based on the ambiguity of a term. If there be a word in language expressive of a transcendent reality, in which all mind agrees, it is ETERNITY. Yet this word, we are instructed, contradicts itself. There is an eternity of the past which has terminus at the present moment; so that we have an infinite chopped off at one end! Then there is a future eternity; so that we have an infinite clipped at the other end! And when both are tied together we have an absolute Infinity. Now, if we will not be governed and cheated by words, we may see that there is here no contradiction in the conception. A geometrician finds it perfectly legitimate to say, "Let this line A B be produced from B to infinity;" that is, without a further end. And that is a perfectly legitimate conception—a line with a beginning and no ending. And in our thinking of that line two valid conceptions arise. We may either think the line ever approaching yet never reaching infinity, in which the element of time and motion is blended with linear form; or we may view the line as now infinitely complete, an endless line. And so man's immortality embraces the conception of a commencement and continuance without end. We speak of a monument to be raised and to stand forever. Men have generally believed in a creation never to be annihilated. So, also, there may be conceived a line with no beginning, yet an end. Applied to time, we might call one *præ-eternity* and the other *post-eternity*, and both valid conceptions. And then, if we call the *whole* eternity, we may see that there are three harmonious valid conceptions distinguished by their three names, and all without contradiction. The other antinomies of Kant are, we think, no more valid.

The Infinity of a Being does not Exclude Personality or Intelligence.

The agnostic philosophers of the present day, as Herbert Spencer, affirm that the human mind cannot attribute *intelligence, personality*, to an *infinite Being*. The two ideas, personality and infinity, are so incompatible that thought cannot combine them in unity. Now, we would like to see that affirmation brought to a closer issue and a manly repudiation. It is a question of psychological *fact*, to be decided by consciousness, and to our own consciousness is the appeal to be made. When, then, for instance, Mr. Spencer tells us that *he* cannot combine the two thoughts in the same subject, we, of course, in courtesy concede him the mental impotence he claims. But when he grows aggressive, and tells me that I cannot, I am entitled to reply that I know by the conclusive evidence of consciousness that affirmation to be a falsity. I can, without the slightest mental difficulty, think the conception of an infinite, perfectly powerful, and perfectly wise, ONE. I can think it much more perfectly than I can most finites ; as, for instance, such a finite being as Mr. Spencer himself, especially such a Spencer as he here presents himself, a man of great intellect who cannot conceive of an intelligent Omnipotent. Such a divine conception we psychologically possessed for many years before we ever thought out this eminent philosopher ; and we cannot now be persuaded that our mind is truly vacant of that composite idea. And, next, having answered for ourselves individually, we hesitate not to appeal to our readers or our hearers for the testimony of their consciousness. Can you not conceive the unity of an infinite Being, perfectly potent and perfectly sapient, just as easily as you can conceive an ocean extending from pole to pole,

or a luminiferous ether bathing the worlds in light, or a gravitation holding the spheres in harmonious roll? And, then, extending the range of our interrogation, we ask the Christendom of eighteen centuries: Have you the conception of an infinite, all-wise, omnipotent God? We put the question to an older Judaism and to a younger Mohammedanism, and from this whole wide jury of the human intellect we know what responsive verdict we obtain. It is, then, too late in the day for our accomplished philosopher to tell us that an all-wise Omnipotence is "unthinkable" by the human mind. The statement is historically a falsehood, philosophically a "pseud-idea."

In his chapter on *Personality and the Infinite* the professor aims to connect and endow the Deity, thus far evinced by the design argument, with absolute infinity. This aim is, we think, rather in the interest of metaphysics than of religion. Practically we need trouble our faith with the question, whether the God whose wisdom reigns through the known universe is metaphysically infinite, as little as the astronomer troubles himself with the question whether gravitation extends its lines to a metaphysically infinite length. Nor do we see that Professor Diman attains a metaphysical certainty on that point. The most that we can say is, that if these metaphysical attributes have a true validity and belong to some being, there is no other known candidate for that crown than the Deity of the design argument. The nomination of any other aspirant is illegitimate.

Who made God?

We have never been able to understand why theologians have averred that the existence of a Supreme Deity could not be discovered by the reason of man. It seems to us an appalling concession to Atheism. The

steps by which the discovery is supposably attained are short, few, and obvious. The child asks, Who made me? Who made every thing? Who made the world? And the child can understand the mother's answer. The positive elements of natural theology are often learned in five minutes at five years of age. Compare this simple process with the discoveries in geometry, made beyond all doubt by natural human reason. Think of the numerous recondite steps to be taken by a matured mind before attaining the mastery of the forty-seventh of Euclid's First Book. The ignorance of the savage tribes of the earth of the existence of a God, admitting the fact, no more proves his existence undiscoverable by the human mind, than it proves that unaided man could not produce a school arithmetic.

The Spiritual Monotheism of the Old Testament.

A Westminster reviewer's truthfulness is illustrated by the following passage: "For the sons of Zebedee, as for the Psalmist of an age long past, the earth was a flat plane of very moderate compass, with a solid heaven separating the waters above the firmament from the waters beneath it, while in this concave vault of crystal the sun and moon moved from one side to the other, and in it the stars were fixed like jewels on the diadem of a king. . . . On the solid heaven sat the Great Lord of all, and bowing his throne touched the mountains and made them smoke."

This is in keeping with the coarse, old-fashioned infidelity, before the art was learned, so skillfully practiced by the politer skepticism of the present day, of eulogizing Jesus to death as Judas kissed him unto death. We used to see a picture of "Jehovah the Jewish idol," made up of an engraved combination of all the anthropomorphic phrases found in Hebrew poetry, forming,

of course, an image as incongruous as the monster with which Horace opens his *De arte poetica*. Yet the man wants sense or candor who will deny that the maintenance of a pure spiritual supreme monotheism was the conscious mission of the Old Testament. "In the beginning God," is its very first announcement; God, the creator of the heavens and the earth. This God had no form, but was symbolized to Israel by the cloudy, fiery pillar. No similitude of him appeared at Mount Sinai, and so the decalogue forbids all shaping of images. No shape appeared upon the ark of the covenant in the most holy. When the temple was built God's presence appeared only in luminous clouds; Solomon declared that "the heaven of heavens could not contain" him; and when Pompey, after conquering Jerusalem, went behind the veil to examine the statuary, he found with amazement—nothing. How far absolute metaphysical immensity of space and absolute divine omnipresence were distinctly conceived by the ancient mind, is not the present question. Just so far, at any rate, as a universe was conceived, a spiritual deity was conceived, amply competent to embrace, pervade, and control it. Such was the literal theologic and philosophic view taken by the Old Testament mind; and yet in full consistency with this it freely dealt with anthropomorphic phrases and conceptions, just as the most ideal of Berkleyan philosophers, who deny all external existences, have no difficulty of talking as staidly about "hard matter" and "solid granite" as the most dogmatical realist.

Pantheism.

The Moses of the late great pantheistic dispensation was that wonderful Jew, Baruch Spinoza. When the slumbers of Europe, under the opiates of tradition and

authority, were first breaking in the seventeenth century, one of the earliest wakers and awakeners of others was Descartes. The clear eye of Descartes plainly saw that truth and falsehood were terribly mixed in the public beliefs, and that a separation was an absolute necessity. His instrument for working this separation was this postulate: *Reject every thing as false of which a doubt can be entertained, and what you will have left will be pure certainty.* He then began, in his own mind, with a clean slate, first blanking his mind of every belief, and then admitting every belief, one by one, bearing the certificate of absolute indubitability. His first step was to argue his own existence from his own consciousness—*I think, therefore I am.* At this very first step, however, Baruch arrests him under the authority of his postulate, and says, Consciousness only gives the *think*, but does not give any *I*. We are thus forever shut up into consciousness; all things exist only in mind. Sensations, perceptions, by which outside things were heretofore supposed to be known, are only modifications of mind, and of any thing outside of mind we can know nothing. The outer world, God, all, alike exist only in the *ego*. Transition is then made to the assumption—we say not how logically—that the All is one great *Ego*, of which my consciousness is but a little phenomenon; and all consciousnesses are

Diverse like the billows, but one like the sea.

One would think, however, that the true result would be for my consciousness to assert its own single and sole existence. If what we call God and nature exist not at all externally, but as modifications of my mind, how is it that man or men, outside of myself, with their imagined consciousness, have any real external existence? Every other man's consciousness is but a modification

of my consciousness, and so has no real existence. The logic that thus destroys the personal existence of God destroys the personal existence of every individual man—but myself.

The history of pantheistic thought from Spinoza, interrupted by the sense-systems of Locke, exaggerated by the sensualism of Condillac, reappeared as an exaggeration of Kantianism by Fichte and Schelling, next, in its esthetic form by Goethe, and its hero-worshipping spasms in Carlyle, and last, its self-idolatry in Emerson. Its abolition of the true God, and substitution of a spontaneous Nature in his stead, are a main source of our present moral enervation and the prevalence of sensuality and violence. That natural spontaneity legitimizes every impulse, consecrates every lust, and authorizes every crime as the true acting out of the divinity of nature. Away with the obsolete distinctions of right and wrong, abolish law, let nature unfold herself in her true freedom. Free love, free religion, free appropriation of all available funds, and free use of the pistol and the dagger are the practical outflow of this godless philosophy. This base prostitution of the word *free* is precipitating us into anarchy—the too-sure prelude to subsequent despotism. It is Christianity alone, with her God of holiness, in, yet above nature, her stern moral law vindicated by the sanctions of eternal retribution, and her great renovating agencies, which stands as the only hope of the age.

Pantheism is the identification of God with nature. There is no deity but cosmos. Of that infinite One every *thing* is a part and every *event* is an unfolding. As well the chair on which you sit, and the knife wherewith you sharpen your pencil, are God, as the stars by night or the sun by day. It is not simply that God is in these; for that is simply affirming the omnipresent

efficiency of God: it means that he is these. When Pope affirms that God

" Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,
Glow in the stars, and blossoms in the trees,"

we have a beautiful expression of an omnipresent omnipotence. But when Emerson says,

" He is the axis of the star,
He is the sparkle of the spar,"

the true pantheistic fetichism is naked before us. We thence know that not only the "axis of the star," but the axle-tree of a butcher's cart, and the blade of a boy's jack-knife, are all Emerson's *god*. If then real worship is to be performed, the African's "mumbo-jumbo" is its true object.

Now Theism, "the popular theism," the theism of the Bible and of the great body of Christian thought, teaches the omnipresence and the perfect immanence of God—God "all in all." It does believe that God is also "outside" of matter; for as matter is finite and God infinite, God does stretch infinitely beyond the limits of matter, as the ocean stretches immensely beyond the little islet it embosoms. What truth or propriety is there in Dr. Hedge's denying that our Theism teaches the all-pervading, indwelling presence of God in nature? Pantheism teaches, as Theism does, not only God's immanence in matter, but it teaches, as Theism does not, God's *identity with matter*. Largely the *God of Pantheism is made up of oxygen gas*. The difference between Theism and Pantheism is this: Theism teaches the immanence of God in matter and the immanence of matter in God, yet the infinite distinctness in essence between matter and God, and the infinite omnipresence of God "without" and beyond the limits of matter. Pantheism teaches the identity of substance, both bod-

ily and spiritual, of God with that of every finite object, whether inanimate, as a rock, or animate, as a cat. We agree with Max Müller that the primitive creed was Theism. Hence men first apostatized, as in Egypt, to Pantheism, and thence, by strict logical sequence, to fetichism. Rigidly and rightly inferring from her premises that every animal was a manifestation and a part of God, Egypt believed that the animal is to be worshiped. Certainly it is absolutely impossible for a Pantheist to worship his entire God without *including* in that worship swamps, rocks, cats, dogs, crocodiles, murderers, and prostitutes. Corporeally and spiritually the prostitute is the Pantheist's god. And it is by this route that the great share of licentious idolatry in Egypt, Babylon, and various parts of the world was attained. Against all these logical and historical results Christianity protests; and by her pure Theism she is able to maintain that sublime ideal of absolute holiness which every other religion obscuring lets the human race down into sin and death. Maintaining the infinite distinctness of God from matter, she separates God from all community with the sins of the flesh; maintaining the distinctness of God from the finite free-agent, she separates him from all the sins of the spirit and the will. She enthrones him as the omnipresent God, the absolutely holy God, before whom can be no allowance for sin.

Buddhism.

Are the Buddhists atheists? A startling fact, if a fact. For the Buddhists are the most numerous sect of religionists in the world; and if they are atheists, the reality of an atheistical religion presents itself as a concrete fact. But, in truth, Buddhism abounds in "gods many and lords many." Buddha or Gotama

himself is not only a man, but a god of most stupendous attributes, far above the Greek Jupiter, through a marvelous apotheosis. The assertion that all tribes believe in gods, and so are not atheistic, does not mean that they believe in the true God of Christian Theism ; but that they hold to supernatural beings, to whom they stand in definite relations. Both the Buddhist and the Greek polytheism seem to imply the probable cessation of the existence of their pantheon in some far future age ; and for successional gods after that cessation no provision had been thought out. Yet free room was left for the provision when the time comes, so that even here there is no real atheism. But does not Buddhism affirm the doctrine of final annihilation, and, indeed, the utmost desirableness of annihilation ? And does not such a doctrine upset all our claims of men's intuitive thirst for and hope of immortality ? It cannot be doubted that the eloquent Gotama in his day taught that existence is an evil, and that the highest desirable attainment is to be released from it by utter nothingness. And, strange to say, he prescribed, as condition of this attainment, the most absolute saintly purity of life and character. All human things are illusion ; are lie, cheat, and misery. Withdraw all desire for, or attachment to, them. Live out of, pure from, and above, all existing things ; and the reward shall be that you will sink into quietude and finally fade into nothingness. Such are the contradictions of our nature. Paul preached the consummation of well-doing to be glory, honor, immortality, and eternal life ; Buddha preached it to be the bottomless pit of non-existence ! What is the solution of this strange antithesis ? We answer, we suppose that Buddha unaccountably overlooked the truth that misery does not consist in *existence* purely, but in the wretched conditions of our present existence. He did not

entertain the conception that existence might be the basis of a blessedness and a glory well worthy of our highest desire. Paul freely admitted the illusiveness and misery of our existence. Very often in terms sounding very like (with a difference) a strain from India, he paints the woe of the groaning creation subject to vanity. But, unlike Buddha, he limits the picture to our earthly present and points to a renovation. Gotama ascribed illusion to all existence, and put his followers in the mental condition of the suicide who hopes to plunge through death into nothingness. This proves not that the love of life and immortality are not instinctive, but that our instinctive feelings may be overcome by counter mental forces. They are not extinguished, but overwhelmed. And this truth is illustrated by the fact that popular Buddhism stops just a little short of annihilationism, and is delightfully contented with a sweet repose—a soft long *nap*—just on its brink. Pure annihilationism is a high Buddhist ultraism. It reminds us of the sublime Calvinistic ultraism of Dr. Hopkins, who taught that justifying faith included a willingness to be damned to hell forever for the glory of God. This was a grand contradiction to our inborn instincts. But then it was this very *willingness* that saved from the dire result. The convicted sinner would then be *willing* just because he was *unwilling*—a very pretty kink. Thus do instincts elude and conquer dogmas. But the atheist and materialist cannot safely quote Buddhism in dispute of the great truth that man is truly a supernaturalistic being, predisposed to the hope of immortality.

ANTHROPOLOGY.

Difference between Physical Force and Formative Life-power.

DR. GULL maintains that life, or the thought-power, is but one of the forms of force, convertible with heat, electricity, motion, etc. Dr. Beale's replies are mainly two. First, experiment has never been able to transform force into life; and, second, the properties of force and life are so different that the entities cannot be identified.

The following is his decision as to the experimental proof: "Notwithstanding all that has been asserted to the contrary, *not one vital action has yet been accounted for by physics and chemistry.* The assertion that life is correlated force rests upon assertion alone, and we are just as far from an explanation of vital phenomena by force hypotheses as we were before the discovery of the doctrine of the correlation of the physical forces. In short, this most important discovery in physics does not affect the question of the nature of the phenomena peculiar to living beings."

On the difference between *Vital Power* and Force: "The relation between *vital power* and the ordinary forces of matter may not be more intimate than the relation between the man who makes a water-mill and the forces which raise the water that drives the wheel, or the materials of which the mill is constructed. And yet the water-mill could not have been made by the water, nor by the wood or iron which in part constitute the mill, nor by the mighty forces imprisoned in these materials. The man, not the forces of the matter or of the water, *constructs* the mill. Where, then, is the evidence that justifies Dr. Gull, and those whom he follows, in asserting that any *form or mode of ordinary*

force has constructive power? Force is mighty, force is powerful, and force may be *destructive*; but what evidence can be adduced in favor of the *constructive* agency of any mode of force? Can any or all the forms of force yet discovered *construct* an insignificant monad any more than they can make an umbrella or build a house? Dr. Gull neither notices the objections which have been raised to the view concerning the *forming, building, and constructing* powers of force, nor adduces one new fact or argument in its support."

Herbert Spencer builds his great structure of biology (or life-science) in order to show that the entire system of living beings has arisen by purely unguided, unintelligent natural forces; so that neither God nor planning mind was needed to evolve the wonderful result. His greatest difficulty, of course, is at the point where forms of life are molded into intellectual shapes. But the *crystal* is his grand transition stepping-stone. The crystal does form into symmetrical shapes, it grows; just as animal bodies form into symmetrical shapes, and grow. The difference is in the different degree of complexity. All this, however, fails to meet the case. The crystal forms to stiff mathematical shapes, such as unintelligent forces by mutual interaction may produce. They may be, like chemical compounds, the rigid results of rectilinear affinities and repulsions, requiring no contingent guidance. But life-forms are *intellectively varied*. They are varied in plans, and selected modes and models. What selective power distributes the particles of matter so as to form the beauty of a maiden's cheek, and the varied styles of beauty of a thousand different faces? These are molded, fashioned, esthetically and artistically planned, and no science has as yet made the first successful step toward showing how they can be

otherwise than mind-molded. Force, motion, electricity, can do nothing here.

One grand distinction of living beings is *heredity*. Every *species* is a secret society; and the secret by it possessed is its *vital formative power*, by which a given form of living being produces another form of living being of its own order. Crystals do not *beget* crystals; minerals are not *born* from minerals. And living beings are as unique in death as in birth. "The crystalline matter can be redissolved, and will crystallize again as many times as we like, but the monad matter cannot be redissolved and reformified, any more than a dog or a man can be dissolved and then produced again from the solution. Neither man, nor any living thing, nor any kind of living matter, can be dissolved, for that which *lives* is incapable of solution. It may be *killed*, and then some of the products resulting from its death may be dissolved, but this is a very different thing *from dissolving the living matter*. Nor can the lifeless substances which are dissolved ever be made to assume again the form and character they once possessed. Nor under any circumstances can the living thing, once dead, be made to live again, even if no attempts whatever be made to effect its solution."

Contrast between Mind-power and Matter-force—Grant and Granite.

Our materialistic, or, as they prefer to be called, "monistic," brethren are very anxious to prove that all *mind-power* is identified with *matter-force*. Their maxim is, as propounded by Büchner and adopted by Bain, "there is no force without matter and no matter without force," which is a very *forcible*, though, as we view it, false antithesis. But the non-identity and absolute contrariety between mind-power and matter-force, or, as we will call them, psychological power and

physical force, we attempt to demonstrate in the following manner :

General Grant is in command of one hundred thousand men. This one hundred thousand men, with an individual weight, each man of one hundred and fifty pounds, possesses a weight of fifteen million pounds avoirdupois. And as their weight is equal to a solid block of granite of that same specific gravity, we will, by way of clearness, call them a block of solid granite. Now the problem is how to move this solid block of granite weighing fifteen million pounds by an antecedent which is not a physical force. It is a case of Grant *versus* granite, and the process is as follows:

General Grant is sitting in his big tent with a map before him, looking very demure. He slowly comes in his cogitations to a mental *conclusion* ; he forms next a distinct mental *conception* that the block must move, and he ends with a *volition* that it shall move; which presuppose three *psychological* processes. He then orders his aid-de-camp to deliver his commands to his generals. In a few hours the granite block of fifteen millions avoirdupois is moved to a position five miles distant. Now by what commensurate physical force was the block moved ? The only antecedent was General Grant's volition (passing through the intelligence and wills of a few of his officers) to effectuate the movement. Leaving out the intermediates, General Grant's mere volition moved a block of granite weighing millions. Here, then, was a stupendous *psychological* causation producing an immense material movement. Had the block been moved by a physical machine, what a vast apparatus would have been necessary ! *Solid matter, then, to an extent without assignable limit, may be necessitated to obey a purely psycho-*

logical causation. There is a mind-force which is not a matter-force and yet controls matter.

In General Grant's brain there was, indeed, a slight molecular movement, implying an infinitesimal amount of physical force. In his act of speaking, also, there was exerted by the volition a small amount of corporeal force. Upon the tympany of the ear of his aid there was a slight physical impulse produced by the articulate sound which was the vehicle of the *idea*. None of these minute forces, however, are, as physical forces, of any account in the moving of the block. These slight forces passing from tongue to tympanum are merely the *carriers* of the non-material *idea*. And that non-material IDEA it is, followed by the series of equally non-material volitions, conducted by these carriers, which moves this block of fifteen millions.

Physical force, we are told, may be *stored*, as in fact it is, in the coal mine. But no force of fifteen million pounds was stored in the white matter of General Grant's brain. In his brain there is only that modicum of force sufficient for the molecular action co-ordinate with the thought action. The precise antecedent, therefore, of the movement of this fifteen million avoirdupois is a psychological causality, namely, a mental volition. The stupendous physical movement was the precise result of a purely psychological causality, in total absence of any physical force. It is a psychological power producing an enormous physical effect. Does not this plain fact demonstrate forever the absolute difference between *mind-power* and *physical force*, and the ordinary subordination of the latter to the former?

Let us now look into the mind of each individual soldier as he starts in this movement. First, his tympanum is affected by an articulate vocality which is

the vehicle of a thought mentally received. That *thought* is then formed by him into a distinct mental *conception* of what he is to do, and that *conception* is succeeded by a mental *volition*. Thus far the causation process is purely mental, with only enough of the physical conditions to furnish vehicles for the successions of mental causation. But now comes a physical phenomenon. A mass of matter weighing one hundred and fifty pounds, namely, one human body, is moved in immediate consequence of that volition, in strict obedience to it, and in absolute and pure causation by it. And thus a train of purely psychological causations, passing from General Grant's mind, through the minds of the officers, to the minds of the soldiers, produces a physical phenomenon as great as a small earthquake. From this we deduce these corollaries:

1. That mind-power is in essence entirely another thing from physical force; and so mind is probably an entirely different essence from matter.

2. That matter receives from mind-power a compulsion to obedient motion, and is by it moved and shaped. A material substance is controlled by a spiritual agent.

3. This fully agrees with the maxim in zoology, that it is life or mind which constitutes and shapes organization, and not organization life or mind.

4. The conception of this primordial origination and supremacy of mind-power over physical force and substance has no definite limits. The universal amount of physical organization is doubtless produced by an anterior amount of mind-power. The whole world-system is mind-created.

5. When we say *Ego*, and our mind falls inward and back upon our *self*, we are right in identifying that *Ego* as something back of and superior to the bodily frame, to the brain, or to the nerves. There is the spirit dis-

tinct from the body, organizing and using the body as its machine.

6. The spirit ruling the body, yet conditioned by it, rightly feels its own analogy with the supreme Spirit which rules the body of the Cosmos.

7. It is out of reason to suppose that between us and the supreme Spirit there are no intermediate intelligences. Science may know nothing of them, yet truth and reason may. How improbable that our five little senses can take in all there is ! Were we endowed with a new sense as comprehensive as our sight, what a world of new existences would it uncover, not contradicting any now known truth, but opening a vast addition in conformity with it. Hence common sense rejects the narrowness of materialism.

Heat in Brain Action no Proof that Mind is Force.

Philosophy asserts the supremacy, universal and eternal, of mind over matter. Were the universe filled with a boundless ocean of pure, even dead, physical force, it could never stir without directive mind to differentiate and define its movements. Force could never move force ; but mind, without being force, and without exerting force, is the evidence of something superior to force, power—power to control force. We know from our conscious experience that mind, *will*, does control matter organized into obedience to it, and nowhere do we see mind but it sits enthroned over matter. In the brain, as in the universe, mind is lord and master. And in the factors, mind and brain co-operating, we can easily see the refutation of the assumption of all aspirants for materialistic glory, that because the acting brain *under mental emotion gives out heat, therefore mind is but one of the circle of correlated forces*. In order for the brain to act, it must have and exert *physical*

force, and until exact measurement shows the contrary, this molecular central action accounts for all the heat. Even in common parlance there must be brain strength for brain action. The brain can no more work under mental direction without force, than the legs; and there is no more wonder that heat comes from the brain in thinking than from the legs in walking.

The Spiritual versus the Material Thought-Tablet.

In the realm of thought Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes finds us inextricably fixed in the mechanical, if not even in the materialistically mechanical; it is in the realm of morals, that is, of responsibility and will alone, that he finds us redeemed from the imprisonment of automatism. Through his entire treatment of the most serious subject he endeavors to infuse a sprightliness—which is itself a little sad, a true *ludibrium flebile*—required in his estimation by spoken address.

Cautioning his timid hearers against identifying a free statement of the important part played by our cerebral machine with a maintenance of materialism, Dr. Holmes runs rapidly yet effectively over the state of the debate between the claims of the cerebral organism and the pure spirit (if such there be) in the intellectual processes. First, he finds a large body of facts confirming the doctrine of so-called “unconscious cerebration”; that is, of the performance of thought processes by the brain, independently of will or consciousness. He does not clearly distinguish whether in the process the brain does actually *think* of itself, or whether it evolves the process through, like a wooden calculating machine, without the possession of any thought. Nor does he give any valid reasons for locating the so-called unconscious processes in the cerebral mechanism rather than in the spiritual fabric, or show why it is a case of un-

conscious cerebration, any more than unconscious mentalization. Our own impression has for some time been that this whole new fangle of "unconscious cerebration" needs, but cannot safely stand, a searching analysis.

The debate between spiritualism and materialism in the field of physiology Dr. Holmes finds so far a draw-game as that the spiritualistic arguments, one by one, are checked by some materialistic fact. Ideas may be scratches on the brain-tablet. If you reply that they are too numerous for the area of the tablet, he will cipher you how many ideas you can possibly possess, and show that the Declaration of Independence can be written on less than the surface of a dime. If you argue that the material tablet has repeatedly changed its substance through life, he replies that, nevertheless, a bodily scar retains its trace through all those changes. And when we note that the drowning man catches a full sight of the entire record of his past life at one glance, "it is possible, it is not impossible, that memory is a material record ; that the brain is scarred and seamed with infinitesimal hieroglyphics, as the features are engraved with the traces of thought and passion. And, if so, must not the record perish with the organ ?" And this leaves the possible inference with Dr. Holmes that the bodily resurrection is the only solution of our immortality. And then for a solution of our responsible and transcendent nature, he makes his appeal to the free-will, firmly asserting on moral grounds his manly protest against fatalism, philosophical and theological.

Yet at the very start of his review of the intellectual debate he states a proviso which we wish he had exerted his brilliant powers in fully analyzing and expanding. "It may be true that the brain is inscribed with material records of thought ; *but what that is which reads*

such records" (the italics are our own) "*remains still an open question.*" Momentously true! The etches on the Sinaitic *rock* are nothing to the rock. It is the consciousness of the reader that not only takes but gives them their intellectual significance. Transfer the scratches on the purely materialistic rock-tablet to the purely materialistic brain-tablet, and what have you gained? You still need a consciousness to stand opposite the record to read it. If you place opposite the brain record a reader with a mere materialistic brain record, you have only repeated the bootless transfer, and all your transfers are mere nothings *ad infinitum*; you have not arrived within less than an infinite distance of such a thing as a *thought*. It is not until the record is taken from the canvas, transformed from a flat writing to an *image* (as a picture is transformed into a statue) in pure *mental space*, that you have an intellectual *idea*. That pure *mental space* is within the conscious being, and is more diverse from the brain-tablet than the ether is from the rock. It is not the retina that sees, but the conscious being which is behind the retina; or rather the consciousness-ether of that being within which the ideal-image floats. If some of the well-authenticated narratives of clairvoyance are true, that conscious being can in due conditions see without the retina. Perhaps Dr. Holmes will let loose and be "as witty" at us "as he can," to the great danger of our corporeity, if we add that, if some well-authenticated stories are true, that conscious spirit may in due conditions be disengaged from all corporeal organs and make itself perceptible to the consciousness of others. Our stock of physiology, scanty as it may be, has nothing that demonstrates the impossibility of such phenomena. We decline to abdicate the world's ancient faith in their reality.

Instinct and Reason as Distinguishing Brute from Man.

Max Müller, with professional emphasis, finds the distinguishing difference between man and brute to consist in the possession by the former of language. He speaks slightly of any broad separation based upon moral or psychological differences. No doubt the possession of language produces a chasm as broad between man and brute as physiologists find between the brains of the two genera. And yet if we will but analyse the nature of the moral faculty of man we shall truly find that it distances him further from brute nature than any external characteristic whatever. Infinitesimal gradations may as truly be traced from human language, made up of arbitrary combinations of voluntarily selected vocables, down, through the significant articulations of birds to the most instinctive impulsive grunts of the most stupid beasts, as between the sentiment of eternal right and wrong in man, and that mere dread of punishment which forms the highest apparent *morale* of the most intelligent brutes.

Instinct may be simply a receptive capacity ; reason, a productive energy. As the piano receives the impulses from the player and evolves the note, or succession of notes, in an order which it is itself incapable of directing, so may brute instinct receive from the external logos those sensational impulses which constitute all the phenomena of brute thought. The page receives the impressions of the printer's type, with letters in due order to form the word, which is spelled from without, namely, by the printer's intellect. What the page is to the order of letters and words, that brute sense is to the logical order of its sensations. It is receptive, not productive or completely formative. Reason is a genera-

tive process, instinct is a mechanical. In the reasoning mind the premise *produces* the conclusion ; in the instinctive mind what is premise and conclusion are impressed in logical sequence from without. Hence reasoning requires *personality*, an energizing productive *self* ; instinct requires but a *susceptible sensorium*, that can feel an impression, without consciousness of any central Ego. The brute, therefore, may justly be viewed as but a temporary fragile frame-work, uninhabited by any distinct or permanent personality, while man is a being, a self, an author of logical thought, thought in harmony with the order of the universe, an image of the Logos that produced it.

Instinct and intuition may resemble each other in that both are impersonal ; their thoughts are *given* from the universal Logos. But they differ in that the former are but given *sensations*, while the latter are given "*ideas*," or conceptions of the pure Reason. Inspiration differs from intuition, in that it is not normal but special ; and is given not from the Logos but from the Holy Spirit ; and belongs not to the purely rational, or even to the naturally ethical, but to the religious, the holy, the blessed.

Dr. Wythe, in *The Science of Life*, well asserts, from Quatrefage, that in estimating Man, the *mind* should as truly be brought into consideration by science as the instincts and mental habits of the bees, ants, and beavers. And so estimated, Man instantaneously stands a kingdom by himself, and an apparent division of a kingdom above all the animal kingdoms of this world, his very mental qualities being an index of his belonging to a higher state of being. And we here see with what cunning and devilish design it is that materialistic anthropologists depreciate psychology, and aim at reducing all anthropology to anatomy that they may, by leaving mind out of account,

brutalize humanity and extinguish the hope of immortality in the human heart. Yet we agree with him in refusing to share in the extreme depreciation of the lower animals practiced by some more Christian writers. Concede to the animal being all that God has conferred upon him. We would not, perhaps, quite agree with him in saying that "the differences" between human and brute mind are "of degree rather than in kind." The difference of "degree" amounts to a difference in "kind." For instance, when we recognize a moral quality in animals, as the dog, it is of a different kind from the moral quality inspired by *conscience* in man and regulated by the Law of eternal Right. So far, indeed, as both are manifestations of *mind* they are the same in *kind*; but so far as the *species* of mentality is concerned they are vastly different in species or *kind*, with a difference that takes hold of eternity. Hence we cannot quite, with Dr. Wythe, find the only proof of man's immortality *in revelation alone*. We see it in man's psychological structure. And then we see it also in man's *anatomical structure*, which is formed to be the adjusted organ of his highest as well as lowest nature. His brain being physically shaped to form transcendent thought, is the organ of immortal consciousness; his hand is the organ to perform the behests of those consciousnesses; his whole body is adjusted in accordance with those same higher consciousnesses; not, indeed, with them alone, but with an alternative capacity for executing the higher or lower behest, indicative of a responsible being.

Trichotomy.

We cannot quite accord with Dr. Raymond, in his *Systematic Theology*, in rejecting the trinity (or, as it is uncouthly called, the *trichotomy*) of our nature, as

body, soul, and spirit. He says, quite incorrectly we think, that the doctrine is mainly founded on St. Paul's words in 1 Thess. v, 23: "I pray God your whole spirit and soul and body be preserved blameless;" but the apostle must have been well aware that that trinality was in his day a current one in Platonic and other philosophy, and must have accepted its recognized use. His distinction of *soulical* body from spiritual body in 1 Cor. xv, 44, recognizes this distinction, and is still stronger than his words in Thessalonians. In an essay by Olshausen, translated by our own hand and inserted some twenty years ago in the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, it is maintained, with great learning, that this trinality remains in the psychology of the whole Bible, and in the psychology of the early Church, and disappeared in consequence of its appearing to favor the Apollinarian heresy. Dr. Raymond would not, of course, deny that, in a permanent classification of our mental operations, there is a lower generic class which we share with animals, and a higher generic class which we share not with animals, but with higher natures than our own. This is a most momentous fact. But if we have thus two sets of lower and higher operations, these operations are founded in our lower and higher natures. It may not be necessary to say that these two natures are two separate entities. And yet it is certain that the lower nature does exist separately in the brutes; and, that not only does the higher nature exist separately in bodiless spirits, but our own glorified bodies will lose most if not all our animal nature.

Soul includes all that belong to a mere *animal*, namely, appetites, sensations, perceptions. Spirit is the transcendental overlay; the *intuition* by which the absolute, the universal, the necessary, the ethical, the

beautiful, the holy, are thought. These are the upper chambers of our nature. While brutes have germs of consciousness, combination, and ratiocination, of these higher thoughts no lower species has the slightest element of capability. These, overlying and overspreading our nature, invest our being with a dignity out of all comparison with the inferior orders of intelligence.

Professor Goodwin, on the words *soul* and *spirit* in the Bible, hardly does justice to the views of the trinalists upon the nature of man. 1. In the first place, no higher being than man, as God, angel, demon, is ever called a *soul*, but a *spirit*. A soul is, indeed, anthropopathically attributed to God, but he is in no place called a *soul*. So also a *heart*, an eye, a hand, is attributed to him. "With my whole *heart* and with my whole *soul*," says God (Isa. xxxii, 41). We thus learn that man has a higher nature, ranking him with the higher beings, as well as a lower nature, ranking him with the brutes. 2. This distinction manifests itself, as Professor Goodwin admits, in our higher and lower faculties; but these faculties are, of course, a manifestation of their substratum. The higher and lower belong to their nature-bases. We must trace the "faculties" to the personal nature in which they inhere. 3. As to the separability of these basal natures, we may surmise, *a*. That they have a twofold origin, one coming from God circuitously through nature-causations, and the other directly from the divine (Gen ii, 7); *b*. That as in a bird evolutionally derived (truly or theoretically) from a serpent, a higher mind is superimposed upon the animal soul; *c*. That, nevertheless, the two are not like a chemical mixture permanently two, but like a chemical union identified into one being; and yet, *d*. In our transition to our higher state a large share of our brute nature, nervous and appetitive, will be eliminated (1 Cor. vi, 13),

and the glorified unit, reuniting with the glorified body, will so regenerate it as to render it a *spiritual* body instead of a *soulical* body. 4. Trinalists do not claim to hold a modern "discovery" in all this, for theirs is an old Church doctrine. But as the discussions with materialism and evolution advance, the doctrine is applicable to the solution of an increasing number of adverse arguments.

Physiology and Psychology.

Dr. Maudsley, in his *The Physiology and Pathology of Mind*, vigorously charges that consciousness is unreliable and inadequate to a science of mind. We reply that consciousness is as reliable as perception; and that physiology is inadequate to as many things as psychology. His onslaught is very jauntily unguarded against a whole series of possible retorts. How slow, blundering, and inadequate has physiology been and still is! Psychology has never accepted her help, simply because she has had so little help to offer. It would certainly be more modest in that prattling infant science to be less quarrelsome, in its babyhood, with its older sisters. Its first utterances should partake a great deal less of self-sufficient snap and snarl. It is very doubtful to our own mind whether physiology is able either to invalidate, add to, or in any way modify, the science of pure psychology, any more than it can the science of pure logic or mathematics. Psychology is simply a *systematized analysis of thought as found in or by consciousness*. Whether consciousness is reliable or not, whether adequate or not, to a complete science of mind, does not touch the question of its legitimacy as a science. And though physiology may add a great many adjacent facts surrounding the circumference of the science, it is doubtful how far the facts she offers have any right to

come within it. No doubt, in preparing a work on mind for our college classes, it may, as has heretofore been done, be practically important to draw large illustrations from the facts of physiology. We may even infer many things as to the nature of consciousness from those facts. But physiologists are grandly mistaken as to the overruling power of physiology in the domain of psychology.

When the psychologist pronounces the simple word *sensation*, or *sensibility*, he names a thing which physiology, with all her knives and lenses, could never discover should she search until doomsday. The searcher must come into the world of consciousness and identify the *feeling* answering to the term. For the moment we utter that word with understanding of its import, we have entered the threshold of a new existence. We are in the inner world of mind. However near in space, the two, the inner and the outside worlds, are in nature infinitely wider apart than Herschel and the Sun. Without that *consciousness*, so much berated, the physiologist could never enter that wondrous interior world. And so superior is that interior world to the cold, dead, outside world, that immensity might just as well be an infinite blank, except just so far as that outside world of matter contributes to the happy existence of that inside world of mind. But this *sensation* or *sensibility*, above named, is but the first step into that world; the most infinitesimal cross of the dividing line drawn between the insensate and the conscious existence. When mind passes forth from the state of *sensation* into the act of perception, and first ascertains an *outwardness* or *exteriority*, and identifies external *objects*, then for the first time the insensate outside world has a chance to rise above the valueless nothingness of blank space, and become good for something. It then first attains, virtu-

ally, if not actually, a real existence. We believe we can indeed conceive of a world of insensate matter as existing apart from and in the absolute non-existence of intelligence in the universe. But we repeat that but for the existence of that intelligence, and the capacity of that insensate to contribute to the well-being of that intelligence, matter and space are equally worthless. Pure sensation, the bottom and the base of thought, could never know that exterior world, but might be made happy by it. It is when the mighty change comes in which mind rises from *state* into *act*, that she first *notices* the world and concedes its value. If it be replied, that whatever be the value that mind concedes to matter, it may, nevertheless, possess a value of its own, our answer is, that nothing exists in the universe competent to contradict the pronouncement of mind upon matter; for the insensate cannot know itself, and cannot defend itself, and universal judgment must go against it by default. Mind, however, does not stop at the direct act of knowing the external and the object; she revolves back and directs her glance upon herself, and realizes her own existence and her own operations; finally, in her highest effort, falling back upon herself and uttering the self-conscious *ego*, which nothing lower than humanity can utter. Of all this physiology can know nothing. What right has she to talk of volitions, emotions, sensations, and perceptions? Physiology must borrow or steal them all from consciousness.

And now we say it was unquestionably a most legitimate and important work, within this wonderful kingdom of mind, to analyze and classify the modes and natures of thoughts, and to ascertain what can be consciously ascertained of their operations and laws. The work lies simply within the circle of consciousness. And whatever is found to be the validity of conscious-

ness, or its adequacy to a full revelation of human nature, the work was a great and legitimate work. If Linnæus could wisely analyze and classify the plants of the vegetable kingdom, and so construct a science of botany, so, far more wisely, could Locke and Hamilton classify thoughts, and so construct a science of psychology. Should vegetable physiology assail botany as inadequate and worthless because a large amount of additional knowledge could be furnished from her discoveries about plants, it would be a very unscientific assault both in spirit and in principle; almost as unscientific as it is for Dr. Maudsley to assail psychology because his researches can add something to our knowledge of mind unknown to mental science. For any real addition all true psychologists will thank his colaborers and himself. Whether or not the addition come properly within the bounds of strict psychology, no liberal thinker will fail to rejoice over any gains to our stock of anthropology.

It is not clear to us, however materialistic many of his phrases and expressions appear, that Dr. Maudsley is what is usually or rightly termed a *materialist*. In accordance with the new philosophy, which finds that the entire variety of things in nature is but the varying forms of FORCE, he seems to hold that mind in man is *the highest form of force*. Hence, though matter and mind are but different forms of the same primitive force, you may still consider matter as material, and mind spiritual; or you may hold both to be spiritual, or both material. In other words, the terms material and spiritual lose much of their distinctive meaning. Without kindling up a quarrel with him on this point, we should prefer to consider nature as *force*, and intelligence as something absolutely higher, namely, as *power*. Force is blind; but power in the form of intelligence

controls it. All force, in all its forms throughout nature, is obedient either to blind necessity or to *intelligential power*. Hence, again, mind is superior, prior, controlling, and originating. God, the supreme mental *power*, is the controller, being the generator of all force; for force is physical, and power intelligential. A true psychology has, we believe, nothing to fear from a true physiology, nor a true theology from the new philosophy of FORCE.

As sensation is in the world of mind, we may as well admit that in the lowest order of being the dawn of *sensation* is the *dawn* of a soul. From that feeble dawn, closely dependent upon matter, soul is found gradationally rising in strength and self-sustaining independence, through perception and consciousness, into the grasp of infinite and universal truth. The soul, whether of man, brute, or insect, is immortal, not by intrinsic physical immortality (which belongs to God alone), but by being placed and retained in *the conditions by which it is held undying*. An insect on earth might be maintained immortal by being placed in such vitalizing conditions as secure perpetual life. Man's soul, unlike brute soul, endowed with independent energy, may survive the wreck of the body; may as *power* invest itself with subtle *force* or essence, forming for itself an ethereal organism, and may live in a vitalizing atmosphere provided for its disembodied state, until the resurrection restore it to an organism worthy to stand by the side of the glorified second Adam.

Greatness of Man as Mind.

Dr. Maudsley, in *Body and Mind*, in a passage worthy of Chalmers for its cumulative eloquence (p. 112), ranging through the astronomic universe, declares that it is very difficult to avoid the generalization that the

universe is ruled by intelligent mind. If so, then we have the primal duality, the grand antithesis between mind and matter, with the controlling power supremely inhering in the former. Mind, then, is master; finitely it is soul and infinitely it is God. To make it, then, the mere effect of the corporeal cause is to reverse the true order of succession, to invert the true order of superimposition. God produces universe and soul produces body. The Materialist is nothing if not an Atheist.

Dr. Maudsley is, of course, Darwinian. In treating the subject of idiocy he discusses the "theroid," or brute-like, form of that sad defect. One idiot he describes as exhibiting the figure, face, motions, nastiness, and rascality of an ape. Such a case he holds to be a retrogression to animalism from which man is developed. We were strongly impressed, for the moment, with this argument. But when, without offering any explanation, he proceeds to spread out full narratives of other cases, of which one idiot is a wonderfully exact sheep, and another possesses the abundant and unmistakable specialties of a *goose*, the argument appears not only effaced but reversed. For how could a human being retrograde down to a goose when, according to Darwin, the goose is excluded from the pedigree of man? Some other cause, then, it is—perhaps the maternal imagination—which stamps the brute type on the human person. And does not this throw a strong suspicion upon a large part of Darwin's reasoning from resemblances of man to brute?

Our readers will perceive that in arguing as above from the existence of a God to the existence of a soul, we come back again to the axiom of Plato, before which no Atheism and no Materialism can stand, that mind is prior to, superior over, master of, matter; and we also may rest upon that maxim of Dr. Bushnell's,

worthy of Plato, that it is as clear that surrounding things are "mind-molded" as that they exist at all. The man who cannot see or will not acknowledge these fundamental truths is radically unreasonable. Such a Materialist is a theroid idiot with the stamp of the goose upon him.

The following extract will indicate the spirit of Dr. Maudsley's philosophy: "I have no wish whatever to exalt unduly the body; I have, if possible, still less desire to degrade the mind; but I do protest, with all the energy I dare use, against the unjust and most unscientific practice of declaring the body vile and despicable—of looking down upon the highest and most wonderful contrivance of creative skill as something of which man dare venture to feel ashamed. Yet to my mind it appears a clear scientific duty to repudiate the quotation from an old writer, which the late Sir William Hamilton used to hang on the wall of his lecture-room:

'On earth there is nothing great but man;
In man there is nothing great but mind.'

The aphorism, which, like most aphorisms, contains an equal measure of truth and untruth, is suitable enough to the pure metaphysician, but it is most unsuitable to the scientific inquirer, who is bound to reject it, not because of that which is not true in it only, but much more because of the baneful spirit with which it is inspired. On earth there are assuredly other things great besides man, though none greater; and in man there are other things great besides mind, though none greater; and whosoever, inspired by the spirit of the aphorism, thinks to know any thing truly of man without studying most earnestly the things on earth that lead up to man, or to know any thing truly of mind without studying most earnestly the things in the body

that lead up to and issue in mind, will enter on a barren labor, which, if not a sorrow to himself, will assuredly be sorrow and vexation of spirit to others. To reckon the highest operations of mind to be functions of a mental organization is to exalt, not to degrade, our conception of creative power and skill; for if it be lawful and right to burst into admiration of the wonderful contrivance in nature by which noble and beautiful products are formed out of base materials, it is surely much stronger evidence of contrivance to have developed the higher mental functions by evolution from the lower, and to have used forms of matter as the organic instruments of all. I know not why the power which created matter and its properties should be thought not to have endowed it with the functions of reason, feeling, and will, seeing that, whether we discover it to be so endowed or not, the mystery is equally incomprehensible to us, equally simple and easy to the power which created matter and its properties."

To all this we may reply,

1. In the doctrine of the resurrection, which Christianity asserted in opposition to the philosophy of all antiquity, which Paul asserted amid the jeers of the sages of Athens, religion confers a glory on the body for which physiology has no capacity. In the incarnation, the transfiguration, and the ascension of Jesus, the gospels reveal a transcendent glorification of the body. Romish monasticism, indeed, borrowed as it was from the idealistic systems of Asia, did degrade and defame the body; but let Dr. Maudsley turn to the New Testament, guided by a Greek or English concordance, and he will find many an honor conferred on the *body* which his philosophy has never imagined.

2. And yet Sir William Hamilton uttered a transcendent truth when he asserted that there is in man nothing

great but mind. Body may be indeed curious, beautiful, wonderful; but while it is but transient, and soon disintegrates amid disgusts and degradations, in comparison with a soul that is immortal it cannot be called *great*. There is an infinity of difference between them; and even the glory of the body, such as it is, is derivative from the soul. For the soul the body is curiously wrought; and for the soul it is heir of the resurrection.

3. Equally noble and true was the other clause in Sir William Hamilton's maxim, that on earth there is nothing *great* but man: matter, however vast its bulk, is good for nothing but for mind, as mind itself is most truly *great* only when it is immortal mind. Matter might just as well be so much space, that is, so much *nothing*, except as it contributes to the happiness or well-being of so much living intelligence. From mind, therefore, it derives all its value; and so, in comparison with mind, especially immortal mind, *man*, it is nothing *great*. Man, therefore, alone is *great* in nature; mind alone is *great* in man.

4. When Dr. Maudsley affirms the endowment of matter "with the functions of feeling, reason, and will," he destroys the immortal soul, and degrades mind, spirit, to the base incidents of material organization. He may still borrow from religion (as he hypothetically does in his criticism on the Archbishop of Canterbury) the doctrine of resurrection; but so far as his philosophy, which knows no resurrection, is concerned, he sinks mind into the accident of a curious but transient and base accident. And, say what he pleases, it is a disgusting and sensualizing philosophy.

Chronological Priority of Civilization to Barbarism.*

Sir John Lubbock tells us largely and truly *what uncivilized men* are ; but whether uncivilization is *primary in historical order* or secondary, he leaves us as uninformed as he found us.

The leading topics under which his facts are ranged are, Arts, Sexual Relations, Religion, Morals, Language, and Laws.

Sir John's argument against the Duke of Argyl, that barbarism is primitive and not a degeneracy from a higher state, we hold to be destitute of the slightest value. He maintains that there are certain possessions of the civilized races, such as letters and religion, that would never be lost, and where these are wanting the race is primitive. That, however, man is in the requisite conditions sure to degenerate, even in these respects, is proved by countless instances. Here in Florida, where we write, is a suggestive instance. Within a century or two a large number of genuine Caucasians (the so-called "crackers"), excluded by slavery from a suitable place in the social system, have, even within hailing distance of what claimed to be a high civilization, changed in color, diminished in size, and forgotten letters, mechanic arts, and religion. Increase their centuries to half a millennium, enlarge the distance from civilization, supply the climatic influences, and to what degradations, physiological, intellectual, and moral, might not these men, without ceasing to be men, descend? In the course of less than a thousand years any form of sexual relation could be established, whether promiscuous intercourse, voluntary and tempo-

* Review of *The Origin of Civilization and the Primitive Condition of Man*. By Sir John Lubbock.

rary unions, polygamy or polyandry, simple or complex as taste, accident, or surrounding customs might suggest. Then rude methods of recording thought by symbol, picture writing, or vocal signs, might arise. Religious superstitions, fetichisms, shamanisms, human sacrifices, might be invented. Whether these deep barbarisms are primordials or degeneracies is to be settled not by *a priori* arguments, like Sir John's, but by history. A few centuries hence a Lubbock, ignorant of the true origin of these "crackers," might quote their degradation as proofs of the primitive condition of man. He would assume that the "crackers" are an aboriginal race, older than the Caucasian Floridians, just because they had sunk into savagism! Such is the logic on which the title of this book is based.

Sir John argues that the Australians, for instance, are autochthonic, because no relics of imported articles from other countries are there found. In modern times European plants are conquering the native growths. The natives say that the foreign rats are destroying Australian rats, just as Europeans are destroying Australians. No traces of metals or pottery, or any other durable relics of ancient civilization, are found. This is, indeed, an argument, but not a conclusive one. Ancient migrations were not made in modern steamers, carrying vermin, seeds, pottery, and armor with them. The first adventurers in Australia may have been refugees from war, bringing nothing but their bare persons. Their landing in Australia may have been the last stage of a succession of retreats through centuries, each stage more barbarized than the former, and successively dropping all traces and relics of earlier civilization. Driven into the savage wilds, they would naturally become as savage as the wilds themselves.

We would remind our readers, however, that our

faith in the Bible is irrespective of the question of the descent of all the human races from Adam. To us it is a question of pure history and science. By Dr. McCausland's identification of the Adamic with the Caucasian race alone, as we have repeatedly intimated, we hold that the full admission of the geologic antiquity of the non-Caucasian races would leave biblical history and theology undisturbed. The arguments for the immense antiquity of some races is so strong, and the authority of the opinions of many scientific men is so weighty, as to give us pause. But no *conclusive* proof is yet brought before us; and we take issue with such bald and bold assumptions as the title of Sir John's book, not in the interests of theology, but in behalf of sober sense and modest logic.

HUMAN SEXUAL RELATIONS have, as Sir John shows, taken all imaginable varieties of form, as promiscuity, pairing by mutual consent during mutual consent, polygamy, and polyandry. Sometimes the man purchases the woman, sometimes the woman the man. There are marriages where the connection had no force every fourth day; others where the parties married for a fortnight, as probation when the connection ceased if the parties did not like it. The forms taken by female modesty are sometimes grotesque, and even terrible. Sometimes the bridegroom takes his bride on his back and carries her home. Sometimes he is expected to make at least a sham fight to capture her. Sometimes she is placed on a fleet horse, and her groom on another, and he must chase and catch her if he can. Sometimes the groom must seize his intended, and a scuffle must ensue in which her clothes must be torn. Sometimes the groom, with a party of friends, steals upon the lady and captures her amid fierce opposition, real or pretended. Sometimes the groom surprises his beloved, and first leveling her to

the ground with a club, carries her off, stunned and bleeding, to his home. The wonder often is that these, and many other strange customs of uncivilized life, prevail among tribes too distant for any intercommunication. They have sprung up apparently by independent organization; and Lubbock shows much ingenuity in explaining by what processes of thought they were originated.

Lubbock says (p. 70), "I believe that our present social relations have arisen from an initial stage of communal marriage." Sir John can "believe" what he pleases, especially as he furnishes not a particle of proof obligating any man of sense to "believe" with him.

Under the head of RELIGION, our author brings ample evidence to show that there are tribes whose minds are blank of any supernaturalism. This does not, nevertheless, touch the question whether man is truly a religious being. He shows that men are found who are *as unable to count as the brute*; and yet barbarous man, if truly in nature *a man*, is an arithmetical being. If the faculty of number may become torpid and incapacitated, so may the spiritual faculties. In both cases excitement, development, training, may bring the dormant energies into action and power. But the man is thus *restored to himself*, not endowed with a faculty new to his personal nature. To ascertain the true *nature* of man we are not to go to torpid man; we are to trace, historically, the evolutions of activity through which he unfolds himself; and his nature embraces the bases for all these activities.

In regard to LANGUAGE, Sir John traces the similarity of the words for *father* and *mother* through an amazing number of tongues in various quarters of the globe. He does not consider this a proof of identity of origin. He attributes it to the perfect simplicity of the ele-

ments of the two words used, by which they are words most readily and easily coming to childhood utterance. He believes, and we could concede the fact, that the most primitive words were vocal imitations of the object designated, and he gives a whole pageful of such words to show how numerous they still are even in our modern English. But when Max Müller speaks of speech as prompted by "instinct" he is unable to perceive any meaning in the statement. We are sorry for the dimness of his perceptions.

In the first place, Sir John, being a theist, and no Darwinian, must concede that God has given man a tongue, and that the tongue was given *to talk with*. Just as men are framed with legs to walk with, with feet to stand in self-poised erectness, with gastric juice to digest with, and teeth wherewith to masticate, just so man is divinely endowed with a tongue for speech. And a good theist should concede that for every organ there is not only its function, but a correlative mental tendency, appetite, impulse, or instinct for action. Just as man will find out a way of walking, so he will find out a way of talking. As for the selection of the particular bit of shaped voice for a particular object, *imitation* (*onomatopœia*) is the first and last easily indicated step. Beyond that step all science is in a fog.

The Genesis history, however, makes a most clear and rational statement. Unfallen man possessed clearer intuitions and more vivid and healthful instincts than his descendants. As patriarch of his family, even after the fall, between whom and himself there was a most transparent sympathy, a degree of clairvoyant reading of each other's thoughts, his utterances would be soon understood and adopted. Let us suppose that his words are, *first*, onomatopœic. Next his earnest vocables for *motions*, accompanied with explanatory gest-

ures, would soon furnish standard verbs. Then, the necessity for designating visible objects with fixed vocables being clearly understood, deliberate *naming* would ensue. Nowadays, such is our wealth of languages and literatures that we make no new words; we only fit old words to new uses. *Oxygen, telegraph,* and *stand-point* are not new words, but old words vamped over. So enervated have we become from our embarrassment of riches, that we have lost not only the power, but even the conception of creating a new word fresh from the raw material of voice in full adaptation to a new idea.

Is it not probable that there is a correlation between every particle of voice with an element of thought? We know that the back vowel sounds are expressive of adverse thought, while the front sounds are expressive of the more agreeable. Thus the back guttural sound *ugh* is expressive of ugliness, impatience, and disgust; while *aw* expresses abhorrence, awfulness, and sublimity. The front sounds, *ê, i, û, ô,* are expressive of specialty, definiteness, delicacy, and beauty. The intermediate *a* is expressive of manly, liberal, firm thought. Of the consonants, the liquid are expressive of smoothness, grace, and ease; the mutes, of harshness, abruptness, force. These starting-points indicate, but do not authorize, the conclusion that there is in possibility a *perfect language* where every element of articulation is adjusted with absolute precision of form and force to the element of thought. The perfect man with intuitions and reason absolutely clear, would in the beginning speak the perfect language, and his true fellow would spontaneously understand him.

Is there any thing in the slow nature of linguistic development to disturb our belief in the Genesis narrative? Is the demand of Bunsen and others for twenty

thousand years of linguistic development more than a whim? If we take one of our long English words, as, for instance, *contemporaneity*, and strip it of the prefixes and postfixes, we shall find a central *stem*, *temp*, which is an old form of our word *time*; and time is the central idea of the word. But further analysis will disclose the fact that every prefix and postfix is really an original word, so that the long word is a heap of words with a central nucleus; and it looks as if the words, each, were monosyllables; and so the original language was a number of monosyllabic roots, amounting, as Max Müller thinks, to about five hundred. How many years would it take Adam to accumulate five hundred monosyllabic words? And if these were all monosyllables, how many hundreds of the near one thousand antediluvian years would it take him and his coevals to combine these primitives into compounds or inflections? What if Dr. McCausland were right in believing that Cain went to the land which now is China during the monosyllabic period, escaped the flood, and founded the empire of the monosyllabic language and stationary civilization? But we must assure Dr. McCausland that we think that, if Adam's dialect was very perfect, Cain must have imparted a highly nasal ding-dong to it.

Peschel on Races.

Peschel's arrangement of races begins with the lowest, the Australians, and ascends to the highest, which he calls the Mediterranean race.

He believes, with Darwin, that all species are in some way derived by transmutation from lower orders, but rejects Darwin's "natural selection" as the mode. But the connecting link or links between man and the lower orders are, he thinks, lost, and may never be found; but if found, as they may be, they would be decisive.

Hence the chasm is somewhat broad; and the increased acquaintance with races once supposed to be almost brutal so raises their reputation for intelligence as to broaden the interval between man and brute, and suggests the doctrine of human unity. And this unity is confirmed by the established fact that sexual conjunction between the most opposite races is prolific. We may, therefore, rather assume that there is amid variety a one *humanity*. But this humanity is of very high antiquity. To prove this he parades the old story of flint implements, Swiss lake dwellings, bone caves, and the rest of that vanity. He does not here furnish any thing new, and what he does furnish was not worth the paper and ink. On the other hand, he gives some remarkable testimony, showing how easily the hardy races of early men could rapidly fill the earth: "We will only observe, in anticipation, that the more rude, and hence the more frugal and hardy, a people is, the more readily does it change its abode, so that, in their lowest stages of development, all families of people were capable of accomplishing the migrations which we have ascribed to them. The difficulties generally exist only in the imagination of the spoiled children of civilization. In Central Australia, where European explorers were exhausted by starvation, hordes of black men roam about, free of care; and if we are startled by the idea that, thousands of years ago, Asiatic tribes are supposed to have crossed Behring's Straits to people America, we quite forget that even at the present day a naked nation of fishermen still exists in Terra del Fuego, where the glaciers stretch down to the sea, and even into it."

Why, then, may not the human race in six or seven thousand years, beginning from the ancient civilization inherited from the antediluvian world, growing more

barbarous as their distance of emigration increased, have populated the world from the Euphrates to Terra del Fuego? We see an immense deal of assumption, but a small amount of proof to the contrary. Nothing that Peschel advances is unanswered by the great work on this subject of James C. Southall.

As to the first home of the human species, Peschel adopts the argument of Haeckel and others. That home was not on an island, for the islands have nearly all commenced to be inhabited during our historical period; a fact, we think, suggesting that man is less than seven thousand years old. It could not have been in America, for here are no animals approximating man; an argument that takes the development theory for granted. And this reason excludes Europe and Asia, and guides toward Africa. But not even Africa is satisfactory; for the human race is clearly not descended from apes, but from an earlier stem, from which both apes and man have branched. We are, therefore, pushed into the Indian Ocean, and must dredge up a lost continent at its bottom, of which Madagascar is one of the remnant summits. This submerged continent is to be named LEMURIA, from the *lemur*, an animal below the ape in development, and so nearer the stem whence ape and man diverged. Professor Marsh has dug up the primitive horse in America; let some explorer fish up the primitive man in Lemuria, so that science may rejoice in "the man on horseback."

A strong proof with Peschel of the unity of the human race is the existence of customs of a very peculiar character precisely alike among very distant peoples. As a marked instance we may mention that the custom, that when a child is born, the father, as well as the mother, should go to bed and undergo a "lying-in," was found in ancient Corsica, in Borneo, in South Amer-

ica, and various other distant points. A dozen or so of such coincidences are quoted. These prove, he thinks, either a unity of racial origin, or a most extraordinary "psychical identity." It is remarkable, however, that he omits to mention some instances that point to a primeval origin in Western Asia. Not to insist on the "handled cross," there are the tradition of the flood, the serpent worship, and the remembrance of the golden or paradisaic age. These point to that region where both the Assyrian tablets and the Mosaic records agree that man originated, without ages of previous savagism, in full possession of a civilization. What right have our scientists to hold those significant customs and those recorded histories as *nihil*? We lay down Peschel's book more confirmed in the conviction than when we took it up in the unity of the human race, and its date according to the record. Pseudo-scientism prattles garrulously about "the prehistoric man;" but, to all present appearance, there never was "a prehistoric man." The first man was historic man. Men locally prehistoric, that is, *unhistoric* barbarians, have plentifully existed. But we wait for the proof that history does not name the first man of the human race.

Religion, with Peschel, is a part of our own nature, and is an instinctive and gradually purifying truth. It is a growth in the race, and progresses with the growth of the race. Its lowest and universal form is Shamanism. A Shaman is one who professes to possess the power to deal with the occult powers of nature, whether by incantations, drugs, ceremonials, fetiches, sacrifices, or prayers. This Shamanism exists not only among uncivilized tribes, but shows traces of its power among our modern and most civilized nations. The supposition that our prayers influence the divine will, and obtain any answers or fulfillment from the divinity, he

holds to be Shamanism. All intercourse between the divine and human spirit is thus cut off. Religion thus comes up from nature below; it does not come down from God above. His religion is, therefore, truly *natural* religion. This excludes not only all inspiration, miracle, prophecy, but all descending of the Spirit of God into our hearts. Yet Hebrew monotheism he views as the most remarkable of religious growths. Its culmination in Christianity is the highest natural religious development in human history. A survey of comparative theology proves the immense inferiority of all other systems to the Gospel as a religious attainment of humanity.

On the whole, we go to Peschel for physical and physiological facts, but not for biblical criticism or theology.

EVOLUTION.

Darwinism.

THE theory of Mr. Darwin may be stated as follows: All earthly living beings, the whole of animated nature, including man, animals, and vegetable existences, are one great genus, generatively sprung from one primordial origin. What are commonly called genera and species of this universal genus, are but remnant groups, whose intermediates have perished from the unsuitableness of their natures to meet the surrounding conditions of existence. These surviving groups, whose wide dividing spaces have thus been overswept with the besom of destruction, are not divided by any law intended to keep them separate. Different species are prevented from blending, not by any ordinance, but by contingent obstacles which in given cases can be overcome, and

thus the fibers of one life, as yet but imperfectly explored, run in a perfectly complex entanglement through the whole universal mass. Man may, therefore, with genetical truth, not say only to the worm "Thou art my brother," but he can claim birth from the same parent as the oak of the floor he treads, or the mahogany of his writing-desk.

1. We note this distinction made after years of study and experimentation upon the subject: "I doubt whether any case of a perfectly fertile hybrid animal can be considered as thoroughly well authenticated." Now it seems to us here is a fatal want of "a perfectly fertile hybrid animal." Until Mr. Darwin will furnish it, his theory, we think, lacks the conditions of existence. We can accept no equivocal or impotent quadruped; no *believed* or *guessed* specimens will serve. Until Mr. Darwin has caught us "a perfectly fertile hybrid animal," sound of wind and organ, his theory has nothing safe to ride on. Until then we must accept the following well-settled statement of Gabineau: "It has been further observed, that even among closely allied species, where fecundation is possible, copulation is repugnant, and obtained either by force or ruse; which would lead us to suppose that in a state of nature the number of hybrids is even more limited than that obtained by the intervention of man. It has, therefore, been concluded that among the *specific* characteristics we must place the faculty of producing prolific offspring."

2. As to Mr. Darwin's fertile hybrid plants, let it be observed that he is able to ascertain no law regulating hybrid fertility. Every imaginable rule is overwhelmed with numerous exceptions, and he is flung upon isolated facts in confessed ignorance of all clew to the principles. But he has found that supposed species have an

unknown range of variation; transcending the space hitherto supposed to be covered by genera. That is, classes of animals which a first inspector would suppose to be unrelated or only generically connected, are really within the same genetic species. How knows he, then, that the isolated cases of imagined fertile hybrids may not be by immemorial descent within the limits of species falsely supposed to be genera or unrelated? How knows he that the supposed hybrids are not the legitimate children of cognate parents? Perhaps, after all, the case is under the law that circumscribes fertility within the bounds of species.

3. From the geological quarter it would seem that Mr. Darwin's theory must be forever indemonstrable. It is by the geological record alone that the successive advances of existence in past ages can be shown. That record, so far as it testifies, gives a negative testimony; asserting that new forms of life have been brought into existence suddenly, at great intervals, and accordantly with a great transcendental plan. Mr. Darwin invalidates the negative testimony; but that seems insufficient. He *wants the positive testimony* before he can bring his theory from hypothesis to science. But, if we mistake not, it will be found that Professor Owen will have something to say why the testimony of paleontology should not be so unceremoniously ruled out of court. Perhaps, also, Professor Agassiz may have something to show for the independent existence of species. We apprehend there will be found abundant truth in Mr. Darwin's despondent remark, "That the geological record is imperfect all will admit; but that it is imperfect to the degree which I require, few will be inclined to admit."

4. Mr. Darwin supposes that, "probably, all organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have de-

scended from some one primordial form, into which life was first breathed." "Form into which life was first breathed?" But that is a miracle; a most stupendous miracle; a direct interposition of a creative power. The *Edinburgh Review*, we believe it was, that first brought into the English language, some years ago, the great thought that the greatest miracle ever performed on earth, was upon the day that man first walked upon it in the full possession of his created nature. Now Mr. Darwin's miracle, though at first sight less objectively stupendous, is really a greater stroke of power, a more momentous interposition, than the organization of a new living fabric (which Mr. Darwin promptly scouts), with a vitality already manifested on earth. Minuter as it may be, nay, invisible to the eye corporeal, it is immeasurably more a miracle to the eye of reason. Let our readers judge whether Mr. Darwin makes a safe bargain in putting off an immediate creation of an organic man in exchange for a supply, at one instant, of a life sufficient for the start of a universal system.

Later Darwinism.

Mr. Darwin's volumes at the first treated his theory, applicable as its principles are to all living beings, solely in application to the animal world. He had long been collecting materials on *human* development, but had not the courage to publish them until the bold avowal of his views by less timid pupils, especially Carl Vogt, of Germany, braced his nerves to the enterprise. His *The Descent of Man* appeared eleven years after the appearance of his first book. Both he and Wallace are free from the trenchant pugnacity of Huxley and Maudsley; and distantly removed from the coarse blatancy of Büchner, who exults, apparently, in the thought of reducing humanity to brute conditions. This

spirit of blasphemy is illustrated by the very title of a Darwinian book (quoted by Darwin) by Dr. Barrago Francesco: "Man, made in the image of God, is made also in the image of the ape." Darwin's spirit is reverent; he maintains the transcendental nature of conscience; and, if we rightly understand him, the immortality of man.

Mr. Darwin traces the human animal to the Old World ape, finding his probable residence in Africa; thence through the lemur, down through bird and fish, to some low marine form. He admits that, though our pedigree is thus very ancient, it is not very noble. He contents himself with the reply that "the most humble organism is something much higher than the inorganic dust beneath our feet;" forgetting that even by his theory our pedigree takes its very earliest origin from the primordial inorganic matter biblically represented by the word "dust." Nor is it true that living natures may not be both more detestable and more disgusting than pure lifeless matter.

On this matter we may suggest:

1. Darwinism cannot get over the threshold of vital existence without a miracle. How did the system of life first begin? The experiments in "Spontaneous Generation" at every repetition confirm the doctrine that *from life only can life proceed*. How, then, without a new creation—a creation however minute in its magnitude, yet most stupendous in its nature—an origination of that wonderful reality, *Life*, in the universe—could our pedigree take its primordial start?

2. If Darwinism admits the immortality of the soul we must have a second instantaneous, yet most stupendous, miracle. At some *point* in the long pedigree *man ceased to be mortal*, and became immortal. This amazing transition from the finite to the infinite must have

taken place at an indivisible instant, for there is no intermediate. And so, in contradiction to Mr. Darwin's statement that there was no time in which man became man, we may positively say man became man "in the twinkling of an eye." There was a moment when man was formed, in the highest sense, "in the image of God;" as the son of Sirach says, "in the image of his Eternity." The race, therefore, has certainly had its *Adam*; for the Hebraic word *Adam*, be it not forgotten, means *Man*. There was an immortal Adam enthroned at a miraculous epoch over animate and inanimate nature, endowed with conscience and responsibility, and installed beneath the government of God. Even then from Darwin himself, we come to a conception so amazingly the type of the old Hebraic history as to impress us with its true divinity. And thus both scientific geology and anthropology, while they at first present a variation from the Mosaic record quite alarming to the believer, do terminate in a strange typical resemblance quite confounding to the skeptic.

3. While Mr. Darwin denies that the similarities of pattern between man and other animals can be solved on the principle of positive creation after "an ideal plan," he is too candid a reasoner to deny that somehow *plan*, model, intellectual shaping, does exist. We then think that most readers would deny that "ideal plan" can exist without antecedent mind to plan it. If we assume that matter can exist without creation, we are not quite obliged to admit that motion of matter could exist without mind to select the direction of the motion. But even if we should admit that matter might move by blind mathematical laws, and so pass through countless evolutions, we can never admit that any thing less than mind can construct, outside of rigid mathematical law, an adaptive "ideal plan."

Mivartism, Three-Souled Fœtal Development.

In reply to certain taunts from the scientists that he was writing under a theological bias, Dr. Mivart informs us that he was really educated in scientific rationalism, but took refuge from its repulsive doctrines in the Roman faith. His *Genesis of Species* gave the first check to Darwinism, and laid down some important doctrines which have not since been invalidated. We specify particularly the following points :

1. Though evolutionary development be true, yet the changes from one species to another are not always by slow degrees, but by sudden, great, and even revolutionary transformations.

2. The new forms are not accidental, but are evolved by an inherent rational formative potency.

3. Man being first formed by an intellectual transformation and the infusion of a high rational soul, was truly *created* ; derivatively *created*, indeed, yet still *created* in strict accordance with the Mosaic history.

4. That this view is neither novel nor heretical, but is essentially an old doctrine maintained by many of the ablest old divines of the Catholic Church. Those eminent doctors did not, indeed, teach the full doctrine of universal evolution, but of a "derivative creation" of which evolution is only an expansion. The full doctrine of evolution is, therefore, consistent with the most ultra Catholic orthodoxy, and, therefore, *a fortiori*, is allowable in ordinary Christians.

The old doctrine of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Suarez was, that organisms are often endowed with a productive or creative potency from which new species are evolved. Thus parasites are somehow produced from the organism on which they depend. If Adam was created pure and perfect, how, for instance, did lice

come into existence, except as evolved from the degenerate human body? And so, said the fathers, there spring insects and worms from putrefaction—that is, by spontaneous generation; for spontaneous generation, though now rejected as heresy by both theology and science, was once orthodox with both. But these views, according to Mivart, established as orthodox the doctrine of “derivative creation;” and evolution is simply derivative creation universally extended.

Many of the fathers, including Augustine, denied the literality of the Mosaic days. They held that the whole mundane system was created at once; and that the six days were not a succession in time, but an order of thought. This was held by a large series of the Church doctors, from Augustine to the present day, long before geology raised any objections to the literal interpretation.

To Mivart's doctrine of the “derivative creation” of man by formal transformation from a lower animal and infusion of a higher soul, Mr. Huxley replies as follows: “If man existed as an animal before he was provided with a rational soul, he must, in accordance with the elementary requirements of the philosophy in which Mr. Mivart delights, have possessed a distinct sensitive and vegetable soul or souls. Hence, when the “breath of life” was breathed into the man-like animal's nostrils, he must have already been a living and feeling creature.”

To this Mivart gives the following reply: “This doctrine was that the human fœtus is at first animated by a vegetative soul, then by a sentient soul, and only afterward, at some period before birth, with a rational soul. Not that two souls ever coexist, for the appearance of one coincides with the disappearance of its predecessor—the sentient soul including in it all the powers of the

vegetative soul, and the rational soul all those of the two others. The doctrine of distinct souls, which Professor Huxley attributes to me as a fatal consequence of my hypothesis, is simply the doctrine of St. Thomas himself. He says (quæst. lxxvi, art. 3, ad. 3): 'Dicendum quod prius embryo habet animam quæ est sensitiva tantum, qua ablata advenit perfectior anima quæ est simul sensitiva et intellectiva ut infra plenius ostendetur.' Also, (quæst. cxviii, art. 2, ad. 2): 'Dicendum est quod anima præexistit in embryone, a principio quidem nutritiva postmodum autem sensitiva et tandem intellectiva.'"

The last sentence we translate as follows: We should say that there exists in the embryo a soul, which at first is merely vegetative, afterward sensitive, and finally intellectual.

This doctrine of ascending souls bears a curious anticipative relation to the discoveries by modern embryology of the ascending transition of form through which the fœtus passes up to man. The vegetative soul first appears in the evolution of and from the ovum; the animal soul evolves the fœtus through the animal forms; the rational soul is complete with the completion of the human form. Yet the lower soul is not destroyed, but is immersed into the higher, so that *all three are identified in the highest*.

This vegetative soul is rightly so called as reigning not only over the animal, but also over the vegetable world. It supplies the growing and formative energy. It is the "plastic power" of Cudworth. It implies no sensibility in the subject, and is to be explained only as *the divine omnipotence working under the form of finite causations and successions*.

The animal soul, the soul of all brute life, consists in the energy of the five senses, with the circumscribed

power of conception, comparison, and inference, among sensible objects.

The rational soul consists in the power of supersensible intuition, beholding truths not made up of sensible impressions, but transcending the level of sensible objects ; such truths as infinity, God, holiness, and ego.

In man these three are three and one.

We adhere, provisionally, to the old Augustinian doctrine that the whole scheme or programme of life, as developed historically into existence, exists in the divine mind as a unit, yet as successively unfolding and ascending by analogies and lines of typical law. Ideally, the whole animal genus is created at once, in due symmetry as a whole. Such typical law does exist ; for hereditary, genetic uniformity is regulated and shaped by it. Why the law cannot exist without the genetic derivation is not clear. And we are not sure that the various similarities of reproduction, growth, diseases, anticipation in the lower species of the higher, and reversions, more or less abnormal, of the higher to the lower, may not be explained by successive creations, through geologic ages, generally ascending, and unfolding under typical law.

That the operations of laws, whether of nature or of God, are modified by the subjects they meet with—that law crosses law, so that compromises between them take place in the result—are facts of which the progress of things is made up. Monstrosities and miscarriages in birth, to which atheism so foolishly objects, are but instances of the operations of one law crossing those of another law. Even in revelation, miracle compromises with and adjusts to the natural conditions. Adam was corporeally created, not out of an essence drawn from the highest heavens, but from the red dust of his geographical section. What wonder, then, that the series

of animals arising under divine law, adjusting to local conditions, should in particular geographical sections conform approximately to particular types. The natural conditions, when analyzed and defined by science, if they ever shall be, will not thereby contradict the law.

And this view seems corroborated by geology. *Successive creations* are written upon its pages. Races in full myriad spring up at their due epoch. Man himself appears on earth a perfect man. The earliest known human skull might have carried the brains of a philosopher. This contradicts and utterly annihilates Darwinism, and cannot be explained by purely naturalistic Mivartism. Both Mivart and Wallace claim an exceptional divine design in man. But in their scheme it is an anomaly, a mere exception, without admitting honestly and frankly what it needs but upright manhood to assert, that *there is a divine habit, method, and law of miracle under which man's creation comes.*

Animal Superfluities Explained by the Doctrine of Plan.*

The recognition of man as the final summation of the living system is a key-thought worthy a conspicuous prominence in this discussion. It presents a striking community between science and theology. By it we see how the life-system is a one conception, a pre-destinated unit in the divine mind, and that, indeed, whether the successive genera in living nature are uniformly produced by a generative process, or by a series of epochal formative originations. Such serial formations could not be "special creations," nor "fiat creations," but æonic originations according to plan, and subordinate to law. Law is, indeed, laid *upon* objective nat-

* From a Review of Dr. McCosh's *Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation.*

ure, but it lies originally *in* the divine mind, and is imposed upon nature by the divine will acting in eternal consistency with itself. So says the celebrated Hooker: "Of law nothing less can be said than that her residence is the bosom of God, and her voice the harmony of the universe." If formative originations do take place, independently of the generative process, as the records of geology seem to demonstrate, then those originations are as truly accordant with law as any generative process whatever.

This plan in nature suggests its parallel in human art. "In civil architecture there are four principles, it is said, to be attended to: 1. Convenience; 2. Symmetry; 3. Eurythma, or such a balance and disposition of parts as evidence design; and, 4. Ornament. It is pleasant to notice that not one of these is wanting in the architecture of nature. The presence of any one of them might be sufficient to prove design; the presence and concurrence of them all furnishes the most overwhelming evidence."

But as the system of life-architecture is in process of building through long ranges of time, *the earlier parts* must be constructed in express view of the *future parts*, and must truly predict their future appearance; and this gives us what naturalists have called "prophetic types." And correspondently some traces of elements of earlier animal forms are found in later, in fact, remnants of old species in the new, which have survived their original use and are apparently otiose in the present except as reminders of conformity to plan. Dr. McCosh, indeed, queries whether we are not too hasty in pronouncing any part of any animal form useless. The hump of the camel was once thought useless, but further observation has shown that it is a heap of reserve aliment to be expended in sustaining the exhaus-

tions of long starvation. Yet, doubtless, animal parts that have survived their uses are found; and Haeckel has grounded his atheistic argument on these facts of "Purposelessness." But the eminent botanist, De Candolle, has fully solved this problem on the principle of structural plan. He says: "In innumerable instances there appear forms similar to those which are connected with a definite function, but which do not fulfill that function; and nature, in these instances, as in the animal kingdom, seems to produce forms which are completely useless, merely for the sake of a harmonious and symmetrical structure." Yet these useless survivals may sometimes be viewed, if one chooses, as, like monstrosities, being natural defects, incident to a plan in which the infinite cause works under conditions of finite causations, subject to finite contingencies. However wonderful many of the peremptory exactitudes of the system, especially in astronomical adjustments, minor inexactitudes, infinite in number, are found in the kingdoms of life; in fact, defects and incompletenesses are left in nature for man to repair and perfect by art, rendering creation a school for the development of the highest earthly intellect.

Dr. McCosh finds a happy analogy between the typology of creation and of revelation. Thereby the kingdom of nature is shown to be the type of the kingdom of grace. In both, long lines of correspondence run from the origin of the world to its consummation. This is manifoldly presented by our author. But, perhaps, he omits to fasten his hand firmly upon the real clew by which the unity of each plan, and the analogy between the two, are most clearly exhibited. That clew lies in the antitypic man as the consummation in which all the types converge, as authenticated by Agassiz, Owen, and Winchell. All the types of creation are

conterminous in man; all the types of revelation are conferminous in the Son of Man. But in the Son of Man, as antitype, are included his work and his Church, of which he is the embodiment.

Review of Winchell's *The Doctrine of Evolution and Sparks from a Geologist's Hammer.*

1. *Predictive Animal Types Explained by Plan.*—When Dr. Stillingfleet, the celebrated English theologian, was promoted to the bishopric, he was reported to have renounced his early volume, *The Irenicum*, in which he maintained the validity of presbyterial ordination; and thereupon the presbyterial party responded, “It is easier for Dr. Stillingfleet to renounce than refute his own argument.” And so Dr. Winchell, who published the first of the above books when he was nearly a decade younger than he is now, as he has advanced in wisdom if not in stature, has renounced the conclusions of its argument. He has thereby, as even the *Tribune*, in its notice of the second and last work confesses, “won a place among scientists.” But upon carefully, and, we trust, candidly, comparing the two books, we have come to the conclusion, at least for the present, that among all his brilliant successes he has not succeeded in refuting himself.

In his first volume Dr. Winchell compares, with judicial impartiality, the two proposed evolutions, the evolution by generation and the “evolution of ideas,” and decides for the latter. Without, probably, having read Dr. McCosh, he frames in his own style a brief but clear statement of the doctrine of types aggregated into a divine intellectual plan; and finds in that plan the concordant solution of all the phenomena. This plan, culminating (as Owen and Agassiz more pointedly express it) in man, is repeatedly expressed, and quite

fully, as follows: "When the vertebrate structure first appeared in the skeleton of the fish, in that remote period when life had not yet been able to take possession of land and atmosphere, that skeleton, simple and unpromising as it was, embodied all the conceptions which have since been evoked into reality in the vertebrate sub-kingdom. Reptile, bird, mammal, and man *existed potentially* in the primitive fish. Modifications of certain bony elements have wrought out each type in an admirable succession, and in the order of progressive derivation from the ichthyic type. The pectoral fin of the fish became the fore leg of the saurian, the wing of the pterodactyl and then of the bird, the fore leg of the fleet deer, the climbing squirrel, the digging mole, the paddling whale, the prehensile-locomotive arm of the monkey, and then the instrument to execute the behests of the intellect of man. Similar relationships of plan are seen running through the whole history of articulates, mollusks, and radiates."—Pages 33, 34.

By this ideal plan is explained the *prophetic* type by which, in a lower species, some element is found dimly present which, subsequently, reappears in its fullness in a higher species. So, selecting our own instance, the humble lancelet presents a glimpse of a vertebra which not until æons after is fully realized in the world-wide creation of fishes. The lancelet predicts the shark. And so, too, there are *retrospective* types, by which, in conformity to plan, a glimpse of previous species reappears in a subsequent and higher, of no use to the higher species, and serving only as a mark of plan conformity. And in this plan appear also *synthetic* types; generic forms where the constituent forms are so combined together as to be solved and separated into several future diverging species. By these three assumed typologies, the *predictive*, the *retrospective*, and the *syn-*

thetic types, the mystery of the creative plan is unfolded and geneticism is shown to be not only incumbered with difficulties, but unnecessary for a solution of the mundane problem. And yet, in his second volume, *mirabile dictu*, he quotes the anticipative, retrospective, and synthetic facts as proofs of generative development, without noticing his previous typic solutions, and so failing, we humbly think, to refute himself. His new logic may be good, but we think his "old" (or rather *young*) "is better."

In the "genealogy of ships" he traces the evolution of ideas exhibited in the advancing vehicles of navigation, displaying a humorous yet logical mastery of the argument in favor of non-genetic plan, derived from ideal evolutions of human inventions. As there is a mind-created series of water-carriages, namely, canoe, skiff, sail-ship, and steamer, so there may be a mind-created, non-genetic series of animal species. Most of the analogies he considers good and valid; but there is one, namely, the existence of useless remnants inherited by higher species from the lower, which he pronounces a failure. No "row-lock" of a skiff ever appears surviving in a steamer. No predictive steam-pipe ever glimmers in the skiff. But this failure is, we think, solved by the fact that it is not one mind which forms the one whole evolution of ships, synoptically, as it is one mind that evolves the creative plan. When men have built their skiff they suppose that they have attained a finality, and dream of no steam-pipes. When God has made a fish he has an eye to man. Nor need the steamer contain any trace of the skiff as memorial of plan. And these intentional tokens of plan in the sum of creation are no more surprising than thousands of intellective *adaptations* appearing in the details. The plan explains the detailed facts; the adaptive facts

prove the intellective plan. Passing this "genealogy of ships," we have a chapter showing that Mr. Huxley's American lectures failed to "demonstrate" geneticism, and then our author proceeds to work out the "demonstration" himself. But that "demonstration," we venture to think, is negatively forestalled in a great degree by the unrefuted solutions of his earlier book.

2. *New Inaugurations after Three Great Epochs.*—What Dr. Winchell styles "fiat creation," others "special creation," but which we call *originative creation according to plan and under law*, is compulsorily admitted by all theistic geneticists. Even Darwin admits that "fiat creation," divine origination, takes place at the very start of the system. Nay, if we consider the system as one great unit, a single stupendous animal, it underlies the whole. The whole system is one organism, produced by "special creation." Stick a pin there. Our geneticist finds this origination to be authentic. And once admitting its legitimacy, he logically legitimates it as admissible at any new commencement, if such new commencement anywhere phenomenally appears. He cannot argue that *we know generation* by experience, but *we know no creation*. And now, that such new commencements do appear, that there are blank spots and new inaugurations in the great series of mundane life, seems a fixed certainty, for we have the sure and final word of science for it.

And in these new inaugurations we may note three things: 1. The blank interval preceding the new commencement is large and clear, not to be explained by the plea of "imperfect record," or the expectation of any new discovery. 2. The newly inaugurated forms and systems appear *suddenly*, without admissible conformed predecessors, and breaking upon us *like* an immediate and very "*special creation*." 3. The new forms

are stupendous in number, indeed, rightly often called *world-wide*. A new animal world, as well as a higher stage in the scale of progressive being, spreads itself before our eyes. So clear is this, that Professor Leconte, a professed evolutionist, declares that this can be explained only by what he is pleased to style "paroxysmal evolution." "Paroxysmal" indeed! A universal fit of contortion seizes the animals half the world over, and they suddenly change by millions of millions into a new species! Or, as Dr. Winchell prefers evolution by retarded or accelerated gestation, a sudden fit of colic seizes a world-wide species and they fling up by spasmodic parturition a higher order of animal creation! Was ever science so romantic? All this to avoid the action of that very creative origination which is *admitted to have first inaugurated the whole!* Where and what became of the parents of this marvelous new birth? Were they all killed, reversing the myth of Saturn, by their own ungrateful progeny? Did they all give up their whole being to the new parturition and so beget themselves in a new and higher form, being their own parents and own children, leaving a blank space behind them? How much more natural than all this is the assumption that the comprehensive power which founded the whole plan, and inaugurated by immediate formative energy the commencement of life, here in due order of law, repeats its first act; and that in due series with future similar acts, so that the whole series is a one regular serial process, with nothing truly "special," or "flat," or violative of law, about it. That formative energy, Dr. Winchell theistically believes, shapes by serial process the form of every generated being. That belief he holds to be both theistic and scientific, and we see not how the serial process of origination is any less so. And under this rational

view we behold Moses and science beautifully harmonized.

Of the several *intervals* in the life series so wonderfully revealed by paleontology we will present but *three*. The *first* is the blank in the strata of the Silurian, as described and demonstrated with overwhelming power by the great Bohemian paleontologist, Barrande, which Dr. Winchell amply quotes in his first book with conclusive effect, and does not attempt to obviate in his last. Examining the brachiopods, cephalopods, and trilobites of fourteen Silurian formations, he found no species continued with modifications; and of species without ancestry, but visibly originated as *new*, he found sixty-five. With so vast a blank, Barrande feels justified in pronouncing geneticisms to be "poetic flourishes of the imagination," and recognizing species as the product of "the sovereign action of one and the same creative cause." The *second* is the blank that precedes the introduction of a new species, the fishes, constituting, it is most important to observe, a new order, the VERTEBRATES. The newness, the inauguration of the back-bone plan, the suddenness, a springing up all at once, and the world-wide extension, all laugh to scorn the dismal subterfuges of "paroxysm" and uterine miscarriage. Our *third* is the appearance of man, the being in whom all the types converge, the microcosm in whom the macrocosm is impersonated; a microcosm which is truly the macrocosm, being greater than all creation besides himself. He is at once animal and spiritual; as animal, crowning the visible forms of animal ranks with his own finite perfection; and as *spiritual*, basing the invisible orders of supernal life. And now the most ancient specimen of man exhumed by science is man in his full corporeal perfection, at a measureless distance from the highest animal

below him. And even science affirms that he is not derived from that corporeally highest form below him, the ape; but from some still earlier stock, of which ape and man are diverging branches! What ranks and rows of intermediate anthropoids ought to be presented before our eyes between man and that far earlier stock to justify geneticism. Not one! Years pass on; the spade of the noble scientists is every-where at work; car-loads of fossils are wheeled into cabinets; not a specimen of intermediacy appears; and the negative argument has already grown solid by time. Thanks to our scientific brethren for, at any rate, their true zeal for truth; thanks, especially, for the truth their labors demonstrate, that man is not a genetic derivation from brute, and that Mosaic evolution is compulsorily confirmed by science. Thanks for the firm platform of both theistic and biblical truth on which their labors entitle us to stand. Would that they all realized the richness of their own benefactions.

3. *Embryological Stages Picture Mosaic, not Darwinian, Evolution.*—But it is the “embryological evidence” that Dr. Winchell finally emphasizes as completing “the conviction that the derivative origin of species is a fact.” We cheerfully agree to this; but the question is whether the “derivative origin” is the Mosaic, as typical and immediately originative from the plastic power, or whether it is Darwinian, genetic, and mediated between forms by an interposed bisexual process. In either case this succession of embryonic forms is shaped very wonderfully as a small model of the great plan. It is optically plain, we think, that in the production of each succeeding embryonic form from its antecedent form there is no bisexual process between the two forms, and therefore it is the Mosaic non-genetic plan that is pictured, and not the genetic—the very point in question.

In order to make a model of genetic evolution each successive form should be begotten and born of its immediate predecessor. Before each form there should be the concurrent parents of opposite sexes. Otherwise it is generative evolution with the generative omitted. That is, it is Mosaic and not Darwinian evolution. Dr. Winchell expends a paragraph in overcoming this distinction, which, not being sure we understand, we lay before our readers with numerically marked annotations corresponding with the numerals in the quoted extract: "It would appear, at first view, that the nature of the derivation must be fundamentally different in the two cases [the ideal and the genetic]; but even this does not impair the meaning of the fact that, in both cases, we should have a *material continuity from form to form*; and this is all which evolution requires.' On reflection, however, the mode of the continuity in the case of the embryo appears substantially identical with the assumed mode of continuity in the succession of geological types. Ordinary embryonic development proceeds through the multiplication and specialization of cells stimulated by the nutritive plasma in which they are bathed.* Generative or genealogical development begins in the multiplication and specialization of a cell stimulated by contact with a cell specialized spermatically in the same individual or in an individual sexually different.* Propagation, moreover, may be viewed as simply a mode of *perpetuating or renewing an individual* which is bisexual, either monœciously, as in lower animals and most plants, or diœciously, as in most animals and certain plants.⁴ The progress noted in the succession of extinct forms is assumed to have resulted from some influence exerted upon embryos in the progress of their development. The development accelerated or prolonged would end in an organism more ad-

vanced.* This would be a new specific form appearing as a stage of embryonic history; and though many generations may have intervened while the embryo was arriving at this new specific type, we may view these generations as simply nature's expedient to continue the being in existence in spite of the wastes of physical life. So what seems at first a mere analogy resolves itself into a profound biological identity."*

1. This is all that is required for a model of *non-genetic* "derivation," but not for a genetic. The very *differentia*, the bisexual process between forms, is non-existent, and leaves us non-genetic transformations only. 2. But what "nutritive plasma" bathes the embryonic antecedent in the formation of the consequent shape? The second form is simply an unfolding growth on proper nutritions no longer spermatic or sexual. 3. But what *spermatic stimulation* is there interpolated between any two successive embryonic forms? Does not the succeeding embryonic form arise simply under control of the plastic power? Certainly it is not a bisexual or spermatic process that appears *between forms* in the embryonic model, and therefore it is not such a process that can appear in the paleontological succession of new originations. 4. Propagation seems to be merely nature's method of continuing an *originated* form, not of originating a new series. 5. But how does this advancement through accelerated embryonic process meet the case of the appearance of the vertebrate fishes with absolute world-wide suddenness? Was there a million of unknown semi-piscatory parents scattered in all the seas of earth undergoing simultaneously accelerated gestations? And what has become of those myriads of parental fractional fishes, and all the intermediate forms down, if you please, to the lancelet or the ascidian? 6. But does Dr. Winchell deny that between the

process of sexual generation and mere nutrimental growth there is an intrinsic, we might also say an infinite, difference? To say nothing of the different forms of the process, the different movements of the molecules, in the two cases, there must certainly be in the human sexual spermata a psychical element, the *principium* of a human soul, found nowhere else in nature. No combination of matter, no chemical compound, no nutrimental element, contains it, or is able to go through its processes or achieve its final human product. Otherwise spontaneous generation might be accomplished. There is the inauguration of a new personality. And it is that primal psychical element in the sperma which at start decides the rank of the final product in the scale of being. The primal vesicle, similar as it seems to all other primal vesicles, contains the secret differentiating cause that determines whether the embryo shall stop at fish, or dog, or emerge into immortal man. The human embryo never was a fish or a quadruped. It was from its beginning human, instinct with humanity. For the parent determines the child. To identify generation with growth is so a fatal fallacy. On the whole, Dr. Winchell does not make clear to our unscientific ignorance how a non-genetic series of forms can picture a specifically genetic series of species. We see in that series a picture of our present view of the Mosaic evolution, but not of the Darwinian or the Copeian.

The Two Evolutionary Maps—Winchell and Rawlinson.

Dr. Winchell's map of the origin and migrations of the race, found in his *Pre-Adamites*, finely illustrates his scheme. Assuming that our race takes origin in the now submerged land of Lemuria, of which Madagascar is an unburied remnant, he traces the various routes of migration over the earth. From this primor-

dial spot, first, there departs a line eastward to Australia, and thence over the Pacific isles to South America; and this marks the track of the earliest and lowest of the human race, the *Australians*. Next, westward curves a line into the southern half of Africa, cutting various graceful flourishes, and ending with an arrow's head at various points, and this is the next earliest and lowest race, the *Negroes*. The third line, of a brown color, shoots up northward, and sweeps over all northern Europe and North America, symbolizing the great brown Mongoloid race. Finally a briefer line ascends to western Asia, called the Dravidian; but as it begins to turn its course from north to west, it changes its color from dark brown to bright red, indicating that the Dravidian had become Caucasian, and is now curving his beautiful lines over the lands of modern Christendom. Our Adamic race is, therefore, traceable back to Lemuria through the Dravidian, and the change from dark to red marks shows when and where by an upward development the Adamic race begins. Now in Genesis the word Adam in the Hebrew has really two meanings. It is a race name, designating a people, and a personal, designating an individual. As a race name, Adam begins with the reddening of the Dravidians into Adamites: as a personal name, Adam designates the earliest ancestor known to the Jews.

The process by which the transition is made from Dravidian to Adamite is a purely natural one, and is suggested to be by an *albinosie*. We are told, "Dr. John Davy, after describing a fine Albino girl of Ceylon, adds: 'It is easy to conceive that an accidental variety of this kind might propagate, and that the white race of mankind is sprung from such an accidental variety. The East Indians are of this opinion; and there is a tradition or story among them in which this origin

is assigned to us.'” But if a white race thus suddenly springs up by an *albinosis*, a whitening, why not a black race by a *melanosis*, a blackening?

Let us now suppose that Dr. Rawlinson, assuming the literal biblical Genesis narrative with the Septuagint chronology, and a degeneracy of the race from its origin, should construct a counter ideal racial map. Assuming not, with Dr. Winchell, that “man is a tropical animal,” but that he is a semi-tropical *being*, created at the center, most suited to his highest nature, he finds that as the race diverges from that center it deteriorates under various depressing conditions, physical and moral, external and internal. He shows, from Peschel perhaps, how rapidly emigrations can take place in early ages when men are hardy and adventurous, and yet how large a share of the earth is found unoccupied, even in late prehistoric times. He shows how much more plastic the race was in filling out its programme of possible divergences in the rapidly incurred conditions, and how permanent the traits acquired by the divergent varieties of race often become. He may find no great difficulty in showing how, after the flood, the three sons of Noah may, within the thousand or two years from the flood permitted by the Septuagint, have sent the Mongol, the Negro, and the Australian, with all their present characteristics, to about their present abodes. Guided by that wonderful chart of ethnology, the tenth chapter of Genesis down to its date, he justly presumes that it must be supplemented by later history. The projecting lines of that chart are pointers, and Dr. Rawlinson finds it easy by simply developing them in their indicated directions to *bring his pencil to every point of present human habitation.*

Is Evolution always Ascending and always Slow ?

Two points, especially, will Dr. Winchell make against this rival map. *First*, evolution, whether by genetic derivation or by divine fiat, is always ascending, so that we must find the earliest race in the lowest ; and, *second*, the rate of change in races is immensely slow, so that ages on ages are necessary for the production of the present divergences of races. On both these points, with our present light, we are disposed to concur with Rawlinson.

On the *first* of these two points Dr Winchell has written an able chapter, which, after our repeated reading, seems to us to miss the real question. *Species*, we admit, do, as a general law, both by the Mosaic and Darwinian evolution, *ascend* ; but certainly *varieties* of species do abundantly *degenerate*. Now Rawlinson may affirm that man is a species, and all his degenerations are varieties, and varieties, even in the animal world, are largely degenerate. Says Professor Cabell, of the University of Virginia (*Unity of Mankind*, Carters, 1859), "Swine in some countries have degenerated into races, which in singularity far exceed any thing that has been found strange in bodily variety in the human race." That seems a pregnant sentence. Here is a vast animal species whose Adam comes first, whose varieties degenerate down an inclined plane to the lowest extreme. Professor Winchell's law seems to be reversed. The highest is first, the lowest is last. Adam we find at the summit, degenerating through the Mongoloid and the Negro to the Australian.

The *second point* is a query whether the formation of a new variety requires a long period of time. And here, first, we can easily conceive a superior plasticity to variation in a young species. Endowed within itself

with a certain range of possible variations, the human species quickly, by emigration ranging through the various conditions of the earth, may early fill out its programme of possible variations, and then the varieties may by continuance acquire almost the fixedness of species. A new variety may start in a single individual. Seth Wright's celebrated new breed of sheep, whose legs were too short to leap fences, commenced with a single birth. And the following late and well-authenticated fact raises a grave suspicion that in the human species a variation of the extremest kind may commence with a single individual. We adduce it from the *Philadelphia Press* of May 2, 1880.

In the year 1879 there was born to Mary Salter, the Irish-descended wife of John Salter, an Englishman by descent, residing in number 1307 Lemon Street, Philadelphia, a beautiful boy with ruddy face and profuse silky brown hair, who was baptized two weeks later. In a few days his face began to darken, his hair grew stiff and crisp, and his eyes black. "At last he became as black as a full-blooded Negro," and was attacked with spasms. Dr. Reynolds, of Eighteenth and Poplar Streets, was called, and pronounced it a case of entire *melanosis*. On being visited by a *Press* reporter, Dr. Reynolds "said the case was a difficult one to explain, as there is so little medical literature on the subject. It was, he said, a case of what he would call melanosis, or overproduction of pigment. Melanin, as the pigment giving color to the hair and eyes, and which gives the boy's skin its dark color, is called, is thought to be produced in the brain, the nerve-center of the body. In this case there is a great overproduction. The opposite state of affairs is where a Negro turns white, or where portions of a white person turn even whiter. This is caused by a lack of production of pigment, and

is termed *leucoderma*. It is produced by nerve affection. Colored persons with white spots upon them are not rare, neither are cases of white people having parts of their body whiter than the rest. The doctor said that the case under consideration was the first known where the whole body had become black. "I first saw the boy," said he, "when he was thirteen months old. He was then as black as any Negro, but he is now growing lighter, and when he relapsed in general health he grew darker again; but, on the whole, he has gradually lost his dark color, and will eventually be white."

Future research may show that such sudden change from one extreme of race to another, at first perhaps as a disease, is no impossibility. Dr. Winchell suggests that the Caucasian came from the Dravidian by an albinosis. We prefer to suspect that the Negro may have degenerated from the Caucasian, in accordance with the law of variety, by a melanosis. Dr. Winchell believes it incredible that the Negro type could have arisen within five hundred and nine years from Noah. We can easily be made to believe that the surplus pigmentation may have taken place in the family of Noah and in the person of Ham, the black.

Cultural Deterioration Becomes Structural.

Dr. Winchell distinguishes race inferiority into *structural* and *cultural*; and he pronounces the Negro inferiority to be structural. But does not the cultural often, and we may say always, become structural? To show how suddenly such degeneration could take place, we take the following instance:

In 1611 a body of Ulster Irish were driven by war into a mountainous region, and exposed to the worst effects of hunger and ignorance, the two great bru-

talizers of the human race. "The descendants of these exiles are now distinguished physically by great degradation. They are remarkable for open, projecting mouths, with prominent teeth and exposed gums; and their advancing cheek bones and depressed noses bear barbarism on their very front. In Sligo and Northern Mayo the consequences of the two centuries of degradation and hardship exhibit themselves in the whole physical condition of the people, affecting not only the features but the frame. Five feet two inches, on an average—pot-bellied, bow-legged, abortively featured, their clothing a wisp of rags—these specters of a people that were once well-grown, able-bodied, and comely, stalk abroad into the daylight of civilization, the annual apparition of Irish ugliness and Irish want."

Here observe how *cultural* deterioration became *structural*, how truly negroid some of these traits were, and in how brief a time it was accomplished on one of the most florid types of the Caucasian race.

Are Racial Distinctions Always Local?

Dr. Winchell, however, admits deterioration, but affirms *that they are always only local*. But how do we know that? We see continent-wide inferiorities to the highest type? How do we know that those inferiorities are not deteriorations? We have carefully read and re-read his able chapter in which this affirmation occurs, and find an entire omission of answer. Looking over the surface of mankind we find constant elevations and deteriorations; and when we ask for the proof that the deteriorations precede the elevations we get no response. Why may not Rawlinson be right in taking loftiest position with Adam, and looking down the vast inclined plane of the race, varied by hills and vales, to

the lowest Australian level, conceive that the highest is first, the last lowest?

Dr. Winchell gives us an admirable analysis of the dispersion of the sons of Noah, as furnished by the Hebrew record, and does his best to build a solid fence between the Hamites, Cushites, or Ethiopians, and the Negroes. Yet he is obliged to confess "that it is difficult to tell where the Hamite ends and the Negro begins." What a fair basis for the conclusion that the Negro is but a more deeply African Cushite! That the Cushite was pretty much a Negro is clear from the query, "Can the Ethiopian [Cushite] change his skin?" And there seems just excuse for assuming that the Negro of the slave-trade is the extreme result of the local miasms of Africa, mostly south of Sahara, working upon susceptible Cushite constitutions, rendered greatly permanent by long continuance. Brace says: "All travelers agree that the color of the Africans, to a certain degree, changes according to the heat and dampness, the same tribe (as the Batoka, for instance) being black or lighter colored, as they are exposed in a greater or less degree to these two influences. The lines of language, as, for instance, those of the Kaffir family, cut across the distinctions of color, and one undoubted race may embrace persons of jet black and others with unmixed blood of a light copper color. . . . What is called the 'Negro type'—that is, the low type of the coast of Guinea—is comparatively the exception." He quotes an eminent *savant*, Abbadie, a resident for eleven years in Eastern Africa, as saying, "It would be impossible to say where the Negro begins and the red man ends." And Peschel puts it still more pointedly: "In some tribes the nose is pointed, straight, or hooked; even 'Grecian profiles' are spoken of, and *travelers say with surprise that they cannot perceive any thing of the*

so-called Negro type among the Negroes. May we not also wonder that Dr. Winchell lays so much stress on the "structural" inferiority of the Negro, inferred from the slaver's "natural selection" of the most depressed of the race? The first Negro, then, if he did not come immediately from the family of Noah, was the first Cushite upon whose internal predispositions the malarial and other necessary conditions were so superinduced as to complete the melanosis. Cabell tells us that the Nubians of the White Nile were once Negroes, transported by the Emperor Diocletian from a western oasis to their present locality, where they have by reversion become virtual Egyptians in a few centuries. The Magyars, or Hungarians of Europe, the countrymen of Kossuth, were originally a tribe of low Mongoloids, and it has taken but one thousand years for them, boasting of their pure blood, to become about the finest race of Europe. They have required but that brief period to bridge the chasm between the Mongoloid and the virtual Caucasian, yet not without some interesting traces in their persons of their origin. Cabell remarks that some believe that they see signs of Negro advance in America; but he doubts it, as there has not been sufficient time. If we give the Magyar one thousand years, give the Negro from five to fifteen hundred.

There nevertheless remains the linguistic separation between the Hamite and the Negro as a difficulty in the identification of the two as one race. But this is a very imperfectly explored field. At present it seems that different sections of the same great Negro race may be as totally separate in language from each other as they are from the Hamites. African plasticity may here be a law to itself.

Sir Thomas Mitchell traveling in Australia says: "This Australian rendered great services. . . . I should

add that his countrymen are not at all so void of intelligence as is generally given out. To me who saw them in their natural condition, they seemed at least equal in this respect to the peasants of England."

The reader should particularly note the line where an Englishman places the Australian on a level with English peasants.

On all this we query: Is Dr. Winchell after all right in placing the Australians at the bottom of the human race, and so at its historical beginning? May not the Samoieds of the Arctic be really as low or lower, and therefore the true originals of humanity? If both lie at the bottom, why may there not be two original races? May not man, then, be both a tropical and "an arctic animal?" Or if the Samoied is to be held a degenerate variety, why not the Australian? Why not both a degeneration from an Edenic center?

The true conclusion seems to be that the human race is *one*; and that, surveyed as a whole, it rounds in upon itself exclusively, girt around with a chasm separating it from all other living races. The highest can pass to the lowest, the lowest to the highest, in the due conditions. Says Mivart: "Sir John Lubbock quotes with approval from Mr. Sproat the opinion that the difference between the savage and the cultivated mind is merely between the more or less aroused condition of the one and the same mind. The quotation is made in reference to the Ahts of North-western America: 'The native mind, to an educated man, seems generally to be asleep; and, if you suddenly ask a novel question, you have to repeat it while the mind of the savage is awaking, and to speak with emphasis until he has quite got your meaning.'" And Darwin says: "The Fuegians rank among the lowest barbarians; but I was continually struck with surprise how closely the three natives

on board his majesty's ship *Beagle*, who had lived some years in England, and could talk a little English, resembled us in disposition and in most of our mental qualities." And again : "The American aborigines, Negroes, and Europeans differ as much from each other in mind as any races that can be named ; yet I was incessantly struck, while living with the Fuegians on board the *Beagle*, with the many little traits of character showing how similar their minds were to ours ; and so it was with a full-blooded Negro with whom I happened once to be intimate."

Degeneration, or Evolution Downward.

An article in the *London Quarterly* on DEGENERATION calls our attention to the fact that genetic evolution has been mistaken in affirming that all development is upward and never downward. There is in nature, under the proper conditions, *degeneration* as well as exaltation. The conditions of this degeneration are given as three : "1. Parasitism is a very general cause of degeneration. 'Any new set of conditions occurring to an animal which render its food and safety very easily attained, seem to lead, as a rule, to degeneration. . . . The habit of parasitism clearly acts upon animal organization in this way. Let the parasitic life once be secured, and away go legs, jaws, eyes, and ears; the active, highly-gifted crab, insect, or annelid may become a mere sac, absorbing nourishment and laying eggs.' 2. Fixity or immobility is another reason, as we see in the case of the barnacle. 3. Another cause of the degeneration of animal forms is distinguished as *vegetative nutrition*. 'Let us suppose a race of animals fitted and accustomed to catch their food, and having a variety of organs to help them in this chase—suppose such animals suddenly to acquire the power of feeding on the carbonic acid

dissolved in the water around them just as green plants do. This would lead to a degeneration; they would cease to hunt their food, and would bask in the sunlight, taking food in by the whole surface, as plants do by their leaves. Certain small flat worms, by name *Convoluta*, of a bright green color, appear to be in this condition. Their green color is known to be the same substance as leaf-green; and Mr. Patrick Geddes has recently shown that by the aid of this green substance they feed on carbonic acid, making starch from it as plants do. As a consequence, we find that their stomachs and intestines, as well as their locomotive organs, become simplified, since they are but little wanted.'"

Now these three conditions upon inspection will, we think, be found reducible to one, *inactivity*, or rather the cessation of the need of activity for satisfied existence. The hardships of life requiring exertion for existence are the sources of improvement, progress, elevation. All nature, perhaps, must thus *work* to obtain ascendancy in the scale of being.

Applying this to the races of mankind, it is said that the law of human progress and regress is explained. Hardships train a people to action, and the ascendancy or even supremacy is thereby attained. But the repose of victory is the fatal beginning of decay. Professor Lankester maintains, however, that science is for the human race the source of safety. Men *know the causes of decline*, and thence are able to avoid them. Hence, for our race, at its present summit of advancement, the course of ascending progress is a plain, clear, maintainable line. To this our reviewer demurs.

He denies that the *knowledge* is likely to secure the requisite action. Will a people at the summit of prosperous ease subject themselves to the hardships of their earlier adversity? The very nature of their enjoyment

secures that enervation which is the very *exhaustion of the power* of energetic action. And hence he concludes that the true safeguard lies in the transcendent element of our *spiritual nature*. The value of that element we readily concede; but our spiritual elevation must not be of the Simon Stylites order, for that produced degeneration.

The source of elevation, the proof against degeneration, let us call *athletism*. It is the vigorous training of our whole nature to its highest tension, physical, mental, moral. Now is it necessary, in order to this *athletic* training, to reproduce the hardships of barbarian or semi-civilized life? May not action be as attainable, and as fully motivated, by the desire of higher ascendancies as by the lower? May not each new level of life become platform for further arduous exertion for a still higher step of the terrace? That lower stage was but one of the lower platforms of the terrace. Where is the topmost plane that leaves no incitement for the higher?

Both Moses and Darwin declare for an ascending evolution. According to both, ascending progress is the law, degeneration is the limited exception. And the degeneration tends to destruction, and so the ascent becomes cleaner and more positive. The first chapter of Genesis gives us the ascending steps. Assuming, as we do, the immutability of the boundary line between species, large on any view may be the area of mutability within the boundary of a given species. We know what varieties are included within the limits of humanity. We are not convinced that any lower species has crossed the line up into humanity; we do not believe that man on earth will ever cross the upper line and rise above humanity. But as our GENESIS pictures the process by which man attained his supremacy at the head of creation, so our APOCALYPSE tells us of man's

gradual attainment of the height of his own terrene nature, and then the sudden more than restoration of his Edenic state.

Impossible Criteria Separating Man from Brute.

In Mr. Leslie's chapter on *The Dignity of Man*, the human and the brutal are both physiologically and psychologically identified; yet the brutality of humanity is at the close somehow soothed by the ideal presentation of the typical highest man, the Christ. Cheerfully admitting that Professor Leslie is not to be identified with the materialistic school of Haeckel, we profoundly deplore his writing so brutalistic a paragraph as the following, every sentence of which, we think, is a disaster. He is abolishing the criteria that would differentiate man from brute: "Language is no criterion, for every animal has a language of its own. The sense of the ridiculous is possessed by brutes, who laugh with their eyes or tail, if not with their whole face as man does. The faculty of worship *in itself* is no distinction; for the devotion of a dog to his master, of a lover to his mistress, of a Christian to his Saviour, of an angel to his God, has the same essential root, so far as we can see. Susceptibility to improvement is not peculiar to man; nor the natural law by which there occurs an hereditary accumulation of acquired powers. This, also, and all the before-mentioned criteria, are only available for a difference in *degree*, but not for a difference in kind, distinguishing man above the rest of creation."

To the first of the above sentences we reply that not only has every animal its own "LANGUAGE," but every inanimate object has a "language," as clear and as significant as the animal. The roar of the cataract is at least as loud and as full of meaning as the roar of a lion. Cataract thereby announces his own nature, and

threatens what he will do if you get in his way. The howl of a tempest, more significant than the howl of the wolf, tells that a whole ship-load of humanity is going to the depths of death. The whistling wind threatens more ferociously than the hiss of a snake. God has given to all natural things around us voices and utterances to warn and instruct us, so that it is a sociable world we are in. And if it be replied that such noises are not "language," since they are not the expressions of the thought or feeling of the sounding thing, we answer, No more are the noises of animal language, for *they do not express the conceptions of a rational spirit.* There is no wider chasm between the vocal cataract and the vocal lion than between the vocal lion and the linguistic human spirit. Language is not a mere mechanically shaped portion of sound propelled forth from an inanimate structure by physical force or from an animal frame by animal impulse. It is a sound volitionally selected from other equally eligible sound, and articulately shaped to represent a given shape of thought. The voluntary adaptation of the given sound, selected from an immense variety of adaptable sound, is the characteristic of "language," separating it by a broad chasm from the automatic noises produced by inanimate or animate beings.

If the professor now avers that, nevertheless, human language may come by *EVOLUTION* from brute utterance, we promptly answer, No, sir. Evolution implies that the product is *rolled out* from an antecedent *in which* it is contained; and human language is not contained in brute vocality, and so cannot be evolved from it. You may in thought, *by subtraction and addition*, exchange brute vocality *for* human language. Take away all that is brute and *superadd* all that is human, and you get human language instead of brute vocality. By subtrac-

tion and addition you can make any thing out of any thing and into any thing. You can, in that way, replace a cataract with a lion. Mr. Huxley taught us, in his American lectures, that birds come by evolution from snakes. But is the song of the nightingale contained *in* the hiss of the serpent? No. You must first eliminate the hiss from the hiss, and put the song in its place. But that is a process, not of evolution, but of subtraction and superaddition. There may be a nucleus of identity remaining; but all that is specially snake must be destroyed, and all that is specially bird must be added by that process so frightful to all so-called evolutionists, "special creation." Man is, therefore, as truly differentiated from brute by language as a lion from a Niagara.

Next, as to "the *sense of the* RIDICULOUS," that is, that nice perception of incongruity between ideas which produces human laughter. No brute ever possessed it. The brute's sparkle of the eye and wag of the tail indicate no such perception, but are simply the automatic expression of being pleased.

There is nothing analogous to *divine* worship possible to animal mind. Such a mental act presupposes the conception of the INFINITE, which surely the professor will not concede to any animal. Nor can any animal think it, or acquire it, but by the creation and superimposition upon him of a rational soul with brain to correspond.

As to the "susceptibility to IMPROVEMENT," the difference of degree here indicates a difference in kind. The difference in the degree of flexibility between a whalebone rod and a cold bar of iron indicates a difference of nature. The difference in degree between the educable flexibility of the brain and mind of the gorilla and that of an Australian girl (the lowest humanity) is

as great as that between the aforesaid rod and bar. In three years the Australian girl learned to operate the telegraph; in three generations of culture the Australian might equal the Caucasian. But not ten generations of schooling would teach the gorilla the first letter of the alphabet. You have got to superadd to him, create upon him, something that he has not, something that he is not, and something that he cannot, without such creation, acquire, possess, or receive. We submit, therefore, that the professor's identification of humanity with brutality is a most ignominious failure. By the criteria of language, laughter, worship, and educability we demonstrate a chasm between the highest brute and the lowest man that can be crossed only by superaddition through "special creation."

Genetic Evolution and Genesis.

To our view Dr. Rudolph Schmid concedes too much to the argument for the antiquity of man from the fossil remains. He marshals out the old and well-refuted instances of the Neanderthal skull, the Engis skull, and also two human skulls from Coblentz, in 1873, in which were "eight marks of lower formation." The Neanderthal skull was really superior to the average Malay skull; the Engis was, as Mr. Huxley said, "a fair average human skull." The scarcity of questionable skulls is a great disproof of their being members of a great past race. As to the skull with its "eight marks," Southall furnishes the following exemplar caution against mistaking modern idiots for ancient fossils: "The Anthropological Society of Berlin [M. Virchow remarked] had recently received two skulls, one belonging to a man, the other to a woman, obtained in some excavations at Athens, and contemporary with the Macedonian epoch. 'These crania had a capacity,' said M. Virchow, 'which

was, at the present day, regarded as insufficient to give a normal physical development. That of the female had the capacity of the cranium of a savage of New Holland: the other was a little larger. One might regard that of the woman as Mongolian by its anatomical characters, and if it had been found at Foorfoos it would certainly have been considered *as coming from a very inferior and very primitive race.*'"

Nevertheless, it belonged to a woman named Glykera, and her rank was indicated by the precious relics found in her tomb.

Highest in authority on the origin of man, Dr. Schmid ranks Von Baer, "the pioneer in the region of the history of individual development;" and some of the views attributed to him are very noteworthy. Von Baer "is by no means disinclined to the idea of the origin of species through descent, whether in gradual development or in leaps;" but he confesses "*with a modesty worthy of acknowledgment his total ignorance concerning the manner in which certain forms of life, especially the higher ones, originated.*" The origin of higher species without the supposition of a descent is to him unexplainable, because the individuals of these species are, in their first development of life, *so dependent on their mother.* Furthermore, he points out the fact that in early periods of the earth the organic forming power which ruled *must have been a higher one than it is at the present*; in like manner as the first period of life in the embryonic development of individuals is to-day the most productive. This higher power of organization, he says, could consist in a higher power *changing organisms into new species*, as well as a higher power of *producing a new species* through primitive generation [that is, parentless origination of new forms]; or it would consist in both. In general, there is no rea-

son to suppose that primitive generations which took place at the first origination of life on earth, could not have been repeated later and oftener. The nearer a generation was to these individuals originated through primitive generation the greater undoubtedly was its flexibility and changeableness ; the farther, the greater the fixity of type."

Here are utterances that seem almost to put us back to the Mosaic evolution and parentless creation of man.

1. The highest science here confesses, after all the boasts of having explained every thing, a "total ignorance" as to the origination of the highest forms. Science, therefore, vacates the field, and leaves it to (not "*special* creation," as it has been absurdly called, but to) organic and law-ruled general creation.

2. This scientific "total ignorance" of the origin of the highest forms may well be confessed. For how can an important limb half formed be put forth without being an incumbrance destructive in the race of life ; without being atrophied by disuse ; without being absorbed by repeated cross generations ? And how can the definite specialization of such limb, its completion and adaptation to a variety of complex special uses, be imagined unteleologically ? And this argument applies more forcibly to the higher species than to the lower. And when we notice Schmid's further statement, that no new species has appeared during the human period, and so no origination of species has ever been *seen* by man, what ground is there for the denial of parentless origination of new species of even the highest order ?

3. The impossibility of a new form arising and maintaining existence, independently of a mother, can be solved only by a miraculous supposition, or a supernature above the plane of our present nature. More than fifty years ago, Dr. Olin, in an eloquent passage in a

published sermon, forcibly argued the truth of the Mosaic accounts of the creation of man from the long helplessness of the human infant. The argument seems to stand good to-day. Says the rationalistic philosopher, Fichte: "Who, then, educated the first human pair? A spirit bestowed its care upon them, as is laid down in an ancient and venerable original record, which, taken altogether, contains the profoundest and the loftiest wisdom, and presents those results to which all philosophy must at last return."—*Kitto*, article *Adam*.

4. This requirement of a greater primitive plasticity, and even of species-creation in earlier ages, has, we may suggest, an apparent accordance with the linguist's requirement of a primitive power of word-forming by original creation, now lost, leaving nothing but word-formation by derivation.

Dr. Schmid justly and effectively emphasizes the fact that *no new species has appeared on the earth since the creation of man*. The variant forms of species are of too low and equivocal a character to form any exception to the universality of this statement. And this is a very significant view. We know thence what constitutes the sabbatic rest of the Creator, when with man's formation he closed the evolutions of new forms of life. And we see how we are now in the cosmical sabbath of God; and how the creative days of Moses were therefore cosmic days. This view spreads the surface of the earth before us as the area of a definite period, an æon, a dispensation, or (as Tayler Lewis invented the term) a "time-world." It is man's day, in which he is ruler over the earlier races that waited his advent. And man is not merely, in our author's phrase, "a somatic-psychical" being, but a somatic-psychic-pneumatic being. He is endowed with capacities and intuitions, correlating him with supernal existence. Room

is here found for all the conditions of responsibility and eschatology. The kingdom of nature opens full space for the kingdom of probation.

Dr. Schmid quotes as expressive of "a right feeling," forsooth, Darwin's sentence, "For my own part I would as soon be descended from that heroic little monkey . . . or from that old baboon . . . as from a savage," etc. "Right feeling" or not, it is not the biblical "feeling;" for that marks man off from the lower races by a direct creative interposition of God, a supernal breath and a divine "image."

What makes this surrender more unfortunate is its ignoring the grand tradition recorded on the memory of all the great races of a golden age, an Edenic origin, and a primal fall, so vividly set forth by Lenormant, as insurance of a historic reality. Evolution has no right to forget that historicity, but must adjust its scheme to its positive reality. How much more should biblical defense insist on that adjustment, and firmly maintain the truth of our Edenic history! The Psalm of the Creation which commences Genesis is poetically true; the paradise narrative that follows is historically true. Woe be to the pseudo-Christian biblicist that surrenders either.

Evolution Requires Little Change in Interpreting Genesis.

Evolution requires no greater changes of interpretation in the history of man's creation than has already been made in the interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis. The Bible will no more fall by the adoption of evolution than it fell by the adoption of the antipodes. Our views of revelation may be as justly changed by new discoveries as our views of nature. We do not believe in the evolutionary creation of man. We shall not believe until it is *proved*. But we shall believe it when it is proved. And we shall then read certain

texts and explain certain doctrines by the light of that discovery. We do not yet believe the pre-Mosaic antiquity of Man. We shall believe it when it is proved. One may, then, either, with Stanley and Farrar, consider the first ten chapters of Genesis as a separate inauthentic document ; or, with Dr. J. P. Thompson and others, may snap asunder the genealogies, and antedate the Adamic creation far back into a geological period : or one may, with McCausland, hold that the Adamic race was a later creation. As we have repeatedly intimated, it is this last theory which we should far prefer.

LIFE.

Definition of Life.

On the topic of Protoplasm, or, more properly, as Dr. Beale calls it, Bioplasm, Dr. Nicholson, in *Introduction to the Study of Biology*, admits the true existence of a "physical basis of life," but exposes Huxley's stupid blunder in confounding the basis with the life itself. The basis is only a condition of the manifestation of life, as the conductor is the basis of the manifestation of electricity. But in neither case is the basis necessary to the existence of the element. Lightning exists without the conductor, and the life may exist without the bioplasm. And the phenomena of life cannot be *chemically* explained. There is an immense amount of cases in which the vital phenomena operate by overriding all known chemical forces and laws. These antichemical and superchemical forces must provisionally, at least, be labeled as "vital forces." It is true, science has in past times been much advanced by rescuing to the domain of chemistry much that was once included in the domain of "vital force."

It is an intensely important question at the present day, What is Life? Writers like Carpenter, Draper, Youmans, Herbert Spencer, a large body of physiologists, define it as simply the sum total of all our *actions* as organic systems; and those actions within our physical systems by which they form, grow, pass through a natural history, and dissolve, are all the results of chemical and mechanical causes. Dr. Carpenter holds that a "vital principle" is no more necessary in a human body than a locomotive needs a "steam-engine" principle. Draper believes that all the phenomena of human vitality are as truly produced by chemico-mechanical powers and forces as the blaze of a candle. And the reader is in due time made to understand that under this term *Life*, as so chemico-mechanically produced, are included all the phenomena of consciousness. The whole come under the term Biology, or Life-science. And Biology, including Psychology, is but a branch of Physiology. All that men have hitherto designated as soul, mind, spirit, are but the chemico-mechanical action of organic masses of matter.

But these gentlemen deny that they are materialists. How? By putting forward *an idealistic theory of matter itself*. Thus, Professor Huxley expends the last third of his lecture in extricating us from materialism by showing that matter itself is nothing but a *force* by which our minds are impressed; that we know nothing of what matter is made, and that it makes no difference whether you call it matter or spirit. The transparent fallacy of such an extrication is, of course, obvious to these gentlemen themselves. Whatever matter is or is not, they silently imply that thought or soul is the result of its organized form, and *forever ceases to exist* when that organism dissolves. Whether their theory denies immaterialism or not, it denies immortality. It

denies that dualism of our nature by which our true self is seen to survive the wreck of our corporeal self. If they demonstrate this theory nothing is left us but the renunciation of Christianity, or the adoption of that Christian annihilationism which maintains the resurrectional reorganization of the same body with the same system of recollections and consciousness, as the only ground of our hope of a future existence.

Dr. Beale, on the other hand, maintains that matter is found in a proper *living state*, in which actions are performed which no chemico-mechanical causes can be supposed to produce. It is derived as no living aggregation is, from a similar organism, hereditarily and lineally; it *grows* in its own unique way as nothing else does; it distributes its own particles into correspondent departments; so as to form and construct itself into a symmetrical and definitely planned organism; it possesses the power of self-motion in violation of the laws of gravitation, and unindebted to mechanical impulsion or chemical agency. And from Psychology Dr. Beale might have added that by consciousness we identify our *ego* not so much with the moved limb as with the moving *power*. What moves my body is I.

To us it seems odd that physiologists never look to the world of *mind*, nor ever recognize such a thing as intelligence, in their pursuit after a definition. As a psychologist, at any rate, we have, or imagine we have, no difficulty—so far, at least, as psychology is concerned. Life we define as that state of organic matter which is necessary to its becoming the basis of intelligence. Or, more briefly, Life is the organic condition of thought. This, indeed, defines animal life alone; and rightly, for animal life is a different *thing* from vegetable life, and so the same description ought not to suit both. Vegetable *life*, if *life* it is to be called, is the

organic condition of *the true growth process*. The animal shares the same *organic* life as the vegetable, with a higher thought-conditioning life ; so that both animals and vegetables *grow*, and nothing else *does grow*. Neither a rolling snow-ball or a crystal *grows*, but animals and plants alone do grow. Vegetable life, therefore, is *the organic condition of growth*, while animal life is *the organic condition of thought*.

How does a microscopist decide that a scarce visible animalcular particle is alive ? In no other way than by its movements resembling those produced by volitions in larger animals. So that manifested volition after all is with him the *test* of life. But even the first faint gleam of sensation in a material particle would imply *life*. And this enables a psychologist, at any rate, to find *in thought* the real distinction between animals and plants, which in their lowest orders become undistinguishable to the eye of the physiologist. The animal belongs, however dimly enlightened, to the *intelligent* world. And between intelligence and absolute unintelligence the difference is infinite. The faintest possible spark of sensation in the lowest animal being is *in nature* one with the highest intelligence, and belongs to the universe of mind overlying the universe of matter.

On Professor Tyndall's profound query whether "life was present potentially in matter when in the nebulous form, and was unfolded from it by way of natural development, or is a principle inserted into another at a later date," we suggest :

If God be, as we believe, immanent within the universe, as well as the universe in him, if he be the Life of its life, the Soul of its soul, and the Substratum of all its substrata, then admissibly he and the essence of our life were both at the beginning in the nebula.

Then it was God impregnating matter that constituted or rather was "the promise and potency" of all the formations and evolutions of matter. And so theism teaches. And so life, though perhaps not a proper *part* of the nebula, was infolded within it, and then by a divine process *unfolded* in due time, or "developed" from it. And the divine "fiat," so called, was not a formula in Hebrew words, but the omnipotent initiation of life at the moment of readiness in the succession of ages. If the nebula itself was eternal, then God is its eternal Creator by its being the eternal effect of his Causation. Life thus evolved by God from the system of matter, yet not itself matter, involves no materialistic conclusions. Even if the human soul, or rather *spirit*, can be truly shown to be thus evolved from the corporeal system, materialism does not follow. The soul is still itself uncorporeal and invisible, and survives the corporeal dissolution.

But until "spontaneous generation" can be proved to be an ordinary natural process, this initiation of life in the universe is an epochal event. It is presumptively extra the ordinary course of nature; it is a miracle quite as great, perhaps, as revelation ever supposes. We submit that thus Professor Tyndall is answered.

Huxley's Protoplasm.

It is a signal proof of the brilliant genius and eminent standing of Professor Huxley that in one fortnight he was able to install the term PROTOPLASM among the key-words of the English language and to fill the higher mind of England with excitement at its alarming import. His performance was a lecture delivered by him in one of the principal towns of England, in which he professed to have furnished the demonstration, as the final word of science, clothed in drapery of most

gorgeous rhetoric, of the non-existence of mind except as a property of matter. The "physical basis of life" is a certain material substance known to science as protoplasm; and all thought is but the molecular motion of the protoplasmic particles. Stripped of all its variegated plumage of words and circumlocutions, the skeleton of the argument, according to our poor understanding, would be as follows—and if it is a very poor showing of logic, we believe it to be no fault of ours:

Protoplasm, then, is demonstrably the "physical basis of life," because it exists in all living beings, the one identical element, whether beings animal or vegetable, whether mosses or men. This protoplasm consists chemically of the four elements—carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen. Now water is, we know, a compound of oxygen and hydrogen; and inasmuch, as, if you properly mix oxygen and hydrogen, and run an electric spark through them, you have *water*, so if you mix carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen under the influence of pre-existing protoplasm, you get *protoplasm*. Now when you thus get *water* you do not need to add to it verbally or mentally any such term or idea as *aquosity*; so when you thus get protoplasm you have no need to add any such word as *vitality*. All the properties of *aquosity* are embraced in the simple being of water; and all the properties of vitality (such as thought and voluntary motion) are embraced in the very being of protoplasm. In your cup you may hold a pint of water; in your fingers you may hold a pound of life.

To state this argument thus nakedly is, if not to refute it, at least, we think, to show the absence of much need of refutation. It seems sufficient to say that there are immense quantities of *dead protoplasm*, but no such thing as *dry water*. If protoplasm is life, then lifeless protoplasm is lifeless life—that is, after you have got

your protoplasm you need to have *vitality* added to it, just as you never need to add *aquosity* to water. Knock a man hard enough and you knock the *vitality* out of him, but not the protoplasm. The universality of protoplasm in all living organisms only proves that it is one of the necessary *conditions* of the visible manifestations of life in our physical world; it does not prove it to be one of the necessary conditions of the existence of life in the universe. Mr. Huxley's performance has not, perhaps, helped the cause of materialism forward one infinitesimal step.

Trinality of Pure Reason, Intelligence, and Vitality.

The basal oneness of animal and vegetable life presents an interesting phase of thought. Whether higher life ascends ideally or genetically is a question not disturbed by such a fact. It must be remembered that vitality is not in itself intelligence, but is a basis upon which intelligence is overlaid. And the very fact that vitality in animal and vegetable is the same entity, demonstrates the fact that the overlying intelligence is a different and a higher entity. We have, then, this column, placing lowest lowest.

PURE REASON—Solely human.

INTELLIGENCE—Animal and human.

VITALITY—Vegetable and animal and human.

This is the old trinal philosophy, the philosophy of the Old Testament and the New; of Plato and of Paul; of the early Christian antiquity and the best modern thought; the philosophy that finds in man the trinity of body, soul, and spirit. It is upon this philosophy that the immortality of man, as distinct from brute, can be maintained. Nor is this trinality at all disturbed by the fact that the *apparent* boundary line between plant and animal is often crossed or obliterated. For what-

ever the form may be, or however undiscoverable by microscopic or other examination, the slightest element of true *sensation* in the individual renders it an animal. The true boundary line may, therefore, be imperceptible to observation, but is none the less real.

Animal Mind and Vegetable Vitality.

If we rightly understand Professor Gray, he maintains that at the bottom the distinction between the animal and vegetable kingdoms not only is concealed, but that it has no existence. At base they are not only apparently, but really, one. Now to our philosophy, if not to our science, not claiming any science, it does seem that such a statement cannot possibly be true. The difference, we venture to imagine, between an animal and a vegetable is the difference between *mind* and *no mind*; between a certain *something* and *nothing*. An animal, however low in grade, has at any rate the lowest grade of mind, a minimum of sensation. And that minimum, according to a distinction elsewhere wittily and wisely made by the professor, "though very little, is very important." It is a minimum in a new direction; toward intelligence, wisdom, omniscience. It belongs to the infinite world of mind, and not to the finite world of matter. Where that minimum begins physics may be unable to tell us, but has no right to tell us that it has no beginning at all. As between the vegetable and mineral the great distinction is life or no life, so the distinction between animal and vegetable is sense or no sense. Life may interfuse with inorganic matter, and form an ocean of "bathybius," but, destitute of both mind and organism, it is below the humblest vegetable. And then the so-called "sensitive plant," lying upon your warm palm, may mimic a crawling creature, yet be no more *living* than the snow-flake

that melts upon that same palm. The vegetable fly-trap may catch its victim ever so expertly, and we may wonder at the design that formed so funny a *lusus naturæ*; but it no more invades the field of animal life than does the steel-spring mouse-trap. It seems to us wonderful that our scientists should so often entrap themselves by making the word *life* embrace the idea of *mind*, fallaciously holding psychology to be but a department of biology, which is nothing more than the vicious tendency first started by Comte to eliminate mind from the world, and leave us nothing but brain and nerve.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE.

Divine Progress in Geological Life-history.

As history is conveniently divided into *ancient*, *middle*, and *modern* ages, so paleontology may be roughly divided as consisting of *paleozoic*, *mesozoic*, and *neozoic*; that is, old-life, mid-life, and new-life ages.

The *Old-life* age, beginning with the dawn of minute vitalities, covers the ascending stages of crustaceans, corals, mollusks, fishes, and amphibians. A humble, yet advancing, series of families!

The *Mid-life* (mesozoic) agents unfold a scene of gigantic reptiles, with long, sinuous bodies, and endowed, by the *savants*, with long, crawling names. These groups of vast living structures, with an underbrush of lower life beneath them, ruled our crude globe for an untold roll of middle ages. But this dispensation went down in night. Under stupendous revolutions nearly every form of its life perished, and the next draw of the curtain reveals a series of new creations.

The *New-life* age comprises the reign of *mammals*, beings with *nursing milk*. An undertone of mammals had commenced with, and run through, the whole middle age. That undertone was prophetic; but who could have interpreted its beautiful prediction that the soft and milky breast should be the ruling trait of the new life? The earlier mammals of this age were as gigantic as the reptiles of the previous. Either from the marvelous intensity of the vital power, or the existence of unknown conditions, or the fiat of the Supreme, the living forms of brute life were of stupendous magnitude.

This age is divided into four periods, according to their share of the modern life-forms now existing: namely, the Eocene, or Dawning-modern; the Miocene, or Few-modern; the Pliocene, or More-modern; and the Post-pliocene, immediately preceding our entire modern. It was during the second of these periods, the Miocene, that the greatest abundance of gigantic quadrupeds roamed the earth. Dr. Dawson paints the Miocene age in vivid colors, believing that European geologists have not fully appreciated its glory. If man existed at this time (as the Darwinians are vainly anxious to believe), Dr. Dawson affirms that, being in a giant era, he ought to have been a giant in stature. But the glories of the Miocene went down under the wintry blasts of the *Glacial period*. An upheaval of the arctic regions poured the icebergs down upon the temperate zones, while a subsidence of land at our zones invited an arctic sea, for a period of unknown length, over the latitudes of our present civilized life. To the eye of a human spectator, our globe would then have appeared a scene of hopeless desolation. But it was the darkness before the dawn. This severe probation really rendered the earth more fit for man, and it was

in the spring which emerged from this winter that man appeared. What was the date of that appearance?

Dr. Dawson's general answer is: "The time involved depends very much on the question whether we regard the post-glacial subsidence and re-elevation as somewhat sudden, or as occupying long ages at the slow rate at which some parts of our continents are now rising or sinking." He holds this to have been a paroxysmal period, in which formations proceeded at a rapid rate for which the arithmetical calculation of modern geological progress furnish no analogy. He gives several instances in which the stupendous figures resulting from such calculations have been signally falsified. He denies, therefore, that there is any proof of the antiquity of man invalidating the narrative of the sacred text. Geology, indeed, reveals a great brief deluge, subsequent to the glacial era and to man's appearance, bearing a singular analogy to the Mosaic flood. The biblical narrative of the flood, with its precise dates and minute, formal details, reads wonderfully like the log-book of an adventurer in this geological deluge.

An Anthropoid not a Man.

Our paleontological friends have had hard grubbing in American soil. From the Floridian jawbone down to Dr. Abbott's drift flints in New Jersey, the geological man turns up a phantasm. They just get finger on his tail, and lo! *non est*. And even had they caught him, how would they show any historical connection between him and any living race? Scientists should not *guess*. Boasting of their grounds of *certainty*, they must give us demonstration, not conjecture nor prophecy. Dr. Dawson, in his *Archæia*, twenty years ago stated the probability that *anthropoids* might be exhumed from the depths of our American soil; but an-

thropoids are not, of course, men. The fox-sized predecessor of our horse was not a horse. Far less are anthropoid apes real men. Man is not only body and life and intellect; he is also *spirit*. *The power to chip a flint does not prove a man*. But, as an eloquent Negro bishop once said, "Whoever can lift his hands to heaven and say 'Our Father' is a man." The Adamic man was not only developed from the "dust" below, but endued with the divine "breath" from above, and no development from below, no genetic descent, could have made him an immortal *man* without the endowment from above. The anthropoids described by General Thomas as exhumed near the line of the North Pacific Railroad, with their receding frontals and long dog-like, or bird-like, aquiline snouts, may have been predecessors of man, genetic or typical, without being man. There may be missing logical links, as well as missing generative links, in the process of proving pre-Adamic man.

Mortillet is sure not only of the tertiary man anterior to the stupendous quarternary, but even of the miocene. We do not quote his proofs, our main object being the certain discriminations above hinted. Was the fossil man the complete man of our present humanity? Or was he, in fact, a lower *species*; an *anthropoid*, and not a man? If the latter, the Adamic man may have no genetic connection with the pre-Adamite, and our race may have begun with Adam.

If even quarternary "man" was not of the same species with our present man, then there properly is no quarternary *man*. And inasmuch as even "the man of Neanderthal, of Canstatt, of Enggisheim, of La Naulette, of Denise," is of very questionable character, how do we know that the being intelligent enough to split flints by fire or by tapping had a human form at all,

even rudimentally? Quantitatively, the beaver and the bee have as great an amount of intelligence, although qualitatively in different direction. We are, therefore, unable to be sure that the flint-splitter was "the precursor of man." But even admitting his precursorship, he was still an animal, with animal body and intellect. The higher nature, the *spirit*, was wanting. The being may have possessed an animal body, and an animal soul, but have lacked the *πνεῦμα*, the transcendent humanity. For man was not only made of "dust" and "became a living soul," but he "became" so by the *inbreathing* of the Divine. We are still left, then, on this scientific admission, ample room to deny that the Mosaic history of the Adamic man is contradicted. The view of Tayler Lewis, and later of Mivart, is left unrefuted. Or, rather, we may say that the genetic connection between Adam and the geologic man remains entirely unproved.

Man's Immortality Requires an Adam.

What specially attracts our attention in Mr. G. F. Wright's *Studies in Science and Religion* is its American measurement of the time of man's existence. The New Jersey chipped flints date back to the close of the glacial period. They are found on the southern margin of the once glacial sheet. How far back was that period? By various measurements, taken in different sections, it was from eight to ten thousand years ago. The men, if men they were, who chipped these flints, were, by any existing biblical chronology, pre-Adamite.

And yet we do not see how any Christian evolutionist, who believes in the immortality of man, can well "get along without his Adam." As the line of evolution marches on, the point of transition is reached when the perishable brute instanter becomes immortal man.

Eternity is all at once done up into his nature. His being is reorganized by a power unknown to earthly nature and taking hold of supernal things. This can hardly be accomplished, in the way Sir Charles Lyell suggested, by single geniuses rising above the level of the species, as a Milton or a Plato rose above their race. The grandeur of the event, whether including one representative individual or a whole race, requires a grandeur of inauguration. It is placing on our planet a something infinitely more valuable than the planet itself with all its contents. And that inaugurated immortal, or body of immortals, is the biblical Adam, one or more.

Feebly and faintly Mr. Wright suggests and authenticates this view. He says, "We may distinguish between the physical nature of Adam and his mental and moral nature; and the spiritual may, for all science *can* [the italics are the author's] show, be as direct a gift to the race, in general, as we believe it to be to every individual. Also, for our part, we have no objection to investing man's creation with miraculous elements." But this reorganization of man from anthropoid takes possession of not only soul, but body; immortalizing the first and resurrectionizing the last. It is the whole man that is re-created. And if our author's theology is true, this re-creation, or rather completion, of immortal man's *creation*, is accomplished through the power of a divine Incarnation. It is the image of Christ completed in man. It seems to us, then, that our author would have been justified in a far bolder statement than that of a "no objection" to the miraculous nature of man's immortalization and a completer enshrinement of the conception into the frame of his biblical theology.

We believe that the Genesis history of the creation of

Adam implies his threefold nature, body, soul, and spirit : *somatic, psychic, pneumatic*. It narrates the infusion of the divine *breathing* or *spirit* by which the merely *psychic* being becomes the *pneumatic* Man. The programme of that consummation is given in Gen. i, 26-31 ; its finality in Gen. ii, 7. Before that inbreathed spirit, that being, like other animals, sprang up from terrene nature quickened by the divine fiat. By that infused (not overlaid) spirit the soul was impregnated with immortal life and the body rendered exempt from disintegration. And so for the first time Man in the image of God was completely created.

Now "*can*" any science show that the chipper of primeval flints was more than a psychic being? Except that his work was in a more manward direction, does it show more intelligence, even in kindling a fire, than that of the beaver, or that of Sir John Lubbock's ants? Was the chipper capable of the thought of the Infinite or the truly Ethic? Was he pneumatic Man?

And, again, can any historic connection be shown between the chippers and the present races of men? Does not the very term *prehistoric* indicate that the merely psychic races may all have perished? Evolution, as stated by its advocates, abounds with cases of the entire destruction of immediately preceding races, produced by "environments," or by the destructive power of the higher race ; why not similar blanks between the "cave man" and the later man? And, again, evolutionists affirm that there are now races having no idea of God. How know they but those are psychic men perhaps incapable of religious conception, or to be rendered capable only by being elevated into the constituency of the first representative pneumatic Adam?

Structure of the Mosaic Cosmogony.

We firmly believe in the canonical authority of the first chapter of Genesis, just as we believe in that of the Apocalypse; but we no more believe in the literal seven days of the former than in the literal seven trumpets of the latter. Both seem symbols of successive stages of advancement in a great process. The six days are the six unfoldings of the created system in the natural order of contemplation, and probably in the natural order of creative development. First the *three* compartments are created, *ether, water, and land*; and then their *three* occupants, the *luminaries, the water tribes, and the land inhabitants*; and the sacred *seven* is consummated by the great repose or *permanence* which endures until now. And of that *process* and of that *permanence* every week and every Sabbath are our blessed reminders.

Professor Murphy's treatment of the Edenic state, the fall, and the flood, furnishes suggestive remarks and luminous discussions. Eden is the center of the human creation. The serpent possessed by the spirit of evil is exalted to a supernatural position, from which he is remanded back to his natural degradation. Here Dr. Murphy omits to compare this instance with the cases of demoniac possession. But why not consider the serpent the mere form in which Satan made himself visible (as he doubtless assumed a human form to our Saviour), and then consider the divine curse as expressed in symbolical terms, drawn from the serpentine guise in which he is found? Dr. Murphy recognizes the importance of Gen. iii, 22-24, as proving that Adam's immortality of body was not absolute and intrinsic, but dependent upon his use of the tree of life. Thence we understand how he was deathless in spite of the fact that animal tribes had died for ages. Thence, too, Dr.

Murphy explains antediluvian longevity, the vital power of the early use of that tree remained unspent for centuries. To this we may add, that connected with the tree of life as its center was the entire bloom of Eden ; and by their proximity to Eden, through divine favor, the patriarchal line, from which Christ descended, may have possessed a longevity unknown to the tribes which scattered farthest abroad. Is there any analogy between the intense primitive vitality which produced the gigantic geologic forms and that which produced the antediluvian longevity?

Had man not sinned, by Dr. Murphy's view, the tree of life was so capable of expanding its influence as to vitalize the entire unfallen race. If the flood was local, as he supposes, the earliest and farthest wandering tribes—the "Turanean"—may have originated earlier than that event ; for we cannot believe, with him, that the antediluvian world was not very populous. It must also result, and is doubtless true, that the earth underwent no great change from the curse at the fall, though it lost the renovating influence of an overspreading Eden. Nor does it seem clear that we can accept the conception of some German theologians, that the disorder of the earth is due to the fall of Satan, for the same mixture of order and disorder reigns, so far as our observation can reach, through the entire material universe.

On the hypothesis that the chapter is simply a picture of the creation as previously outlined in the divine mind, Mr. Rorison's analysis of the six creative days, slightly modified, might be thus exhibited.

The six days may be set in double threes :

- | | |
|----------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Light. | 1. Lights. |
| 2. Watery Expanse. | 2. Water animals and birds. |
| 3. Vegetative earth. | 3. Land animals—Man. |

It will be seen that each digit of the first column corresponds with the same digit in the second column. Each digit in the first row denotes a created *residence*; and the same digit in the second row denotes its created occupant. *Light* is created at figure 1 in the first three, and the *luminaries* as its tenants at figure 1 of the second three. Second in both are the *waters and the expanse* tenanted with *water animals and birds*. Third in both is the prepared *earth* with its highest *order of tenantry*.

In both rows there is a parallel descent, the three grades of which are, the empyrean, the medial, and the terrene; the ethereal, the fluid, and the solid; the skies, the atmosphere, the earth. The narrative goes upon the plan that the whole system was constructed the first three days, and stocked with occupants the second three days. A similar instance of double threes will be found in the Lord's Prayer, as presented in *Whedon's Commentary*, page 93. In the first three of the prayer also will, we think, be found nearly the same descent—celestial, medial, terrestrial. It will be seen that, according to this analysis, the plan of the creative days is not naturalistic but artificial. This, if so, would seem to close the issue between the "cosmogony of Moses" and the geology of science.

We give our decided though not irreversible approval to Mr. Rorison's exposition of the Mosaic creation. The analysis of the interior structure of the first chapter of Genesis clearly demonstrates to our view that it is constructed on other than scientific principles. All the ingenious theories by which it has been forced to agree with science are purely unscientific dreams. The six days are divisible into two sets of *three*; the former set presents the receptacles, and the latter set the occupants. The number seven symbolizes (see *Whedon's*

Commentary, Luke x, 13) God's development of creation. Its sublime imagery and majestic rhythm entitle it to be styled the Psalm of Creation. And we heartily repeat a former thought of our own, not as a fact, but as a favorite fancy, that it may have been composed by Adam, and chanted in the Church of the patriarchal ages.

The rhythmical character of that passage, its stately style, its parallelisms, its refrains, its unity within itself, all combine to show that it is a *poem*. Analysis of its interior structure exhibits a most artificial synthesis, founded upon well-known sacred numbers. It is, therefore, a grand Symbolic Hymn of the Creation, composed, perhaps, by Adam himself, and handed down to Moses through the line of the patriarchal Church, to commemorate the great fact that *this world is the work of a triune God*. We no more believe that it is a detail of the process of creation, as furnished by modern science, than that the description of the New Jerusalem is a true physical picture of the heavenly state. The Bible opens with a primordial apocalypse, and closes with a terminal apocalypse. And this parallel is curiously indicated by the fact that the same symbolic numbers, in different combinations, prevail in both passages. The seven (3+4) of the creative record is paralleled by the twelve (3×4) of the pictorial New Jerusalem.

Resemblance Between Religion and Science.

The religion with which Mr. Bixby (*Similarities of Physical and Religious Knowledge*) proposes to reconcile science is a religion of a very scant pattern. It rejects the Trinity, the incarnation, and all those specific and inspiring truths with which a Wesley or a Moody stirs the hearts and reforms the characters of men. He rejects miracles, and so holds religion within

the bounds of lower nature. He hustles the Bible into the same crowd with the Vedas and the Koran. He deals unceremoniously with the Church and all her history. If his were all the religion that can be reconciled with science, his work of mediation we should hold to be of little value. Happily, however, his argument as truly authenticates the Trinity with all its results as it does his own slender creed.

He compares science and religion in respect to their *methods*, their *objects*, and their *degrees of certainty*, and finds that science can in these vital respects claim no exclusive superiority over religion.

1. As to *methods*. It is untruly claimed that science sustains herself in the use of sense-observation, induction, deduction of experimental tests, and verification, while religion deals in intuitions, authority, and analogy. Science plentifully relies upon intuition, and, in fact, geometry and arithmetic are purely intuitional sciences. We know the existence of an external world only by intuitional faith. Then there are what he does not, but that we would, call Primordial Assumptions rather than intuitions, that lie at the basis of all science. Such assumptions, uncognizable by sense, are the indestructibility of matter, the uniformity of nature, the laws of motion, the persistence of force, and gravitation. These principles cannot be proved; they are not intuitively seen, like a geometrical truth, but they are *assumed by faith*, and must be assumed before we can commence any course of physical reasoning.

2. As to *objects*. It is falsely claimed that science deals with pure mundane and sensible objects, while religion alone mounts into the immaterial, the transcendental, and the infinite. Science dwells amid invisibilities and infinities. No physicist ever saw that parabola which he affirms that a rifle-ball describes; no

chemist ever saw oxygen. There are musical notes illimitably above and illimitably below what human ear has ever heard. Who ever saw a molecule, much less an atom? Geometry is familiar with infinities. Does not science deal with those unseen infinities, time and space? Who ever saw gravitation, and who doubts its unlimited extension? What about force? Who ever saw it? If it be limited to objective matter, how does it pass through pure space? And who can draw a boundary line around its extension? Who has seen, can measure, can reconcile the contrarieties of the luminiferous ether? And we may here add, as Mr. Bixby does not, why should the mind which dwells amid these mysteries and irreconcilabilities launch any sarcasms at the Trinity or the Incarnation? Trained by conceptions like these, science ought readily to accept those divine mysteries transmitted by the Church of ages, as verified by the sacred records, from the Incarnate himself.

3. As to *certainty*. It is falsely claimed that science is exact, certain, immutable, and religion uncertain and changing. All science is but approximation. The best geometrical figure falsifies its definition and its name. Induction is a process of examining a few specimens and guessing at all the rest. Kepler's laws are not exactly true. The minutest atom indicates complexities that science can only conjecture. There is no perfect time measure; no perfect space measure; no "physical constant" whatever. Nobody knows that the sun will rise to-morrow. And then science is continually false and changing. Where is astrology, alchemy, and the *elixir vitæ*? The rise and fall of so-called sciences are like the rise and fall of empires. The corpses of dead sciences, killed by time and truth, strew the pages of history. The scholar who learned his science fifty years ago must largely unlearn it and learn it anew to-day.

And, now, in what divine contrast with these mutabilities of science stands the immutability of the central theology of the Catholic Church of all the Christian ages! From the time of Christ himself down to this hour that theology in its great structural outline has never changed. The dogmas of God, infinite, all-wise, eternal; of the Trinity, three personalities in one essence; of the Incarnation, true God and true man identified in one Christ; of the fall and the redemption; of the forgiveness through faith in Christ; of the immortality of the soul and eternal retribution; all these have stood through more than eighteen centuries unchanged. They will "stand acknowledged while the world shall stand." Temporary and local additions have been often made to them. Special views and theories have often been proposed in regard to them. But bring us to-day the catechism of St. Petersburg, the decrees of Trent, the articles of England, the platform of Geneva, and the symbols of Augsburg, and these dogmas are all there. St. Irenæus and John Wesley earnestly alike maintained them. This theology stands "as it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be." Subordinate differences, leaving free play for human thought, there ever have been. The same article has worn a different phase to different ages and sections of the Church. And the body of articles is held generically rather than specifically and minutely. Yet in their great generic range they have ever been the same. The changes demanded by advancing science, be it well noted, are *not changes in THEOLOGY*, but *changes in special biblical EXEGESIS*. In the latter, changes ever have been frequent. Various interpretations of many parts of the sacred text have left large scope for commentary and discussion. Blundering scientism has often mixed its alloy in with those interpretations and produced blun-

quering exegesis. The false science of the day, incorporated with such interpretation, induced Lactantius and others to deny that there were antipodes, and later interpreters to deny the motion of the earth. For these errors the scientists are to blame. And exegesis holds herself free to borrow new light from any quarter, whether from history, psychology, physiology, or any other science. And in all these departments, burdened as the text has been by the errors of science formerly imposed upon it, she sets her interpretations right when science confesses her mistakes and comes right. These were aside errors, having nothing to do with the immutable type of Christian theology. That stands unshaken and indestructible.

And from her high place of calmness this theology can utter free words of cheer to the true scientist, the earnest delver after truth amid the visible works of God. The abused theologian is often himself a pioneer in physical discovery. The biblicist is not compelled to revise his interpretation of the text of the Bible half as often as the scientist is compelled to revise his interpretation of the text of nature. These reinterpretations of nature leave nature unchanged; so do our reinterpretations of the particular text leave our immutable theology untouched.

Conflict between Christianity and Science.

Dr. Draper's book, *History of the Conflict between Science and Religion*, is, rather, an indictment against the Romish Church for hostility to science, especially to cosmogonical science, based upon her interpretation of the biblical cosmogony. It was in astronomy, mainly, that the "conflict" existed. Copernicus showed that the center of things was not earth and man, but the sun; and Copernicus was silenced. Galileo showed

that the earth moved around the sun, and not *vice versa*; and Galileo was imprisoned for nine long years. This indictment is fully sustained. The prison of Galileo is an imperishable disgrace, not to Christianity, but to that ecclesiastico-political power which Luther and many a learned Protestant have held to be the incarnation of Antichrist. Yet Dr. Draper's dreary picture of the papal ages seems to us overdrawn, and unjust both to the papacy and the mediæval Christianity. It is really as one-sided as the declamation of a no-popery zealot. It is a profound question, How came it that these "dark ages" were the mother of modern Europe? To deny a large thanks to the Church, nay, even to the popedom, is want of candor. And when Dr. Draper says that the good done by the Church was unintended by the Church, he forgets how self-love and interest are blended in all human goodness. Dr. Draper writes his book, doubtless, to do good; but if we were to say that he wrote for reputation, from love of intellectual power, from ambition, we should tell the truth, provided we did not affirm these to be the only motives, and declare that good-doing is with him unintentional. Ulphilas and Boniface, and other mediæval missionaries, who Christianized the pagans of Europe, were men of pure and earnest motives. Charlemagne, whose sword brought the wild Saxon tribes to order, and to possible civilization, meant both to rule and to do good. The Church of the Middle Ages, from mixed motives took the barbarians of Central Europe, unified them, spiritualized them, developed them, and contributed largely to the modern European system. Her monasteries were the schools, her doctors the teachers, her clergy the scholars of those ages. She founded universities, and promoted the arts and sciences. Painting and architecture flourished. The first use of the newly-discov-

ered types was the issue of a printed Bible. To fling all this into an invisible background, and to bring out, as the entire picture, Rome's hostility to a true cosmogony, is falsification. It is (as we said of a previous production of the same author) casting history into the mold of a theory.

In the geological part of the great questions of cosmogony, the discussion came before Protestant Christianity. It is during the present century that the antiquity of the earth and man, and the nebular theory, have come before the churchly mind. And here Dr. Draper, more candid than many of his scientific brethren, acknowledges that there has been "moderation," and that it has been merely a "controversy" rather than a "conflict." This appears to us rather a sign that our scientific brethren are at last beginning to feel that the public mind does not admire the bitter style in which they have treated the religious thinkers of the age. They have carried this style so far that it is becoming a clear conception that it is not the clergy who are the "bigots" and the "persecutors."

Dr. Draper imagines that astronomy has given Christianity a great shock by abolishing the earth-center and establishing the sun-center of the cosmos. Man, in the vastness of the new immensity, shrinks to an atom—a nothing. Dr. Draper leaves the matter there. A cold chill is left upon the heart with the feeling that we are out of the notice of God, sinking like a snowflake in a vast icy ocean. Why could he not have the soul to add that, nevertheless, astronomy herein undoes all the mischief she does? For she gives the full conception of an absolutely omnipresent God, to whom the infinitely little is as truly present as the infinitely great; and whose infinity is so perfect that he is able to take as complete care of me as if I were a planet or a

solar system; or as if I were the only thing in the universe besides himself. Dr. Draper can show us how FORCE and LAW regard not magnitudes nor minitudes as ruling both with equal absoluteness. Why can he not see the same truth to be applicable to omnipotence and omniscience? If the telescope reveals an immensity of vastness, the microscope reveals an immensity of littleness, with law and wisdom ruling over both alike. And grant for once that man is IMMORTAL, and you make him *worth more than a solid universe of dead matter*, or a vacant universe of pure space.

Dr. Draper tells us that "the most solemn and sacred of Christian doctrines, the atonement, . . . originated among the Gnostic heretics." We are amazed! We had supposed that for ages the Hebrews had observed a "great day of atonement," in which the doctrine of substitutive atonement was concentered in the ceremony of the scape-goat. We had thought that the sacrificial victims suffering for the sin of the offender formed a large share of the Old Testament Levitical ritual, as duly and fully expounded, and installed in the Christian system by the author of the Book of Hebrews. And when John the Baptist spoke of "The *Lamb* of God," and that he "taketh away the sin of the world," we have dreamed that the atonement was traced by him to the Old Testament. And when the victim himself said, "This is my blood offered as a 'ransom for many,'" we see a divine authorship of the doctrine of the atonement. And we are likely still to retain these notions in spite of the light shed upon our minds by that illustrious biblical luminary, Professor Draper.

Dr. Draper sets Providence and Law at antithesis, as being opposites; and he tells us that "the priesthood" prefer the former. The providence which he credits to "the priesthood" implies intervention, inter-

position, miracle, all of which the scientist considers as opposed to law. Now, as great a scientist, perhaps, as Dr. Draper, who also belonged to "the priesthood," namely, the late President Hitchcock, of Amherst College, once showed, with what we think great clearness, that Law and Providence are at one. Providence rules by law; and its interpositions are in accordance with law. If there be an infinite and eternal Mind, who acts by the law of perfect wisdom, it may be that he will never interfere, and that physical causations will take an eternal, unvaried course; and it may also be that he will always intervene when the law of divine wisdom suggests. My clock strikes but once an hour; the *clock of the cosmos may strike but once in ages*. And when that hour of the ages comes to its end, the divine hand intervenes in the train of events, as the hour-hand of my clock intervenes in the train of the minutes and seconds.

What a glorious army of martyrs this Church of the Scientists is. It sends out a cry of "persecution," "persecution," and you would think by the howl and growl they make that their books were burned, and their persons were obliged to lurk in sheep-skins and goat-skins in the fastnesses of the mountains and the dens of the earth. The ferocious theologians are often after them with a Bible in one hand and a fiery fagot in the other. And the joke and felicity of it is that they have all the *glory* of this martyrdom without the slightest *inconvenience* of martyrdom. When the old Christians suffered martyrdom, it was an awkward endurance. The Roman ax did chop; the beasts of the amphitheater did bite and draw actual blood; the fire of Nero did burn to ashes. But as for these scientific martyrs, their furious theological executioners string them up to the very staple of the gallows without the slightest squeeze of

the neck; the pincers and thumb-screws torture them without the slightest pain to their protoplasm. Even after they have been burnt at the stake, and are in the condition of cinders and ashes, they quietly sit as professors in Christian universities, and issue volumes against Christianity; they assemble great congregations in a nominally Christian city, and lecture against what they suppose to be theological dogma, to be applauded to the echo by the public press.

For the last thirty years—ever since its start by Sir Charles Lyell, we believe, in the first edition of his great work on geology—we poor Christian preachers have lived with the most direful scientific thunderbolts rolling over our heads, denouncing us as “persecutors.” We are arraigned and condemned without “benefit of clergy,” as making war on science, and crushing the hapless and helpless scientists. Now, as we are rather a feeble, unarmed folk, and belong to a class that in past ages has done more for education and science than all the other classes put together, we are inclined to ask, What are the import and amount of all this hue and cry? We take it to be just this: *Science is bound, when she propounds any claim to a new discovery, to demonstrate it against all previous opposite opinions.* Such previous opposite opinions may be based upon imaginative conceptions; or upon the immediate perceptions of the senses; or upon the teachings of former science; or upon the interpretation of religious records; or upon the dogmas of a false, or partly false, revelation. Now these previous opinions have their rights. They have a right to sit in judgment upon the newly-propounded discovery, and to claim that it demonstrates its positive reality before they can be required to surrender their own. They have a right to say to the scientists: “Gentlemen, it is false that we have any ‘con-

flict with science,' or any war with discovery. Go and work with honesty and zeal in your own fields, irrespective of any previous conceptions, and learn the truth as it is. But when you have arrived at a conclusion, do not shirk scrutiny. Do not whine and whimper, and cry 'persecution,' because we put your announcements to the severest tests. Do not turn into fierce martyrs because we refuse you credit until you have given us, what you are bound to give, *demonstration*. When that comes, and not till then, your hypothesis is SCIENCE; and every opposed opinion accepts its claim, and crowns you, not with the amaranth of martyrdom, but with the laurel of successful discovery."

Theology stands, in this respect, on the same ground as any other pre-established opinion. She holds real science to be but another word for *ascertained truth*. Before that, no anterior opposed opinion can stand. We are all learners. Advancing developments, new science, have often poured new power and grandeur into theology, new and larger meaning into the text. The millennium to which we look consists of that grand blending of scientific and religious truth which, in God's own time, shall finally bring all human belief to itself.

Dr. Draper has given us a fearfully frigid book. It abolishes the fatherhood of God, and gives us the modern scientific blind god, *Force*. He abolishes providence and gives us law, consisting of the invariable succession of physical causes. He points us to the sublimity of dying without hope, as without God, in the world.

The Created World-system and Christianity.

What is the best theory that the science of our day can frame of the origin, structure, and destiny of the material universe as a whole? This is the large question, very large, which Dr. Winchell's *World-life* aims

to answer. Worlds and universes have been built by theoretic thinkers, in chronological succession, during the past ages of active thought. They have been largely of an *a priori* character, yet gradually modified to truth by the advance of science. And now, at this day, so great a mass of scientific material has been piled up by the illustrious sons of science, that our author takes his stand upon it as a high pedestal, and throws out his bold conjectures, in lines of logical probability, so grandly as to sketch the rational outlines of a whole. He can tell us with a certainty, not wholly absolute, yet furnishing a reliable repose for our faith, what the substance, the growth, the history, the decline, the death—without a resurrection?—of the stupendous but not infinite Pan.

It is, we may say, in a special sense, a *serious* subject. In spite of the deep interest we feel in *knowing*, yet, bare of all living beings, the material universe, with all the sublime vastness of its magnitudes, movements, and spaces, is a bleak machine. Fires and blazes and heats enough it has; but they are not of the sort to warm the heart. And the fact that there hangs over the whole a destiny of final dead-lock, that all its movements are but "funeral marches to the grave," sheds over the whole an aspect of disaster and doom, without the dignity and human interest of the tragic. It is simply a vast machine coming to a general hitch from which there is no known extrication. All its parts remain; but with so perfect a countercheck that not a particle can move. Not a pulse can beat, not a breath can heave. It still encumbers space, but as a worthless hulk! Büchner, the frank atheist, leaves it there through all the eternities of the future, and seems to jubilate over the prospect. Spencer suggests a hope of revival on his theory of pulsation and remission. Dr. Win-

chell, who claims to be the first announcer of this sad finality, even earlier than Spencer, has a resource in Theism; but does not tell us the process by which Theos restores the dominion of motion and inaugurates the new *αἰών*. Even our theology and our religion shudder over this catastrophe, and our spirits wonder what is to become of us ensconced in the solid bulk of this universal iceberg. And yet, somehow, our little Greek Testament seems to anticipate such remissions and pulsations when it talks of divine existence and even human penalty as enduring *εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων*. And, truly, what danger to the body of the resurrection from any material evolutions? Spirit-ruled, and able to rule its own corporeity, it stands unharmed amid "the crash of matter and the wreck of worlds." Perfect master of its own sensations, it refuses to suffer any pain from heat or cold; perfect master of its own molecular organism, it repels or evades all danger from collision. "The mind," says Milton, "in its own place and of itself can make a hell of heaven, a heaven of hell."

The world-stuff, or substance out of which our system is made, is found by our author in various degrees of aggregation, as meteors, comets, and nebulae, and the problem is first to show how these are modeled into planetary forms. This leads to a discussion of the primordial nature of the world-stuff, and the theory dawns into view that the some sixty so-called elements of matter are in simplest state a primitive *one*—"a semi-spiritual ether." All material things are then but the foldings and combinations of this primordium. "As a vesture shalt thou fold them and they shall be folded." In the Second Part we have a full discussion and maintenance of the Nebular Theory and the formation of planets and solar system on that hypothesis. He em-

braces that view under the conviction that it requires more credulity to reject than to accept it. Our planets and their sun are specimens of the entire plan of the universe.

The Comparative Geology of the Planets, like the parallel columns of a polyglot, present but a varied repetition of the same story. Beginning with a "fire-mist," which (the apparent solecism is the author's) is "cold" and "dark," there are, successively, conflagration by condensation, a surface crust from surface cooling, a temperate inhabitable period, a refrigeration, and final frozen stereotype. Our moon has gone through this process; and our earth may look upon the dead lunar surface as a middle-aged gentleman gazes upon the pale, cold face of a dead baby and reads the image of his own destiny. And here, Dr. Winchell, with a human and Christian interest, raises and discusses the question, whether the sister worlds of astronomy are inhabited? Shelley, the poet, once said, that astronomy amply refutes the notion of God's begetting a son from a Jewish maiden. The greatest of Chalmers's productions was his astronomical sermons, preached to reconcile the vastness of the universe with the incarnation and the atonement. Whewell, on the other hand, undertook to solve the theological problem by denying the population of any world but ours. But modern theology prefers to believe in a vast republic of living worlds, divided into planetary provinces, with some common interest, under the Supreme Ruler. Dr. Winchell, while furnishing admirable statements of the vast variety of forms suited to a wide variety of existences on our earth, points out the *non-necessity of requiring that all living, intelligent, or even responsible forms, must be conformed to the human model.* He reminds us that it is simply an affair of attaching intelligence to a material form; and there

is no limiting the variety of methods and forms with which they may be done. "Why might not psychical natures be enshrined in indestructible flint and platinum?" We read, a few months since, a Swedenborgian speculation that the form of a human soul is globular. And that curiously reminded us that, years ago, we had occasion to illustrate, colloquially, the difference between brute instinct and human reason, and were led to say that the former radiated from its center in a few far-reaching directions, while the latter emitted its radii equally in all directions. We thus made the human intellect a globe! How easily might there be a race of living, brilliant globes, like far-seeing eye-balls, blazing with far-reaching intelligence, floating at their own sweet will in ether or even in pure space, unchilled by cold or unmelted by heat, and unknowing of dissolution. And then the nereids and mermaids of the mythologies tell us how easily watery Jupiter may be stocked with living beauty. And Dr. Winchell's reminder that there may be beings with more than five, six, or seven senses, suggests that even the bleakest age of a planet or of the moon may be truly invested with an unseen glory, and be the residence of unseen populations and "principalities and powers." Just so the white, dry, cold skeleton in the anatomical room was once clothed with beauty and occupied by intelligence. And what is this bleak machine universe but a blank skeleton? It is good for nothing, and it might just as well be so much space if it be not subservient to the existence and happiness of living beings. A living canary bird is of more value than a dead universe.

Dr. Winchell's last utterances, as here presented, on the commencement of the visible life-period on our globe, are very noteworthy. How long since the first incrustation of our globe commenced? Mivart ciphered

that Darwin's natural selection, by his own statements, required twenty-five hundred millions of years since life first dawned on earth. Professor Thompson disturbed our evolution brethren profoundly by telling us it could be but fifty millions. Then it was announced as but fifteen; and then ten millions. Dr. Winchell now ciphers it at *three millions!* Truly, that crushes natural selection to nonentity. We may rest with La Conte's "paroxysmal evolution," but the paroxysms must be very spasmodic. Or if, with a late writer, we style it "saltatory evolution," evolution by jumps, it must be a very nimble jumper. On the whole we may, perhaps, fall back on Dawson's creation in accordance with evolutionary laws. More important than even this limitation of earth's Zoic Period is the late closing of the Glacial Period, and consequent late creation of man. For independent measurements, by American geologists, so agree as to form a medium estimate of six or seven thousand years. Does not science begin to make her bow to Moses?

CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES.

Responsibility for Moral Beliefs.

THE *Westminster Review*, not long ago, affirmed that no one could be responsibly guilty for rejecting a historical fact, such as Jesus and his divinity can only claim to be. Then Dr. Southside cannot be responsible for disbelieving the enormity of American slavery, for that is a historic fact. Then the murderers of Jesus, or of Socrates, or of John Huss, cannot be to blame for not recognizing the fact that their victims were excellent men. Most principles which men reject or accept can

be viewed as historic facts, past, present, or future, or one, or all. Most principles which men accept or reject are, however apparently abstract, probably found only in some historic concrete. The wickedness of an assassination, a treason, a robbery, is a historical fact; and yet the perpetrators are bound to recognize and accept the truth, and obey the obligation that truth imposes.

God is a historical fact through eternal ages. His existence, his administration, his incarnation, are all historical facts, which only need in like manner to be properly authenticated to impose a corresponding obligation. The truth of Christ's divine mission may just as clearly authenticate itself as the guilt of American slavery; it may impose obligations as much more imperative as it is a more stupendous fact; its rejection may aggravate guilt in the degree of the importance of its prevalence over the world; and that same rejection, inexcusable in its nature, may produce ruin as a natural consequence of its rejecting the Redeemer and his redemption. And if the aggravation of the guilt of that rejection be proportioned to the importance of the prevalence of that religion, and that religion be for the redemption of the world from ruin, then does it follow, as by an involution, that the guilt of that rejection deserves the ruin in which it tends to involve the world.

If a man be responsible for the guilty use of his hand, is he not responsible for a misuse of his brain? If the unholy use of the eye be guilty, is not the dishonest use of the intellect? Are all our powers responsible save our truth-seeking faculty? And how know we that God has never propounded a *test-truth* to probationary men, by the acceptance or rejection of which the honesty of each man's truth-seeking faculty is infallibly decided? When such a *test-fact* is presented, the act of rejection reveals the reprobate, decides his moral

ruin, and works a series of disastrous and responsible consequences. Such a *test-fact* the divine Incarnate does announce himself to be, and surely no more suitable *test-fact* in the universe can exist. *For a discrimination am I come into the world, that they which see not the truth they seek might see it; and that they which see with a truth-avoiding spirit might be made, in fact, what they are in purpose, blind.* John ix, 39. Under that assumption, his rejecters are by himself and his apostles, throughout the New Testament, placed under the ban of moral condemnation. Rejection of him is the parent sin which produces all other sins, and prevents their expiation or pardon. "He that believeth not shall be damned." Some are *led away by the error of the wicked*. There is a *deceivableness of unrighteousness*. There are those who *deny the Lord that bought them*. In fine, "There is a way that *seemeth right* to a man, but the end thereof is death." Nor do the New Testament writers ostentatiously display their friendship for the deniers of the great *Test*. Neither St. Peter, St. Jude, nor St. John speaks blandly of them. They know no innocent unbelievers, no excusable infidels. In fine, pleasant as the sunny theology may seem, which holds antichristian doctrine to be the venial error of a man as honest and as well off as believers, it has no authority in Scripture nor in reason. There is a solemn, awful side to God's word; a dark and terrible phase in God's moral system, at which it becomes us to tremble; nor can we ignore it wisely, any more than we can ignore the tragic depths of woe that lie entombed in the whole groaning creation that travaileth until now.

Thus much, indeed, is true, that crimes of action are tangible by the magistrate; sins of opinion, however responsible, like dispositions of the heart, are safely amenable to God alone. This arises, not from the dif-

ferent guilt of the two, but from the imperfection of the magistrate. Punishment of pure opinion is doubtless persecution; not because opinion is less guilty by nature or by consequence than action, but because the punishment of opinion belongs to an infallible judge. Yet when it comes to argument and moral criticism, we cannot hold our difference with a Theodore Parker, a Dr. Bellows, or a David Hume, to be as unimportant as a variance in a matter of taste or science. It is a difference high as heaven and deep as hell. That difference, however it justifies not hatred, involves moral reprobation. Nor is this a time to concede the veniality of the skeptical error preached from the pulpits of our contemporary Antichrist. When eloquent semi-infidels, with Rev. prefixed to their names, propose to inaugurate in our midst their "Broad Church," it is in perfect charity that we hold their edifice to be "the synagogue of Satan." The inscription upon its archway, placed by their own hands—BROAD—may well be held as the first word of the monitory line: "BROAD is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there be which go in thereat."

The *North American Review* suggests the same great question in a review of the "Discussions" of Mr. Chauncey Wright. Mr. Wright was an extreme, an *ultimate*, sensationalist. He rejected the supersensible, and so rejected not only God, but Herbert Spencer's unknown absolute, as a gigantic phantasm, and reduced all knowledge to sensible experimentalism. He was a genetic evolutionist, yet rejected the doctrine of "the survival of the fittest;" and so, also, rejected the beneficent idea of *progress*, which, in the reviewer's view, is necessary to a just deduction of Theism from evolution. And to this "dreary landing-place," he was brought, as the reviewer thinks, by his "quest of truth."

Inferentially the reviewer then adds: "Few expressions have been more fanatically abused than the phrases, 'An evil heart of unbelief,' and 'The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God.' No doubt there have been many in ancient times who ignored a supreme Ruler because their deeds would not endure inspection, and their desires and passions were too gross to be indulged without compunction while God was in their thoughts; and in these latter days there may be as many who wish Christianity to be false and Theism an illusion, because the former interferes with their wickedness by teaching retribution, and even the latter might imply responsibility and a hereafter. But to class all skepticism as proceeding from a wicked heart, and all doubt of a God as a certain mark of sinful folly, is pure fanaticism. There are at this day many unbelievers whose characters are as lofty, and whose lives are as pure and useful as the lives and characters of most orthodox believers; and among this number we must reckon Chauncey Wright."

Now, before we can assign Chauncey Wright this "lofty" moral position, we must have answer to the question, Are there such sins as sins of *the spirit*, in contradistinction to sins of *the flesh*? Is there any responsibility for the use or misuse of our intellectual powers? A murderer, a traitor, is guilty of sin of the flesh, and our reviewer would utter no apology for such a villain. But what shall we say of the intellectualist that promulgates the sophism that led the murderer to the murder, and the traitor to his treason? The gross, external, muscular sinner is thus cruelly damned; while the refined, internal, cerebral sinner, though really the primely responsible, is glorified. Are we, then, accountable only for the deeds of our hands, and not for the exercise of our brains? And all this resolves itself

into the one great question, a question which the transiently great men of our day would do well to ponder—*Are we in any way responsible for our moral beliefs?*

On the reviewer's authority we doubt not that Mr. Wright performed with more than average completeness the duties of equity and courtesy to his fellow-men. But we ask—and our reviewer is no atheist—did he perform his duties to God? Was reverence to the divine in his heart, prayer to the Supreme upon his lips, communion with the Holy Spirit in his spirit? Who was it that said, "Thou shalt *love* the Lord thy God with all thy heart?" Has the Decalogue any authority, or is the table of duties to God, forming half that Decalogue, broken in pieces? Is it true, or is it not, that God is the great good; indifference to God the great apostasy; separation from God the great damnation? If these are truths they cannot be sacrificed in compliment to the good behavior of Henry Wright. They are not to be judged by Henry Wright; they it is that must judge Henry Wright. What right has any man to suppress all the high and holy intuitions that God has bestowed upon him; to exclude the aspirations of the spirit toward the divine Spirit; to cast off fear and restrain prayer; to give heed only to those lower faculties that tell of matter and its properties, and then come forth to the world and proclaim that God does not exist? It *was* this suppression that made Mr. Wright the "fool." It *was* "an evil heart of unbelief." And we do class all "skepticism" that rejects God as revealed to us "as a certain mark of sinful folly." Atheism is in itself a heinous sin. It is not a *crime* which man may punish, but a *sin* which God will judge. And the apostle truly and justly pronounces a final judgment upon "those that *know not God*, and obey not the Gospel of his Son." If that

is "fanaticism," it is the "fanaticism" of the entire Bible. That may be no argument with our reviewer, but there is a remnant, and a pretty large remnant, too, who believe that the grand old Bible will stand when the *North American Review* (as well as our own *Methodist Quarterly Review*) is forgotten.

Definition of Miracles.

Mr. Edmund Kirke gives us what is by many esteemed the latest and most satisfactory definition of a *miracle*. It is "the action of a higher law upon a lower one, by which the lower is for the time neutralized and suspended. Thus, whenever we lift a hand, we overcome the law of gravity; that is, our will suspends for the time the natural action of matter." Now we simply avail ourselves of this statement of the explanation of miracle, to take issue with it, and furnish what to our own mind is the true one. Mr. Kirke's statement overlooks the difference between a *law of nature* and a *process* under a law; the former is never suspended or neutralized; the latter is often suspended, or rather interrupted and modified.

Suppose a feather descends by gravitation until it alights upon the surface of a tin roof. A process is interrupted, namely, of the feather's descent to the earth under the law of gravitation; but the law itself continues in full force, confining the feather upon the roof. The law of gravitation does not require that the feather shall go to the earth through the impenetrable roof. The law is completely fulfilled by the feather's lying on its surface. Every law of nature in the existing conditions is fulfilled, and none interrupted, suspended, nullified, or overcome. Then suppose a wind blows the feather horizontally from the roof, and it falls to the ground. A process under law, namely, of the feather's

repose upon the roof, is interrupted; but still no law is suspended. The interruption is produced by the incoming of a new antecedent, the horizontal force of the wind. Two processes, then, namely, of gravitation and horizontal force, take place under two different laws, modify each other, and result in an intermediate course of things in the movements of the feather, but no law is suspended or neutralized. The feather is under the complete operation of all the law, both of gravitation and lateral force, belonging to the conditions of the case. A process is modified, interrupted, deflected, but no law is suspended.

If a little stream of water is flowing down an inclined surface, and Mr. Kirke, interposing his hand, deflects the stream into a new direction, a process is interrupted, but no law is suspended. So if Christ, by a word of power, changed the direction of the wind, and arrested the storm, a process, a certain procedure of the wind, was interrupted and modified, but no law was suspended. If he changed the current of the human blood, and so arrested a disease, a process was modified, but no law suspended. The interposition of Christ's power was simply the introduction of a new antecedent or cause by which the process was interrupted and changed. That new antecedent acted under laws. For there are laws of the divine nature as well as of finite nature; laws of mind as well as laws of matter; laws of will as well as laws of intellect. When Mr. Kirke lifts his hand he does not "overcome a law of gravity," he simply interrupts and changes a process under that law, namely, of inert repose of his hand. His soul acted in accordance with law in willing the *lift* of the hand. And so in the whole process, law was always fulfilled, and never suspended. What, then, is a miracle?

A miracle is the interruption of a process under nat-

ural law by the interposition of some higher power; meaning by higher power, a power above the forces known by experience to form the system of our mundane nature.

Jesus, by his miracles, suspended no law. He only interrupted and modified processes by interpolating, from above, a new antecedent, changing the course which we experientially know that things would have taken without his interference.

Miracles no Contradiction of Law.

Make to Professor Tyndall the concession that Lucretius demanded, "that the atoms move in tune" to the music of law, especially of a sufficiently flexible law, and God is superfluous. He will fix you up a first-class universe without any theistic aid. In his *Religion of Chemistry* Professor Cooke showed how elementary substances, with their repulsions and attractions, were all wonderful evidences of a great constructive mind. But Professor Tyndall sees nothing but the wonderful harmonic yet unintelligent marches of the atoms. The atoms, spontaneously, take their due places and form a crystal. By the same self-marshaling, the atom, each for himself, nimbly trips to his proper position, and the blade of grass, the cabbage, the oak, is formed. By the same spontaneous, self-arranging movements, the atoms conspire into a human body. And when atoms all marshal themselves aright, and a perfect body is formed, would it not, if exposed to the vital air, be a living body? Undoubtedly. Nothing but sound body and fresh breath are necessary to a live man. To all this, which is truer than revelation, we must learn to listen, and brace our nerves heroically and tonically for far more terrible things to come. But, sooth to say, it is all, at last, the same trite old Lucretian materialism

and atheism over again, expressed in the terms of modern science. The science is new and vigorous, but the atheism is senile and decrepit.

The identity of the old issue may be seen in Mr. Tyndall's arraying the immutability of the laws of nature against the offering of prayer for rain. We grant all that any physicist, as a physicist, and within the limits of physicism, can claim for the immutability of the laws of nature. By the light of experience and intuition he analyzes those laws and pronounces them *intrinsically* immutable. Granted. *Intrinsically*, in and of themselves, they are immutable. That is, in and of themselves they possess no power to stop or vary their own course. They contain in themselves no provision for self-suspension or self-deflection. That is all physicism, within her own limits, and exercising all the range she possesses, namely, of examining the laws themselves, can say. But mark! *the question of miracles is not a question of the nature of nature's laws*. The question still remains untouched. May not the *course of events under and in accordance with those immutable laws* be interrupted or deflected by the interposition of a power from without or from above mere nature? This question, by its very terms, is without the limits of physicism. It takes no issue with the immutability of nature's laws. The question now is, as to the existence of that power above nature, and as to His nature, and what He is likely to do; and then is opened a new field of inquiry by different faculties, and with a different set of facts, which inquiry, as it spontaneously grows, becomes theology. Professor Tyndall argues the whole question within the limits of physicism, just as if there were no God above physics. Next it is to be inquired, *Has such interposition ever, in fact, taken place?* and that is a question of history.

Mark, the question is not now whether the laws of nature have ever been suspended, but *whether an event, or course of events, under those laws has ever been modified by the interposition of a superhuman volition?* A suspension of a law is one thing; a modification of an event, or course of events, under law, is another. There are laws which cannot be suspended, as the law of causation, or the laws of mathematical relations. When a ball is thrown from a player's hand, the laws of nature would carry it to the utmost exhaustion of its force. Should another player's bat stop it midway, would that law be suspended? Not at all. The course of the ball and its stoppage by the bat are both under nature's laws. If an Homeric hero hurls his javelin powerfully enough to reach his foe, but the goddess Pallas turns it from its course, no law is suspended; only a new antecedent comes in, and, under law, modifies the course of events. So if, by the unchanged course of nature's law Peter will be drowned, and Jesus interposes, the miracle is no suspension of nature's law. And even if God at the word of Joshua arrested the sun in his course, there was no more a suspension of law than when the player arrested the ball with his bat. Simply a new force comes in, and under the law of forces the course of events is changed.

Dr. Tyndall expends several useless pages in showing that the law of atmospheric pressure, for instance, first explained by Torricelli and confirmed by Pascal, has never varied. The laws of gravitation are by experience proved invariable. Undoubtedly; and miracles not only admit such invariability but assume it. *Were there no invariable law there could be no miracle.* There could be neither any course of events to interrupt, nor any law of forces to interpose the interruption. For the very interruption and interposition must

take place and proceed from the interposer through the course and force of law. The whole question, then, the conclusion again returns, is removed from the court of physicism, and becomes a question as to the existence of a competent and probable imposer, namely, a God, and as to the ascertained historical *fact* of the interposition.

A miracle may be an occurrence in the interests of the highest order. In the gradation of nature we find matter, chemical force, vegetable life, animal life, spiritual life, in which the lower exist and work for the higher. If, now, disease and disorder attack the highest rank, as they have done in man, God may use the lower laws and forces of nature for its restoration to health and order if he sees it best, even though it be by miracle. The possibility of it ought not to be questioned by a believer in a personal God. Physical science never has proved, and never can prove, its impossibility, while its facts do show supernatural intervention on his part. There was, for instance, during unnumbered ages, an established order of things under the laws of nature, when suddenly by the divine volition a living man, thinking, willing, moral, and free, was brought into being. Here was a supernatural new beginning in nature by divine interference. And cannot he who created nature and its laws use them and modify them, if he pleases? Every plan of man to which he gives effect in action uses these laws, counteracting them if he holds up a stone, combining and utilizing them if he builds a steam-engine; thus from time to time making new beginnings, and exhibiting what is the very essence of the supernatural. God did this in the creation of man by his power and will, and by the same power and will he manifested himself by miracles in the supernatural beginning of Christianity. Hume

argued that miracles are contrary to experience, and so incredible. Well, it is contrary to experience, in Hume's sense, that man should come into the world in any other way than by ordinary birth, which would prove that man has existed from eternity. But science proves that somehow there was a first man, which, on his theory, ought to be incredible. And, after all, the world does believe the most astounding things on trustworthy testimony, and it is contrary to all human experience that such testimony, multiform and cumulative, as we have for the Christian miracles, should be false.

Dr. Chalmers was the first, we believe, to note that Peter, in predicting the saying of the "scoffers" that "all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation," gives the argument of Hume against all miracle. It is the argument of *the visible permanence of the order of nature*. This continuous fact of the actual visible and reliable uniformity of nature's order, is formulated by some presumptuous scientists into such a law as to exclude the Creator from interposing in the very succession of events which his divine will carries on. But every sensible theist can understand that things would stop of themselves if not energized by the constant influx of divine energy, and it is nonsense to doubt whether He who continues the series cannot interpose his power and act between the events that compose the series. God interposed when he originated terrene life; he interposed when he first created man; he interposed by Christ's first advent; he will again interpose at his second advent. God's clock is a clock of ages; after a long period it strikes; and skeptics fix their eyes on the length of that period, and forget that the stroke will ever again come. When God's hour is complete, it is his own hand that strikes.

Supernaturalisms and Miracles.

Henry More, Wesley, Dr. Bushnell, and others, agree that supernatural manifestations, the projection of superhuman agencies into our human sphere, so far from being, in accordance with Hume, *contrary to experience*, are verified by thousands of recorded and constantly occurring experiences. It is a most vicious circle to maintain that supernaturalism is contrary to experience by rejecting every experience that is a supernaturalism. Nor is it just or logical to say, that if you admit the truth of any modern narrative of the supernatural you must admit the whole body of superstitious marvels; for all history and all narrative must be tested by a discriminating criticism, eliminating fiction from truth; and when these narratives are so tested, there is an immense residuum which is rejected not by the fair reason, but by the persistent *will* of the skeptic. It has been maintained that Protestant theologians, compelled, as they fancied, to reject the miracles of Popery, have fearfully played into the hands of infidelity by so strenuously denying the validity of evidence as to shake the credibility of the Scripture miracles; but to the Papist we may reply by admitting any duly authenticated Catholic supernaturalism, and then showing quite as good and quite as numerous miracles among Protestants. Sporadic supernaturalisms, in countless numbers, occurred among the pagans. They are occurring every day, among the religious and the irreligious, in the form of dreams, second sight, presentiments, etc., sometimes carefully concealed in silence for fear of ridicule, sometimes circumstantially narrated in our secular newspapers.

How can miracles be specially adduced in favor of Christianity? We answer, the term miracle is often given to *all* supernaturalisms, whereas we would limit it

in a *strict* sense to a particular kind, namely, to a *supernaturalism visibly originated and performed at the will of a visible agent in attestation of a religious truth, system, or mission*. A supernaturalism, like a dream or a presentiment, *coming upon* a man from an unseen source, rather than performed voluntarily by him, is no miracle. Miracles, therefore, are in fact mostly limited to Scripture history. Moses performed one miracle of larger physical magnitude than any one performed by Christ; but his miracles were specifically limited and prescribed to him. *Christ alone appears to be full master of all miraculous power at will*. He stands alone in the attitude of claiming and wielding at pleasure any power he pleases in proof of his supreme identification with God himself. The human system, the elements, the gates of death and hades, nay, the powers of hell, submit to his sway and volition. He stands, therefore, without a rival; and when we superadd the identification of his divine person by antecedent prophecy, the majesty of his personality as it presents itself in the gospel picture, and the wonderful effects of his life on human history, it is absurd to bring any supernaturalism, however clear its reality, into competition with his divine supremacy. Quite the reverse. Every other visible manifestation of the supernatural serves to remove the presupposition against miracle, and especially against the supreme miracle of Christ claiming to be God-man.

Many Protestant theologians deny all modern or extra-scriptural supernaturalism, not only from fear of Papal miracles, but because their views of "an intermediate state" are in danger of being contradicted. Those who deny an intermediate state can scarce admit a message from a disembodied spirit. Others fear a contradiction to their particular views of the conditions of the intermediate state. We entertain neither of these

fears. That there is an intermediate state, that there may occur conditions under which a spirit in that state may make communications, true or false, to a living individual possessing the proper predisposition, is to our view uncontradicted by Scripture. Nor have we met with any tolerably authenticated narrative of the kind that at all disturbed our theology.

Conscious Experimental Evidence.

Dr. Fisher's *Faith and Rationalism* sets in a strong light the value of the evidence for Christianity resting on its intrinsic excellence as directly *looked at* by the appreciative soul. We need not say that Methodists have laid very earnest emphasis on the self-evidencing power of the Gospel. To "experience religion" has been from the beginning our stereotype phrase. And we expected that "experience" to result in a "know," and not in a "hope" or a guess. The felt presence of God is to us the final demonstration for the divine personality. The consciousness of pardon and peace, the assurance that we are a child of God, the realized witness of the Spirit, are with us blessed inheritances from "the fathers." Professor Fisher endeavors to sustain the general view by the testimonies of Augustine, Bernard, Coleridge, Schleiermacher, and others; but of the more effective expositions of Wesley, Fletcher, and Watson he seems unaware.

What we most disapprove in this little tract is its setting the conscious experimental evidence of religion in *opposition* to the historical and logical, instead of presenting them as co-ordinate and harmonious reciprocal conditions to each other. Historical Christianity is largely the basis and body of that religion which evidences itself to the soul. Prophecy and miracles are the base of the entire superstructure; and though

the superstructure is *higher* than the basis, it has no right to attempt to kick the basis from under itself, and undertake to stand on a stratum of thin air. The rejection of miracles is cultivated by some thinkers with a fine aristocratic air; and a sneer at plain, old-fashioned William Paley generally points the sarcasm at "Christian evidences." It was Coleridge who imported that *cantilena* into our English thought; but we frankly say that we consider one Paley worth four and twenty Coleridges "all baked in one pie." We were in our early days, induced by the eulogies of President Marsh and others, an extensive reader, but never a follower or admirer, of the intuitional opium-eater, having better guides for both our faith and philosophy. The sneer at Paley is a sneer at Him who came on earth girt with an array of miracles, himself embodying all miracles in himself. When John the Baptist doubted his Messiahship, what was *his* reply? "Go and show John those things which ye do hear and see: the blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, the dead are raised up, and the poor have the Gospel preached to them." And he then poured forth his upbraiding upon the near cities that had disbelieved in spite of his "mighty works." How could a divine personage descending from heaven to earth authenticate himself except by supernatural deeds and words? And how could these be authenticated to others save by narrative and history? When, therefore, Dr. Fisher quotes with approbation Coleridge's fanatical ejaculation: "Evidences of Christianity! I am weary of the word," he is more Coleridgean than Christian. Evidences of Christianity founded the Christian Church and perpetuated its existence on earth.

To show the unwisdom of a reliance upon miracle

history, and logic, the professor quotes the fate of Unitarianism, which built itself solely on this basis, yet found a progeny of infidel errors spring from its own system. But how? Not by a generative derivation from that method, but by a categorical rejection of it, and a taking of intuitional grounds. Theodore Parker and George Ripley formed their religions by the direct intuitional gaze both at the evangelical system and their own. Taking his intuitive spy-glass, Mr. Parker eliminated from Christianity all but four great self-evident truths. And the tendency of the professor's over-emphasis of the intuitive evidence, and assigning it a false relative position, is to subject religion to every man's whim, labeled as "intuition," and tends generally to launch the public soul in the same boat with Carlyle, Dean Stanley, and Max Müller. And when we notice that a large share of the semichristianity at the present day is intuitional, we can hardly recognize the propriety of bestowing the epithet "rationalism" upon the holding the truth of Christianity as based fundamentally upon its historical supernaturalism. There was once in our collegiate class in Paley's *Evidences* a young man who at the beginning of the course of recitations was a skeptic, and at the close a believer. Very soon afterward he went to the place of prayer, and avowed that, as now he believed Christianity to be true, he was bound by common sense to become a Christian. That man is now a Christian bishop. Dr. Fisher may think he acted rationalistically; we think he acted rationally.

A Paleyan Argument.

There is a very interesting undesigned internal trait in the Book of Genesis, which we think few persons can examine without a deep intuitive feeling of the truth of the narrative. Let any man compare the state

of Egypt as visited by Abraham with its state as visited by Joseph, and note the progress in wealth and power during the interval. The Pharaoh of Abraham appears not very greatly the patriarch's superior; and the presents he makes to Abraham are of a singularly rural character. But the Pharaoh before whom Joseph is summoned is a magnificent monarch, whose presents are of a regal character, whose establishments are upon a munificent scale, and who requires a statesman of large views for his prime minister. And yet the differences of the two appear, not from formal description, but inferentially, by comparing groups of incidental facts. The perfect absence of all purpose, the natural keeping of each separate group, and the characteristic differences between the two, carry a force of conviction to the mind, very difficult to resist, of the genuinely historical character of the narrative.*

Historic Christianity.

Historic Christianity is in our possession, embodied in the Holy Scriptures, and traceable, in a luminous and unmistakable succession, back to the divine Christ himself. The Church of all sections holds those Scriptures in its hand historically authentic, and a train full and strong of her master-minds extends from Christ to the present hour, showing that while the Church has been the historic custodian of the Scriptures, the Scriptures are the charter and master of the Church. A scheme of Christian doctrine there is, embodied in the creeds of all the great Churches, ever having been claimed to

* Abraham is said, on the authority of Josephus, to have taught Pharaoh Acthoes and the Egyptians *arithmetic*, on his visit to Egypt about 2010 B. C. It is a somewhat remarkable coincidence, mentioned by Osburn, that before Abraham's visit there is no record, whatever, of any king or subject, *having date*; but thereafter "*dates* are not uncommon," and continued to the end of the dynasty.—*Eds.*

be authenticated by Scripture, of which the Nicene Creed is a fair average representative, and which is held by the Church of England, and by the forty various confessions of Christendom. This is our concrete, incisive, historic Christian faith, which undeniably did not exist in the year of Rome 747 (the birthyear of Christ), and did exist in the year of Rome 847 in its full and graphic completeness. This faith, according to all the contemporary documents, came from the lips of the supernatural One, whose voice was self-pronounced to be the voice of God.

Such is historical Christianity. It is definite, structural, demonstrable. With all the variety of freedoms within its area, admitting full play for idiosyncrasies and live discussions, we can draw a rigorous outline around it. By the definiteness and vigor of that boundary line we can unceremoniously cut off the ancient Ebionitisms and Gnosticisms, as well as their modern identities, the Unitarianisms, Rationalisms, and semi-infidelities that hover around her margin and illegitimately claim the Christian name. With that same sharp historic outline we cut off the modern accretions which Rome has attempted to gather on the faith, upon the historic beginning of which we are able to put our finger and say they did not exist until such and such a time. Thus do we eliminate every foreign element, and have an amply firm ascertainment of the specific identity of our Christianity.

And now in what relations does this concrete structural Christianity stand to its various rivals, presented by modern skeptical thought, such as Religious Sentiment, Intuitions, Philosophical Speculation, Modern Civilization? The relations, we answer, of real subordination, or of hopeless inferiority. The so-called *Religious Sentiment*, which reveals itself as the basis

of the various religious notions of different ages, nations, and individuals, is nothing but man's *susceptibility* to spiritual truth. As a mere susceptibility, and not a formative activity, it can give no positive shape to notions, but receives them as fancy or circumstance collects them upon its receptivity. Historic Christianity is entitled to take them as crude matter and give them its own shape. The *Intuitions*, when their respective validities are ascertained, are taken by Historic Christianity, checked in their overgrowth, supplemented in their deficiencies, assigned their proper place, and embodied into her own system. *Philosophical Speculation*, which begins with subjective ideas, continues in subjective ideas, and ends in subjective ideas, always undoes itself, being ever obliged to acknowledge its own incapacity for settled result, and has in fact arrived at the full confession of its own invalidity in the philosophy of Comte. Historic Christianity, as an objective fact, acknowledges *no identity with the abstractions which Comteism justly banishes from existence*, but asserts her positive place in a true catholic positive philosophy. Christ is as true an historic character as Julius Cæsar; and his true Christianity, as a structural dogma, is as historical as the Roman Empire: with the existence of either "speculation" has nothing to do. Even Comte does not expel history from the domain of true knowledge.

Three Witnesses to Religious Truth.

It is by **THREE GREAT WITNESSES** that we attain unto religious verity, the **WORD**, the **CHURCH**, and the moral **CONSCIOUSNESS**, and these three are one.

The Word is the great current of spiritual thought running through the written text. Save the Decalogue alone, the text is mainly human, and in what propor-

tions the human and the divine are mingled is a problem not wholly soluble. We know the text as it stands is in many cases incorrect; we are often unable to be sure of perfect accuracy of the historic statements in non-essential particulars. We have inherited from ultra-Protestantism, Puritanism, perhaps too mechanical a biblical theory, as if every chapter and verse were written on stone by God's own finger. Admitting textual error only where it is demonstrated, it is nevertheless often much easier to the penetrative student rather to rest his mind upon the great currents of spiritual thought (which is the soul of the text), in which all the ages of the holy have sympathized and been spiritually identified. We are then secure from panic as if all were lost if there be passages whose perfect accuracy may be fairly questioned.

The Church is revealed to us in the history of Christian men, organizations, and doctrines. This gives us HISTORICAL CHRISTIANITY. Woe to the man who "will not hear the Church," For, first, the Church is the great author, preserver, and interpreter of the Word. The volume of the book of the Word has lain in the ark of even the corruptest Church of Christendom. Based upon it, secondly, and found in it, is a great outline type of holy doctrine: the Trinity, the Atonement, the Sacraments, and the Retribution, from which no private interpretation must vary. In that great TYPE of doctrine, and even in one great type of ecclesiastical organization, Irenæus, Chrysostom, and John Wesley essentially agree. There is a great truth contained in the profound maxim, *What has every-where and always been believed by those who hold the supremacy of the Word is true.* This may not apply in exegesis. There may be texts which the great body of the Church has wrongly interpreted. There may have been ten-

ets in regard to physical and cosmical things, and outside the limits of pure theology, in which every individual of the Church was mistaken. But within her limits the Church does not err.

The *Consciousness*, duly regulated by the Word and the Church in regard to spiritual truth, and exerting itself in honesty, is right. The two regulatives serve to secure from fanaticism and rationalism, while the due exercise of the spiritual consciousness brings home the power of truth upon the soul. Thus under this great trinity of the Word, the Bible, the Church, the great sacramental body of believers in the Bible, and the earnest *conscience* of the individual, the Christian man rests secure of truth and salvation.

The Destructive Criticism based on Antisupernaturalism.

The latest and most destructive theory is that of Graf, sustained by Wellhausen, according to which the Old Testament is mainly the work of Ezra and his compeers after the captivity. The leading characters of old Hebrew history are myths. The stories of Abraham, the patriarchs, the prophets Elijah and Elisha, are legends. Of course so sweeping a monstrosity, such a massacre of the history of this wonderful people of the Messiah, does not stand unchallenged. There are Christian scholars amply competent to meet the onslaught. Our great Old Testament Commentaries—Lange and The Speaker's—perform well their part. Nor are we fearful of any surrender or in haste to make any concessions to the spirit of a bold and licentious "criticism" on the sacred canon. We purpose to "hold the fort."

The underlying secret of all this recent movement is the dogma of antisupernaturalism. With all the ardent faith of a devotee the critic first assumes as an axiom the fatality of physics and the absolute impossibility of a

supernatural event. There cannot be a miracle, either of action or of prophetic foreknowledge. In regard, then, to the biblical records, the problem is not to ascertain whether they are true or not; but, assuming their untruth, to explicate how they came into existence and credit. To secure the triumph of the antisupernatural axiom, the whole literature of a people, standing through ages, is to be remorselessly ground to powder. The axiom will not admit that prophecy prefigured either the person and history of the Messiah, or the miracles of the Messiah himself. The absurdity of the processes by which the conclusions are attained, and the monstrosity of the conclusions themselves, are not fully felt until the whole stupendous abolition is complete, and then comes a revolt of the common sense. Father Hardouin and Bishop Colenso are found to be twin theorists.

But it is not the Bible, the Church, and the religion alone that are swept by this axiom of unfaith. Nature is by it reduced to a mechanism, and God to a superfluity. The issue then is the Bible or atheism. And with the Bible and Theism goes immortality; and man is reduced to the mere animal. Our purest sentiments become coarse and brutalized, our highest aspirations are bent downward. It is a battle for our highest nature. Nor will this degradation stop in thought, philosophy, or religion alone. It demoralizes and brutalizes private and public character and life. It engenders ultra-democracy, anarchy, and communism. Atheistic revolution is the penalty; from which there is no recovery but on the high plane of a firm religious faith which Christ and the Bible alone present.

The Authority of the Bible.

"The Bible is the word of God;" or, "The Bible contains the word of God." Which of these two propositions is true? If the former, then the Bible is our master; if the latter, then we are master of the Bible. If the former, then the evangelical theology stands, the vehicle and the regulator of Christian feeling; if the latter, Rationalism gains the ascendant; and after, for a while, in deference to evangelicism, displaying a fine glow of devout feeling, it will soon dissipate its vague emotionalism and relapse into cold, hard Sadduceeism, that is sure of nothing, and ready to admit itself to be little better than Atheism.

The author of *Liber Librorum* is yet in this first stage of devout rationalistic evangelicism. He may personally remain there. But for those who adopt his views, his abolishment of the ties that bind to evangelicism opens the sure downward path. Theodore Parker, with his rare talent, could use his intuitional rationalism as an instrument to stir the emotions; but when he departed no successor could wield his wand, and his flock has vanished to the winds. Wesley took the evangelical-biblical theology; he roused the hearts therewith of his age, and his instrumentalities in the hands of his successors have formed a flock upon whose fold the sun never sets.

For those who complain that we have no criterion by which to distinguish the authoritative from the unauthoritative, he asserts that the true heart does possess a "verifying faculty." That verifying faculty is "reason enlightened by the Holy Spirit." This, he holds, is *safe*: for it puts the testing power into the hands of the regenerate, and only of the regenerate who are conscious of being "enlightened by the Holy Spirit." And un-

doubtedly where this "faculty" does pronounce a passage uninspired, the inspiration may fairly and safely be surrendered. But how shall the test be tested? Once admit that authority deserts some parts, and who will feel himself bound to wait for the decision of this author's test?

To our own view, it is the *authority* of the Bible over our faith which is, even before the matter of inspiration, the *first* and most important question. The *authority* of the Old Testament we hold to be mainly founded upon the New Testament. Christ did quote the Old Testament as a final authority both for himself and his hearers. All the New Testament writers occupy the same position. That a statement is in the Old Testament, in *whatever part*, does, with Christ and his apostles, render it a decisive *authority*. No one ever imagines, when Jesus quotes, that he is liable to the reply that it is an unauthoritative part. No doubt all sides held that authority to belong only to the original true text, as it came from the hand of the primitive writer. The real Old Testament is assumed as authoritative in the New; and the same Lord Jesus Christ is the voucher for the authority of both Testaments. The contemporary Church of Christ, to whom the apostles spoke and wrote, endowed by him with the gift of the discerning of spirits, really did by spontaneous concurrence accept the New Testament canon as a perfectly true, complete, and unquestionable expression of its religion. Hereby having the *authority* of both Testaments sanctioned and settled, its *inspiration* is a secondary question; important and profoundly interesting, indeed, but incapable of disturbing the firmness of our reliance upon every part and particle of the true text in matters of faith and doctrine.

For the absoluteness of the authority of every genuine part and particle of the Bible over our faith, it is

unnecessary to affirm the same mode, or the same degree, of inspiration for every portion. The Jewish Church held to four great methods. The celebrated "John Smith, of Cambridge," wrote an essay expounding and maintaining these four methods; and it is noteworthy that Mr. Wesley inserted Smith's essay in his *Christian Library*. We can easily conceive, indeed, a high state of spiritual inspiration, circumscribed within religious limits, highly and perhaps perfectly authoritative within its sphere, yet perfectly consistent with mistake regarding a secular or historical fact. Stephen's mind was doubtless filled with the Holy Spirit. It was exalted to a high state of purity and spiritual power. He doubtless at the moment possessed higher, truer views of Christianity than any living man. Well would it have been if all had for the moment been wise enough to accept his authority within this sphere. Yet we see no possibility of clearing some parts of his reported speech from historical mistake. When an unquestionable instance can be adduced of one of the inspired canonical *writers* having made a statement irreconcilable with truth, undoubtedly we must in that instance admit the limitation to his inspiration. But we wait for that instance to be adduced. The *authority* of the true text still stands over our religious faith. The Bible, the whole Bible, is the standard of ultimate appeal.

As we have said, the important question appears to be not so much the inspiration of the Bible as its *authority*. Christ, the great Head of both the New Testament Church and the Old, did uniformly speak of the Old Testament as the standard of religious authority, whose dictum was final. The true meaning of an Old Testament text was held by him, within its proper scope, to be decisive on a question of theology. Now whether the primitive documents, of which scholars decide that

Genesis or any other book was made up, were originally inspired at all or not is not so important. On the authority of Christ we hold them *authoritative*. It may be, for aught we know, that parts of Kings or Chronicles, or all, were written with only the official inspiration of the sacerdotal historiographer. The narrative, for instance, of David and Abishag may be written with none but the ordinary inspiration which belonged to a holy, chosen official of the chosen Church of God. Still as truth in a book of truth, that narrative comes down sanctioned to us by the lips of incarnate truth.

As there are men who are constitutionally supra-naturalistic, so there are families, races, and periods pre-eminently so. When, as in Etruria, and at one time in Asia Minor, that supra-naturalism is disunited from a high moral spirit, it goes into magic and demonism ; or, as at the present day in our own land, into pseudo-spiritualism. But the Abrahamic family, blending a supra-naturalistic temperament with a faithful piety, were humanly constituted to become a chosen people of Jehovah. They were the proper subjects and media of divine revelation, prophecy, and miracle. Constructed into an organism, they became Jehovah's Church. To them suitably were committed the oracles of God. Of Jehovah's monotheistic nature, and the fact of his future incarnation, they became, by divine selection, the official depositories and expositors to the world. Hence was formed in various degrees an inspired Church, with a body of records assuming the various forms of history, prophecy, apothegm, and hymnology. And when He came who was the divine flower of humanity, he hesitated not to sanction the questionless authority of those records. So much for the Old Testament.

We believe the New Testament canon to be a UNIT. It is an absurdity to our view that Christ should come,

preach, and die, and leave for the world no authentic official record for what he came, preached, and died. We hold very cheap, therefore, all dubious discussions of the New Testament books. Christ did not labor and suffer for nothing. He chose and inspired his official witnesses, he organized his Church; these witnesses and that Church prepared the *great* STATEMENT for the world. And either Christ did his work very poorly, or that *statement* contains an infallible exposition of Christ's religion. Every New Testament writer is a witness chosen by Christ; and if every line and word which such witnesses have left us is not reliable, then Christ pitifully failed in his attempt to give us his real system of holy truth. He lived and died in vain. But Christ, also, for this same purpose, inspired his early apostolic Church. The New Testament *unit* comes down to us accepted by the primitive body of Christians as the *canon* of Christ's religion. We claim the right to believe, then, that it is *Christ's own canon*, and, as such, whether in every part originally inspired or not, is in every part and particle binding on our Christian faith.

It might, however, be worth while to investigate how far the great body of our Christian evangelical laity are practically and unscientifically influenced by the semi-critical discussions of the day. They know little of Christian "*evidences*." From the newspapers they learn that Darwin and Lyell come into serious collision with Genesis. Few thoughtful laymen, we suppose, but do occasionally, in reading certain passages of the Old Testament, entertain, momentarily at least, a misgiving or a query; yet, for some reason or other, such a layman's permanent position is thereby practically very little disturbed. If passages of Genesis or Chronicles do momentarily appear inexplicable, there is somehow in the Bible a great *positive power* which, without

going into the question of absolute infallibility of every part, he feels and obeys. Those great, stupendous, self-evidencing truths, such as the existence of an all-ruling God, under whose sway sin must meet with retribution, hold him fast. The impressive personality of the incarnate Son of God, in the wonder of his life, and still more his death, somehow possesses his soul. At every communion the power of the atonement comes home upon his heart and touches his personal experience. Over all these truths and processes the blessed Spirit, with its heavenly power, presides. And thus, while scientific infidelity is waging its war, our revivals still spread vitality over the Church, our Church blooms like the garden of God, the centennial offering pours in its spontaneous millions, and the massive Christian structures are taking their age-enduring foundations. Truly, seldom have ruin and decay looked so much like prosperity and immortal bloom.

Inspiration.

So far as the absolute authority of the Scriptures is concerned, it might be of little consequence what is the theory of inspiration, so long as it is conceded that they are *sanctioned* by God, as the veritable revelation from God, and as true in every part and proposition when interpreted in the intentional sense of the writer. The question of plenary authority being assumed, the question of the mode or modes of *inspiration* is matter of permissible sacred curiosity, and of fair textual interpretation, but no longer an article of a standing or falling rule of faith.

Entering, then, the interior of the sacred volume, assuming the perfect truth to the letter of all its declarations, and interrogating its own authority as to the particular modes, we think there might be shown ample

grounds for holding that the modes and degrees of inspiration at different times were very various. Dictations of word there no doubt often were; pictorial representation, animating impulse, restraining guardianship, and spiritual exaltation. And yet in the historical parts, where simple matters of human memory and previous document were arranged and recorded, we seem to find that little else was needed or afforded, other than providential guardianship and guidance. It is undemanded by any safety of faith, as it is burdensome to any reasonable belief, to suppose that the Books of Chronicles or Ruth, and the narrative of Abishag or Tamar, were produced with the same full flow of plenary inspiration as the Messianic prophecies of Isaiah. We believe in the divinely sanctioned truth and authority of every genuine syllable of these records. They are a decisive rule of faith. We deny the safety and the right of unsettling their foundations or discriminating their authority. We accept them as a whole, and assert their every part. We shoulder the whole task of meeting the attacks of cavil and criticism at every point. In that task we promptly assume as true whatever cannot be by demonstration proved as false. It is true, if every difficulty on any reasonably invented *supposition* admits a solution; it is true, even where no supposition solves the difficulty, and nothing is left but the possibility that the difficulty could be solved by a fuller knowledge of facts.

Such being our view, we deny the theory of universal plenary inspiration; but hold the doctrine of plenary authority. We do not hold the doctrine of verbal dictation, but we do hold the doctrine of verbal truth and binding power. The assumption that we think only in words is plentifully contradicted by every man's consciousness. As children, we have conceptions long be-

fore we have words. The dog that lies dreaming of the chase has rapid trains of thought, but not a syllable of a word. We are constantly exercising perceptions of shades of color, and shapes of matter, for which there is no name. He must have a feeble power of consciousness, or a mighty power over words, who is not often possessed of a thought for which he pauses for the word. We hold the conception fast, waiting for its correlative term to come. Who does not often think of a friend's face without being able to recall his name? The argument, then, derived from necessity, that a revelation must be verbal because we cannot think without words, is not conclusive.

In all due reverence for the Bible as the word of God we fully sympathize. An intuitional religion, unfastened by the letter, unregulated by the rule, may flare gorgeously for a while, but will prove as evanescent as it is emotional. We protest against a faith without a belief. We hold to a doctrine and affirm a creed. Christ is the *truth* as well as the life; and the Church that disparages the truth will, in due time, lose the life. Those who pretend to hold the *power of godliness* and deny the *form thereof* will not retain either power or form. We fall back upon "the Bible, the religion of Protestants;" and we would rather fall back to Liturgy and Rubric, where Wesley lived and died, than attempt to soar into that pseudo-transcendentalism which feels the Scriptures a clog and an obstacle rather than a stay and a guide.

The New Testament Canon—How Made.

In what manner and by what authority were the books constituting our present New Testament selected and credited with a divine authority? The skeptic and the Romanist put this question, each with a different

purpose: the former to overthrow Christianity, the latter to establish the sole authority of the Church, that is, of the Romish Church. A notion prevails that the selection was made by ecclesiastical councils; and the suspicion is cherished that it was by an arbitrary and unfounded process, leaving out other works quite as well entitled to divine honors as the constituents of the present canon. There is satisfactory ground for the conclusion that, as the successive books came from their authors, they were immediately accepted by the body of the Christian churches with complete unanimity; that their autographs were, some of them, deposited in archives of the particular churches; that they were accepted and read from Sabbath to Sabbath; that copies were taken and spread broadcast during the apostolic day, and widely scattered through the churches of Europe, Asia, and Africa, and that they were received without dissent, with a free spontaneous faith, as the authoritative exposition of Christian doctrine, as the canonical Scripture of the New Dispensation. After these canonical books were written, an interim of silence appears. Few or no Christian writings are issued. But the moment this silence is broken, a new class of eminent intellects hold the pen, and from them we learn that while the Christian Church forms an immense body throughout the world, eight ninths of our present New Testament are held by her unanimous voice, are installed as the divine charter of her existence, and the infallible standard of her faith, order, and practice. When asked who selected the books of the canon, we might well answer, Nobody selected them; they took their place spontaneously. They formed into a body of themselves, with the unanimous concurrence of the witnessing Church.

And this age, in whose sacred silence the canon was

born, was the age of the apostolical martyr Church, governed by regents selected by Christ himself, in full possession of miraculous gifts and the power of the discerning of spirits. Were we to say, then, that the books were singly written by individuals animated by no special inspiration, but by only the ordinary measure of the Spirit then vouchsafed to the eminent and holy men in the Church; that they uttered only in the most truthful spirit the facts of the Gospel narrative, or in the most wise and devout spirit the doctrines and sentiments of Christianity; what then? We nevertheless have a canon, every line and word of which is accepted and indorsed as the rule of faith, the word of history, the doctrine of Christ. Peter erred, and Paul was excited; but the sacred canon depends not on Peter or Paul singly, nor upon Matthew or Luke, but additionally upon the concurrent acceptance and ratification of the Pentecostal Church. What was the nature of the individual inspiration of each writer is, then, a question of justifiable and rational curiosity. It is a proper subject of investigation in the light of reason and Scripture; but we do not think it is one in which the divine authority of the New Testament or the Old is so deeply involved as is generally supposed. Should a man tell us, "I cannot believe that the words of the New Testament, with all their solecisms, tangled sentences, ambiguities, and incomplete expressions of the thought, are dictated by divine wisdom;" we should reply, "But at any rate those words were *sanctioned* by the charismatic Church as the true expression, in their proper meaning, of the Christian faith."

The Oneness of the Scriptures.

How clearly the Bible is a supernatural book, a self-evident miracle, is, from the neglect of a critical study

of the connection between the Old Testament and the New, very inadequately realized. The whole drift of the Old looks forward to the New; the whole self-assertion of the New looks back to the Old. There are thousands of mutual ties, some of them minute fibers singly easy to break, others strong cords, forming in the whole a oneness of the two unparalleled in the history of human thought. This miraculous circularity is not to be found in any of the sacred books of the unchristian nations—the Vedas, the Shasters, or the Korans. It belongs to the Bible alone, and thus places the Bible *as alone* among all written monuments.

Dr. Smith's *Prophecy a Preparation for Christ* is one of the most important efforts in our language at unfolding this miracle and making it patent to the mind of the Church. It is a historical survey of Old Testament prophecy, especially in its anticipations of Christ and the Gospel ages. He first analyzes the nature of prophecy and the precise character of the ancient prophet from the earliest antiquity. Its rise is dim and sporadic in the twilight of antiquity. The prophet is not purely predictor, but revealer of the divine mind as well, whether in regard to the future, present, or past. His utterance is oral, and his impulses and existence occasional.

At the close of the age of the Judges, a great character arose, wonderful for his endowments, intellectual, ethical, and supernatural—the prophet Samuel. He was the reformer of the past and the founder of a new era. Corresponding to his great character was the divine effusion of spiritual endowment that marked the epoch. Thereby he was enabled to establish *the school of the prophets*, a sacred university, which, in a form more or less definite, remained until the captivity. This divine thrill from on high quickened the genius

of Israel in every department of thought and life, and the intellectual and moral being of the nation moved thenceforward on a higher plane. Happy day, when every branch of human improvement recognized itself as but a radiation from the divine! In Samuel's college there was one rare youth, the strains of whose inspired genius still roll in our ears and elevate our souls to God; one who as warrior, royal statesman, and sacred lyrist, was, despite of grievous errors, to render his name the type of that great Unknown who stood in the future as the "Hope of Israel." From Samuel and the Judgeship to David and the monarchy was an ascending step in theocratic history.

The next great epoch was the inauguration of written prophecy. When the monarchy arose and Jerusalem became the national center, a varied literature sprung into existence, the monarchs themselves leading the movement; books were published, libraries established, and an enlightened public mind created. The sacred colleges were led by men of divine endowments, who studied with earnest interest the teachings of their predecessors as the basis whence their premonitions augured the divine purposes and shot their predictions farther and clearer into the future. Each prophet did not stand in a bleak lonesomeness. A critical general mind, scarce inferior to that of the prophet himself, judged his manifestations and embodied utterance after utterance into established doctrine. But, for a long time, the predictive utterances were oral. At length, when the brief power of Assyria was at its height, Jonah wrote his book announcing the wonderful fact of mercy upon repentance even for heathendom—the first great startling type of the call of the Gentiles! Then followed Joel, announcing the great catholic truths quoted by Peter at the Pentecost. From the catholic

generality of these two primal prophets Isaiah rises to deduce the most specific delineations of the coming God-man. In him prophecy culminates. Micah is his not unworthy contemporary in the sacred college. Then, through Jeremiah and Daniel, down to Malachi, numerous additional touches are given by each successive hand to finish out the picture of the future One.

To the argument from this phenomenon of *prediction*, so patent in the Bible, so unparalleled in any other literature, there is no adequate answer. The Pantheistic axiom, *there can be no supernatural*, is the sole ground upon which all counter-argument is based. But for this primal assumption of skepticism the phenomenon would be at once admitted, and the self-styled "higher criticism" would have no existence. On this basis it is first objected that prophecies *are obscure*; but the reply is, Flung out every obscure prediction and the perfectly clear ones are superabundant. It is next assumed that when they are clear they are written *after the event*; but the reply is, All the events of Christianity, so clearly predicted, took place long after the Septuagint translation of the old canon; while other predictions, as the Jewish dispersion, are being fulfilled at the present hour.

With regard to the Messianic predictions, the last subterfuge is that they fulfilled themselves: or, as Strauss puts it, the early Christians constructed the Christ-history from the Old Testament delineations. And that subterfuge concedes a great deal. It admits the existence of the Messianic ideal fully and specifically formed in the Old Testament and held by the Jewish Church. And now the historic Christ of Christianity, so far from identity with this formation by the Jewish mind from old prophecy, is quite a reverse character from that ideal, and is yet *the true fulfillment*. The

Jewish national ambition had so distorted the prophetic ideal as to make it a fictitious character. Christianity brought out the ideal into a true reality. And nobody was more taken by surprise at this process than Christianity itself. Nothing can be more intuitively natural and true than the description of the conceptive change taking place in the apostolic minds, while out of the false Jewish Messiahship the true Jesus Messiahship, according to prophecy, breaks upon the apostolic view.

The Christian Church Older than the New Testament.

Now we had occasion to say, years ago, that the Christian Church is older than the New Testament, and lived a century or so without it a life of wonderful power. With a living heart, inspired by the same Spirit as inspired the Bible, the Church is, in a sense, greater than the Bible. But our impression is, that if our Christian scholars investigate the matter they will find that no Church is faster bound to the text than the Romanistic. The words, for instance, of the Council of Trent are, "This Synod venerates all the books of both the Old and New Testament, *since God is their author.*" The late General Council issued *The Dogmatic Constitution of the Catholic Faith*, containing these words: "Let him be anathema who . . . shall refuse to receive, for sacred and canonical, the books of the Holy Scripture, *in their integrity*, with *all their parts*, according as they were enumerated by the Holy Council of Trent, or shall deny that they are inspired by God." And to this *dictum*, a thousand times repeated in Romanistic documents, that Church is bound by the insoluble tie of immutable infallibility. Her doctrine is that the canon is "the word of God," and by that dogma she stands or falls, for she cannot retract or abate jot or tittle. This dogma is none the less vital because she

makes apostolic tradition co-ordinately "the word of God" with the Bible. She cannot surrender the divine authorship, inspiration, and authority of the Bible without surrendering her own infallibility, and so giving up the ghost. To confess a mistake is to commit suicide.

Not so the Protestant Church. Without impairment of vital truths we hold, we are able to confess that we have erred and still may err. The very words, Protestant and Reformation, point to doctrines changed and abandoned. When full conviction comes upon us (which surely has not yet come), we are able to change the Romanistic dogma, "The Bible is the word of God," to "The Bible contains the word of God." Suppose the New Testament comes to be confessed to be simply so many historical documents; they are still, according to ordinary historical criticism, ample proof—certainly the highest proof—of what the first Christianity was. If Christian criticism were finally to conclude that Second Peter and the Apocalypse were not written by apostles, they would still stay, at least, deuterocanonical, primitive testimonies as to what Christianity was. Evangelical scholarship has very generally concluded that Genesis is very largely made up of pre-Mosaic documents: patriarchal Bibles successively given. If, however, science should demonstrate that the first three or four chapters of the first document cannot be literal verity, or if researches among the Assyrian bricks should show that the entire nine chapters are semi-mythical, how much easier would it not be for Protestantism to qualify her indorsement of these chapters than for Romanism? Give us merely of the Old Testament what the most searching fair criticism can leave unquestioned, and the main body of the evangelical faith is untouched. Then give us as truly genuine the

Gospel of Luke and the four Epistles of Paul (Romans, I and II Corinthians, and Galatians), acknowledged to be genuine even by Tübingen, all the other New Testament books being unquestionable documents of a very early period, and the evangelical faith would be essentially untouched. None of these changes could Romanism admit without admitting her own mutability. Such, in the face of all criticism, does the Protestant Church hold as her rich abundance and reserve of power. With these views it can easily be felt that there is no need of panic; and we may add, we believe there is no real panic.

While scientists and critics are undermining Theism, Genesis, and the Apocalypse, still Christian enterprise, revival, discussion of the central truths, are going on as vitally and vigorously as ever. Sin still presses upon the conscience; joy still springs from faith in Christ; holiness is still the boon after which the Christian heart will pant. We are essentially at one with the Church of the first two centuries—the Church that scarce had a canon—yet the Church with a heart glowing with a sense of oneness with Christ; the Church that smiled at martyrdom, and conquered in the battle, less for the book, than for the Christ the book contained.

ARMINIAN THEOLOGY.

The Latitudinarian Arminians before Arminius.

In two remarkable volumes, namely, *Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century*, Dr. Tulloch displays great critical thought, expressed in eloquent style, in bringing to view two phases of English ecclesiastical history hitherto much

overlooked, but really invested with special interest. Two *groups*, rather than sects or schools, of Christian thinkers are presented: the former springing from Oxford; the latter, a little later, from Cambridge. The former are Liberal Churchmen; the latter, rather of Puritan origin, yet mostly Churchmen, are usually styled "the Latitudinarian divines." It was the province of the former to maintain the idea of a comprehensive Church; of the latter to raise and expand Christian thought above and beyond the narrow type of prevalent Puritanic dogma.

Dr. Tulloch preludes his history with a review of the growth of earliest Protestant dogmatism. Early Protestantism was compelled to stereotype her creed in order to meet the positivism of Rome with a counter positivism. The Bible, as against the pope, was the infallible standard of faith; but then it was the Bible as read and expounded by a man who could not read the Bible except in a translation—Augustine. The right of private judgment was asserted; but then private judgment was bound to judge that the established creed was right.

It was the duty of the Church faithfully to maintain the creed, and of the magistrate firmly to sustain the Church; so that liberty of belief was as fast bound under Protestant as under Papal regimen. It required a new reformer to complete the Reformation. The initiator of that new reformation was James Arminius.

Calvinist as he is, so far as logical views are concerned, Dr. Tulloch at this point gives the frankest and most eloquent credit to the great services of Hollandic Arminianism in originating and unfolding the modern doctrine of toleration anywhere to be found upon pages written by a non-Arminian. The Dutch Armin-

ians defined the true province of creeds as simply forms of voluntary concord, and gave an impulse to independent biblical investigation. We should add, too, though Dr. Tulloch would not admit it, that they really found the most logically constructed mode of interpreting the Bible, so as to explain the sovereignty of God in accord with the freedom of man.

From the influence of Arminian thought, and from their own reflections, the Oxford men formed their views of a free, comprehensive, Protestant English National Episcopal Church. The leader of this noble group was Lucius Cary, Lord Falkland, the most learned and accomplished layman of his age. Around him were grouped Hales of Eton, Chillingworth, Jeremy Taylor, and Stillingfleet. The prince of this group was Chillingworth.

Hales, of Eton, is memorable from the fact that he was present, when a young man, at the Synod of Dort, and wrote home his reports of that unfortunate body—unfortunate in having so truthful a reporter of its doings. He began his reports a strong adherent of the Calvinistic side, but before he got through he “bade good-night to John Calvin.” Dr. Tulloch adds, however, “he did not bid good-morning to Arminius.” That is hardly correct. The term Arminianism, in its broad sense, covers the theological territory which lies between Augustinianism and Pelagianism. If Hales abandoned Calvinism and rejected Pelagianism (as he certainly did in signing the Thirty-nine Articles), then he occupied, however vaguely, this intermediate ground. Call that intermediate what you please—Arminianism, Melanethonianism, Liberal Evangelicism—Hales did, in bidding good-night to Calvinism, bid good-morning to this mild region. Dr. Tulloch himself loftily and truly proclaims that “the days of Augustinian predominance

are forever ended." Augustinianism is now illustrating the last two lines of Bryant's stanza :

" Truth crushed to earth shall rise again ;
The eternal years of God are hers ;
While Error, wounded, writhes in pain,
And dies among his worshippers." *

It is just as certain that the downfall of Calvinism is the ascendancy, not of Pelagianism, but of Arminianism more or less definite.

While the Oxford men were thus in accord with the Arminian liberalism, broadening the comprehension of the Church and calming the discord of Christian polemics, it was the mission, next, of the "Latitudinarians" of Cambridge to lift the Christian style of thought above the level of mere creed into the region of a Christian philosophy. The creeds were the formulation of

* Yet how slender a "predominance" in the entire Christian Church Augustinianism ever has possessed, is admirably and truly shown in the following statement made by Dr. Summers, of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, in his Introduction to Brandt's *Life of Arminius*, of the grounds taken by Methodists in regard to Arminianism: "In common with all who take the Arminian view of the Five Points, they contend that this is the catholic view: that it has always been held by the Eastern Church—that it was held universally in the Western Church, till the unhappy controversy took place between Pelagius and Augustine, when the latter in opposing one error went over to another; that the indorsers of Augustinianism were always a minority in the Western Church down to the time of the Reformation; that it never was cast into logical form until the time of Calvin; that although, through his influence, it was embodied with less or more distinctiveness in many of the Reformed Confessions, yet it was never able to displace the broad, generous, scriptural system which it sought to supplant; and that it has been so modified from time to time as that, in many cases, its avowed supporters can scarcely show any difference between it and that which they professedly oppose; while not a few, missing the *via media*, have gone over to semi-Pelagianism, or what has been significantly denominated New Divinity."

Scripture interpretation on questions at issue between the Reformers and the Pope. The Latitudinarians, mostly Platonists, endeavored to show that Christian doctrines, freely interpreted, were at one with the highest and noblest range of human thought. The principal of this group were Whichcote, Cudworth, John Smith, and Henry More. With the writings of these men we have for years been familiar, and recognize in Dr. Tulloch's survey of them a work most admirably performed which it is strange was not performed long ago. Of this group the prince clearly is Cudworth. His works have been most republished and read, in our time, of all the four. His great work in refutation of Hobbes may be carefully turned over with advantage at the present day, as pertinent in the contests of the present hour. The writings of John Smith* were the first brave effort to show that the great points of the so-called "natural religion," as embraced in Christianity, such as God, immortality, spirituality, are far nobler, sublimer, more worthy to be believed, far more elevating and aggrandizing to the soul, than their opposites. This is true and obvious to the present hour. Materialism is ever and unchangeably conscious of a certain meanness in itself. Whether held by a Hobbes or a Huxley, it seeks to cover its shame with some disguise. The atheist feels a tremor in avowing himself. And so the necessitarians, such as Hobbes and Edwards and Hodge, patch up an effigy which they call *free-will*, and endeavor to cheat themselves with the palpable phantom. And so faith is aspiring and upward looking toward the sublimities, and the excellences, and the divine; while unfaith tends downward toward meanness and depravity and the devilish. It is boldly replied to

* Wesley introduced John Smith, of Cambridge, into his *Christian Library*.

this, at the present day, that the nobleness of a dogma is no valid proof of its truth. But a true theist refuses such a reply. If there be a kingdom of God, the development of our nature into the good, the true, and the divine, most accords with the divine wisdom and goodness, and whatever tends in that direction shall be true.

The Oxford men above named were the harbingers of a more decided Arminianism in the Church of England. Yet it is to be noted that the true honor due to Arminius personally was withheld from his name. Dr. Tulloch quotes, as indicative of great magnanimity, the words of the accomplished Sir Henry Wotton: "In my travel toward Venice, as I passed through Germany, I rested almost a year at Leyden, where I entered into an acquaintance with Arminius—then the professor of divinity in that university—a man much talked of in this age, which is made up of opposition and controversy. And, indeed, if I mistake not Arminius in his expressions—as so weak a brain as mine is may easily do—then I know I differ from him in some points; yet I profess my judgment of him to be that he was a man of most rare learning, and I know him to be of a most strict life and of a most meek spirit."—Vol. i, p. 200. Wesley, in his tract, *What is an Arminian?* says, "To say 'This man is an Arminian,' has the same effect on many hearers as to say 'This is a mad dog.' It puts them into a fright at once: they run away from him with all speed and diligence, and will hardly stop, unless it be to throw a stone at the dreadful and mischievous animal."—*Works*, vol. vi, p. 133. Our New England Calvinistic pulpit used to belabor "Arminianism" by name with as much vigor as it did Deism, until heroic Moses Stuart, in the *Biblical Repository*, with great independence and learning, revealed, to its astonish-

ment, that "Arminius was not an Arminian;" that is, he held no such Arminianism as its ecclesiastical drum-stick had for two centuries been beating. Nor is there wanting, even now, a degree of magnanimity in the full and generous justice rendered by Dr. Tulloch to the character of one of the noblest personages of modern Church history.

At Oxford, where the semi-Arminianism of these "liberal" Oxford men became intensified and definite in conjunction with High-Churchism, Wesley appears, at a later period, as their lineal heir. He breathed the hereditary spirit of the place, and Jeremy Taylor furnished him his horn-book in spiritual discipline. But as their thoughts and writings dwell solely in the regions of high speculation, it was his mission to go out from the academic sphere and carry the power of these principles, touched with a new life, to the lower strata of society, and quicken the popular heart of England and America with a new reformation, or, rather, with a completion of the old reformation. It is to this point we wish most emphatically to call the attention and interest of our thoughtful Methodist readers. We have long known that these Oxford men and this "splendid Latitudinarian school of divines" (as the celebrated Catholic lawyer, Charles Butler, styles them in his celebrated *Reminiscences*) were in no small degree our spiritual ancestry.

Mr. Anthony Froude is quite unhistorical in saying that "Calvinism has been accepted for two centuries in all Protestant countries." Certainly, for two centuries England has rejected it; and Lutheranism in Germany has some rights to a mention in history. Under Luther, Zuinglius, and Calvin, predestination did at start acquire a predominance in Protestantism such as it never before nor since possessed in any great section of the

Christian Church, however predominant in the Moham-medan. It became strongly intrenched in the national creeds. But in most signal instances the second sober thought resulted in reaction, and, from that time to this, the belief and the creeds have been gradually bidding each other good-bye.

Mr. Froude affirms, as is often affirmed at the present day, that we cannot deny that Calvinism accords with the *facts*. Arbitrary inequalities and rank injustices do exist in the world. If we listen not merely to our subjective feelings, but to the story of facts inductively studied, they will preach us Calvinism. Then, we reply, The preaching is falsehood. The "facts" are villainous liars. They libel God. They are blasphemers; for they impeach his rectitude. A true theology which shall "vindicate the ways of God to man" does not legitimatize and eternize these "facts," but will show how the "up clearing" of judgment and eternity will reverse the story and give these lying "facts" the lie. Assuming, with the Calvinist, that the story of these "facts" is ultimate, the Atheist denies that there is any God; the Manichean affirms that there is a God half-good and half-bad; the Pessimist declares that existence is a curse, and the Buddhist that the highest of all attainments is Nirvana. The Arminian refuses to take these facts as ultimate. Those "subjective feelings," which Calvinism requires us to silence, Arminianism holds to be holy intuitions, the virtual voice of God within us asserting the divine rectitude. It admits that "*this* world" (with a powerful emphasis on *this*) "was made for Cæsar," and that Satan is god of this æon. But its eye of divine faith, in accord with the faith of all the faithful of old, looks to the day of rectification, when the world and all the "facts" that are therein shall be "burned up." The very difference between a

world of probation and a world of retribution is, that in the latter the Cæsarisms and Satanisms are not perpetuated, but rectified and made subservient to a grand reversal.

As to the monopoly of nobleness of character by Calvinism, it depends much on the list you please to draw up. It will be a small catalogue in human history that owes its luster to its Calvinism. Of all countries in Europe, perhaps England has given the two opposing isms fairest play, and how meager a showing is made by Calvinism! What share had Calvinism in her very highest line of names, as Shakespeare, Milton, Bacon, Locke, Newton, Butler, and Wesley, or in Marlborough, Chatham, Franklin, Washington, and Wellington? The very fact that, starting with the predominance at the Reformation in the noblest nation of Europe, she was dispossessed, worsted, and outlawed, doing her greatest good mainly as an unsuccessful revolter, yet leaving England still the noblest nation of Europe, is decisive proof of her failure as a predominant good in history.

The English Compromise.

There are two books of fine old English theology well worthy the attention of the Methodist theological thinker: *Pearson on the Creed*, from whom Watson culls many a fine extract, and *Burnet on the Thirty-Nine Articles*, which sheds much light upon our own standard document. The former is a true specimen of the free, fresh English of his age; the latter is less lucid and classic, yet abounds in vigorous and suggestive discussions. When, in the reign of James I., the debates aroused by Arminius in Holland had powerfully impressed the English mind, the best thinkers in England were awakened to find how completely they were fettered in their Articles by the imported theology of

Geneva. The still older Eastern, Greek, or Chrysostomian, theology had been supplanted by the later Western, or Augustinian, dogmas. They had not strength enough to reconstruct the Articles, and so the Chrysostomians, or Arminians, re-interpreted them. The various parties were so equally divided that a compromise spontaneously took place, by which, under the generic Calvinistic phrases, different specific meanings might be allowed. The clergy generally went back to the Greek theology, and this, in fact, drew them nearer to that of Trent, and the fashionable and court opinions became anti-Calvinistic. The result was, as somewhat overstated for terseness' sake, by Lord Chatham, that the English Church has "a popish liturgy, a Calvinistic creed, and an Arminian clergy." The Puritans adhered to high Calvinism, so that the curious antithesis, remarked by Selden in his *Table Talk*, existed by which absolutists in creed became the liberalists in politics, and *vice versa*. But so severely did the Puritan absolutistic liberalism press upon the nation that the reaction brought in Charles II. with a national debauch. The revolution of 1688 restored the public balance. And here it is, in the time of William and Mary, that Burnet comes in with his "Exposition" of the Churchly Articles. The Calvinists and Lutherans and Arminians were all in a quarrelsome mood; and he brings them counsels of peace and love; yet not without a free fraternal discussion of doctrinal truth. In much of his treatment he gives the various views of leading minds and classes of minds, with but gentle interposition of his own opinions. Upon the Predestinarian article, especially, he congratulates himself upon having stated the argument on both sides so fairly that nobody could tell on which side he stood, although he really held the Eastern, or Arminian, theology. Dean Stanley wishes

that some one would explain historically how John Wesley became a maintainer of the Eastern theology. We understand it to have been, as to Predestination, the theology of the whole Wesley family, derived from its High-Church antecedents.

Instead of modifying the Articles by diverse interpretations, Wesley, in his day, expurgated the Articles themselves. One of our Roman Catholic exchanges lately impeached the integrity of Wesley for mutilating Articles he had sworn to maintain. But Wesley made no change which altered the doctrines as then held by the Church authorities, and as by him promised to be taught. All he did was to diminish the amount of the assent required by those who belonged to his "Societies." And as American Methodism, in ceasing to be "Societies," and becoming a Church, adopted his diminished form, so, what he struck out from the Ninth Article is not to be required as Methodist doctrine; nay, it stands in the historical position of being, like the Nineteenth (predestinarian) Article, positively excised and supposably denied.

Shedd's History of Christian Doctrine.*

Of Augustine, Dr. Shedd's theological idol, we admire rather the great talents and massy volume than the theological soundness. There is scarce a character in Church history from whom we inherit so disastrous a theological legacy. His conversion from Manicheanism seems ultimately to have consisted in slicing away the better half of his double God, and in spreading the black deity over the firmament of Christian theology. To his *ingenium atrox* we trace the accursed dogmas of infant damnation, transferred guilt, the identification of depravity with sexual appetite, and predestina-

* From review of Dr. Shedd's *A History of Christian Doctrine*.

tion. Pelagius was the better man, and not doctrinally the greater heretic. The former relaxed the moral nerve of man, the latter *diabolized* God. The former was a practical rationalist; the severer doctrines of the latter, while they repelled and made infidel the highest reason of man, when fully accepted, resulted often in a self-immolating but reasonless piety, none the less self-ish for its self-immolation, resembling the self-consecration of an Oriental pantheist. True Christian doctrine lies between the two; is neither Pelagian nor Augustinian; rejects the self-sufficiency and disregard of gracious divine aids of the former, and the God-dishonoring fatalism of the latter. It is the golden mean of true theology which the whole Christian Church of the first three centuries held; which, with minor variations, the great body of the Christian Church, Eastern, Roman, and Protestant, holds; the Protestant, with the exception of those sections which have come under the influence of the Genevan forger of the *decretum horribile*. Dr. Shedd's great art consists in bringing out into monstrous prominence the narrow and exceptional, so that Church doctrinal history consists largely of a history of doctrines which the Church did not hold.

When he comes to the anthropology of the entire Christian Church, Eastern and Western, from the time of the apostles to the time of Augustine, Dr. Shedd is obliged to exert his utmost ingenuity to evade the undeniable but stupendous fact that all the peculiarities of modern Calvinism are utterly contradicted and condemned, and that the entire Christian body was what would now be considered substantially Arminian. The Eastern Church, Syriac and Greek, he is compelled to surrender outright. Its theology was not far from the sub-Arminianism of Limborch and Curcellæus. Under a prattle about "germs" and "tendencies" to Augus-

tinianism in the early Western Church, etc., he endeavors to disguise the fact that its pre-Augustinian theology was not above the level of the Arminianism of Arminius himself. Of this he tells us Augustinianism was a development; which is as true as that Princeton theology is a development of Wesleyan theology. Dr. Shedd's phrase, "the Latin or Augustinian theology," is a plump historical mistake. Augustinian theology never was "the Latin theology." It was, even in the West, generally the theology of a slim minority of fatalistic ultraists. But what we wish specially to emphasize and spread out for deliberate contemplation and permanent memory is this: Even in the West before the teaching of Augustine the entire Church rejected the doctrine of hereditary guilt, necessitated damnability, irresistible grace, predestination, unfree-will, and unconditional election. This whole brood of cockatrice's eggs was hatched in the Church by the evil genius of the fervid African. The primitive Western theology was not the theology of Calvin, nor Twisse, nor Hodge, nor Shedd; but rather of Arminius, of Cranmer, of Wesley, of Watson, of Wilbur Fisk, and of our *Methodist Quarterly Review*.

In regard to Dr. Shedd's direct treatment of Arminianism, we can realize that "blessed are those who expect nothing, for they shall not be disappointed." The random statements contained in his *Discourses* warned us of his unacquaintance with a theology which he imagined himself to be opposing, when, in fact, he was only misunderstanding and misstating. Dr. Shedd's reading, like his writing, has been one-sided. His studies, like every other man's, have been not universal, but partial, and they have not lain among the great Arminian divines; and his second-hand quotations and misstatements are of the most perturbing nature. He tells us (vol. ii, page 496) that the writings of Limborch were

dogmatical, and those of Curcellæus were exegetical; whereas a glance at their pages would have made him say that Limborch is partly exegetical, and Curcellæus wholly dogmatical. A reading of those great Arminians might have prevented his giving Limborchus as the Latin form of Limborch, instead of Limburgius. The name of Curcellæus is spread in capitals on the album page as among his standard Arminian authorities on soteriology, and his Book Seven is specified as the treatment of that subject; whereas, Curcellæus is, we are sorry to say, essentially Socinian on the atonement, and his Book Seven has nothing to do with the subject. That book is entirely devoted to Christian ethics. What is more amusing still, Dr. Shedd (vol. ii, page 373) professedly quotes, refutes, and flaunts with a lofty sneer at the soteriology of (as he supposes) Curcellæus, when in fact it is Limborch whom he is really quoting, giving the twenty-second chapter of Curcellæus's Third Book as his authority, when there are not twenty-three chapters in his Third Book; and his Third Book has nothing to do with soteriology. Curcellæus discusses very briefly the atonement in his Fifth Book; and a perusal of that book will show Dr. Shedd that he is no representative of Arminian soteriology, his views being even below the Grotian.

The correctness of his treatment of this point in this passage is about equal to the accuracy of the quoting. Dr. Shedd's words are (quoting imaginarily Curcellæus, really Limborch, *Theologia Christiana*, lib. iii, chap. xxii):

"'Jesus Christ,' says Curcellæus, 'may be said to have been punished (*punitus*) in our place, in so far as he endured the greatest anguish of soul, and the accursed death of the cross for us, which were of the nature of a vicarious punishment in the place of our sins,* (*quæ*

* What does Dr. Shedd mean by a vicarious punishment in the place of our sins?

poenæ vicariæ pro peccatis nostris rationem habuit). And it may be said that our Lord satisfied the Father for us by his death, and earned righteousness for us, in so far as he satisfied, not the rigor and exactitude of the divine justice, but the just as well as compassionate will of God (*voluntati Dei justæ simul ac misericordi*), and went through all that God required in order to our reconciliation.' According to these positions," continues Dr. Shedd, "the sufferings of Christ were not a substituted penalty, but a substitute *for* a penalty. A substituted penalty is a strict equivalent, but a substitute *for* a penalty may be of inferior worth, as when a partial satisfaction is accepted for a plenary one, by the method of acceptilation; or, as if the finite sacrifice of the lamb and the goat should be constituted by the will of God an offset for human transgression. And the term 'satisfaction' also is wrested from its proper signification, in that the sufferings of Christ are asserted to be a satisfaction of *benevolence*. 'Our Lord satisfied . . . not the rigor and exactitude of the divine justice, but the just as well as *compassionate* will of God,'—a use of language as solecistical as that which should speak of smelling a sound."*

Now Limborch, whom Dr. Shedd is unknowingly quoting here, really takes the ground that Christ did not suffer infliction either *identical* or *equivalent* to the sinner's true desert, but a *less* accepted by God in the stead of the greater. "So that in this sense," he adds, "Jesus Christ *may be rightly said to be punished* in our stead, inasmuch as he bore for us the accursed death of the cross, which had the nature (*rationem*) of a vicarious punishment for our sins. And in this sense the Lord, by his own death, can be said to have satisfied the Father for us, and for us to have

* Shedd's *A History of Christian Doctrine*, pp. 372-374.

merited justification inasmuch as he satisfied not the rigor of divine justice, but *the WILL OF GOD*, just and at the same time merciful, and performed all required by God to our reconciliation." Now Dr. Shedd's assertion that the term "satisfaction" is here "solecistically" applied, and that "the sufferings of Christ are asserted to be a satisfaction of benevolence," are palpably incorrect. It is God's "*just will*" which receives the "*satisfaction*." That *will* is, indeed, additionally *merciful*; but that mercy is engaged not in demanding satisfaction, but in diminishing the amount of suffering demanded. The mercy cancels just its own amount of the requirement of satisfaction. It is really because the *benevolence* does not require satisfaction that, in Limborch's view, Christ's penal sufferings may be less. If "smelling a sound" be as little "solecistical" to Dr. Shedd's senses as satisfying a just demand lessened by mercy, then his olfactories must be endowed with a vigorous taste for music.

Freedom and Responsibility.

An article in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, on "The Old School in New England Theology," by Professor Lawrence, of East Windsor Theological Seminary, makes some candid and, in the general, correct remarks respecting the doctrines of Methodism. Its references to some of my own statements suggest a paragraph or two in reply.

1. The "freedom" ascribed by Professor Lawrence to a responsible agent is, so far as we can see, the freedom attributable to a machine. Just as a clock-hammer possesses in its given antecedents no power for a different stroke instead, so the agent has no power for "a different volition instead." The agent can in the given case give none but a one solely possible volition,

just as the clock-hammer can give none but a one solely possible stroke. This is true of every volition that ever takes place, just as it is true of every clock-stroke that ever takes place. It is true of the entire series of volitions of every single agent, as it is true of the entire series of the strokes of every single clock. Just as, should a clock have an eternal existence, each stroke would be a solely possible stroke, so, should an agent have eternal existence, each volition would be a solely possible volition. As the clock could not, in a single one instance of the different series, help giving the given stroke, so the agent could not in a single instance help giving the given volition. If the volitions were all wicked, still, the agent gives the solely possible. No sinful volition that ever takes place could in the given antecedents have been withheld. No sin ever committed could have been helped or avoided. Sin and damnation are as inevitable to the sinner as the clock-stroke is to the clock. This the professor calls "freedom." It is just the freedom of a machine. It excludes guilt, responsibility, just retribution from existence, and makes a just, retributive divine government impossible.

- 2. A clock-hammer can give a different stroke, if it inclines or is moved to. That is, it can strike differently sequently upon different antecedents. Just so, Calvinists admit that the agent can will otherwise IF—the antecedents are otherwise. That is, he can will differently *in different cases*; which nobody was ever so unwise as to deny. Thus, to our making a man's Arminianism or Calvinism depend on his answer to Fletcher's question, "Is the will at liberty to choose otherwise than it does, or is it not?" Professor Lawrence replies, "A man is at perfect liberty to choose otherwise than he does, *if he wishes to*." A clock-hammer is perfectly

at liberty, we reply, to strike otherwise if it is *inclined* to. But Professor Lawrence teaches, with all other necessitarians, that this anterior "*wish*" of the agent is just as absolutely necessitated and controlled by antecedent causes, as this *inclination* of the clock-hammer is controlled by its antecedent mechanical causes. Each lies as a link in the chain of necessary causations. So that the volition, *in the given case*, is as solely possible as the clock-stroke in the given case. And that excludes all responsibility or possibly just retribution.

3. Professor Lawrence endeavors to exculpate the elder Calvinism from the logical difficulty of teaching that "it is divinely just to create one being bad, or a race bad, and then damn them for being bad." Of this dogma he affirms that Calvinism "ignores it and abjures it as cordially as do our Methodist brethren."

Professor Lawrence possesses that manly equanimity which prevents his construing our pushing a doctrine to its logical consequences into an attack upon the doctrinary himself. His love both of discussion and of truth would prompt him to say to us, Push our views into a logical or moral absurdity if you can, and let us see how fairly and conclusively it can be done. Very well. We say that in his own statement of the doctrine of the will and responsibility, as we are obliged to understand it, is wrapped the very doctrine that he "abjures."

Calvinism teaches that *subsequent to the fall the race comes into existence necessitatedly sinful; and without any claim for power to be or do otherwise, it deserves damnation for being what it is, as thus brought into existence.* That, we say, is holding that *God may damn a creature for being what he makes him be.*

Professor Lawrence in reply says, 1. "God created . . . man 'very good;' he never created any being or race bad." 2. "He condemns men only for the evil they were free in producing." 3. All attributable to God is, "he did not annihilate it," namely, the race. We reply to these in the same numerical order, 1. God created man with a nature which in his circumstances, according to Calvinism, was necessitated to sin. He was created volitionally unable, under the actual antecedents, to avoid sin. For he had no power of contrary choice. And for that created unavoidability in the conditions he is damned. The subsequent race is brought into existence deserving damnation for being what they are as thus brought into existence, and without any claim to power to avoid that nature and that damnation. The fact that they are created through second causes, namely, the processes of generation, cannot come into a moral consideration, so long as those secondary causations are the mere media of successive necessitations started from the first cause. If I am necessitated into existence by a necessitating cause, which necessitating cause is necessitated by a line of necessitating causes, started by a first cause, I am necessitated into existence by that first cause, no matter how long the chain or how many the links. The first cause is author of the last effect. Birth, then, in this argument, differs nothing from creation. If I am guilty for being born bad, I am equally guilty for being created bad. To be born is to be created through a series of necessitative secondary causes. 2. God, according to necessitarianism, condemns men for the evil "they are free in producing;" just as free in producing, we reply, as a clock-hammer is free in striking. The being, *in the given case*, can no more avoid sinning than the clock-hammer can avoid striking. In both cases it is a free-

dom *to*, without a freedom *from*, the act. Hence, if in either case there is damnation, it is damnation for what the actor cannot help. He is created to act, under those conditions, as he does; and for being created such, both in necessary being and necessary action, he is damned. 3. But all that Calvinism affirms is that God "did not annihilate" the race. No, Professor Lawrence, it is not merely *non-annihilation*, nor non-prevention, nor privative non-interference that Calvinism teaches. It teaches that God is the necessitative first cause, through a straight inevitable line of necessitating second causes, of the man's existence, and of his every act, and of his final damnation for that being and act. Necessitated to be what he is, to do what he does, of that necessitation, God is the necessitator, the necessitator who not only negatively precludes any different results from any possible existence, but positively necessitates that sole result to come into existence. That is, God necessitates his existence, his nature, his sin, and his damnation for that necessitated nature and sin. Man has no adequate ability for different existence, choice, act, or destiny. And that is the most appalling fatalism.

Professor Lawrence expressly denies the power of contrary choice or volition. When a man volitionates sinfully he had no power to volitionate otherwise; he could not help willing as he did. He is created a necessary sinner, a necessary heir of hell.

And without power for "contrary volition instead," there can be no power for "contrary action instead." If a man cannot will otherwise than a given way, he cannot corporeally act otherwise than a given way. If through his eternal existence a man has power but for a certain series of volitions, then he has power but for a certain series of corporeal motions. What a man must

will, that he must do. What a man cannot will, that he cannot do. The power of willing but thus excludes the power of doing otherwise. So that if there be no *moral*, that is, volitional, ability for different choice, still less can there be *natural*, that is, corporeal, power for different action.

Basis of Moral Obligation.

Dr. Schaff says, "He only is unrighteous who is *under obligations which he does not fulfill*; but God is *under no obligations to his creature*, hence can do with him what he will. God's will is the absolute and eternal norm of righteousness, and all that he does is necessarily right. There is no norm of righteousness above him to which he is subject, else were God not God."

At this piece of absolutism we stand aghast. A creator, forsooth, is under no more "obligation" to pursue one course than another with his creatures! One course is as right as another, and any other course is as right as this one; so the distinction of right or wrong, as to the divine character and conduct, is obliterated, and the moral attributes of God are effaced at one fell swoop. Of course, the man who holds this absurd and abominable doctrine need not be troubled at the doctrine that God decrees the sin and damns the sinner. The imagination of a devil cannot conceive a course which God might not just as rightfully pursue as any other course. Why, then, does Dr. Schaff attempt to show, as he elaborately does, that of all possible courses God takes just the one that is *the intrinsically right one*? If righteousness consists in the fulfillment of obligation, and God can be under no obligation, then God can possess no righteousness. And if God, as being under no obligation to his creature, can so "do with him as he will" that any way of willing would be right and

equally right—then, surely, there can be no one particular “norm of eternal right.” If a creator, finite or infinite, is not bound or obligated to do right and not wrong to his creature, why need Dr. Schaff take pains even to predicate *right* of God’s will at all? But it is an appalling doctrine that a creator is under no obligation of specific right toward his creature. If a father owes duties to the child he begets, much more a creator to the being he originates. To say that because he created him he could do no injustice to him, that the creature has no claim of justice or goodness from him, is a truly accursed absurdity; absurdity, because contradictory to our intuitive reason; accursed, because absolutely abhorrent to our moral sense. The talk about such an obligation being “above him,” and so undeifying God, is the shallowest of *ad captandum*. It is like an Eastern despot’s saying, in an old play, that he is “above slavery to his promise,” as if absolution from moral obligation was any elevation, or subjection to it any degradation, to any being. Did Abraham think it any degradation in the Judge of all the earth to be obligated to do not wrong but right? Did the apostle think it any degradation that God cannot lie? Is not God, as the self-existent being, *under necessity* to exist; and is not that necessity just as truly “above him” as moral obligation? Does the necessity *under* which God is to be omniscient and omnipotent, undeify him? Surely he does not *cease to be God* because *he must be God*. Neither does he cease to be God because he is under moral obligation to be a righteous God. Nay, the necessity of that very “eternal norm of right,” which Dr. Schaff holds, is as truly *upon* God and “*over him*,” and so undeifies God as truly as the view he opposes. And if “all he does is necessarily right,” is he not under a necessity of doing and being right, with a

necessity "above him," and, therefore, no longer God ? The being morally obligated to right no more degrades him than the fact that "all he does is *necessarily* right."

Dr. Shedd's Doctrine of Free Agency.

Dr. Shedd's *Essay on Original Sin* (originally an article in the *Christian Review*) is, with due credit given, very much a summary of the treatment of that subject in Müller's *Doctrine of Sin*. We wish Dr. Shedd had clothed that whole work in his powerful English. We may condense his condensation of Müller, so far as our purposes are concerned, to the following points : 1. Sin is not so much an *act* as a "*nature*," or "*state*," and as such is *guilty* and *damnable*. 2. This nature is "a product," namely, a product of the human will, and depravity lies properly "in the will," and consists in the state of free self-determining, permanent tendency, or tending of the will in an evil direction. But, 3. The will is not the mere volitional faculty, but is inclusive of the affections, emotions, intellections ; the whole man himself viewed as determined in unity to a given direction. 4. The origin of this tendency, as well as its specific volitions, is too deep for the recognition of consciousness ; and, 5. Hence it is to be considered as taking its origin in our unconscious sinning in Adam. In all this Dr. Shedd conceives that he is reconciling the antithetic points, that sin is a *nature* and is yet *responsible* ; and he congratulates himself that thus the intuitions of the soul are satisfied by our reinstatement on the old grounds of the creeds and theologies at and succeeding the Reformation. We believe, on the contrary, that it is an advance *backward*. Let us review the points.

No relief of the intuitional distress at a nature's being held as a *guilt* can be derived from holding that nature

to be a fixed, necessitated, everflowing tendency of the will. To aid the relief by such prefixes as "free" and "self-determined," is to cure a fatal disease with medical talk. When WILL is so defined as to make it include the entire structure of the soul, the advances made by modern psychology are ignored. We are, by a retrograde movement, made to identify will not merely, like Edwards, with the necessitated emotions and sensibilities; but, like a still earlier and cruder mental analysis, to petrify it into the necessitated intellections and even into the impressions of external objects upon the sensorium. All this brings us back upon the old and execrable dogma that a necessitated nature is responsible; that *a being, a race, a universe, may be brought into a condition of fixed evil, and damned for being so.* Upon that dogma all our moral intuitions rise up and pronounce a reprobation, a sacred curse. We treat it with no respect or ceremony. It is diabolical, dishonoring God and man, and has no fitting home this side of its infernal birthplace.

Of what use is it for Dr. Shedd at this point to say, "Were this nature created and put into man, as an intellectual nature or as a particular temperament is put into him by the Creator of all things, it would not be a responsible and guilty nature, nor would man be a child of wrath? But it does not thus originate. It has its origin in the free and responsible use of that voluntary power which God has created and placed in the human soul as its most central, most mysterious, and most hazardous endowment. It is a self-determined nature—that is, *a nature originated in a will, and by a will.*" The man with his actions is as truly molded; he receives as truly a necessitated, *made* nature from God as if he were run by a forger's hand, like molten metal in a matrix, to a statuary's model. A necessitated motion is as

irresponsible as a necessitated being. A *nature* consisting of a fixed mode of action is just as guiltless as a *nature* consisting of a fixed shape of substance. What boots it me, whether a superior being damns me for a necessitated doing or a necessitated being? Justice can just as readily hold me condemned for a necessary essence as for a necessary quality; and for a necessary quality as for a necessary *operation*: for a necessary operation is a property, and a property is but the essence manifest. God can as well necessitate me to *be* a certain thing, and then damn me for it, as necessitate me to *do* a certain thing and damn me for it. For herein *doing* is *being*; for *doing* is nothing but necessitated changing states of necessitated *being*. Yonder metallic shrub, shaped by the cunning hand of modern art, standing with its stately stalk, lifts aloft a little wilderness of foliage and vines, most light and airy to the eye; but those clustering festoons and the rigid stalk are, alas! alike—*cast-iron*! So the stalk of a necessitated nature and the wildest wreathings of necessitated action are alike *cast-iron*—irresponsibly fatalistic. The actions and being are one inseparable piece, one being, one nature. And this doing-being is created by God; for it is necessitated by him into existence, and to necessitate into existence is to create.

Nor herein does generation differ from creation. For God to set into necessary succession a series of matrices, of fixed and by him necessitated forms, regulated by him with necessitated modes, and then to push a quantity of being through them, is as fixedly to mold the last shape of the series of the forms of being as if he had created it. No matter through how lengthened a series of wombs I derive my being from the Maker's hand; if no free, unnecessitated, alternative will has intervened, I am as truly (so far as responsibility is con-

cerned) *created* as if I were first in the series. And if my substance, qualities, and operations are all equally necessitated, then they are all equally irresponsible.

This cast-iron necessitation is not softened by expressing its quality under those fine old Arminian epithets that were invented and appropriated to express non-necessity, and which still, to the popular heart, have the ring of liberty, such as *free*, *self-determining*, and *originating*. It is a poor verbal solace which our fatalistic brethren so artificially construct for themselves, this carefully predefining all the terms of libertarianism into a fatalistic meaning in order to express their dogma in formulæ that sound like freedom, and so *seem* to accord with our intuitions. Before they are done these gentlemen find that they have given our whole theological vocabulary a double meaning. Theology becomes a duplicate science. Its nomenclature is a system of double-entendres. It has a complete strabismus. Its leading phrases have an outside and an inside meaning—outside Arminian, inside Calvinistic. The same gentleman is giving, in the same terms, two hostile theologies. He can, in the same words, preach Arminianism *ad populum*, and lecture Augustinianism *ad clerum*.

Should the leading paleontologist of the age announce to the world this proposition—*The animal fossils of geology are nothing but plastic forms spontaneously produced by unconscious nature*—the world would wait in rapt attention to hear his proof. If, however, in his exposition, he should define *plastic* to mean “born in the process of natural generation,” and “forms” to mean “once living animal bodies,” and “unconscious nature” to mean “a formative scheme in the hands of the living God,” we think his proposition would be pronounced a positive imposture. And now, when a theologian announces, “A nature is sinful and guilty because it is a

product; a product of the free, self-determining, self-originating will," we should expect its amplification in a clear Arminian exposition. But when he comes to definition, and makes "will" signify the entire stereotype-fixed nature of the agent; and "free" to signify a limitation to one sole course or state; and "self-determining" to exclude all power of alternative action, and to mean an energetic forth-putting in a solely possible direction; and "self-origination" to mean necessitative causation, we think he rivals the imposture of his paleontological brother. To the paleontologist the hearers would say, if you mean that the fossils are petrifications of once living animals, why not say so without a set of words defined out of their ordinary sense. And to the theologian we would say, if you mean that a nature is sinful and guilty because its whole fixed being, by necessity, projects a series of necessitated volitions, why not say so? Why must *nature* mean a series of volitions, *will* mean the entire necessitated *soul*, *free* mean circumscribed, *self-determining* mean limited to a solely possible terminus, and *self-origination* mean automatic projection? In short, why, unless there be a settled predisposition to self-deception, must a principle be clothed in language that seems to express its contradictory?

But Dr. Shedd (after Müller) maintains that this permanent current of our will, inclusive of our whole soul as agent, which constitutes our depraved "nature," resides and generally acts in a region below the reach of consciousness, and yet is none the less guilty and deserving the divine wrath. Men, as matter of fact, are perpetually sinning, without knowing what they are about, and a large share of moral effort is to be expended in bringing them to a consciousness of sin. "How often the Christian *finds* himself already in a train of thought or of feeling that is contrary to the divine law. Notice

that he did not go into this train of thought or feeling deliberately, and with a distinct consciousness of what he was doing. The first he knows is, that he is already caught in the process. Thought and feeling in this instance have been *unconsciously* exercised in accordance with that central and abiding determination of the will toward self of which we have spoken ; in other words, the will has been *unconsciously* putting forth its action, in and through the powers of thought and feeling, as the self-reproach and sense of guilt consequent upon such exercises of the soul, are proof positive. The moment the Christian man comes to distinct consciousness in regard to this action that has been going on, 'without his thinking of it' (as we say in common parlance), he acknowledges it as criminal action, responsible action, action of the will. The fact that he was not thinking—that the will was acting unconsciously—subtracts nothing from his sense of guilt in the case." Dr. Shedd conceives this volitioning below the reach of consciousness to be a curious, surprising fact ; the dark problem of its blended unconsciousness and irresponsibility he feels, but does not attempt to solve. He unfolds its darkness without a ray of light ; he deepens the snarl but gives no clew. The *solution*, we think (overstretching the homeopathic maxim that "*like cures like*"), is contained in the very cause of the difficulty, "unconsciousness."

For, not only are there unconscious volitions, but there is, in the same sense of the word, an unconscious consciousness. All consciousness is properly unconscious. If consciousness be, as Dr. Shedd uses the word, an inspection of our own thoughts, then while we are inspecting we are not inspecting our inspecting. Otherwise we are involved in an infinite series of inspections of inspections. If there be in that deep substratal region of the

mind an unconscious, or rather subconscious, series of volitions, there is also a subconscious consciousness of those volitions. Surely if the mind be choosing, it is also perceiving the object of its choosing; it is cognizing, comparing, preferring motives, motives ethical and non-ethical, and the whole apparatus of free-agency is in motion. The moral perceptions are as able to work subconsciously as any other faculties. The consciousness is truly enough also at work; only all the movements are so intense and absorbing that the exterior recollective consciousness cannot recall and re-present them.

This underlying region of thought needs more analysis than we have room to give it. Dr. Shedd, as well as Müller, has, we think, failed to explore or properly comprehend it. But we may add the thought, that *our moral nature is doubtless as truly in perpetual action as any other of our perceptive powers*. An ethical quality in an object or combination is as readily perceived as any other quality, and with the same sort of consciousness or unconsciousness; and that ethical quality may be accepted or rejected as a motive by the free-will as any other quality, and so be as truly a matter of responsibility as if the recollective consciousness could subsequently call it up into the clearest light and most graphic form. Let the eye gaze upon a variegated carpet, and perception may take in (unconsciously, it may be called) every single hue; yet not one of them is singled out, isolated, noticed, though every one be felt, and be capable, each one, of being a motive of action. When the Christian specified by Dr. Shedd "finds" himself "caught" in putting forth wrong volitional action, did he first *learn*, after the conscious recognition, that the volitions were wicked? No. He knew it all the while. He *knew* the wrong, and *chose* the wrong;

both with an equal consciousness or unconsciousness, or subconsciousness. In that same sphere of subconsciousness a man may avoid sin as well as accept it; may apostatize from good or repent of evil; may indulge in crime, or walk the ways of righteousness. The thoughts within that region are not necessarily infinitesimal or dim; they may be the most intense and absorbing topics of our lives, and all the more unconscious because they leave no part of the mind at leisure to perform its introspections.* The problem of their responsibility, therefore, seems to us not so difficult of solution.

It is a nimble leap of logic that would infer that because we sin so "unconsciously," therefore we may have sinned dormantly in Adam's sin. Neither Müller nor Shedd has, we fear, elucidated the enigma. Both are masterly theologians, but they have not, perhaps, mastered that problem.

"Shall" and "Will."

One of the most remarkable pro-Calvinistic uses of words has been perhaps, in some degree, the simple result of time. It is one to which we have seen no reference; and though pervading the whole Bible, is very likely to be overlooked even by Arminian revisers. It is the use of the future *shall* where our modern vernacular requires *will*. At the present day, at least, this has become a very false translation, for our uses of *shall* has an imperative force, just as it has always possessed in the Decalogue. Should a parent in our time say

* De Quincey says, "Rightly it is said of utter, utter misery, that it 'cannot be remembered.' Itself as a rememberable thing is swallowed up in its own chaos." And he quotes from Coleridge's *Remorse* the lines,

"I stood in unimaginable trance,
An agony which cannot be remembered."

to his sons at table, "One of you *shall* betray me" (John xiii, 21), it would be understood as a command. And so Rom. ix, 12, "The elder *shall* serve the younger," makes an imperative of a simple future. It may be indeed said that God's futures are imperatives. Whether that be so or not, we should allow God to use his futures instead of imperatives when he pleases.

Under this class of the false *shall* comes, perhaps, one of the most curiously mistranslated, interpolated, misquoted, and abused texts in the Bible. It is Psa. cx, 3, "Thy people *shall* be willing in the day of thy power." This is a military Messianic psalm, and the words really mean, Thy people [are] ready in the day of thy military gathering. There is really no verb at all; and the *shall be* of the translators, as well as our *are*, is an interpolation. Then the *shall* is made a false imperative. Next follows a laughable mutilation of the text, current among our Calvinistic brethren, not only colloquially and among the people, but even disclosing itself in the deliberate writings of the best scholars. The false *shall be willing* is transmuted into a falser *make willing*. We have, for instance, a venerable volume by old Dr. Spring, of New England, on Free Agency (which abolishes all free agency), in which this text is quoted as a title-page motto, correctly according to our translation, but in entire perversion of the textual meaning. Next, our readers will find it used by Rev. Mr. Tyler, as it happens, on page 311 of the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, 1873, mutilated into "make willing." Next, we will find it in Dr. Shedd's *History of Doctrines*, vol. ii, p. 73, thus mutilated: "Makes him willing in the day of God's power." Next, we will find it in Hodge on Romans: "God supersedes the necessity of forcing us by *making us willing* in the day of his power." And, finally, we grieve to say it, even our friend, Dr. Schaff,

has inserted a slight finger in this *Credit Mobilier*, by quoting with approbation this same unfortunate passage of Dr. Hodge's, in his *Romans*, p. 95. The same mutilation of the text is also in Dr. Hodge's *Theology*, vol. i, page 435.

Battles of the Commentators.

As a commentator on single books of the New Testament, Dr. Eadie is scarcely surpassed. Less exclusively verbal than Ellicott, he is scarcely less accurately philological, and his freer range renders his work less arid and more readable. He brings in a large amount of moral, spiritual, and theological reflection, giving more body, roundness, and color to the philological skeleton. As a Scotch Presbyterian, he is, of course, professedly Calvinistic, though his heart is so Arminian that he abundantly contradicts himself, being alternately on each side of the Synod of Dort, now chiming with Episcopius and now with Bogerman. In defending his Calvinism he takes the ground of mere *foreknowledge*, which is Arminianism. Anon, he tells us that predestination and freedom are irreconcilable, but both true, which is virtual confession that Calvinism as a solution of divine government is failure. Finally, as if to save his orthodoxy, he chalks up to true fatalism, yet with an obvious feeling that his own fatalistic statement has in it not a little of the appalling.

With entire conclusiveness Dr. Eadie, in *A Commentary on the Greek Text of the Epistle to the Ephesians*, shows that *eudokia*, rendered "good pleasure," in Eph. i, 5, should be rendered "benignant purpose," that is, *benevolence* or *beneficence*. We are, then, "predestinated," not "according to the *good pleasure* of his will," but *according to the beneficence of his will*. One of the pet phrases of arbitrary absolutism, therefore, in which

Calvinism intrenches itself, is demolished. In both the Septuagint and the New Testament the use of the word is uniform; and so an English phrase which sounds like a curt, peremptory, omnipotent silencer upon all inquiry, is really a term for divine liberality. The election of Ephesians is not based by St. Paul in an austere, divine reserve, but in an open, free beneficence.

Our hearty thanks are due to the independence and honesty of Dr. Eadie, in rescuing this most beautiful word, *eúdokía*, *beneficence*, from the sad perversion by which Calvinism has made it a most repulsive cant term for a reasonless despotism on the part of the wise and blessed God. This abuse of this sweet word is constantly occurring in Calvinistic standard writings. Thus Calvin: "God hath a sufficient, just cause of his election and reprobation in his *own will* or *pleasure*." And so Archbishop Usher thus stultifies Omniscience by making God act by mere will without just cause: "There is, indeed, no cause of reprobation in the reprobate that they, rather than others, are passed by of God; that is, wholly from the unsearchable depths of God's *free-will* and *good pleasure*." And so Dr. Eadie's countryman, Dr. Dick: "If there was sin in the reprobate, there was sin also in the elect; and we must therefore resolve their opposite allotments into the *will* of God, who gives and withholds his favor according to his *good pleasure*." How men, learned men, good men, should be so fascinated with the work of exhibiting perpetually so disgusting a caricature of our holy God is a problem we attempt not to solve.

But one of the grandest battles of the commentators on Ephesians is fought over Eph. ii, 3: "Were by nature the children of wrath, even as others." Does this text teach an inborn depravity, depravity in our nature? Does it mean that our nature at birth is under damna-

tion? And this last question truly involves "infant damnation." If the child before responsible action is damned in the womb, its final damnation is just. Nay, the whole race might justly be born and damned, without an actual sin, and without a Saviour, to hell forever. And that, as we all know, is the fundamental Calvinistic assumption. This assumption is claimed as necessary in order to show that the gift of Christ is pure "grace;" and in order to show that a part might be elected by pure "good pleasure," and the rest left as reprobate, to their own previously damned state. For Calvinism this text is a Thermopylæ, a narrow pass in which it intrenches itself for dear life.

Dr. Eadie shows conclusively, we think, that "children of wrath" signifies, not, *liable to a possible wrath*, but "involved in wrath," the wrath lying in actual contact on the object. So far Calvinism and Arminianism must agree. "Children of disobedience," in verse two, is in the Greek, "sons of disobedience;" and Ellicott and others say that "children" implies a stronger and nearer connection than "sons." The statement is, however, untenable. • Children of "wisdom," in Matt. xi, 19, expresses no stronger relation than "sons of disobedience." Yet these, and perhaps all the parallel phrases, imply contactual relation.

But the vital contest is upon *φύσει*, "by nature." And here we think the definition of nature credited to the German commentator Harless is the true one: *that which is born or grows, in antithesis to that which is made. Nature is never made; it is born and becomes.* Dr. Eadie illustrates this with a rich variety of Greek quotations. He does not deny that the term is sometimes used as second nature; the superstratum deposited by habit over our primary character. Nor could he deny, we suppose, that the superstratum of regen-

eration, though a result of an act, and truly *made*, is called a *nature*. Nor, although God neither is born nor grows, do we hesitate to speak of the divine *nature*. Yet Dr. Eadie is justified in maintaining that these secondary and sporadic meanings cannot stand before the normal and ordinary definition. The true ordinary meaning of "nature" must be accepted.

Dr. Meyer, however, denies that a *nature* in this sense, under *wrath*, is Paul's doctrine. He maintains that the apostle teaches that all penalty is the result of *actual* sin, and all wrath rests upon a developed *nature*. He refers to Rom. v, 12, where it is said that all die *because all sin*. When asked, then, why infants penally die, he replies, *the apostle did not think of that question!* This reply will not satisfy "New England theology," nor our poor New York theology either. Macknight, followed by Dr. Clarke, denies that original sin appears in the text, and both quote a number of Greek passages in support of their views. Yet in every one of these quotations the predicate is truly affirmed of the inborn nature base. Wesley, on the other hand, explicitly affirms that Paul lays the wrath of God upon our inborn nature. Against the Pelagian view, which denies original depravation to be found in this text, Dr. Eadie's victory is, we think, complete. Standing alone, the text would not be sufficient to establish original sin; but coming in as auxiliary with Rom. v, 12-21, it is a very powerful and decisive confirmation.

Evil Entailed by Natural Consequence.

Unfallen Adam, we suppose, was, by the indwelling Spirit and the power of the tree of life (emblem, perhaps, of immortalization through Christ), placed upon a high plane of being. The disintegration of the material organism, and consequent disease and death, were

prevented. In this compound nature of spirit and body, angel and animal, the spirit so elevated even the animal that Adam realized, approximately, Paul's conception of "spiritual body." See our note on 1 Cor. xv, 44. The fatal act of sin sunk him as animal at once from this high plane of supernature to the conditions of animal nature; on the same plane essentially, so far forth as animal, with the other animal races, and so to material disintegration, pain, disease, and dissolution. Yet, though as animal he passes through death, his higher nature secures, through unconditional redemption, spiritual immortality and bodily resurrection.

This was unquestionable *personal penalty* for guilt upon Adam. But it was, through the universal and fundamental law of propagation by which like parent generates like offspring, that bodily and mental suffering were entailed upon Adam's posterity by natural consequence, and not by penal infliction; through propagative law, and not by judicial guilt. When a prime minister for some offense is degraded to the ranks of his majesty's subjects, that is upon him penalty for guilt. But when he begets children, and they are subjected to the same humble level, that is natural propagative consequence. The rest of his majesty's subjects were born to those conditions without any offense or royal displeasure. And so God might, without penalty or injustice, have created man in nature conditions, like other animals, without any preceding fall. He so created races of animals of different grades, to furnish out the varieties of nature, before the fall. Moreover, the various grades of being are suitably placed in surroundings adapted to their nature. Air, earth, and water, mountain-top, plain, and marsh, are all conditions suited for their proper occupants. And so it was fitting that man, the immortal animal, should be placed in a world

suited alike to his immortal probationary prospects, and to his transiency as a dying race. He is a normal sinner in a humble world, amid temptations and trials and tasks calculated to form his character, if he will, to a lofty hardihood of virtue, piety, and immortal rewards. Other animals testify that they are endowed with an existence, with all its disqualifications, so happy that they are ready to flee from death and fight for life with all their will and power. They are in covenant with God to accept all the ills for the basal good with which those ills are compensated. The law of satisfactory COMPENSATION is the divine justification for their creation. Into that contract man has entered; and if he breaks his contract and commits suicide, it is the result either of insanity or of a desperate wickedness by himself acquired. The animal races are not punished with the natures bestowed upon them. The beautiful so-called "bird of paradise" is not punished because he does not live in Paradise. A gnat is not punished because he is not an eagle, nor a mouse because he is not a lion. So neither is man punished because he is not an angel, and does not live in Eden as his first progenitor did.

But while the progeny thus lowly placed are not punished for a sin not their own, this dispensation from God is an exhibition in the sacred history of our world and of the universe of the fatal nature of *sin*. It shows how a one sin and how a first sin may entail immeasurable ruin. The first alcoholic glass may entail upon the drinker uncontrollable appetite, depravation, death, and hell. Adam, it is popularly said, only ate an "apple;" and this man only drank the grape; and both apple and grape bring perdition. And this analogy, ever repeated in human history, explains the apparent smallness of Adam's probationary test at which skepticism cavils.

The Issue Between Arminianism and Calvinism.

The essential and universal issue which Wesleyan Arminianism has taken against Calvinism may mostly be stated in a single proposition. We deny and they affirm the GENETIC PRINCIPLE that *the divine government may inalternatively secure the sin of any being, and then justly damn him eternally for the sin so secured.* We deny, and they affirm, or assume, that *a being can be justly damned for sin which he never had the adequate power of avoiding.* We affirm that adequate, unneutralized power to a volition is necessary to responsibility; *unless, always, that power has been responsibly forfeited.*

Calvinism affirms, or assumes, that God may damn beings for sin which they had no adequate power to avoid, in at least the following seven cases:

1. ORIGINAL SIN AND ABILITY.—The whole human race, as fallen in Adam, might be justly damned with an absolutely universal damnation, without any Saviour being interposed or any adequate power of avoidance. At such a view we stand aghast with abhorrence. Arminians hold that a “gracious ability” is necessary to the responsibility of fallen man; Taylorism holds that fallen man has still “natural ability” to repent—his depravity consisting in the free uniformity of voluntary sinning. This last is semi-Pelagianism. We may add that we use the word Taylorism not in disrespect, but as a brief term to designate a systematized view; just as we use the word Arminianism.

2. ETERNAL REPROBATION.—From the above first Calvinistic point it follows, *a fortiori*, that God might pass by as reprobate, and leave in eternal damnation, those who, without any adequate volitional power of avoidance of their own, are involved in the guilt of

Adam's sin, so that the reprobates are damned for what they never could avoid. About the most appalling of dogmas !

3. INFANT DAMNATION.—*A fortiori*, it is equally just for God to pass by and leave in reprobation and eternal death any or all infants, as they are merely, like all the others, damned for what they cannot help. Our Arminianism teaches universal infant salvation ; Taylorism, so far as we know, accords.

4. WILL POWER.—*A fortiori*, again, no adequate volitional ability, or power of counter choice, is requisite, in order to render any choice, or course of choices and actions, justly worthy of eternal damnation ; so that, again, any being may be justly and eternally damned for what he cannot help. Taylorism teaches that the agent must possess adequate power of choice contrary to strongest motive, though it is certain he will never exert it. Arminianism teaches such power of counter choice unbound by any such certainty.

5. FORE-ORDAINED DAMNATION.—By an act of irrespective, unforeknowing fore-ordination, predetermining what shall come to pass, the reprobates passed by, and intrinsically incapable of repentance, are decreetively consigned to perpetual sin and eternal death. So that reprobates are again damned for what they cannot help.

6. PAGAN DAMNATION.—All pagans and other persons who never heard of Christ, and never had any means of salvation, are justly damned eternally for that want of faith in Christ which they cannot help.

7. IMPUTATION.—Sin may be justly and literally imputed to the innocent, whether the innocent could avoid it or not ; so that Adam's personal sin may, with strict justice, be imputed as *guilt* in his innocent posterity, and the sins of men may be literally imputed in their

guilt to Christ, and he suffer infinite punishment in strict justice, so that a man may be, by intrinsic justice, held responsible for what he did not do and could not help. Arminianism denies the transferability of guilt or literal punishment. The sin of Adam is not imputed to his posterity, nor the sin of man imputed to Christ. Taylorism is here rather Arminian.

Now, whoever holds any one of these seven points, must hold it on the generic principle that a man may be justly damned for what he cannot help; and, having once conceded the principle, he has no defense against either of the others. He must, in strict logic, reject or accept the whole. He can reject any one only by summarily rejecting the generic principle on which the whole are based.

From all this we may see two things. First, that *every variation from genuine Calvinism, on all the points in dispute, Original Sin, Imputation, Depravity, Ability (as well as Free-will and Necessity), has been in direction toward Arminianism.* It has, in every instance, either approximated to or coincided with our Methodism: or it has overleaped us and vaulted into semipelagianism. Had we space we might demonstrate this on every point. Second, the reason why "New Divinity" men, in Calvinistic churches, like Taylor, Beman, Fitch, and Finney, were *involved in perplexity and contradiction*, is, that they tried to evade the generic principle of eternal damnation for the unavoidable on particular points, instead of throwing that principle entirely overboard, and coming out upon the broad, free platform of RESPONSIBILITY ONLY FOR THE AVOIDABLE.

Dr. Shedd remarks: "The unconditional decree, in reference to the non-elect, according to Augustine, is one of preterition, or omission, merely. The reprobating decree is not accompanied, as the electing decree is, with

any direct divine efficiency to secure the result. And there is no need of any; for, according to the Augustinian anthropology, there is no possibility of self-recovery from a voluntary apostasy, and consequently the simple passing by and leaving of the sinful soul to itself renders its perdition as certain as if it were brought about by a direct divine efficiency." * "*There is no need of any!*" No, indeed; for, as it is damning the infinite Gorilla is after securing, it must be admitted that his hapless victims are very efficiently and thoroughly damned without "need of any" direct decree of reprobation. *First*, by fore-ordination he damns them to hell, an eternity before they are born; *second*, holding them guilty, by an atrocious lie, of a sin they never committed, he doubly damns them; *third*, subjecting them to a paralysis of soul by which they cannot repent without the Spirit, and arbitrarily withholding the Spirit, he trebly damns them; *finally*, hemming them in by overruling motives to impenitence, without "power of contrary choice," he quadruply damns them. "There is no need of any" quintuple damnation, as Dr. Shedd grimly and truly says. It is folly to imagine that he has here presented the scheme of Calvinistic reprobation plausibly! Every fiber of our whole moral nature rises up to pronounce it *accursed!* The polyglot furnishes no language to express the depth of unanimous abhorrence with which our readers will salute its awful face. Among all the haggard superstitions of the earth, Comparative Theology can furnish no more truly diabolical untruth.

* Shedd's *History of Christian Doctrine*, vol. ii, pp. 70, 72.

METHODISM.

Methodist Theology from the Oriental Church.

THERE is a manifold and striking interest as well as profit in contemplating the history, doctrines, institutions, and general spirit of the Oriental Church. Within its limits is the probable cradle of mankind, and, beyond doubt, the Ararat from which the renewed race took its start. Within its boundaries Abraham founded the chosen race, and Moses gave the law. There lies Palestine, whose "sacred acres" were trodden by His holy feet. Let not Rome boast the antiquity of her Christianity, or prefer her doubtful claim to the primacy, or even to the presence of Peter; for the East has in her Antioch a more ancient Christianity, a more primordial primacy, and a more undoubted Peter. To this Oriental mother of us all the entire Western Church is but a great body of manifold dissenters, and the pope is but an earlier Protestant, no better than Luther. Augustine has not taught her the doctrine of original sin, nor Calvin his *decretum horribile*, nor Edwards his volitional fatalism. And to most of our readers there will appear something striking in the following remark :

"The revival of the national Church of Greece contains many germs of hope for the future. A continuous history of Greek theology, from its peculiarities in the Eastern Fathers of the third and fourth centuries, through the schools of Constantinople, down to its last great effort in the revival of letters in the West, and its influence on the Cambridge Platonic divines of the Church of England, and, through them, on John Wesley, in the eighteenth century, is still, I believe, a *consideratum*."*

* From Stanley's *Lectures on the History of the Eastern Church*.

It is indeed a striking thought, that the youngest vigorous branch of the Christian Church has derived its most characteristic theology from the parent trunk.

Doctrinal Divergences of the Early Methodists.

With modesty and candor Mr. Tyerman says, in his preface to *The Oxford Methodists*: "The book is not a series of written portraits. I make no pretensions to artistic skill. I have simply done my best in collecting facts from every source within my reach, and have narrated them as truly and lucidly as I could." We deem it unfortunate that the faithfulness in gathering facts and the skill in handling them do not meet in the same man. Mr. Tyerman has accumulated a mass of "raw material" for history, leaving it almost as raw as he finds it. Yet great thanks are due him for what he has done. He has shed a clear, broad light upon the life of Wesley, and especially, in the present volume, upon the first beginnings of the Oxford movement. He has given body and life to what were heretofore almost mere *names* in the Wesleyan history. Clayton, and Broughton, and Ingham, and Gambold, if not symmetrical characters, are live men. And we trace the misty progress of those *origines*, out from which the figures of the Wesleys and Whitefield emerge with such startling life. As an accompaniment to the life of Wesley this volume is invaluable in Methodist history.

It was in 1727 that four young Oxonians, the two Wesleys and Broughton and Kirkham, met to read the Greek Testament with devout purpose. In 1735 Wesley counted his company as "fourteen or fifteen in number, all of one heart and mind." Great were their subsequent divergences both of doctrine and history.

Estrangements, and even hostilities, between each other mark the subsequent narrative. But, in some form or other, nearly every one retained an earnest Christian character to the end of his career.

The points upon which they doctrinally diverged were matters of either churchmanship or soteriology. They all began strict churchmen, and the influence of Clayton infused a large share of ritualism into the Wesleys. And Clayton persevered, a high ritualist, a "Puseyite" before Pusey, unto the end; haughtily refusing to notice the Wesleys after their fall from high-churchianity, and ready to accept the popish descendant of the Stuarts as his *jure-divino* sovereign. Yet who can withhold admiration from Clayton's stern, consistent, lofty conscientiousness of life? If severe to others, he was severe to himself, and his rebuke of sin was sharpened by his deep sense of responsibility to God as a minister of Christ. We are unable to say that he had not true justifying faith in Christ. No more do we believe this of Wesley while in his ritualistic era. They did not indeed *realize* the emphatic place of *faith* in the Christian life. They had not performed that conscious act of entire self-commitment to Christ by which the vivid *evidence* is attained, and the rich communion with Christ, and with God through Christ, is established, so that the soul springs forward with new life and glad obedience in the way of active duty. And hence, when Wesley came to that turning-point of self-surrender, he felt his heart "*strangely warmed*"—*strangely*, because in all his ritualistic days he had never felt that warmth. He had long served God by severe self-subduing rule; henceforth he serves him with an abounding will and joy. Yet he had served God—served God trusting in Christ, yet trusting in Christ so distantly that he never came within speaking, loving distance of the lover of his soul.

The change was so great that Wesley for a long time believed that it was a change from death to life, a *first* attainment of justification.

But as it was the doctrine of justification by faith that separated Wesley from the high-churchman, so it was their overstatement of that doctrine which repelled him from Hervey, Whitefield, and the Moravians, Ingham and Gambold. As a student of the early Fathers, by whom predestination was repudiated as a Gnostic heresy, and from his kinship with Jeremy Taylor and the other great Arminian and semi-Arminian divines, Wesley could never believe that faith was other than the free act of the creature, *enabled*, but not infallibly *secured*, either by the atonement of Christ or the power of God. Hence, when Whitefield diverged into the heresy of predestination, Wesley smote the blasphemous dogma with lightning strokes. When Hervey taught the crude dogma that the merit of Christ's holy actions through his whole life was imputed to a certain selected set of mankind, Wesley dealt upon the infantile theology of that gentle-spirited writer a very few, but very decisive, touches of his terse pen. Ingham retired to Yorkshire, married a lady of quality, and raised a flourishing circle of country churches, of which he was installed bishop. Over that blooming garden of spiritual life came the "northern blast of Sandemanianism," the doctrine that carries Calvinism to its consistent figure, and teaches that the elect is saved with no act of his own, but by the divine force carrying him panoramically through the motions and movements by which he is wheeled into heaven. Under this blast Ingham's Yorkshire diocese wilted. Wesleyan Methodism overspread the shire, leaving, to this day, a few shattered remnants of the once flourishing field of Ingham's evangelic labors.

We thus, by comparison, see what was the secret of the success of the Wesleyan movement. Rejecting the cumbrous rigidity of high-churchmanship on the one hand, and the ultraistic extreme of the doctrine of justification by faith on the other, Wesley retained an *energetic Church polity and a true doctrine of salvation through Christ*. To these he added the intensifying doctrines of the conscious witness of the Spirit and entire sanctification, and insisted on their actual realization in experimental life. His entire system of polity, of doctrine, and of life, thereby strangely presaged and harmonized with modern freedom and activity. It was an anticipation of our age. It was the morning-break, in the religious world, of the modern life.

A Healthy Church requires Symmetry of Doctrine.

The following passage from Dr. Rainy's *Delivery and Development of Christian Doctrine*, on the formation of heresies, may seem to some readers curiously suggestive in regard to some movements in our own Church at the present hour : "Commonly, as has often been remarked, these heresies arise in some such way as this : Some Christian *idea, or some one aspect of a Christian principle, was laid hold of in an intensely exclusive manner*. It began to be urged willfully and impatiently. It was developed extravagantly, and conclusions were urged as needful in order to its being duly recognized and held, which were perverse and erroneous, and traversed some other principle of Scripture teaching ; and, finally, the process was cornered by the explicit denial of the part of Scripture teaching which thus interfered with the tendencies that were at work. The Church, meanwhile, could win a complete and real victory over such a heresy only in one way, namely, by *doing justice to whatever truth the diverging tendency rep-*

resented, but at the same time evincing its consistency with the other truths which that tendency had neglected or opposed. Such a process could not fail to educate the Church's mind, and force her on to a more full, exact, and fruitful acquaintance with the *whole relations* of truth as unfolded in the Scriptures."

All experience shows that a healthy state of a Church requires that there should not be an exaggerating emphasis laid upon one truth, but that the symmetry of Christian doctrine should be preserved both in preaching and in Christian effort.

The Wesleyan doctrine of attaining a higher plane of Christian holiness, of "power" against temptation and sin and "cleaving to God," seems to be infusing itself spontaneously into the belief and acceptance of all earnest evangelical Christians. The doctrine is all the more powerful by taking "its place" in a symmetrical Christian faith and practice. Says Mr. Moody, "Some temperance men make a grand mistake, and that is—*they lug in the question every time they get the chance.* Every thing in its own place! If I go to a prayer-meeting I do not want to hear temperance or the higher Christian life. There is a man who comes to our noon-day meetings; no matter what the subject is, *he gets up and talks every day on the higher life.* A friend, in going out of the meeting one day, said to me, 'I like a fiddle with a thousand strings, but not with this one of higher life played on every day.'"

The power of these evangelists resides in their great faith and their gift of realizing the old truths. Says Mr. Moody, "I believe that heaven is real, hell is real, the devil real. God is real. If God did not wish us to speak about heaven, he would not have put so much about it in the Bible." And what a thrilling illustration of the atonement is here! "The Spanish authorities in Cuba

had arrested a man who, though born in England, was a naturalized United States citizen. He was charged with conspiracy against the government, and ordered to be shot. But the consuls of both England and America believed the man to be innocent, and used all the persuasion and entreaty in their power for his release, but the proud Spaniards haughtily disregarded their petition. The hour of execution had now arrived, and a company of soldiers was drawn up in line. The condemned English-American walked out before them, calmly awaiting his fate. He stood at the foot of the grave already dug, his coat off, and his hands pinioned behind him. The officer ordered his men to load, and at the word 'present' they brought their rifles to their shoulders, awaiting the word of command to fire. In the awful suspense, suddenly there sprang forward from the by-standers the two consuls; the one drawing from his breast the Stars and Stripes, wrapped it right round the prisoner, while the other threw over him the Union Jack. The consuls now stood on either side, defying the Spaniards, who dared not fire on the flags of two of the mightiest nations under heaven, and the man was released, and proved his innocence to the satisfaction of the authorities."

Methodist Orthodoxy.

The *Westminster Review* (portraying English Methodism from an antichristian stand-point) complains of its rigid orthodoxy. In our own country its picture would be largely false. Methodism is a voluntary association of free minds agreeing in certain fundamental views of the religion that is most truly Christian and most conducive to the good of the world. It claims no right to compel any man to join its association or accept its views; but it does claim *the right of not allowing its pulpits or other*

institutes to be used for the purpose of assailing and destroying its own fundamental principles. Like every other voluntary association for a philanthropic purpose, it has a right to limit its own principles and actions, and to confine its voluntary agents and ministers, young or old, within those long-held and well-known limitations. The measures taken to secure itself from the intrusion of hostile or hypocritical members are perfectly wise and right. The attempt, like this of the *Westminster*, to caricature and vilify them with exaggerating, sneering, or opprobrious words and phrases, is itself proscriptive and persecuting. So far as the young candidate for the ministry is concerned, he is as free in choosing his course as any young man can be in choosing any course of life. It is no fault of ours, it is the misfortune of our finite human nature, that a large part of our most momentous choices for life have to be made in the immaturity of youth. We believe that few make a happier choice than does the young man qualified by nature and grace to enter the Methodist ministry. Many, no doubt, mistake their call ; but those who therein do obey a truly divine call, need desire or envy no other calling. To our infidel reviewer the Conference is old Spider inviting young Mr. Fly into his webby parlor ; to us it is a divine messenger calling youth and holy ambition to the field of highest usefulness—to a grace and glory here, and a crown hereafter. So far as the aged minister is concerned, to our view the reviewer's picture is shamefully false. Where sincere changes of opinion in advanced life have taken place, what our Church has asked is that her pulpits and institutions be not used or abused to propagate doctrines which she condemns. To the piety and services of the dissenter she still pays commensurate respect. If he feels bound to proclaim his new tenets, she rightfully excludes him from using

her institutes or her communion for the purpose. Whatever inconveniences result to him from making a change in his relations are outside the direct aims of the Church in excluding him, and are results arising from the nature of things, and not from any ecclesiastical purpose. We believe that all such truly conscientious cases are treated with the most humane and fraternal consideration.

Methodism at Wesley's Death.

At the death of Wesley, as is apparent from Dr. Stevens's *Methodism*, there was a sudden change from a spontaneous monarchy to a sort of democracy that wonderfully looked like anarchy, and seemed to threaten disintegration. The crisis concentrated the moral forces of the Methodist body. But it was no doubt the powerful *religious life* which constituted the conserving and organizing power. The hour does not always bring the man ; but this hour did develop and furnish the *men*. The working of a great Providence was scarcely more marked in the adaptation of the instruments for the *founding* than for this *continuation* of the movement. These first sons of the first founders proved amply competent to maintain, adorn, and extend their heritage. And nothing is more striking than the dramatic variety and fitness for their part of the individual characters of this second generation. There was, first, Waiison, the systematic theologian, surpassing all his predecessors, and as yet without a successor ; there was Bunting, the statesmanly "pilot that weathered the storm ;" there was Clarke, the peerless among English general commentators ; there was Newton, the prince of preachers ; and far into this age extend the labors of Coke, the world-wide missionary evangelist. Under the labors of such men Wesleyan Methodism stands out

from the diverging and vanishing branches of Calvinistic and Church Methodism so called, vindicated, energized, extending, triumphing; overcoming its difficulties, and flinging out its projects with a bold and boundless expansion.

A striking feature of the entire movement is its *joyousness*. The true Methodist, the entire Methodist body, is jubilant with the thought that it has found a prize which is enriched by the privilege of impartation, and all the more enjoyable from the increasing multitude of its participants. In a large amount of modern evangelism we recognize a stern, solemn, not happy spirit, partaking less of the dispensation of Jesus than of John the Baptist. But the whole tone of the history as given by Dr. Stevens is rich and exultant. It reads like the Acts of the Apostles just after the day of Pentecost.

Largely the practical and successful working of Methodism proper is the result of its actual theology. There is a large number of well-read ministers who imagine that Methodism has pretty much no doctrines at all. They give our founders and our body credit for a congeries of religious notions, and many of them would, we suppose, be surprised to learn that a consistent, symmetrical system of THEOLOGY, strikingly accordant with the intuitions of the human soul, and dictated to us by the most obvious meaning of Scripture, forms, in our own estimate, a large share of our power to win sinners to Christ, to maintain the unity of our faith, and to spread the Gospel over the world.

Methodism and Unitarianism.

Dr. Hedge says of the Paleyan age, that its "practical evil . . . found a corrective in the rise of Methodism. That new dispensation of the Gospel reacted with heal-

ing power on the Church." But we reply, Methodism, strangely as it may sound, is founded upon; and is a necessary consequence of, Paleyism. Whitefield and Wesley assumed the evidences of Paley to be valid, and made the historical miraculous Christ, with his actual vicarious atonement, the basis of their "dispensation." Take away these, and these men were powerless. And take away these, and every dispensation will be powerless. No religion can live and work without its body of historical facts. Dean Milman pregnantly remarks that "no Pelagian ever has or ever will work a religious revolution." With the implements that these writers and their editor would furnish, the indifferentism and skepticism whose reign closed the last century could never have been dethroned. It would only have found "in the lowest deep a lower deep."

While Methodism was working out her humble and hard-working dispensation, Unitarianism was the deadest part of the Christian Church. President Kirkland and his contemporaries were the driest of Lockians, the tamest of Paleyans, reducing Christianity to the most naked history, and preaching a Gospel of natural ethics. To them, Methodism and fanaticism were different ways of spelling the same word. What has wrought the change by which our graceful Unitarian can call Methodism "a new dispensation of the Gospel?" A fashionable philosophy. Intuitionism is *now* in the ascendancy; and the high glow of moral and philosophic feeling which it cherishes not only sincerely feels an affinity for, but even confounds itself with, a spiritual, earnest religion. Dr. Hedge speaks, then, with no purpose of shallow compliment, but with a profoundly serious meaning. Yet, with all its profoundness, it is a mere ephemeral phase of sentiment. It is simply the humor of the reigning metaphysics. Twenty years hence it may

be blown off, like the foam from a German's mug of lager, and leave nothing but a residuum of dead sensationalism worse than ruled the age of Paley and Kirkland. Should we now allow ourselves to be cheated into the humor of renouncing the historical evidential basis of Christianity, what will become of us when the high fever glow of the present transcendentalism chills down into empiricism? Both the historical and the spiritual would be lost, and nothing but a blank, desolate, Tom Paine infidelity would be left us. We must tell our Unitarian and rationalistic friends, then, that we can no more accept their guidance in this their hour of excitement than we could in the day of their deadness. Methodism maintained her revivalism in the day of their prosaic Paleyism; she now maintains her Paleyism in the midst of their revivalism. For if Paleyism be true, our revivalism is right. If the facts of Christianity are reality, the spirit of earnest religion is solely rational. Paley was right and logical when he framed his evidences; he was illogical when he declined to infer the obligation and necessity of the most earnest religious feeling and action. Paley and Wesley are antecedent and consequent.

We are not, then, to be fascinated out of that firm maintenance of Christian FACTS, for the masterly statement of which William Paley's name is illustriously trite wherever the English language is read. His manual has solidly based the faith of untold thousands. It will survive whole æons of literary bubbles. With all our Methodism, we would not give one ounce of Paley's solid evidential sense for the entire volume of transcendental gas that exhilarates the brains of these glowing intuitionists, who would kick the massy platform of fact from beneath their feet to show how buoyantly they can dance on nothing.

It was our fortune to read in close connection Theodore Parker's *Experience* and Dr. Stevens's historical portraiture of Wesley. We thereby were led to bring into close comparison the Christian and the antichristian Reformer. We must say that in the presence of the great, serene, reverential founder of Methodism, our Absolute Religionist looks meager, limping, and bombastic. Great pretenses does he make of originality and haughty rejection of the faith and theologies of past ages. And yet he miserably fails in comparative depth and power. How infinitely less searching is his discourse to disturb the guilty conscience with the damnation of sin and the terrors of God ! How feebly he arouses the scourge of remorse or the radical volition of repentance. What knows he of the rapture of pardon, of communion with God, and joy in the Holy Ghost ! All these deep, solemn, glorious feelings he ignores, and substitutes old Stoicism, with its marble moral will and its desperate reliance on self. Hence, never, never can he stir the moral depths of the popular heart, and pour religious revival through the soul of the dying masses of men. No John Nelsons or George Storys spring up to his side. No Kingswood collieries grow holy under his discourse. No helpers rise by hundreds to carry the glad evangel to the common people of all the land. No impatient missionaries burn to herald his frozen gospel to distant isles and continents. From the far hemispheres and antipodes no echo comes, making the heavens above him glad with the shout of redeemed souls rejoicing in a gospel of peace.

Bishop Spalding on Romanism and Methodism.

The first three lectures (*Lectures and Discourses*) of this eminent Catholic prelate are devoted to a defense

of our common Christianity against the assaults of modern scientists and philosophers. So eloquently and ably is this done that, in our reading, the hearts of us two seemed to draw nearer together, and our own heart seemed to ask why should there be so fixedly a great gulf, a χάσμα μέγα, between us. We have "one Lord, one faith [in Christ], one baptism." And yet this our Christian brother repudiates our communion, discards our worship, denies our human right to our own moral judgments, excludes us with horror from his consecrated cemetery, and pronounces us a heretic who needs correction and straightening into orthodoxy, even, if necessary, by physical infliction and force. Thus a σχίσμα and a χάσμα μέγα stand, as a moveless and mournful reality between us.

The reason and responsibility for this schism open upon us the moment we commence the fourth lecture, describing "The Catholic Church." Dear to us, as a sweet music, is the very word CATHOLIC, as inherited, not indeed from Christ, nor from his apostles, but from the creed of the early ages, by all true justified maintainers of the "one Lord, one faith, one baptism." In that threefold oneness is their unity; in that broad, universal comprehension is their Catholicity; under the divine Head of the Church are they recognized as salt of the earth and heirs of heaven. But, as with an inflexible cleaver, the learned prelate creates a direful schism. He takes a *section* of the holy body, cuts it out from the rest, and limits the name and attribute of Catholicity to that section or "sect." Not only the younger sections, the Protestant, but sections older than the Roman, the Syriac, where Christ himself laid the foundations, the Greek, in whose language the New Testament speaks to us through all ages, both older than Rome, are excom-

municated. All, save the communion of the bloody pagan capital, are

"Shorn from the holy altar of the Church
And offered up as sacred to perdition."

All this is done under the claim that Peter, endowed with the successional kingship of Christ, established his throne at Rome; an assumption unknown to and contradicted by the New Testament documents, and unaffirmed by any contemporary authority, and so utterly unhistorical and untrue.

In a chapter on the *Decline of Protestantism*, the venerated prelate plausibly finds Congregationalism in a state of disintegration, and Episcopalianism a feeble, aristocratic minimum; but coming to Methodism, he acknowledges a "success" and a "preponderance." He honours us with several pages, in which, leaving out numerous depreciatory phrases, somewhat otiose in their character, we seem not seldom to discern that the religious emotion of Dr. Spalding kindles with more sympathy than he is quite willing to reveal. How profoundly, in so discerning, do we deplore the barriers he is obliged to set up that prevent sympathy from enlarging into communion! It is in this sympathy, in which we find traces of the inner oneness of all devout believers in Christ, which will be revealed when these temporal bars have vanished at the final revelation of the sons of God. If we are ever admitted to the vision of God, we expect to find myriads of Roman saints in that transcendent glory. They are mistakes which divide us; mistakes not guiltless, but mistakes that will be cleared up at the grand upclearing. Dr. Spalding recognizes the true Catholicism in Methodism in the following frank statement of the secret of her success: "The Methodist preachers appealed to sentiments which are part of our

religious nature; and in this respect their sermons were but repetitions of truths which have been announced in the Church from the beginning. The necessity of salvation, the merits of the Passion and death of our Lord, the power of faith, the evil of sin, the need of repentance, the efficacy of prayer, God's mercy, and the joy of a holy life, are not subjects which Methodism, or any form of Protestantism, has [first] introduced into the Christian pulpit. But the Methodist exhorters urged these truths with a power and freshness which brought them home to those who were either ignorant of religion or accustomed to hear from the pulpit only moral essays and sectarian controversy."

And yet Dr. Spalding maintains that Methodism is contributing to the decline of Protestantism by reducing religion to a mere feeling, to the neglect of doctrine and historic connection, that is, with the Roman papacy. But Methodism, however much she relies on emotion, and however much she has used moving machineries, has not made such her predominant aim or reliance. Dr. Spalding's own statement shows on what a body of vital truths, the vital *doctrines* of Christianity, she has made her success depend. The mere *emotion* has never been her aim, but such a change of heart and life as renews the man in Christ. Her avowed aim is not to diffuse shallow emotionalism, but to "spread scriptural HOLINESS through the land." She aims to do this by vital truths, deep experiences, and efficient organisms, with, greatest specialty of all, Christ as our sole head and "center of unity." In holding that head and center, we are one with the Roman, the Greek, the Anglican, the Reformed, Churches, and with Bishop Spalding. But when he or they attempt to insert a human head between us and the divine Head, we most promptly reject all such interlopers. The learned prelate's ar-

gument that a visible body should have a visible head is plausible but not convincing. The kingdom of nature is a visible body without a visible head. The very universe is a visible body with a divine invisible Head.

For the claim set up by Dr. Spalding, and conceded by the Episcopalian Bishop Seymour, that Peter possessed a "primacy" over the other apostles, is questionable. Peter did possess a *seniority* of age, and hence might occasionally speak as *spokesman* for the rest. He possessed also an impulsive overforwardness which prompted him often to speak in a malapropos style which involved him in blunder and disaster. But, exceptionally we might say, once or twice, he spoke so pertinently for all that Jesus responded to him graciously for all. But no words of Jesus to him conferred such direct personal power over "nations" and "kingdoms" as Jer. i, 10, confers upon Jeremiah. And yet the powers conferred on Jeremiah were not *executive*, but simply *declaratory*, limited to the utterance of God's message to men, and they died with his person. There is nothing to show that Peter's powers were any more executive, or hereditary, or successional.

Dr. Spalding quotes the favorite texts in favor of Peter's popedom, and they are so strikingly inadequate that one wonders that he is not ashamed of the performance. They fail in many respects to affirm the claim; but we may specially note but three, namely: *explicitness*, *universality*, and *successionality*. They fail in *explicitness*, for surely it is preposterous to interpret such phrases as "confirm thy brethren," "feed my lambs," in behalf of a papal power. Any Congregational pastor fulfills the entire meaning of these phrases in his daily duties to his flock. They fail in *universality*, and to quote these words as conferring absolute power over *all future Christendom* is logical beggary.

They fail in *successionality*, for not one word in the whole indicates that any such powers were to be transmitted to apostolic successors, any more than the commission to Jeremiah declared a prophetic transmission. And then to bolster up this weakness with the unhistorical "see of Peter" at Rome, is a pretension just on the level of the forged Decretals.

Methodism and the New Theology.

The purpose of *Dorner on the Future State*, which is simply a translation of the section of his *System of Christian Doctrine*, comprising the Doctrine of the Last Things, with an Introduction and Notes by Newman Smyth, seems to be to bring the high authority of Dorner before us to justify the speculation of a *post-mortem* probation. In directing attention to this peculiarity of his Eschatology, we at the same time particularly note that he relieves the notion from its worst aspect by applying it only, or mainly, to those beyond the reach of the Gospel message. So held, not as a dogma to be imposed on the Church, but as a hypothesis relieving to the mind of the individual, the notion need create no great commotion. Similarly, the personal suggestion of Rev. Joseph Cook, that there may be cases of eminently conscientious men whose souls are quickened into a living faith at the moment of transition from time to eternity, may be a conception that one might adopt as a relieving hope. There are eminently conscience-governed men outside the Church whose rectitude of life often shames the members of the Church, skeptics, it may be, yet comparatively ruled by right, upon whom it seems difficult to pronounce the doom of eternal misery. What shall we say to or of such men? The great doctor of the Roman Church, Thomas Aquinas, would say: Heaven is the vision of

God to which the pure in heart through Christ are alone admitted; while outside the divine vision are varied regions of happiness, which is not *blessedness*, where the virtuous not holy abide. And all outside the visional heaven is hell. The holy live in the eternal golden sunshine of glory; the virtuous in the silver moonshine of intellectual enjoyment. Personally, we would not peremptorily condemn Mr. Cook's hypothesis as a mental relief to those who need it. We cannot, however, elevate the conception to a dogma, nor write it an article in a structural theology. Whichever way private speculation may verge, we should say to the virtuous not holy man, Your position is, nevertheless, precarious and dangerous; "give heed to make your calling and election *sure*." Leave not the eternal blessedness to a contingency.

We cannot fully admire the finesses of Mr. Smyth in this and previous volumes. His curvilinear periods about the "New England theology," as if New England had but one theology, and as if a narrow local name for a theology were a recommendation instead of a disparagement, we do not intensely admire. And to cover over his emergence from the past Calvinism of New England under such terms as "the New Orthodoxy," "the New Calvinism," "the New Theology," seems to us a very superficial showiness. He seems like a fresh spring butterfly who imagines that such an epoch as *his* emergence into existence is to make all things "new." It took long centuries and æons for creation to arrive at his advent. Now, we say that truth is *old*. As Dr. Nevins once said, "*Old* Calvinism is none the worse for being *old*." If oldness were Calvinism's only unfortunate point, that point it shares with geometry and with God. The new geometric truth, discovered not invented, never invalidates the

old. We are, and are proud to be, traditionalist. Next to the Bible and conscience we believe in the Church. We study the dogmas of the thinkers of past centuries, and especially the nearest to Christ. With Wesley we love to recur to the "Scriptures and the primitive Church."

But Mr. Smyth now brings out the giant Dorner upon us to crush opposition like an avalanche. Awful! But we have heretofore intimated that we are to be numbered among the admirers, but not the worshipers or followers, of Dorner. In his *History of Protestant Theology*, for instance, Dorner gives a definition of Arminianism which, Arminian through our life long as we had supposed ourselves to be, defined an Arminianism we never heard of, and never dreamed, and do not understand. We do suppose the gross caricature had a purpose. And Dorner is often muddy. We cannot, indeed, quite characterize him as Robert Hall did the great Calvinistic doctor, John Owen: "A continent of mud, sir; a continent of mud!" At any rate, we should make reserve that the muddy continent has many a placer of golden ore; and the mud may be quite worth restoring for the sake of the golden finds. But as *authority* Dorner decides nothing for us.

But while we do not admire the finesses of Mr. Smyth, we do confess a reverence for the high-souled frankness of Professor Park, in boldly attributing to Wesleyan Arminianism a central prominence at the present hour in the maintenance of Protestant orthodoxy. It is a high compliment from a high authority. Methodists entertain thereat no puerile feeling of triumph, but do cherish a veneration for the magnanimity that makes such a statement. It portends no ecclesiastical unions of organizations; but it heralds a harmony of inward feelings among the organizations. For fifty years past

it has appeared to us that our Methodism stood very much in the way of the New England reformers from Calvinism. We had preoccupied the ground of a liberal evangelical theology; and their problem, a very difficult one, and also a very unnecessary one, was how to liberalize without coinciding with us. Moses Stuart, in a bold, true, historic spirit, revealed to astonished Calvinistic New England that Arminianism, true Arminianism, the Arminianism of Arminius himself, was not the ragged effigy which their pulpits had been be-thumping for a century or two, but was evangelical and marked with the characteristics of truth. In the same style Professor Park has made a still further frank advance. But in the general, the impolicy of the late Dr. Fitch, of New Haven, and of Newman Smyth, has been followed; namely, to smuggle themselves into Arminianism, and call it "a different statement of the same doctrine," "a statement of Calvinism which is so made that Arminians are obliged to accept it;" or a "New Orthodoxy," "a New Calvinism," and finally, in Mr. Smyth's present *brochure*, "a New Theology." In all these flexible metamorphoses one curiosity is the absurd tenacity with which they stick to the term "Calvinism." If they are unhappily born heirs to a theology which the nineteenth century of Christendom will not stand, no man in history is more flagrantly responsible for this, their fate, than John Calvin. Nevertheless, they writhe to get out of his fetters and yet to retain his label. Great were the powers and energies of John Calvin; great his services to the Protestant Reformation; yet his great and ghastly failure was as a constructive theologian; and, curiously enough, it is in just this sphere that they struggle to retain his name!

As to the heathen problem, to solve which the theory

of *post-mortem* probation is suggested, it has been fully considered and fairly solved in the Arminian theology. Curcellæus in his able treatise, *De necessitate cognitionis Christi ad salutem*, unfolded the true view, followed, or at least coincided with, by Wesley in his commentary, and Fletcher of Madeley in his polemic tractates. Of that solution we have given a tolerably full statement in our chapter on the Equation of Probational Advantages, pp. 343-360 of our volume on *The Will*. So satisfactory to our Methodism herself from the beginning has been that solution, that we have had no temptation to the *post-mortem* theory in the past, and none but a very few eccentric and local thinkers in the present have tended toward that notion—thinkers, especially about Boston, who have apparently absorbed it into their organisms from the surrounding Congregational atmosphere.

The Methodist Idea of Human Probation.

We might well call attention to Dr. Prentiss's dissertation, in the *Presbyterian Review*, on PROBATION. It is, he says, a modern word. He finds it earliest in "that able work," Dr. Daniel Whitby's treatise on the *Five Points*. A little more than a quarter of a century later, Bishop "Butler employs it as a key to the moral government of God in the world." But Dr. Prentiss maintains that the idea of *probation* belongs to natural religion, and not to the Bible. To the elect, whose salvation is eternally secured, he tells us there is no *probation*, no conditional trial, but only a "training" to a fixed result. To the reprobate, whose wills are fore-ordainedly and administratively secured to final impenitence, there is no opportunity, no trial, no chance, no hope! They are damned before born, without a possibility of escape! Of course, for both classes, and

equally, there is no *probation*. We need not say how thorny would be the pew-cushion of most Methodists in listening to such a Gospel! There is no chance of damnation for the pre-eternally elect; there is no chance of salvation for the pre-eternally fore-ordained reprobate. This reprobate's will is sealed to unrepentant sin. And thus, with all the doctor's irenics, no doubt perfectly sincere, we have the old fatalistic story. It is just as Wesley concisely expressed it: "The elect will be saved, do what they will; the reprobate will be damned, do what they can." To a Methodist, *PROBATION*—not the word, but the thing—forms the very soul of the whole Bible. It begins with Adam, and ends with the closing eschatology of the Apocalypse. *Obeys and be saved, disobey and be damned*, is the entire biblical strain. With Adam it was the obedience of works; under Christ it is "the obedience of faith." To unfold those alternatives before the perceptions of men, and before "the autonomy" of their free, unnecessitated, undecreed will, is the work, purpose, and life of the Law and the Gospel. And this difference between the two Churches is not merely metaphysical. It makes two different Bibles. And so when our Methodist fathers came to America their success was not due, as some say, to "their preaching the doctrines common to all evangelical Churches." They every-where found it necessary to sweep away predestinarianism in order to make way for the offer of a free salvation. Before that sweep predestinarianism is fading and almost ready to vanish away. More and more the public mind revolts from a fatalistic gospel. And it is only by the banishment of that dark dogma that a free Gospel can over-spread the earth.

How that dogma can be retained in the minds and hearts of great, good, and humane men, as most surely

it is, is to us the most insoluble of psychological problems. And here is the only way we know to our Irenicum. We drop doctrinal differences, and we can unite with Presbyterians in every good word and work. Who doubts the profound piety in the great Presbyterian body? Who does not rejoice in their stalwart efforts to benefit the world? Who does not recognize in that Church a great bulwark of Christianity—a bulwark alike against wickedness, against infidelity, and against the man of sin? Who does not admire the ability, the piety, and the scholarship of the Presbyterian ministry?—a scholarship most richly exhibited in this *Presbyterian Review*, to the perusal of which we heartily commend every scholarly Methodist.

Witness of the Spirit.

If Luther is held to have said truly that the doctrine of justification by faith is the testing article of a standing or falling Church, perhaps it is equally true that the retention in its full force of both the doctrine and the practical experience of the Witness of the Spirit is the test of a standing or falling Methodism. Before the definite individualism which this test requires both in the first assurance of conversion and in the continuity of Christian life, priestly intervention disappears, ritualism and formalism lose all luster, and religion is ever reduced to a personal home-coming matter of the heart and life. And while that is the case, how can a Church fail of retaining vitality, power, and aggression?

And this test, too, is a great conservator of an evangelical orthodoxy of creed. It pre-assumes all the great truths of evangelicism in all their power and freshness. It demands the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost in all their divinity and oneness. It demands the blood of the atonement in its full and saving power.

It has no fellowship with a self-sufficient rationalism. It feels and knows the inspiration of the divine word; it finds so rich an aliment in the gospels, it is conscious of so divine a sympathy with the deepest utterances of the Pauline epistles, that it fastens itself with a firmness to the New Testament that no modern pseudo-criticism can disturb. How, then, can the Church, with this ark of the covenant unmoved from its central sanctuary, fail of life and victory? And just here it is that we find our ground of trust, that, amid the darkness and storm of the coming age of infidel power and onslaught, Methodism will not only stand her ground, but win the triumph for the truth and Christ. With the witness in her heart there can be no faithlessness, no heresy, no cowardice, no shrinking from the fight, no yielding of a single post, but onward, right onward, must be the word till a dying world is saved.

Upon a sermon preached by Dr. E. P. Humphrey, before the Old School Presbyterian Assembly, the *New Englander* remarks: "Dr. Humphrey thus accounts for the growth of Methodism: 'It might be clearly shown, as I humbly conceive, that its past success is to be referred, not to those doctrines which are peculiar to itself, but to those which are common to both theologies.' Perhaps the Wesleyan would reply that the success of Dr. Humphrey's system is due likewise, not to its peculiarities, but to the elements which it has in common with other systems. But will Dr. Humphrey deny that one of the chief causes of the spread of Methodism, is the antagonism of its preachers to a notion of predestination, which served in the popular mind to cast doubt on the sincerity of God in the Gospel invitations? Is not their success very much due to the emphasis with which they have insisted on the truth of God's unwillingness that any should perish—on the truth that none

who will seek God are cut off from the hope of salvation, and that all *may* seek him—nay, that all are commanded and entreated to do so? The vitality of Methodism sprung from its assertion of these truths of the Gospel. So far, its power is the power of the Gospel. It has erred in denying what it could not set in harmony with them. But what shall be said of the creed which says nothing of the love and grace of God, and his desire for the salvation of impenitent men—like the creed on page seven of the sermon before us? What shall be said of the preaching which leaves the impression that the Gospel affords no opportunity, except to a small portion of those addressed? Of such preaching, this at least may be said, that it is responsible for the astonishing progress of Methodism, and for whatever is one-sided in Methodist theology.”

It would, indeed, be a problem for Dr. Humphrey to show how, if Methodist success arose from “doctrines held in common with other denominations,” she has, during her brief life, outrun them all! How should the same amount of cause produce double or treble the amount of effect? But Methodists know full well, that while the doctrine of justification by faith (of which Calvinists have so often denied us the possession) is the common life-spring by which all evangelical denominations run, the sources of all our own extra freshness of feeling and vigor of action are not *one*, but nearly *all* the points in which we differ from Calvinism. A Methodist preacher would, indeed, feel his mouth shut up by the dogma, that every sin and every impenitence was predetermined by God; and that more than half, perhaps *all* his hearers were damned not only before he began his sermon, but before they were born. What expansion to a preacher’s soul, to preach a free salvation offered by a sincere God, purchased by a universal

atonement, unlimited by any secret exclusive decree, unobserved by any volitional necessity of rejection—that is, disenthralled of *all* the hampers of Calvinism, moderate or immoderate! What a constant warning to the Christian's persevering life, to know that apostasy is a real possibility, verified by many an actual example; not a *safe impossibility*, as old Calvinism saith; nor a *shadowy possibility that never can happen*, as young Calvinism subtilly splits it. And then, while both Calvinisms dread the doctrine of *Assurance*, knowing that, joined to the doctrine of infallible *Perseverance*, it produces a bold presumption of not only *present*, but *eternal* salvation, Methodism teaches us the duty and the joy of knowing a present salvation; and knowing it each hour of life just for that hour! And, inasmuch as Calvinism must affirm of every apostate, however bright his evidence of conversion for long years, that he never had any grace, it thereby destroys to the soul all certainty of evidence until probation is closed, making the Christian life a path of mist. And as the completed perseverance is the only sure test of reality, the Calvinist lives not in a state of cherished and joyous faith, but in a position of perpetually cultivated doubt; a state of permanent, querrying self-diagnosis, which can never be verified by present phenomena, but only by final result, by which he becomes like a dyspeptic studying his own stomach; not like a racer taking his health for granted, and running because he is vigorous, and vigorous because he runs. And then, to know that mighty is the fullness of the Spirit, whereby we may be here on earth made triumphant over the temptations that assail us, and sanctified from the sins that would beset us, not as a metaphysical possibility never realized, but as a fact of multiplied experience—what a stimulant to earnestness of prayer, and to struggling after real, livable

holiness ! Thus, wherein we differ from Calvinism, therein it is we are fresh, happy, and strong. An entire different religious temperament is created. All the difference is realized between Puritanism and Methodism. And a freer, more flexible activity is formed; a variety, that dissipates the monotonous, and breaks up the mechanical. And we must tell our New Haven friends that, while the above paragraph indicates, what we have often thought, that their divinity was framed to forestall Methodism without becoming identical with it, we are deeply certain that they have but little mended the old divinity of Calvinism. Their umbratile distinctions, by which they would attain the advantages of Wesleyan Arminianism, without plagiarizing its principles, are metaphysical *chef-d'œuvres* but practical failures. There remain the contradictions, the exclusions, the unbroken fatalities of Calvinism in the creed. There remain the acridness of Puritanism in the spirit, its angularity in the form, its mechanicalness in the activity. Indeed, we have often felt in worshipping with our devout but monotonous Calvinistic friends, as if their and our whole performance were a solemn panoramic movement, of which we were a fated part; and in no instance has this sensation been felt more vividly than under the ministration of some of the chief doctors of New-Haven theology themselves. And we join their Old School brethren in fearing that they are in a doubtful transition state; standing on unmaintainable ground; and liable to wake up, next generation, Pelagian. We Methodists know our firm position. We are marching to our second centennial, without a nail of the old Wesleyan platform changed, sprung, or rusty. But of New-School Calvinism we stand in doubt what will be its future *status*, or, mayhap, its *terminus*.

The Christian Examiner furnishes us with the fol-

lowing surprising information in regard to the Methodist view of the doctrine of Assurance: "The Methodists ignore it, or, rather, are completely ignorant of it; although, like Spurgeon, they practically adopt it in revival preaching, thereby making unconscious *self-sufficient* Christian converts."

For reckless assertion like this, the plea of ignorance might be allowed, were not the author so self-complacent in his style, and were not the knowledge so abundantly within his reach. If, rising from his study, he had walked into the streets, and put to the first plain, earnest Methodist he met, the question: Do your people hold that a man may and should know his sins forgiven? the prompt and clear-eyed affirmative he would have received would have convinced him that his informant well understood both the question and the true answer. Would the said writer next go to a place where he might learn many things he sadly needs to know, namely, to a Methodist prayer-meeting, and put, not to the pastor, but to the people there, the same question, he would receive an answer so unanimous and so hearty, as would show him that the doctrine was not confined to a period of special "revival preaching." Would he then condescend to look into a Methodist Hymn Book, more copies of which are probably scattered through his own single State of Massachusetts than of any Socinian volume of Psalmody through the whole world, he would find a department of some thirteen pages, headed at each page with crowning capitals, "ADOPTION AND ASSURANCE;" upon which pages the hymns would contain stanzas like the following:

"His Spirit which he gave
Now dwells in us, WE KNOW;
The witness in ourselves we have,
And all its fruits we show."

If then he would proceed to open Wesley's Sermons, more copies of which have been doubtless circulated throughout our land during the last thirty years than of any other three divines extant, he will find no less than three sermons on the "Witness of the Spirit" as an *assurance of our salvation* to our own spirits. If, finally, he will open that widely-circulated body of divinity, *Watson's Institutes*, he will find the doctrine clearly discriminated and ably elaborated.

And now, having put this peremptory gentleman through this course of study, we benevolently offer him this parting piece of caution. Whenever you attempt to make sweeping imputations of ignorance upon your neighbors, be sure you are not yourself the *ignoramus*.

Yet one word more. This writer, on the authority of Sir William Hamilton, affirms that the doctrine of Assurance was the "salient point" of the Reformation, and that the orthodox Protestants have abandoned their own ground, and coincided with the Romanists on this point. If he will turn to the eighteenth number of the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, he will find Sir William Hamilton somewhat refuted on that point, and will, perhaps, conclude that he is himself as much mistaken in his second-hand erudition as in his first-hand imputations.

The Class System.

The Methodist class-leaders form one of the most unique and may be one of the most efficient vitalizing agencies in the universal Church. There is nothing like it, at least in Protestantism. A large and a powerful class of laymen, giving their gratuitous labor to the spiritual interests of the entire membership, quickening others and thereby quickening their own spiritual life, contributes in an incalculable degree to the vitality

of the Church. Thereby is created a body of secular men who are diffused through the community, laden with responsibilities and vitalized by their duties, and possessed of a practical alertness for religious action and influence. These serve as a collective pastorate, permanent amid the changes of the itinerancy, enabling each new minister to be the essential continuation of his predecessor. As permanent watchmen they become the *police* of the Church ; carrying the influence of its religious government to the individual, serving to ascertain the actual membership and worthiness of membership of each. And, finally, they are the ready confessors, counselors, and comforters of those who need their aid. All these points are, at least ideally, in the office, and we believe they have been realized to a marvelous extent ; this body being a scarce appreciated factor when we endeavor to account for our own successful history.

The subject of class-meetings seems, at the present time, to awaken a special attention in the Church. So long as our itinerancy endures, the class is a counterpart necessary to the effective discipline of the Church. We think the right of the Church authoritatively to require the attendance of her laity upon these means is just as unquestionable as her right to require her ministry to itinerate. We may be safe in saying that that will ever be a well-ordered Church where the class efficiently performs its disciplinary functions. Very strongly do we reprobate any effort to remove the absoluteness of the condition to membership of the performance of this duty ; for the refusal of class attendance is a withdrawal of the most elementary support from the institutions of the Church.

But as fashions change, and as law has ceased to sustain the stringency of the office, the question arises

whether the efficiency cannot still be retained, and this powerful body be improved and largely utilized for the future. May it not be called into greater self-consciousness; an *esprit du corps* be created; a new enthusiasm be aroused; a mutual sociability be awakened; a higher qualification be called into the service, and a larger result of religious profit be gathered? The class-leaders' conventions which are occasionally held cannot fail to be of profit. It has occurred to our own thought that a periodical *Class-Leader* should be regularly published, filled with matter to organize, instruct, and stimulate these under-pastors of our Church. Our Sunday-school teachers have their *Journal*. We might, at least, start a semi-monthly sheet, and our own opinion is that an enlargement would soon be demanded. Both leaders and members could be furnished with a pabulum which would not only supply nourishment, but create an appetite for more.

Methodism and the College.

Conversing a few months since with Rev. Mr. Bird, for many years Wesleyan missionary in Hayti, and author of a volume entitled *The Black Man in Hayti*, we were informed by him that many of the sons of the wealthier Haytians are sent to Paris for their education, and very uniformly return confirmed, and often boastful, Atheists. Deeply wrong, as it truly is, that the education of the young in Austria should be placed by law in Jesuitical hands, it is very possibly true that the sad alternative, to a large degree, lies between the Jesuit and the infidel professor. The student masses, in some parts of Europe, to a large and increasing amount, are, under existing influences, blatant, mob-like denouncers of God. So fearfully is this the fact that the *London Spectator*, a few years ago, predicted that the

closing century would be a period of the blackest unbelief ever known to European history.

And there seems to be in this country, in process of inauguration, a scheme for producing in our own colleges a correspondently irreligious condition. Rationalists and infidels have seldom built colleges. They find it more cheap to steal than manufacture. With how pious a purpose Harvard was founded, and how terribly it does not fulfill that purpose, is generally known. The *Nation*, not long since, took the ground that ministers are unfit to be educators. The assigned reason was, that theirs is that effeminate morality, unsuited to secular life, which prompts the coupling, so often expressed, of "ministers and women." In other words, Christian morality ought to be excluded from our colleges. And, of course, *à fortiori*, ministers are still less fit guides for the adult; and so are fit, ministerially, for nothing but non-existence.

It is not "secular colleges" (like the Michigan University and Cornell College) to which we object. It is not, however, to the *secularity* of any college, but to the *antichristianity* seeking (vainly, we trust, in regard to the former) to get possession of them. Secular colleges, in the sense of non-denominational, where the various sections of Christianity unite, pervaded by a common religion, are to us matters of warm interest. Such a one we have had in past times at Ann Arbor, and, in spite of some spots of ill omen, we shall in future have. But when the so-called "secular colleges" become strongholds of irreligion, we shall assert and use our right to do two things. We shall utter a very distinct pronouncement of the fact; and we shall withhold our children from the teachings of its professors.

Not only does not irreligion build colleges, but, in all ages, such has been the affinity of mental development

with religion, that piety has been the founder and the priest has been the educator. The cause lies in the fact that true intellectual culture and religion are alike an aspiration and an ascent of man's higher faculties toward the Divine. It was religious faith, not unfaith, that founded the universities of Continental Europe in the Middle Ages, and of Cambridge and Oxford in England. In America, Harvard and Yale were established by the earnest efforts of Christian ministers and laymen, whose first anxieties were to secure thereby a godly ministry, and a cultured intellectual aristocracy, for New England's future. One of the first cares of the first founders of Methodism in America was to found Cokesbury College. When that was twice burnt down, humbled Methodism, despised by the collegiate caste of the day, grew discouraged, and, in her less-informed ranks, opposed to the highest educational institutes. When the era for their establishment came, our people were largely distrustful lest colleges should become the enemies of a true and simple piety. And what was it that dissipated that distrust and created a unanimity in our Church in behalf of academies and colleges? It was, as we well recollect, personally, *the sweeping revivals that took place within their walls*. The Methodist opposer of lofty "book learning" was utterly disintegrated when he found *that the seminary was the place to get his ungodly children converted*. A true Christian university, under the patronage and tuition of highly cultured Christian men, forming a little model Christian republic, self-governed through the power of Christian influence, where our sons and daughters are trained to the highest style of Christian manhood and womanhood, has become with Methodism a controlling ideal. It has become a part of her programme of molding the world to that same ideal. Of that other sort of univer-

sity, which this movement is laboring, unconsciously perhaps, to introduce, where the infidel sneer curls the *savant's* lips, and the blatant blasphemy is the pupil's response ; where the revival is a jest and prayer is unheard ; where the Sabbath is a carouse, and the only Church is a club of Atheism ; where the soul is materialized, and a brutifying science debases its followers into a practical bestiality, her abhorrence is profound, and, we trust in God, will never diminish.

Methodism and Revivals.

The late Dr. Neander became interested in the subject of American revivals, by reading a work of Dr. Sprague's; and he put the task of giving a delineation of them in the German language, into the hands of his pupil Uhden. Upon surveying the subject, Uhden fancied that, in order to a full development of their nature, there was *necessity* for tracing the ecclesiastical history of New England, from the peculiarities of which he imagined that American revivals sprung. This necessity was fictitious; for the ground upon which it was based, namely, the derivation of American revivals from Puritan institutes, is false; and Uhden's conceptions of their ground arose from his unacquaintance with the true history of revivals, and the narrow source whence Neander drew his little knowledge of the subject. American revivals no more sprung from Puritan institutes than the Atlantic Ocean sprung from the Hudson River. The "Puritan Fathers" came from Old England, an entire body of earnest Christians; and what more natural or more beautiful than the expectation that in these rough wilds they might hope to be unmolested in their purity, and here set up a millennial community, in which all should share in public rule, and all be truly and experimentally Christian? The Church

was the State, and every one was to obey the laws of God and be holy. Thence Uhden is pleased to style the government a theocracy. And it is no fault of the theocracy that it does not stand until this day. The fault lay in the divergent opinions of good men who do not so accord, in our present imperfect conditions, as to make due harmony possible; in the incoming of foreign elements, which cannot be expelled without provoking reaction and overthrow; and in the degeneracy of later generations, to whom the strait-laced institutes of their fathers are a tedium. The first of these causes appeared in the dissent and repulsion of Roger Williams and his followers. The second appeared in the inroads of the Quakers, who just then seemed instigated by some spirit with a marvelous obstinacy to infest their community. The "Puritan Fathers" only sought the removal of the Quakers, and felt themselves justified in inflicting the extreme punishment for their contumacious return. But so persistent were the intruders in their disobedience, that the government began to see no end of bloodshed. The Fathers woke up on a somber New England morning, and found themselves—persecutors! To their honor, in due time, upon this discovery, they withheld their hand; and the arrival of the royal mandate, arresting further execution, found it already voluntarily stayed. But the third cause, posterior degeneration, assumed a variety of forms, unnerving the tone of religion and morality, and producing indifference, skepticism, and immorality. Against these causes of decay were interposed, as obstacles, organic efforts of reform, producing public movements and theological platforms that but feebly stayed the downward progress. The other obstacle interposed was the Northampton revival, under the ministry of Edwards, which was local in its character, and perfectly powerless as an opposition to preva-

lent degeneracy. With a slight exception, American revivals were wholly a foreign element, superinduced upon Puritanism contrary to its genius, and opposed by its authorities and institutes, but nevertheless ultimately accepted from a foreign source by the hearts of the people.

It was the "great movement of the eighteenth century, called Methodism," that gave New England, as well as America, her revivals. Methodism gave them to New England, in the first place, by the ministry of Whitefield, shortly after the Northampton excitement, by which she was opportunely made possible, and partially acceptable; but so ungenial was New England to revivals that when Whitefield made his second visit he was repudiated by New England, and his ministry proved a failure. Whitefield's visitation southward warmed the hearts of the people, and prepared the way for the second great advent of Methodism, of which we may give the following account:

It is to Francis Asbury, "The Pioneer Bishop," the founder bishop of American Methodism, and to the itinerancy under his charge, more than all other human sources together, that America truly owes her revivals. With less, indeed, of trained acquirement than Wesley, yet with all the same natural power to command, and ability to found, and with all the same natural spring, and holy, world-embracing impulse, he is let loose upon a broad continent, over which, in its rude, half-developed state, he sweeps with a true Napoleonic rapidity, and, in a far better cause, with a true Napoleonic success. "Thunder and rain, awful mountains, deep rivers, and swollen streams," in his own bold language, were obstacles with which he was familiar. Ruling first by Mr. Wesley's choice, next by a free and unanimous election, and thence through his whole life

with the most earnest and almost uninterrupted unanimity of the whole Church, and with an unrivaled pre-eminency for forty round years, under his administration the little flock, commencing at John Street, spread its swarming myriads, and drew their Conference lines amid joyous labors and glorious revivals, covering the civilized continent, and, in less than half a century, outnumbering the largest denominations that had been for two centuries in the land. There is nothing surpassing it in the history of the Church. To talk of American revivals taking their origin from New England Puritanism, forsooth, is reduced to a folly and a laughter from these facts alone.

The great revivals in Virginia in the time of Jarratt and the greater revivals in Kentucky were converting their thousands, while New England Puritanism was spiritually torpid. When Methodism with her revivals invaded New England, she found a general opposition not merely to her theology or her forms, but to her revivals as such. The very spirit and make of the New England churches were uncongenial. The narrow theology, the frigid temperament, the fixed organisms, the traditional prejudices, the dread of "excitement" and "animal feeling," were adamantly set against them. Yet there was an element of genuine piety in Puritanism, to which a warmer glow of religious feeling had an affinity. In the very contest against revivals and Methodism pious hearts would take the holy contagion, and then whole churches had to work for revivals in self-defense. As years have passed on New England has relaxed her fatalistic theology, surrendered her rigid forms, and accepted the great revival element. But let her not outrage history with the scandalous pretense that these great movements flowed *from* her as an effect from inherent causes. We grant her all due credit

when we say, that New England is about as much the source of American revivals as the Hudson River is the source of the Atlantic Ocean.

Emotion in Religion.

We love a piety blending holy emotion with intellect. We know the rich power of spiritual joy. We thank God for the religion which has in all ages made men weep and shout, and has even resulted, through human infirmity, in jerks and catalepsies; but we desire no effort to promote the weeping, shouting, jerking, and catalepsy as a distinct institution. We love in our home the gladness and buoyancy which make our children noisy and riotous; but it is no disparagement to our parental love that when the noise and the riot become special objects, or assume indecorous forms, we take measures to abate the domestic nuisance. And specially when the *noise* is cherished by them as in itself a source of pleasure, arousing the nerves by its concussions, and exciting the *animal* by its negation of restraint, it is an act and a duty of parental kindness not only to suppress the demonstration, but to correct the taste that enjoys it. With just the same view, as a pastor, we love in the Church the rich devotion which prompts to earnest manifestation; but, as we think, "nature itself teaches" that such *manifestation* is rather to be an irrepressible accident than an object; that it is never to be made an aim; that, when unchecked, it is very liable to assume unseemly forms and extravagant lengths, and that its encouragement is very apt to produce a sensuous love of the nervous excitement, and to engender a very unintelligent style of piety.

To a certain extent it is true that extravagant external demonstration of emotion is the characteristic of a rude age, society, or class. The very essence of savage-

ism, indeed, consists in wreaking its malign emotions in cruel action upon its victims. The half-civilized man gives free vent to his impulses in unmodified, unchastened laughter, crying, shouting, howling, leaping, and dancing. The Old Testament presents specimens of this in fact and in language which are not to be quoted as models for action, or literal requirements for obedience. The rams' horns of Jericho would not justify a religious charivari, nor the dance of David authorize a holy cotillion. As society advances, decorum chastens our exhibitions of emotion; and the cultivation of the intellect, and the refinement of the taste, while in fact they deepen our better feelings, soften their expression. The Old Testament mother wept and howled, and even hired salaried howlers to express her extravagant grief. But her affections were less pure, less deep, than those of yonder Christian mother, who hides the face suffused with silent tears. The expression of religious emotion obeys the same laws; and he who wishes to cultivate extravagant religious demonstration in itself, *as an object simply*, desires to send us back to a rude antiquity. He cherishes a forced and false enthusiasm; and when, in addition to that, he rebukes as false professors the Christians who maintain a chaste reserve, he becomes censorious and condemnable. He then exhibits the "enthusiasm with an infusion of the malign emotions"—which is, as near as we can recollect, Isaac Taylor's exquisite definition of fanaticism.

We are somewhat acquainted with the pages of the eminent masters of *Holy Living and Dying*, with Kempis, and Jeremy Taylor, and Henry More, and Fenelon; and while we recognize in some of them a decided tendency to a holy repose, a sanctified quietism, and in others admissions that excited manifestations are an unavoidable incident, we do not recollect in any of

them a chapter implying that shouting or falling is any desirable accompaniment of a work of God, or any proper part of Christian sanctification. There are, indeed, usually in every period of great religious excitement unavoidable overactions of this kind. The Bible attests that, in a ruder age, religious earnestness sometimes manifested itself in shouting, leaping, and dancing. But it is a sad thing when these incidents are by weak persons exalted, as they sometimes are, to regular institutions, and made tests of the genuineness and the exaltedness of piety. Such persons will graciously admit that some who are Christians do not shout, but perhaps it is "because they have nothing to shout for." Where this test of piety and superior holiness becomes established in a given Church, those who have no other qualifications are sure to adopt this route to distinction. To disregard the standard of civilization around them, and to overlook and override the feelings of fellow-Christians, are, in their view, a religious merit, a triumph of militant piety. More intelligent and thoughtful Christians either, like Edward Irving, bow in submission to these self-anointed dictators; or, browbeaten and disheartened, silently retire, carrying their influence and means to build up the institutions of other churches, which rise in power and success around us, and leaving us a residuum of feeble piety without influence or hold upon the community; a standing quotation against Methodism, and an argument against all profession or attainment of higher religious life. In such a community you will hear it said, "There are members enough gone from us to other churches to form here, by themselves, a powerful Methodist Church." To steer clear of these evils without checking the spirit of a true Christian zeal, and producing a reactionary coldness, is often a difficult problem. It requires the application of a

skillful, loving, chastening hand upon the part of the wise pastor.

Methodist Evangelism.

A racy and suggestive writer in *The Christian Quarterly* remarks: "The Methodist Church converts for all other Churches; for, of the products of an ordinary Methodist revival, some go to the Presbyterian, some to the Baptist, and some to the Episcopalian and other Churches. And of those who unite with the Methodist Church, including all classes of temperaments, many subsequently leave it for others, because not constitutionally adapted to be Methodists. But, notwithstanding it supplies all other Churches, it still keeps itself larger than any of the rest, and increases at a faster rate."

This is a truth both annoying and consoling. We have more than once said to a Presbyterian who viewed Methodists as a superfluous sect. "My dear sir, so far from our detracting from your strength, you are all the stronger for our existence. We not only back up all evangelical Christianity with our strength, but we are continually gathering in raw material from the world, converting it, and distributing it among other denominations." The consolation of it is that essential Methodism is becoming infused into the entire evangelical Church.

And this reminds us of two prophecies, one of which was fulfilled and the other not, as follow:

One of the holiest men American Methodism ever produced was Rev. Nathaniel Porter, the first Principal of Cazenovia Seminary. We never saw him but once, and his heavenly face still lives in our memory. On his dying bed he heard some zealous friends saying that they believed that every body would yet become Methodists. "No," replied he, "all will not become Method-

ists, but all the sister denominations will become Methodized. Our life and zeal will in time quicken them all." Of that prophecy we have seen a great verification.

The first interview we ever had with Dr. Durbin was in 1832. In that conversation he remarked: "We shall not grow, as a denomination, in the future as in the past. Heretofore when any one was in earnest for salvation he was obliged to come to us for sympathy and guidance. But other denominations have now become so enlivened that inquirers no longer need to come to us." Acute as the remark was, its prophecy has been signally falsified, and Dr. Durbin has had the honor to contribute largely to its non-fulfillment.

The same writer thinks "the Unitarians the future Church," and the Methodists, "with their genius for change," quite likely to become the Unitarian Church. There is quite as much probability of our becoming Papists. He has no idea of our unchanging firmness of doctrine. He does not know that in England the Methodists hold themselves to be the most immovable stay of English orthodoxy. Now, as at the beginning, we hold fast to the theology of John Wesley, and could accurately express it on every point in John Wesley's own words. And this not by applying any staying force upon ourselves, but by a spontaneous and loving preference for the mild evangelicism of the Wesleyan-Arminian system. And if there is any thing in which Methodism exults and glories and shouts aloud with her loftiest voice, it is in proclaiming to the world the joyous message of a free, full, abounding, and unlimited redemption through the priceless atonement of the eternal Son of God. She runs with the feet of the roe, and flies with the wings of the eagle, to fill the world with that wonderful news. This is her joy and her

life, and when this ceases she shall give up the ghost. She is then but a stupendous bubble, and the sooner she bursts and goes out the better.

We need the rich and the refined and the learned, but not at the price of abandoning the poor and the uneducated. We want a ministry equal to the best in the Universal Church in erudition and pulpit talent and intellect; and we want a ministry that can go into the hamlet, hut, and the lowest cellar without overawing their tenants with its respectability. How can these two be obtained and continued? How can each class and each man be induced to move contentedly, spontaneously, and eagerly in his own sphere, unimpeded by jealousy against *caste*? Romanism can do it. Why not Methodism?

What Shall be the Future of Methodism?

We are aware that some of our rationalistic friends tell us that such is the march of *progress* that Methodism has no second century to live; the age of religious faith will, before the coming century closes, have merged in "the age of reason." That is, however, an old hereditary boast. Julian was to "conquer the Galilean;" Voltaire was to "crush the wretch;" but the Galilean conquered Julian, and the crucified One has "crushed" Voltaire. Dr. Strauss tried to criticise the "life of Jesus" out of existence; but Jesus Christ still lives, "the same yesterday, to-day, and forever;" and unhappy Dr. Strauss, in spite of his attempt at galvanizing himself into a resurrection, is a dead man, and terribly fitted, we fear, for a deeper literary *damnation*. We stand, blessed be God, on the Rock of ages, and WE KNOW WHO WILL CONQUER. And as for these gentlemen's boasted *progress*, we would have them bethink themselves where *this* glorious progress is to terminate.

*They may say in Rationalism, enlightenment, heights of science; but Monsieur Comte says in Atheism and ultimate beastliness! His progress promises that men shall in a future age become "the unrecognizable wrecks of what had once been" civilized beings, "crawling over its surface, and degenerating, through stages of meaner and meaner vitality, back into shapelessness and extinction."** Draper holds that after the age of reason, in which we now are, is past, the age of decrepitude and idiocy will succeed. Herbert Spencer predicts an age of "equilibration," in which every particle of the universe is to be perfectly immovably still, beyond which he can see no reason for any future motion! Fit counterparts are these to Darwinism: one claims that man grew from brute; the other claims that man shall return to brute and worse than brute. Such, gentlemen Rationalists, is the goal of your *progress*; the cheering, elevating vista of your faith; the ultimatum predicted by your great prophets! John Stuart Mill is quoted as saying that the word *necessity* is "a brute of a word." And we say that all this is a brute of a philosophy; fit only for the hogs—"the hogs of Epicurus's sty." We thank God for that higher nature that feels itself compelled to concentrate all its force to pronounce such doctrine of progress ACCURSED. We, too, have a doctrine of progress, quite unlike this career through Rationalism and Atheism into bestiality. We believe not in a blind nature, but in a God who rules with infinitely wise design, and to a grand and glorious ultimate. We believe in the headship of the great Redeemer, in whom man is made divine. Under his leadership there is a "progress;" a progress of the individual in knowledge, holiness, and fitness for an inheritance with the saints in light; a

* Masson, p. 106.

progress of the Gospel of Christ, by means of his Church, to a universal millennial triumph; a progress of the world's history under the guidance of Providence until its consummation in the final judgment of the human race by the eternal Son of God. In this faith our fathers died—as no Rationalist ever dies—with the shout of heavenly triumph on their lips. In this faith, brightened by the progress of another century, we have an unflinching trust that our children will rejoice with a far more abounding joy than ours.

The great evangelic Church of our present day, based upon the Old Testament and the New, successor of the prophets, apostles, and martyrs, the Church of the Trinity, the Atonement, and the Regeneration, stands at this moment refreshed with revival and the gift of the Spirit, exerting an aggressive power unparalleled since the Pentecostal day. Never was the spirit of holiness more intense within her heart, never her love for her precious central TRUTHS more vital, never her plans of world-wide conquest so bold and so sure, never were her machineries so vast. Behold her centenaries dowered with outpoured millions; and count her laymen rearing in massive granite her biblical institutes, for the very purpose, mark it well, of teaching *forever* the theology of James Arminius and John Chrysostom. While at home she is battling with vice and error in every form; dealing death-blows upon slavery, drunkenness, profanity, and infidelity; planting her spires on every hill and plain of all our land, she is distributing her Bibles by increasing millions to all the languages of our race, and commissioning her missionaries to every land of the habitable globe. And while these stupendous plans for human renovation are going forth in rapid progress, some silly gentlemen in or about Boston, heirs in regular line to the Porphyrys, Lessings, and

Tom Paines, are still scribbling essays about the obsoleteness of the Church and the destruction of Christianity! Truly they are not the first fools who have mistaken the cant of their own clique for the opinion of the world, nor imagined their own little horizon to coincide with the circumference of creation.

Dr. Lord, in the *Presbyterian Quarterly*, discoursing on the Methodism of the past, in closing, thus remarks: "We imagine that this offshoot of the Anglican Church has reached its most triumphant period. It is losing that which is more convincing than authority, wiser than learning, more attractive than eloquence. It has felt the doctrine which it has preached; it has discarded, almost despised, the graces of culture; it has been rude and coarse, but it has been sincere and in earnest; it has not had many preachers who knew how to 'divide the word;' not many who could mix the light of the sun, the roar of the torrents, and the sublimity of the heavens in their speech; not many of melting voice, and graceful gesture, and beautiful simile; not many who could interpret the Psalms, or explain the prophets, or unfold 'the things hard to be understood' in Peter and Paul; but it has had a great company who could teach the hearts of men, and make them ask, 'What shall we do to be saved?' But like all reactionary churches, it at last comes to the state from which it reacted. It is ambitious for the things which it has left."

This reminds us of an article in the *Westminster Review* of twenty years ago, touching on Wesley and Methodism, glorifying the first generation of English Methodists, as men of striking natural endowments and rare power for effect in consequence of their intense sincerity, and setting them in vivid contrast with the insincere, mechanical, and *effete* Methodism of the then

dead present. Yet never in all her history has Methodism made more gigantic advances than during the twenty years of that dead present. And during all that period, not a biennium has passed in which some prophet has not arisen, and with a rare freshness of inspiration, blended with profound philosophy, predicted that "Methodism has fulfilled her mission; she was a great power in the past, but her methods and spirit will fail for the future." Dr. Lord's vaticination is one of the series, just as good as the thousand and one of its falsified predecessors. We do not think that with the Presbyterian as with the infidel soothsayer the wish is father to the thought. But, somehow, the method of both is the same—a eulogy of the past to the disparagement of the present. And, somehow, the query arises, Did the past Methodism, when present, receive better courtesy than the now present? When Wesley and his preachers were really living and at work, did infidelity write eulogies on their characters? And as for our American Methodism of fifty years ago—faugh! what a *mormo* it was in the eyes of the then living Presbyterianism! It is only the *past*, not the at any time *present*, Methodism, that these prophets admire. They write blazoning eulogies only on the assumption that their eulogies are epitaphs.

Of the Methodist preaching of the past Dr. Lord knows about as much as he really does of the Methodist preaching of the far future. A large share of our preaching has, no doubt, been rude and coarse; but never, like the parallel Presbyterian sermon-reading, sleepy and paralytic. And as for those "who could mix the light of the sun, the roar of the torrents, and the sublimity of the heavens in their speech," etc., the learned doctor prattles like a babe. It is from oratory as oratory, native-born pulpit oratory, such as the

schools can never teach and seldom reach, that much of the popular power of Methodism in the past has been derived. When from a countless host we select the names of Asbury, McKendree, Bascom, Summerfield, Maffit, Cookman, Fisk, and Olin, we fear no comparisons.

But Methodism is one of the "reactionary churches" and must relapse. What great Church, we reply, was not in its origin "reactionary"? Protestantism itself, Puritanism, Presbyterianism, and Quakerism—all, like Methodism, had their "reactionary" phase. Methodism, like all but the last of these, possessed, however, not only a negative reactive phase, but it also has its positive element of permanent persistence. More than a century of tireless progress, unfolding in an increasing variety of methods and agencies, adjusting itself to every new demand of the age, would seem to decide. As for being "ambitious for the things it had left," Dr. Lord does not know, we presume, how widely he misstates our history. Methodism began in a university, and she did not go out, but was hustled out. She began in consecrated churches, and stayed until she was driven into the streets and fields. When she came to this country she found the college gates frowning upon her, and the "standing order" scowling at her. One of the first enterprises of our first bishops, Coke and Asbury, was to build a college and call it after their own names, *COKESBURY COLLEGE*. And when reprimanded by Wesley for calling it so big a thing as a "college," they none the less determined a college it should be. After it was twice burned down, leaving a heavy indebtedness, they concluded, perhaps not unwisely, that their immediate mission was the open Gospel field. For a while the university work was suspended. In that interval there arose, doubtless,

hundreds among us who distrusted learning itself as an aid to religious progress. Popular preachers, even, feeling their defect of college education, indignantly deprecated the advantage they did not possess. But never did Methodism forget her origin in a university, or cease to boast that her founder was a "fellow" of Oxford. The very preacher who sneered at "college-bred parsons" was often heroic in his readiness for sacrifices in the cause of building "a college of our own." And when Methodism enters upon schools and colleges and universities and seminaries, she only returns to her starting place. The scenes of enthusiastic liberality which we have witnessed in Methodist Conferences in behalf of a seminary or a college would fully attest both that the Methodist ministry never lost its original affinity for higher education, and that it had no doubt that our learning might be impregnated with all the glowing zest of our religion in the past. And this, we confess, is the problem before us. Here Dr. Lord predicts that we shall trip. Here, however, we think and trust that it is Dr. Lord himself that trips.

For, does the learned doctor really believe that zealous, aggressive piety, touched with the holy fire of the past, is really incompatible with learning? We submit to Dr. Lord whether he is not herein adopting the very theory attributed to untaught Methodism, namely, that religious life must lower as the intellectual life rises. We believe no such libel upon our religion. The very fact that our Methodist opposers of education were converted to its cause by the sweeping revivals that proved our schools to be the place to get their children converted, is a cheerful prophecy that religious zeal and intellectual culture may beautifully blend in our future history.

INFANT SALVATION.

Historic Survey of the Doctrine of Infant Regeneration.

It was a good many years ago when grand old Lyman Beecher published, in a Congregational periodical called *The Spirit of the Pilgrims*, an extended denial that the Calvinistic fathers held to the doctrine of infant damnation. This called forth from the Unitarian side a learned response, going over the historic ground, and giving plentiful quotations from those venerable fathers, which showed very sweepingly Dr. Beecher's unacquaintance with their literature, and administered to him a Waterloo defeat. Within a decade or two Dr. Hodge made some similar adventures, which called out Dr. Krauth, of the Lutheran Church, who, with a still richer erudition, marshaled a body of old literature and spread it so broadcast before the public that never will there be a third respectable denial.

The doctrine of infant damnation was a part of the irrespective reprobation scheme introduced by Augustine into the Western Church. At the Reformation it came in with the still severer irrespectivism of Calvin and other reformers, either as subjecting salvation to the accident of baptism, or to the absolute decree, irrespective of free agency or "any thing in" the finite being. And here we may note two things:

First, the dogma of infant damnation spread through the Reformation Churches, including the Augsburg and the Anglican. It appears in the *desert* of "God's wrath and damnation" upon every one "born of Adam" of the ninth of the English Thirty-nine Articles. How narrowly our Wesleyan Methodism escaped this dogma, by a few providential strokes from the pen of John Wesley! And how lamentably strange it is that the

latest great system of theology published by an eminent Methodist scholar affirms that this erased passage is believed by every Methodist; that, indeed, the whole thirty-nine, the predestinarian seventeenth, included, is standard with Methodism; and that this statement, without modification or annotation, is installed in *The Course of Study* of our American Methodist Episcopal Church! Very plausibly it might be argued from such high authorities that Methodists themselves are maintainers of the rightfulness of infant damnation!

Next, it is clear that *infant regeneration* has been extensively held by the Protestant Churches from the time of the Reformation until now. A limited infant salvation was based upon infant regeneration, and that upon infant baptism. And infant baptismal regeneration was as truly held by the Puritan as by the Churchman. This may be illustrated by the title of a book published at Oxford in 1629: *Baptismal Regeneration of Elect Infants*, Professed by the Church of England, according to the Scriptures, the Primitive Church, the present Reformed Churches, and many particular divines apart. By Cor. Burges, Dr. of D., and one of his Majesty's Chaplains in Ordinary. According to his mercy he saved us with the laver of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost." It closes with a Latin quotation from Augustine to the effect that "*Sacraments effect what they symbolize in the elect alone.*" That the Presbyterian Church holds to *infant regeneration* is conclusive enough from the following passage in the "Confession of Faith:" "Elect infants, dying in infancy, are *regenerated*, and saved by Christ through the Spirit, who worketh when and where and how he pleaseth." This corrects the error of those Methodist thinkers who, a few years ago, supposed that *infant regeneration* is an intrinsic absurdity and a heresy hitherto

unknown in the Church. Wesley, it is said, believed originally that baptism regenerated ; but whether he ever held that it regenerated internally and efficiently, or only externally and declaratorily, we are not so clear, not having thoroughly examined the record. In his earliest tract on baptism we believe that it will be found that he expressly declares that God's grace is not tied to ordinances. But certainly he did believe in infant regeneration.

Infant Damnation.

The *Christian Intelligencer*, the able organ of the (Dutch) Reformed Church, thus squarely puts the case : "The fact is, that any one who holds that infants are saved in Christ must hold, with Calvin, that they are lost in Adam. Salvation implies a previous perdition to be saved from. If infants are saved, it must be from damnation ; and if they are saved from damnation, they must, in the sight of God the Saviour, deserve damnation. God never saves any creature from something which he does not merit." The *Intelligencer* thus, in its own estimation, forces upon us the alternative, no salvation in Christ or real damnation of infants in Adam. On this we remark :

1. It is a very brave shouldering of the *onus*. All infants do deserve to go to hell. All infants are damned, if not in hell, yet in the womb or in the cradle. Stick a pin there. *Infant damnation is just and righteous*. We submit, then, for any one to say, upon mere sentimental feeling, that this righteous thing never finally takes effect, is an effeminate dodge, entitled to no place in a manly theology.

2. This assumption that every infant, that is, every human being, comes to a *damned existence*, is the very center, heart, back-bone, and base of Calvinistic election. Inasmuch as all are anteriorly damned alike, so

the infinite blind Polyphemus may dab his hand into the whole crowd and snatch one here and one there, for no reason or motive in the chance object, but from his own "mere good pleasure." And that is Calvinistic "election." And this is "glorious grace!" It is of no use for the *Intelligencer* to say that we misrepresent this matter. We state it truly, and we state it in the terms in which it ought to be stated; and we hold it up to execration. If these doctors cannot give us a better theology than that, they had better step out.

3. It is no doubt true that the infant is born a fallen moral being, incapable, without a renovation, of the blessedness of a holy heaven; but it is not true that he is guilty or liable to actual damnation for being so born. Before his birth, provision has been made for his case. Fletcher of Madeley beautifully states it. As the sin of the infant in Adam is only seminal and conceptual, so his condemnation is only seminal and conceptual, and his justification in Christ is seminal and conceptual. He sinned only in Adam's loins; he was damned only in Adam's loins; and he is justified in Adam's loins, and in that justification he is born. And not only does he inherit justification from Christ, but he also inherits the regenerative baptism of the Spirit, entitling him not only to baptism and a place in the Church below, but also, dying in infancy, to a place in the Church above. Not until his complete forfeiture of the grace of the atonement by actual sin does he incur actual damnation. We, therefore, promptly reject the *Intelligencer's* dogma, taken in its literal sense, that actual salvation of infants by Christ presupposes their previous actual damnation and actual desert of literal damnation in Adam. And we pray that its editor's heart may be softened, and his mind enlightened, and his pen be delivered from its inhumane theology.

Wesley's Excision of Hereditary Guilt from Our Articles.

It is usually said that Methodist doctrine is everywhere one. And in regard to its great structure and outlines, this is true. Yet this is not a mere machine identity. In fixed and ascertained mathematical and mechanical science, our minds are so constructed, for wise reasons, that we ultimately see exactly alike. But, for equally wise reasons, in moral and theological science, there is room for play of variations amid our best agreement. Our varying individualities look even at the same acknowledged theological truth as with a different pair of spectacles. So the different writers in the New Testament give us the same truth with variations. Between Wesley and Clarke there were some differences. There are some differences between Wesley and Watson; and between Wesley and Pope; and between Pope and Watson. And, if we mistake not, some different shades and phases exist between British and American Methodism, not only in Church organization but in theological doctrine; and in both the American is the more Wesleyan. It is the modern exegete that loves to trace the comparative individualities of the four gospels; our latest Methodist scholars will, perhaps, begin to scrutinize the individualism of our own theological standards.

The most marked of Dr. Pope's peculiarities, in which, we would trust, he stands entirely alone, is his persistent statement that *the whole Thirty-nine Articles of the English Church* are the standard of our Methodist faith.* He first made that statement in his translation

* Dr. Pope's position is disproved by Mr. Wesley's own publication, in 1786, of *The Sunday Service of the Methodists in his Majesty's Dominions*, with the identical Twenty-four Articles which he prepared for his American Methodists.—Eds.

of Winer, and we then recorded our "firm fraternal protest against" it. As Winer was a work for theological scholars generally, Dr. Pope was able to set the echoes flying through English theology, proclaiming our allegiance to the Thirty-nine. But as Dr. Schaff esteemed our protest of sufficient importance to be inserted in his great work, *The Creeds of Christendom* (vol. i, p. 893), our declaration of independence had a somewhat similar general circulation. It seems amazing, in view of the fact that Wesley deliberately struck out fifteen of those Thirty-nine Articles, and struck out important words and sentences from the remainder, that one of our standard theologians should assure the world that the whole were somehow standard for us. And in his *A Compendium of Christian Theology*, Dr. Pope gives a peculiar force to this assurance by defining our doctrine of the effect of original sin by quoting the entire Ninth Article of the Thirty-nine, the most pointed part of which was struck out by Wesley; and this he does, prefacing it with the words, "Methodism accepts the article of the English Church." Vol. ii, page 80. That is, "Methodism accepts" the very doctrine which Wesley rejected! The Wesleyan doctrine of depravity is defined in terms that Wesley abolished! We give the article entire, with the rejected part in italics, and two rejected special clauses and two rejected words in capitals:

"Original sin standeth not in the following of Adam, (as the Pelagians do vainly talk), but it is the FAULT AND corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam; whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil [Wesley here closes with *and that continually*] so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the Spirit; and therefore IN EVERY PERSON BORN INTO THIS WORLD IT DESERVETH GOD'S WRATH

AND DAMNATION. *And this infection of nature doth remain, YEA, IN THEM THAT ARE REGENERATED; whereby the lust of the flesh called in Greek φρόνημα σαρκός, which some do expound the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire of the flesh, is not subject to the law of God. And although there is no condemnation for them that believe and are baptized, yet the apostle doth confess that concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin."*

Both for the clumsiness of its form and the heresy of its doctrine we think that every American Methodist could be thankful to Wesley for our deliverance from this article, and no way thankful for its reinstatement by any authority. Wesley doubtless struck out this large portion mainly in view of the three capitalized passages. The former two plainly affirmed the false dogma of *personal desert of damnation*, even in the infant, our *personal GUILT*, for original sin. The last seems to deny the doctrine of entire sanctification. It is the former with which we deal at present, and we remark:

1. Wesley rejects the doctrine of our personal desert of damnation here affirmed, for the very reason that it contradicts our intuitive sense of right and justice. That rejection removes from theology a contradiction to the moral sense and to common sense. Great were Wesley's logical powers; greater his administrative powers; but greatest of all his intuitive powers. His primitive intuitive perceptions might for the time being be overborne by hereditary prejudices, or clamor of dogmas, or temporary exigencies of argument; but when he hushed all these hinderances, his intuitive faculties spoke with an almost infallible clearness. And, undoubtedly, the moment when he prepared these Twenty-four Articles was, if any moment of his life, the crisis when he looked at pure, absolute truth. Those

articles were to be for all Methodism *standard*; and if ever, in sermon, essay, treatise, or commentary, he has expressed a different view, that different view is canceled before this one monumental record. Wesley himself would then have to be overruled by his own Twenty-four Articles by us accepted "of faith."

And we make this last remark in some degree in reference to Dr. Pope's unqualified indorsement of Wesley's treatise on *Original Sin*. That is a valuable work, but written early in his life, in an earnest antagonism against the Socinian Taylor, under strong, one-sided influence from the readings of Jennings and Watts, extracts from whose writings form a considerable part of his volume, and at a period long before his final formulation of faith for the Methodist body. There are some passages in it, especially the illustration of original sin from the English law of attainder—a law so fundamentally unjust that our own national Constitution has an article expressly forbidding it in America—which must be read under modification of our Twenty-four Articles.

2. Wesley clearly saw that this clause lay at the foundation of the Genevan theology from which it came. If all are born under desert of damnation, then all mankind may be justly damned for original sin. They are, in fact, born damned. And that is infant damnation, a dogma unquestioned in old Geneva. And then, if all are in birth-damnation, justly and from *desert*, Geneva could triumphantly maintain that it was "glorious grace" for God to pick out a few, no better than the rest, and "for nothing in them moving him thereto," and give them to Christ for salvation. Grant the premise expressed in this clause, and the Genevan deduction is irresistible. And so granting, our mouths are stopped as against Calvinian reprobation. The whole scheme is at once legitimated.

How outsiders understand us is indicated by their statements. In a survey of the progress of religious denominations during our national century closing in 1876, Professor Diman, a Baptist, in an article in the *North American Review*, said that a great source of our success in America was our "protest" against the "theological doctrine of hereditary merit and demerit," a protest in accordance with the Republican spirit of our time.

Dr. Schaff, after a thorough study of our standards, thus states our doctrine in his *Creeds of Christendom* :

"Wesley, Fletcher, and Watson, describe this natural corruption in consequence of Adam's fall in the darkest colors, almost surpassing the description of Augustine, Luther, and Calvin ; but they deny the personal responsibility of Adam's posterity for his fall, or the doctrine of *original guilt*" (vol. i, p. 897.)

And precisely that we suppose to be the view presented by our best American theological writers, in precise accordance with Wesley's rejection, in our Articles, of the desert of damnation for original sin. The most eminent, thus far, of our American theological thinkers, Dr. Wilbur Fisk (quoted in our note on Rom. v, 18), says, "Guilt is not imputed until, by a voluntary rejection of the Gospel, man makes the depravity of his nature the object of his own choice. Hence, although, abstractly considered, this depravity is destructive to its possessors, yet through the grace of the Gospel *all are born free from condemnation.*" That truly avoids the doctrine of desert of damnation for Adam's sin. By that view man's corrupt nature is guiltless until by a free act of sin he has appropriated that nature and made himself responsible for it. It is, then, not a "hereditary guilt," but a hereditary nature personally made guilty. Similar views to those of Dr. Fisk have been expressed by Bledsoe, Raymond, Miley, Summers,

and Bishop Merrill. Dr. Miley's view was given in his able article on Pope's theology in the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, and in his valuable book on the Atonement placed in the "Course of Study" by our Bishops. Our own views are exhibited in our notes on Rom. v, 12-21, and Eph. ii, 3. Adam, by sin, fell into a lower moral plane, into the level of mere nature, and became thereby liable to death. His posterity generatively inherited that nature, but *irresponsibly*. Yet, as "potential sinners," and nearly certain, sooner or later, amid the constancies of temptation, to fall into responsible sin and incur eternal death, they could not wisely have been brought into existence but for the provision of grace. It was out of the nature of things that they could have been *guilty*, that is, under "desert of God's wrath and damnation" for being "born" of fallen Adam. They were *sinwardly* disposed; and so their intrinsic nature was diverse from their divine nature; intrinsically bad; but not RESPONSIBLY bad until their own free appropriative choice made them responsibly bad, and subjected them to such "desert."

Wesley did indeed leave in the Second Article the clause "a sacrifice not only for *original guilt*, but also for the actual sins of men." And the phrase "original guilt" did mean, unquestionably, as it came from the pen of its Calvinistic authors, "hereditary guilt;" but not in Wesley's theology. Had he so construed its unchangeable meaning he would have erased it, as he did the equivalent phrases in the Ninth Article. He doubtless retained it because a true meaning could be read into it. Such a meaning is furnished in the words of Fisk, already quoted. By our first appropriating act of sin we are doubly guilty; guilty for that as for an act of sin, and guilty for our existing evil nature, so made responsibly our own. And in that evil nature so made

our own is the "original guilt" from which all our subsequent guiltiness proceeds. It is original guilt both as originated at the commencement of our individual responsibility, and as the originating fountain for all our future condemnations. So with our whole race that falls into sin. We need "a sacrifice," not only for our actual (or actional) sins, but for the antecedent guilt of the corruption, indorsed by us, from which they flow.

In apparently diametrical opposition to Dr. Fisk's statement is Dr. Pope's view in vol. ii, p. 84: "The true doctrine is opposed also to every account of sin which insists that it cannot be reckoned such by a righteous God save where the will actively consents; and that none can be held responsible for any state of soul or action of life which is not the result of the will at the time. There is an offending character behind the offending will." But if that previous "offending character" has not been superinduced by previous free act of will, if it be necessitatedly inherited from Adam, it bears (according to Wesley), no "desert of wrath and damnation." As we understand Dr. Pope, he does restore Wesley's rejected *thesis*, and in declaring his allegiance to the Thirty-nine, is at variance with the Twenty-four, Articles.

Dr. Pope has a chapter on "HEREDITARY GUILT," and one on Hereditary Depravity. Now, Hereditary Depravity we know; but "Hereditary Guilt" we do not know. He defines *guilt* as "the personal consciousness of being responsible for the wrong." But surely the guilt and the "consciousness" of the guilt are two things. The *guilt* is hardly more than the having intentionally performed the wicked action. When a jury finds a man guilty of murder they simply mean that he has performed the intentional act defined as murder. Hence, guilt is a personal thing, and is neither inheritable nor transferable. Upon the guilt follows desert of

penalty; and that is neither inheritable (as Wesley decides), nor transferable. Again, he says: "Guilt has another meaning. It is the sure obligation to punishment." But the "obligation to punishment" (if such a phrase is allowable), is not so much the "guilt" as the "desert" that follows the guilt. There is the being guilty of the act, and that is one thing; and there is a desert of punishment consequent upon, and inseparable from, the guilt, and that is another thing. And as guilt is uninheritable and untransferable, and desert is uninheritable and untransferable, so punishment is uninheritable and untransferable. So, also, there can be no so-called imputed guilt unless imputed to the actual transgressor. The very phrase "imputed guilt" upon an innocent person confesses his innocence, and so falsifies itself and declares itself a calumny. The phrase "imputed righteousness" also implies that the righteousness imputed does not truly exist; and the phrase is merely a gracious one, implying forgiveness. The former would be an injustice, and cannot exist; the latter is a graciousness that, at least verbally, may exist.

The Relation of Children to Redemption.

Very delicately must we criticise the application of the word "sinful" to our original moral state; for it is authorized by general theological use. But it is an ambiguity pregnant with mistake. If it mean guilty of sin, *sin-guilty*, we deny its application. If it mean *sinward-tending*, we concur. And this term *sinward*, with its derivative *sinwardness*, is with us a most expressive and explicit key-word. The predicate *sinful* ordinarily means guilt; the term *sinward* means a tendency which is not in itself guilty. *Sinwardness* expresses that tendency to sin which our Seventh Article describes as our depraved moral state. "Depravity" is *sinwardness*.

Nor do we like the term "principle of sin," as if there were deposited within us a positive *entity* of sin, a substance or a lump. Our depravity by the fall is, as Watson says, "a depravation by deprivation." It is an original sinwardness consequent on the original deprivation of the Spirit. Before the fall the divine Spirit, the regulator over the soul, pointed man with easy and predominant preference to the rightful course. That divine regulator lost, man's passions become unrestrained, and run chaotically wild. Before the moral agent in this world after the fall the ways of wrong set open by selfishness and by specific sensations are a *thousand*, while the way of right is *one*. Nor is this *sinwardness* a tendency to sin as to one positive individual object; it is a tending, regardless of the divine regulator and the divine law, toward any preferred object of gratification. Sin is not necessarily chosen as sin, but it is chosen, regardless of obligation, as gratification. The object or course of action most gratifying to the individual's feelings becomes predominant, and forms a habitual "bent to sinning" in that direction. This sinwardness is rather a settled *state* of the soul than an inwardly deposited "principle."

Men do, when the probational alternatives of right and wrong present themselves, very uniformly, apart from grace, land in the wrong, sooner or later. Hence there is so uniform a sinning that men are, by unsanctified natural state, called *sinners*. And so St. Paul says *all sin*, and the *many are made sinners*. This is just the sense of Wesley's words in our above-quoted Seventh Article, "of his own nature inclined to evil, and that continually."

Let us carefully note that it is one thing to be *bad*, and another thing to be *responsible* or guilty for that *badness*. If we are created by God, either immediately or through the medium of birth, depraved, we are truly depraved, but not, therefore, responsible or guilty.

The infant, therefore, possesses depravity, but not guilt. That is a key-saying of Wilbur Fisk's: "Guilt is not imputed until, by a voluntary rejection of the Gospel, man makes the depravity of his nature the object of his own choice. Hence, although abstractly considered, this depravity [sinwardness] is destructive to its possessors, yet through the grace of the Gospel *all are born free from* [judicial] *condemnation.*" As depraved, there is a contrariety of character between a holy God and the irresponsibly unholy infant being. There is a real, but not judicial, displacency of God toward him. As undeserving, yet unpunishable, as unholy, yet not responsible therefor, he is contrarious and naturally, but not judicially, offensive to God. That displacency holds him guiltlessly inclined to sin; which is not properly sinfulness, but SINWARDNESS. In saying that such displacency is not judicial, we mean that it can inflict no just punishment. This displacency is the "condemnation" of Rom. v, 18; that is, the natural displacency toward an evil non-free agent; which "condemnation" is not the judicial, punitive, damnation of a guilty free-agent. If God can create a being bad, and damn him for being the bad he is created to be, then he may create a world of reprobates, and damn them all for being the bad he has made them.

When our Arminianism affirms that Christ, by his sacrificial death, became our second Adam, and acquired the blood-bought right to reconstruct our future probationary existence, it enables us to say that thereby he, by virtue and merit of this self-sacrifice, became entitled to adjust his provisions to all the peculiarities and specialties of all classes and all individuals of the race. The born individual, thereby, though not judicially condemned, is displacent, and, as unholy, is offensive to God; and so the reconciliation of that displacency, in

order that God's face may shine upon him, is a blood-bought grace. That unholiness is so expiated, and that divine displacency is, through Christ's sole merits, so propitiated, that the infant's actual guiltlessness may be divinely recognized and held by God available for his justification as truly as that unreal, but virtual, guiltlessness of the adult procured through pardon. He thereby stands in the same essential gracious position as the forgiven and justified adult. No justice, human or divine, can indeed pardon the guiltless, just because there was nothing to pardon. But pardon and *declaratory* justification are two things. Christ, by his self-oblation, is entitled, as our advocate, to *declare* the infant's justification, unworthy though he be through his sinward nature, against all who would "lay charge" against him. "Who shall lay any thing to the charge of God's elect? It is God that justifieth," just because "it is Christ that died." And thus being justified and reconciled, the infant becomes fit subject for the gracious influence of the Spirit that cures that sinwardness and regenerates the nature; so that (whether we use the term *regenerate* or not), the infant is in the same essential condition as that into which the justified and regenerate adult is brought by voluntary faith. Justification effected by securing the efficacy of guiltlessness honors the Redeemer's sacrificial work as much as justification effected by securing the pardon of sin. There is, therefore, no need of imagining a fictitious guilt in order to show a pardon which is as fictitious. The divine real recognition of guiltlessness is as gracious as the divine virtual recognition of guiltlessness through pardon. There is no more difficulty, then, in understanding how, at death, the infant spirit is received into paradise, than how the regenerate adult is; and no more difficulty in understanding how he is just as

readily glorified in the resurrection; and no more difficulty in seeing how the whole process is gracious, blood-bought, in one case than the other.

We understand that baptism is "an outward sign of an inward grace," namely, of the regeneration which it symbolizes; and we see no right or reason for the "outward sign" to be given where the "inward grace" has no existence, and never may have. Our Seventeenth Article declares that "Baptism is not only a sign of profession and mark of difference whereby Christians are distinguished from others that are not baptized," etc. That is, baptism is a distinctive sign of the professed and accepted Christian. Baptism assumes and declares its subject to be a Christian. But "baptism," while it is that, "is not only" that; it is something more. "It is also a sign of regeneration, or the new birth." The affusion of the baptismal water pictures the descent of the regenerating Spirit. But why picture upon the subject what has no existence there? And so, by our Baptismal Service, the congregation is exhorted to pray that the personal subject "being baptized with water, may also *be* baptized with the Holy Ghost, *be* received into Christ's holy Church, and *become* a lively member of the same." Now in this passage there is twice a *be* and once a *become*. And the two-fold *be* asks the present grace, namely, the "Holy Ghost" and membership in the Church of Christ; and the *become* asks a future blessing, namely, a continued living membership of the Church. And, as infant baptism is to be "retained in the Church," so it is the baptized infant that is signed and distinguished as a present Christian, while the Holy Ghost and entrance into the Church are his present gifts and graces. That this article originally avowed "infant regeneration," both by the old Church and by Wesley, we know, for we know that they held

to baptismal regeneration. The regeneration of the infant was to them no novelty and absurdity. So that infant regeneration is an old Church doctrine. And, being in this *our* article, it is *our* Church doctrine. Yet we hold, as Wesley did in later life, that infant baptism sustains, not a causative, but a declaratory, relation to regeneration. Baptism does not (except in an external sense of the word), *regenerate* the subject, but recognizes his regeneration. And the infant is entitled to baptism, not, indeed, because he has faith, but because *he is, through the unconditional power of the atonement, without actual faith, what the adult has become through faith*. For even the adult is baptized, not so much because of his faith as because he has by faith attained that regeneration of which baptism is symbol and seal. And herein is the true, impregnable ground of infant baptism. We cannot agree with Professor Burwash in saying that Wesley's words about sinning "away the grace received in baptism" "belonged not to the Methodist Arminian theology which he was founding, but to the Churchism which he was leaving behind." Most certainly our Seventeenth Article and our ritual do avow "a grace received in baptism." Are the fervent prayers of our service all a vain form, a nonentity, a heresy? Do they not ask a present divine power upon the spirit of the child? And does not apostasy sin away the grace of regeneration recognized and objectively "received in baptism?" Baptism initiates the infant into the Church of Christ, but not into a particular Church organization, as the Methodist Episcopal Church. It is that organization, however, that is bound to require the full evidence of true justifying faith in its catechumen, in order to admission to its fellowship and its ordinances. In our own Methodist Episcopal Church the approved probationer is publicly examined as to his spiritual state

and purposes. As a mere seeker he cannot be admitted into the Church, though voluntarily in class under her nurture. Of the probationary candidates, when coming forward for full membership, it is said : "Into this holy fellowship the persons before you, who have *already received the sacrament of baptism*, and have been under the care of proper leaders for six months on trial, come seeking admission." And then it is asked of them, "Have you saving faith in the Lord Jesus Christ? *Ans.* I trust I have." Through this catechumenship and induction the worldling does not desire to pass. It would be by the relaxation of these safeguards, that is, *by the baptism and admission of mere professed seekers*, and not by the doctrine of present infant salvation, that the Church would become secularized.

The Relation of Baptized Children to the Church.

The action of the Church [in inserting, in 1864, in the Discipline, a series of regulations thus entitled] recognizes that our children are children of the Church. She takes all obtainable children into her nursery. She recognizes baptized children as virtually within the pale of the Church. She only waits the mature and intelligent evidence of a hopeful regenerate character to call them to the communion table. We cordially welcome these movements. We welcome the whole discussion of the "infant question" as sure to result in truth and good. That the Church has in the past rather floated along both in measure and doctrine on this all-important point is owing to her vigorous and busy immaturity. Let not our thinking men fear or tremble at the submission of the whole question to what it has never had, a full and fraternal discussion. A large number of our best thinkers hold that while, irrespective of the atonement, man is depraved in his entire nature, yet that the child is met

by the atonement at his entrance into life, and placed in a saved state. But that is matter of mere theory. When it comes to the matter of practice we suppose that most of them would esteem the present measure of the General Conference as quite sufficiently advanced. If we understand those thinkers aright, they would rather fear that it goes too far. They would rather ask a more guarded requirement of explicit evidence of a true religious experience, of a settled regenerate nature, before the final ratification of complete Church-membership. There may be, we have no doubt there are, children who have never been in an unsaved state. It would be a melancholy thing if there were not. It would be a strange Gospel that requires every human being to pass some part of his life in a state of heirship of hell. There are, so far as experience shows, those who "need no conversion;" happy but rare cases, in which Christian nurture and the Spirit's influences have so blended as to precede and preclude what Mr. Wesley calls the loss "of the grace received in baptism;" or, as some would say, the grace received before baptism, of which baptism is but the outward sign and seal. O that Church spirituality and parental piety were strong enough to make this the rule and not the exception! Normally now the evidence of qualification for the full Church profession is through conviction of sin and conversion. Infant regeneration, if it exists, certainly does not secure childhood piety. Our children are not *of course* Christians. Nor, certainly, without the proper evidence, are they to be called Christians. Childhood does often exhibit a tenderness of conscience, an eager interest in holy things, a simple realizing faith that makes elder Christianity blush for itself. The repulsive pictures drawn by unflinching theologians of depraved infancy and childhood are often far more appli-

cable to even professing Christian parents, who have mature reason to guide them and so less excuse, than to the child. We shrink from such partial pictures, invidiously selecting certain special evil traits, and assuming that infant piety should be more perfect than adult regeneration. We fully approve, then, the changes of the Discipline that bid us meet our children with a tenderer feeling. Or, if we have any exception to take, it is to the want of a sufficient demarcation line requiring in more express terms a regenerate character as condition of unqualified Church membership.

The readers of the *Methodist Quarterly Review* will recollect an article by the late lamented Dr. Nadal, sustaining Infant Baptism on the ground that *the Church does not require regeneration in her membership*. Although we hold this to be the most unscriptural, most dangerous, and most un-Methodistical of all the views proposed, we did not feel at liberty to exclude the Church from hearing what one of her most learned and loyal sons had to say in its behalf. The Christian Church, in our view, aims, however imperfectly the aim is accomplished, to be the Church of the Regenerate. Dr. Nadal's view, we think, contradicts our Thirteenth Article of Faith, which declares that "The visible Church of Christ is a congregation of *faithful* men." In regard to which it may be affirmed, 1. That the unregenerate are not "faithful" men; 2. That in the view of the Church the baptized infant is a "faithful" man. If "seekers" have in former times been admitted by our Church to the "class," it is not properly as members of the Church. We never knew a "seeker" to be baptized; he can be dropped by the pastor without trial; and all such should be, so soon as they cease to be sincere "seekers." They are admitted to the "class" simply in order to receive the aid of a spirit-

ual adviser so long as they feel the need of advice and are disposed to profit by it. A good Baptist like Mr. Marsh, of course, agrees with us in rejecting the doctrine of an unregenerate Church. He differs from us in inferring, therefrom, the impropriety of Infant Baptism.

The indefiniteness of opinion on this subject, described by Mr. Marsh * as general, certainly exists in our own Church. It arises, we believe (and in this entire discussion we desire to be understood as speaking not representatively but individually), from the fact that a majority of our Church has unconsciously varied from our own standards. A large majority has, if we mistake not, contrary to Arminius, to Wesley, to Fletcher, and to our Articles of Faith, come to hold that *the living infant is neither justified nor regenerate, and becomes so only on condition of death*. This we understand from Mr. Marsh to be the present Baptist view. It seems to imply a present infant condemnation; and, at any rate, under the Calvinistic view of an irrespective, unforeknowing decree, both of foreordination and reprobation, the logical result is eternal infant damnation. This last doctrine Mr. Marsh repudiates in behalf of all Calvinists of the present day; but, accepting fully his rejection of the dogma, we aver that logically he ought to accept it. Here, if pressed closely, he would find himself involved in a "puzzle" quite as perplexing as any he imputes to Pedobaptists.

The theory which, in our individual view, comes most nearly to our best standards, is very nearly in Mr. Marsh's words: "That infants are to be baptized because under the atonement they are born regenerate." Dr. Nadal refers to this theory, and repudiates it as being "certainly in the very teeth of the teaching of the Or-

* Article on Infant Baptism and a Regenerated Church Membership Irreconcilable, *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1872.

thodox Church in all ages." When this view was advocated by Mercier, Hibbard and Gilbert Haven, it was rejected very indignantly by most of our best thinkers ; and, in humorous allusion to the initials of the last writer (afterward one of our Bishops), it was said that G. H. stood for "Great Heretic." Yet we believe it clear that Dr. Hibbard's view is about the view of the Church, if her formulas are to decide the question.

One minute but important correction, however, is to be made. Arminius, Wesley, Fletcher, and Fisk could not be said to hold that infants are "born regenerate." The true statement would be that they are born into the world depraved ; but, as Fisk expresses it, "the atonement meets them with its provisions at their entrance." Their justification or regeneration, so far as it exists, is not *congenital* but *post-genital*. The atonement fills this probationary world with its influence, and the human being receives his atoning justification consequent upon his having entered into it. It is as if a room were filled with a purifying influence, and a leper is cleansed by entering within its walls. The question is not as to the genuineness or the depth of the depravity as derived from Adam, or from the immediate parent. That depravity is done up in all the elements of the foetal man. Nor does regeneration, infant or adult, absolutely remove it until completed at the glorification ; for both infant and adult still retain susceptibility to temptation and sin, mortality, disease, and death, until the final renovation.

And here comes in our reply to Dr. Nadal's argument against infant regeneration, pushed by him with much emphasis, drawn from the fact of the sinfulness of the growing and grown-up race. It is much the same argument as Watson pushes against the non depravity of the race drawn from the uniform wickedness of the

race. But Nadal's argument has none of the force of Watson's. Our inherent depravity is not entirely removed by regeneration until the regeneration is completed at the resurrection. For the best of us, the maintenance of our saved or regenerate state is a work of care, skill, and firm volition. These qualities the un-nurtured child does not possess, and hence he falls an easy victim to sin. The nurtured child may retain an unfortified Christian character. It is at this age, indeed, that docility to truth, conscientiousness, and simple piety often unfold themselves.

Here let us observe, 1. Our later writers do not rigidly insist on the word regeneration as the technic to designate this *saved* state of the living. That word is framed in Scripture normally for adults. And it may be objected as absurd that a man should be generated and regenerated in instantaneous succession. This is not, indeed, a very valid objection. What is meant by these writers is, that *the state of the saved living infant is essentially the same for an infant as the state into which regeneration brings the adult*. And so infant justification is, for the infant, the *same as that justification into which faith brings the adult believer*. The adult believer is not baptized—let our Baptist brother mark this—because he *believes*, but because he is *justified and regenerated* in sequence to his belief. *The infant, possessing that same justification, is entitled to that same baptism*.

2. This does not imply baptismal regeneration or ritualism. The infant is not regenerate because he is baptized, but is baptized because he is virtually a believer, and so virtually justified and regenerate.

3. This avoids the danger of an unregenerate Church-membership. If the infant so grows up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord as never to lose his saved state (no imaginary case) he needs no conversion. He will

bring forth the fruits showing him entitled to an unforfeited Church-membership. - Otherwise, his membership is forfeited, as in any other case of apostasy. Nevertheless, not only most children, but most adults, often need converting over and over again.

Methodist Authorities on Infant Regeneration.

Miss Catherine Beecher informs us that she finds in the Episcopal Church the true theory of educated piety, in distinction from the revival piety of Puritanism and Methodism. To baptize the child and hold him to be a Christian, to train him by catechisms, and forms, and instilled principles to mature profession, as an *of course* Christian, is the true method for all churches and all the world. Her doctrinal theory is unequivocally Pelagian. She holds that every human being born into the world is as innocent and pure *by nature* as the new-made Adam, and that development *of the nature* is the requisite for adult Christianity and salvation. To this view she believes, very mistakenly, we think, that the Christian world is gravitating. Within the range of our observation no such tendency exists.

Miss Beecher compliments Wesley and Methodism for their "common sense." They use their common sense in this, that they are a living reaction against the nominal Christianity produced by merely baptismal and educated Christianity. We believe much in educational piety; we see nothing wrong in calling a baptized child, in a broad sense of the word, "a Christian;" but we believe it would be a fatal day for the true vitality of Methodism when a fully evidenced justifying faith in Christ is not required in order to a complete Church membership. When Methodism arrives at this point she may as well merge herself into the dead ecclesiasticism from which she rose, for her mission is ended.

Miss Beecher announces that a new development is taking place in the Methodist Episcopal Church, which, she imagines, will result in childhood Church-membership. We doubt the newness of the matter she describes. To show how great our advance is, she quotes a passage from Arminius, in which that great doctor taught that infants are by "the covenant comprehended and adjudged in their parents," and so have "sinned" and become "obnoxious to God's wrath." But if she will turn to his works, vol. i, page 318 (American edition), she will find that by that same covenant there is, in his opinion, a provision of grace in which children are so included, as putative believers, "as not to seem to be obnoxious to condemnation." Both of these views are consistent, and may be correct. Condemned by the covenant in Adam, living children, like believers, may be justified in Christ. If Miss Beecher will turn to Fletcher's *Checks*, vol. i, page 461, she will find that writer expressly maintaining the doctrine of both the "justification" and the "regeneration" of living infants. In a note he adds these remarkable words: "Those who start at every expression they are not used to will ask if *our Church admits of the justification of infants?* I answer, UNDOUBTEDLY; since her clergy, by her direction, say over myriads of infants, 'We yield thee hearty thanks, most merciful Father, that it has pleased thee to REGENERATE *this infant.*'" He then proceeds to prove that this *regeneration* is antecedent to baptism, and universal. And he instructs us so to construe his mention of "the regeneration of infants," in his *Appeal* (a work adopted in our course of ministerial study), Part V, Inference 7, as designating regeneration unconditional upon baptism, and of course as existing in the case of every *living* infant. So firmly convinced was Fletcher that Adamic depravity does

not preclude infant regeneration, that it was in a powerful work in favor of depravity that he maintained such regeneration. If this be a new development, it is by no means "a new doctrine." According to Fletcher's interpretation, indeed, our infant baptismal service teaches the same doctrine. Our baptismal Scripture lesson from Mark x, 13, etc., declaring "of such is the kingdom of heaven," teaches, in his view, that infants are truly born of the Spirit as ground of their now being baptismally "born of water." They are to receive the outward sign because they *have received* the inward grace. We say not that these teachings of Fletcher are an article of our Church faith; nor that they are true or false. We only say that they are found in one of the standards which has always been put by our Church into the hands of her young ministers; and such is even there affirmed to be the doctrine of our standing Ritual. If Fletcher's interpretations be true, we have been proclaiming living infant regeneration at every infant baptism from the very foundation of our Church. But this Arminian and Fletcherian view is very different from her Pelagian denial of a depravity by nature derived from Adam.

Mr. Wesley's views of the baptismal Scripture lesson appear scarce different from Fletcher's. "The kingdom of heaven" there mentioned he held to be the "kingdom set up in the world" (see his comment on Mark x, 14, and Matt. xix, 14), that is, the regenerate earthly Church; he held that little children "have a right to enter" that kingdom or Church; and that "the members of the kingdom" "are such," that is, "natural" children, or "grown persons of a child-like spirit." That membership he interprets to be not contingent and prospective, but real and present. And yet he believed that no one can be within that kingdom

who is not regenerate. (See his note on John iii, 5). We have then the syllogistic premises: All members of the kingdom of heaven are regenerate; children are such members; and then what conclusion a logician like Mr. Wesley would draw we leave others to decide.

In contradiction to Fletcher, Mr. Watson, beyond all question, held, 1. That infants are not justified or regenerate in immediate sequence to their personal existence. 2. That infant regeneration is nevertheless a reality; and, 3. That its becoming actual is limited to dying infants, and, as we understand him, takes place just antecedently to their death. On what texts of Scripture this last limitation is founded we are not informed.

Dr. Fisk's view appears in the following words: "Although all moral depravity, derived or contracted, is damning in its nature, still, by virtue of the atonement, the destructive effects of derived depravity are counteracted; and guilt is not imputed, until, by a voluntary rejection of the Gospel remedy, man makes the depravity of his nature the object of his own choice. Hence, although, abstractedly considered, this depravity is destructive to the possessors, *yet through the grace* of the Gospel ALL ARE BORN FREE FROM CONDEMNATION. So the Apostle Paul: 'As by the offense of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation, so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life.'"—*Calvinistic Controversy*.

Here we are told that all are born "free from condemnation;" and this freedom from condemnation is identical with the "justification" named by St. Paul. And this freedom from condemnation or justification (not merely a title to contingent prospective justification), is at birth upon each living individual infant; and universal, being in spite of our depravity derived from the atonement. The infant does not wait for death before

he is justified. Death, actual or approaching, is no condition of salvation. Whether Dr. Fisk also believed in infant regeneration, or whether he believed that, in the case of infants, justification and regeneration could be separated, we know nothing in his writings to decide. During our ten years of personal intercourse with him we never heard him discuss the subject.

In regard to Mr. Fletcher's doctrine of infant justification, we remark:

1. No one affirms that the regeneration of an infant, as taught by Fletcher, is psychologically absurd, or contrary to human or Christian consciousness. The doctrine of infant regeneration, either unconditional or conditional upon baptism, is no new doctrine, but has been a dogma in all the great sections of the Church, whether Greek, Catholic, or Protestant. The regeneration of the infant is nothing different in nature from that in the adult, except as modified by its subject; and the use of the term is in both cases equally proper, involving no innovation in theology of either thought or language. If an infant can be depraved it can also be undepraved; if it can be positively unregenerate it can also be regenerate. In the infant nature as truly as in the adult, there may exist all the potencies, predispositions, and predeterminate tendencies, natural or gracious, for an actual though not responsible moral nature, good or bad.*

* On this subject Dr. Olin says: "We have scriptural authority for affirming, that, in some instances at least, the Holy Spirit has impressed the characteristics of piety upon children in early infancy, and even from their birth. Such instances may be thought miraculous, but they prove none the less conclusively the *possibility* of divine operations upon children anterior to the development of reason. There is; at least, nothing in the nature of the case to exclude them. Again, we all believe that God's grace renews those infants who die and go to heaven before they know how to discern the right hand

2. The doctrine of depravity is neither implicated in nor modified by the doctrine of infant regeneration, whether unconditional or conditioned by birth, baptism, or death, actual or approaching. In either case the depravity comes from Adam, is by nature, and is equally complete; and, in either case, regeneration comes from Christ and is by grace, being extra to and above nature. The unborn John the Baptist was "filled with the Holy Ghost" (Luke i, 15), and "leaped" at the approach of the mother of the unborn Saviour. And such cases at once explode the objection of the "manifest absurdity" of "regeneration between conception and birth." Nor is there any more absurdity in the infant being regenerated between conception and birth, than in his being depraved at conception or between conception and birth. And this would seem to finish, too, all the argument about the absurdity of generation and regeneration being simultaneous.

3. If Arminius, Wesley, Fletcher, and Fisk are right in their positions, then the Arminian doctrine of falling from grace must be true. And we see the reason why Calvinists must reject those positions unless they would become Arminians. All who become unregenerate, or unjustified, as Fletcher expresses it, have "sinned away the justification of infants." Or, as Fisk says, the

from the left. This quite dissipates the philosophical objection; there is no *natural* obstacle to the work of grace in a child. Indeed, when we recollect that conversion has quite as much to do with the heart as with the intellect, and that the affections and moral sentiments of children are developed, and may be variously acted upon and modified in their earliest years, and anterior to the development of the understanding, it is not a little strange that this difficulty should have arisen in thoughtful minds."

And again; "God's grace does not, at least it does not, it is said, *ordinarily*, operate before the mind is capable of exercising faith. This is far from self-evident."

"man makes the depravity of his nature the object of his choice," and not until then is "sin imputed unto him." If there be those happy exceptions, who have evidently not "sinned away the justification of infants," Fletcher would doubtless have held them to be Christians, and at responsible age have admitted them to communion. And an Arminian, like Fletcher, would have no difficulty with our Lord's declaration to Nicodemus, "Except a man be born again," etc.; for he would understand that such words are addressed to all apostates, entirely irrespective of any past experience, whether of an infant or a previous adult generation.

4. From this general apostasy it would arise that our authors describe our general depravity as men and as adults, without a slavish reference in every case to the exceptional point of infant justification. That transient seminal period is left out of account, and a depravity is attributed to men in the gross and the entirety, which is no more contradicted by infant than by adult regeneration. No passage describing depravity in any of our authors is to be quoted as deciding his view of the infant's gracious state, unless the infant status is his proper subject.

5. If infants are by the covenant virtual believers, we see full answer to the Baptist argument against infant baptism. "Believe and be baptized," quotes the Baptist; none but believers are to be baptized. By the covenant, Arminius and Fletcher could have replied, infants are, in the eye of the law, believers. Wesley, in his sermon *On the Education of Children*, describes mankind as natural-born atheists. They are so. Ignorant infancy believes, by nature, neither in God nor in Christ. And yet, by the covenant, Arminius would tell us, they are believers both in God and Christ. Does any man believe that Wesley in baptizing an infant held

himself to be baptizing an atheist? Atheists, he held, dying, go to hell. But here, forsooth, is a *baptized*, unbelieving, unjustified, unregenerate atheist : baptized, because "of such is the kingdom of heaven!" Fletcher would doubtless have said that the infant, though by nature an atheist, is by grace a believer in God and Christ.

We have not been arguing the *truth* of the doctrine of infant regeneration, in regard to which thoughtful men are indisposed to "dogmatize;" but analyzing the position of our doctrinal standards, and the relation of those positions to other points of Arminian theology. And we incline to conclude that, judged by those standards, the dissidents from Fletcher have no claim to a credit for special orthodoxy.

Infant Non-probation.

In proof of "Hereditary Guilt," we are pointed to such passages as Matt. xxiii, 35, where our Lord says to the Jews of his day, "That upon you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel, etc. . . . All . . . shall come upon this generation." But this merely ancestral sin is accepted and ratified by "this generation;" and so voluntarily made their own "hereditary guilt." The whole previous context narrates their own present enormous wickedness, and declares that it is **THEREFOR** that the accumulated consequences of past wickedness should come in temporal penalty upon them. And this is, in fact, proof of our own doctrine. By uniformity of wickedness the whole national line had become as one guilty person, until the day of execution at the destruction of Jerusalem and the overthrow of the Jewish state. Our note on the passage says, "Though the temporal punishment be commensurate with the guilt of their whole history, not a man really suffers more than his own sins deserve;"

and, we may add, not an infant whose death is not a translation into life. And "*each man may repent, and be saved* in the world to come." And then, verse 37, follow our Lord's plaintive words, "How often would I have gathered thy children, and *ye would not!*" It was their own sins that had made the national guilt their own. And thus it is that, according to the Decalogue, God visits "the iniquities of the fathers upon the children;" because the children, by a like wickedness, are alike guilty, and suffer really no more than their own deserts. And so Achan's children were put to death, not to punish them as *guilty*, but as a punishment to the father. And Levi paid tithes, being in the loins of Abraham, not from any *guilt* of his own, but by the natural fixing of his relative position in life by heredity. And be it specially noted that all these visitings of parental sins upon posterity belong wholly to the temporal, earthly, law of descent, and not to the system of eternal retribution.

And perhaps these views may aid to solve, too, the problem of INFANT NON-PROBATION—the problem that induces Dr. Prentiss, in the *Presbyterian Review*, to argue against all probation, and Dr. Newman Smyth to demand a *post-mortem* probation for infants. In thus being blended into one, the two kingdoms—namely, the realm of man's animal nature and the realm of probation and immortality—modify each other. The realm of nature secures bodily death, even of infants; the realm of probation secures resurrection. In the former, the Divine Ruler exhibits the blended realm in its most benign aspect of non-probational, unconditioned grace through Christ; in the latter, he manifests the probational alternative aspects of conditional grace and justice. The fall is thus simply man's subjection to the law of all earthly races. With both vegetable and ani-

mal progenies premature death is arrest of development. The infant oak, trampled as a shrub to death, can never shoot up its trunk, sweep the clouds with its top, and shake the tempests of centuries from its sides. The slain lion's whelp can never rouse the forest with his roar. And so the dying infant immortal, though raised to perfect bliss, may never unfold the fullness of his probationary being. He can never appear as the hardy moral warrior victorious through grace in the battle of life. He has been allowed only to *be*, and to *suffer*, but not to *do*. He may be as an ever-blooming, ever-blissful flower in the garden of God, but not the stately tree. He would be living proof of the predominantly gracious nature of the probationary kingdom. Why should not both these aspects present themselves in the one blended realm? And what need of the *post-mortem* probational appendix? What ground for assuming full literal probation for all as an unailing law? Is not the appendix an awkward structural addition? Could not the end be better secured by postponing, in all cases, death to adult age?

CHRISTIAN PERFECTION.

Regeneration and Entire Sanctification.

By our physiological and psychological sensitiveness, we are susceptible to temptation and very liable to sin. No constituent part of our psychological or physical constitution is cast out or, in substance, changed in regeneration. It is the vitalizing influence, presence, and power of the Holy Spirit, obeyed and acted by our free agency, that constitutes our regeneration. Nor does the still-remaining presence of the above-named suscep-

tibilities and liabilities to sin in the least contradict the doctrine that our regeneration is of the whole man. The regenerative Spirit does pervade body, soul, and spirit. But here is a momentous distinction between the *extent* of the Spirit's presence and the intensity of its presence and power. This is the distinction sometimes philosophically found between *extension* and *intension*. We tolerate the phrase "total depravity," because that depravity truly does pervade the *total* man; not because its degree and intensity in the whole man is total, so total that he is as bad as the devil; bad as he can be; so bad that the most abandoned mature pirate is no more depraved than a modest young girl. "*Totus vir depravatus, not totus vir depravatus totaliter.*" And so the regenerate spirit is entire in its *extent* through the whole man, but measured in its intensity of influence and power; so that the free will is able to yield to temptation. According to the fullness of the presence and influence of the Spirit obeyed by the man is his degree of spiritual power; that is, the entirety of his sanctification. When that Spirit's power and the man's concurrence are so entire that the man is able to, and actually does, reject *all* sin, and so does remain in the undiminished fullness of the divine approbation, unquestionably he is entirely sanctified. The love of God is in his heart, and his path is the path of the just shining to the perfect day. And this is the simple account of the difference between regeneration and entire sanctification, at which so many minds are perplexed.

Grades of Depravity and Holiness.

Had we been privileged to peruse Dr. Crane's *brochure, Holiness the Birthright of All God's Children*, before publication, we should doubtless have endeavored to convince him that there is no such difference in

his views as to require him to place them in so frank an antagonism to Mr. Wesley's. Mr. Wesley holds that regeneration is at first so incomplete that *traces of depravity remain in the soul*, as is evidenced by the "sins willfully committed" (according to our Twelfth Article) "after justification." Dr. Crane admits that "after justification" there are "weak faith," "temptation," and "sin," but denies that their base is a "residue" of our natural pravity within us. This may seem to some a shadowy difference, but it really leads him to a brave contest with Mr. Wesley's sermon on *Sin in Believers*, which has been accepted as standard by our Methodism the world around. We think it must still remain standard.

We venture the following statement. Mr. Wesley and Dr. Crane agree that, at justification, there is conferred a degree of "power" over sin and against temptation. Both would agree that according to the degree of that "power" is the degree of sanctification. Indeed, we think one of the best definitions of sanctification is: *The power, through divine grace, more or less complete, and more or less permanent, so to resist temptation and avoid sin as to live in the fullness of divine favor.* Where the correlation between the inner state of the soul and temptation is such that there is no power to avoid sinning, "and that continually," the depravity is entire. Where, *secondly*, there is power through grace, by faith, largely but partially and precariously to avoid sin, with usually but a dim sense of divine approval, then we should by parity infer that the pravity was not entire but partial. If it were the case of one who had been previously in the *entirely* depraved state, we should imagine that it was a trace of that previous entire state. And viewing this to be about the condition of the ordinary justified person, we

look upon this deficit of his spiritual power as a remains of his previous entire inability. Where, *thirdly*, the power is such as to enable one, with the exertion of unremittent care and energy, to maintain, with a clear and regular continuity, the avoidance of such sin as diminishes the light of God's smile upon us, we might with trembling trust call that entire sanctification. Where, *fourthly*, such is the correlation between the state of the soul and temptation that the avoidance of sin is a matter of perfect normal and natural ease, and may be rationally predicted as forever and absolutely permanent (even though there is a free power for sin, and though sin be most abnormally the actual result), there is clearly no depravity. And this is Adamic perfection. But it is quite irrelevant to quote Adam and Eve before the fall to illustrate either of the previous cases. Finally, where the soul is entirely removed from the sphere of sin, perfectly filled with God, and framed within a body incapable of sin, so that sin becomes impossible, the holiness is finitely absolute. This last stage of complete, indefeasible bliss will be at the resurrection. It is that glorious day to which St. Paul, earnestly looking, beholds the whole creation groaning for the manifestation of *the sons of God*. Regeneration is, indeed, truly a specific term in theology, and yet it comes under the grand genus of the final renovation. Then, for the first moment, the impairment we, one and all, have derived from Adam and sin, shall be completely repaired. Hence, our regeneration here, as individuals, is but initial, as part of the entire regeneration completed at the resurrection. Let us not be impatient because God is so slow as to leave an imperfect "residue" within us. "God is patient because God is eternal."

We have above traced at least *five* degrees of spirit-

ual power over sin (which we hold, with Wesley, to be sanctification), and thereby demonstrated the difference between our initial sanctification and its full ultimate perfecting.

These *five degrees* of spiritual power against all sin we may illustrate by the *five* following *degrees* of moral power against intemperance, though the number of the degrees may be increased by minuter division. There is, we may say: 1. The man to whom alcohol is so utterly repugnant that his stomach throws it off, and he *cannot* drink it. 2. The man who greatly dislikes it, but can swallow it as a repulsive medicine. 3. The man who neither likes nor dislikes it, and can with equal ease drink it or let it alone. 4. The man who likes it, and can scarce refrain from drinking. 5. The man whose will has lost all resisting power; like the man, once described by the late Sylvester Graham, whose will, when the glass was set before him, could no more stop from taking, than a steel trap could stop from springing; not even if he knew that death and damnation were the immediate sequents. And this last is parallel with the *total depravity* of our spiritual scale. Now, how figurative is the question, whether numbers 2 and 3 have any *intemperance in them*; as some brethren query and debate whether a justified man has any *sin in him*! All you can say is, that such is the state of the man's mind and body that he has just such and such a degree of like or dislike of the object. And so, by parity, you can say that a Christian has more or less power over sin. And here you have got to the bottom of the inquiry. How it is that a man's sensorial surface is impregnated with such a sensitivity that alcohol is exquisitely agreeable, or agreeable in one or another degree, science has never begun to guess; any more than it can tell why scratching the bottom of one's foot will

tickle and scratching the face will pain. We know that here is a man whose sensorium is delighted with alcohol; is in a terrible state of pain, which we call *craving*, at its long absence; and whose will pounces upon it when it is at length within his reach. And that is the sum of the matter. Let our candid readers place these five degrees beside the five degrees of power produced by the empowering Spirit, reversing the order, and we shall be disappointed if the whole matter does not become tolerably clear. Only it must be remembered, as against Pelagianism, in sanctification the power is divinely bestowed, and not merely natural.

To perceive the difference between justification and entire sanctification let us take another view. At justification, or pardon, God beholds the soul as being in Christ perfectly innocent, perfectly pure from the guilt of sin. In that sense he is, at that moment, *perfectly holy*. Then such measure of the Spirit is given as God pleases; and even the slightest measure of spiritual life thereby bestowed is regeneration. Assuming, then, that the soul is, in the above sense, *perfectly holy*, is he possessed of such *perfect power over the future commission of sin as to constitute entire sanctification*? That is, does entire sanctification ever take place at justification? If such a case should be, it would be a rare exception. Experience shows that such a power over and against sin is the usual result both of growth and of fuller measures of the Spirit, and "gift of power." And now, what is the measure of what can be called "*entire sanctification*?" Our answer would be: *Such a measure of power over sin as holds us, with more or less continuity, in that same perfect fullness of divine approbation as rested upon us when justification first pronounced us, through Christ, perfectly innocent of sin.* Happy, tran-

scendently happy, is the man with whom such fullness is permanent! With others it may be for a season; with others, a vibrating experience; and rarer than is usually supposed is the case of its permanence.

We think it accords with Wesleyan theology to say, that the amissibility of even the most entire sanctification in our probationary life is based in a "residue" of our hereditary moral debility. Just because it is part of the great racial impairment waiting the great racial repairment. And just because, also, it is such a correlation of the soul with temptation, belonging to our nature, inherited from the fall, as leaves us, as Mr. Wesley repeatedly states, inferior to Adamic perfection. Whatever inferiority we possess below unfallen Adam must be part of that loss we have suffered from fallen Adam.

Sanctification is, perhaps, less the taking away any thing from our inward nature than the bestowment of a repressive power over our inner sinward tendencies. On the rail-track the sprung iron sometimes turns up a dangerous elastic "snake-head," that, unless fastened down, will smash the train. The natural man's heart contains a circle of elastic "snake-heads," pointing from circumference to center, that nothing but divine grace can press completely down. The Spirit of God, aiding our firm volition, applies a pressure that shuts them down more or less completely; and according to the completeness of the shut-down is the entirety of the sanctification. That divine grace ever completely takes away the snake-heads, or even their elasticity, during probation, is more than we can affirm. Whatever be the conscious feeling of the professedly sanctified man, our impression is, that spectators often perceive the snake-head when he little thinks it. St. Paul found it necessary to *keep his body under*—that is,

to keep the snake-head repressed; and it was that repression, not the *removal*, that constituted his sanctification. The unremoved snake-head is evidenced by the energy still required to keep it in repression; and apostasy discloses the snake-head present and elastic as ever. It is, perhaps, only in the sense that the complete repression of the snake-head would be its cessation as a snake-head, so that it is a snake-head no longer, that there may be said to be in sanctification a cessation of our hereditary pravity.

What constitutes *the difference between the sin of the unregenerate and the sin of the regenerate?* We answer: the former is the hostile act of an enemy, the latter the offense of a child. For the former God has justice, for the latter correction. When faith is strong and fertile, that childship is manhood. When faith is "weak" and barren, the soul is dwarfed in moral manhood and becomes a babe. When faith expires, the child of God becomes a child of the devil. In the heart of the regenerate, faith, however weak, is a deep, moral protest underlying the sin he commits; a potential repentance, likely soon to manifest itself in action. The difference, therefore, between the sins of the unregenerate and regenerate is not intrinsic but relative; it arises from the different conditions of enemy and child. The denying the Christian's sins to be sins is a fatal procedure. Dr. Hodge charges an Antinomian tendency upon perfectionism, but carefully adds that it has no such effect among Methodists. Any inclination to deny sin and guilt in the believer would certainly introduce such tendency. We must beware how we sustain our regeneration or our sanctification, not by avoiding sin, but by whitewashing the sin we commit.

Dr. Crane, like many others of the purest and holiest men in our Church, has been impressed with

what seems to him a vast amount of both false showiness and extravagance under the guise of sanctification, with which much of the present hour is disfigured, and he wished to furnish a conservative remedy. He attempted this, we think, on a mistaken basis, a platform outside the Wesleyan doctrine. He forgot that Wesleyanism furnishes not only the animating but the conservative element united in mutual countercheck. Its doctrines are beautifully symmetrical. As conservative check, Wesley presents before us the absolute penalty of the divine law, damning us for even the slightest so-called "infirmities." He presents the full interval between us and unfallen Adam in its ample breadth. And then, his pages of caution to the followers of George Bell are providentially on record. These conservative forces, if brought out and emphasized, are ample and adequate to the purpose of blowing off all the froth and "fury signifying nothing" with which these errorists are trying to overlay the cause of the higher Christian life.

Correctness of our Definition of Entire Sanctification.

Our definition of entire sanctification, as given above, being questioned, with a challenge to compare it with that of Wesley, we will place them side by side. We are sure the reader will discern their oneness of ultimate essence under a variety of form:

Our Definition.

Such a measure of POWER over sin as holds us with more or less of continuity in that same perfect fullness of divine approbation as rested upon us when justification first pronounced us through Christ perfectly innocent of sin.

Wesley's Definition.

Sanctification in the proper sense is an instantaneous deliverance from all sin, and includes an instantaneous POWER, then given, always to cleave to God.

Both these definitions make the sanctified state consist of two things: *First*, "deliverance from sin" (by perfect justification at first); *second*, "power," namely, to maintain that perfect "deliverance from sin."

Both definitions make the sanctification proper consist in "POWER." Wesley says, "power always to cleave to God;" ours says, "power to avoid sin, so far as to retain the perfect divine approbation." Both express the same "power;" ours completely and fully, Wesley's briefly, and rather crudely, for a definition. Even the merely regenerate man has "power to cleave to God." Nay, an unregenerate theist does, as against atheism, exert "power to cleave to God." Wesley's words are, therefore, inexplicit and inadequate, not completely expressing his own meaning. Taking, now, the previous point: Wesley says, "deliverance from sin," (that is, the guilt of sin, by justification); ours, too, makes the justification from sin the starting and measuring points. Both are, in brief, justification for past sin and power over and against future sin. Both imply that the complete justification at first, maintained by the divinely accepted avoidance in the future, is *holiness*. If a man is first cleared from all guilt, and then possesses and exerts the power of so far avoiding all sin as to stay as guiltless as at first, would he not be an evangelically holy man? Would he not be both guiltless, and, measured by the Gospel standard, sinless?

It is said that "this is only a continuity of justification." Very well; but the permanent continuity of *absolute* justification (which is *guiltlessness*, evangelically sinlessness), *would be the highest sanctification*. But, inasmuch as no man can possess a permanent continuity of absolute justification without gracious aid, so we define Christian sanctification as *the gracious power of*

maintaining a justification equivalent to that of our first pardon, which was absolute justification at that moment. The *justification* is one thing, and the *POWER* is another thing. And the *POWER*, in both Wesley's definition and ours, being exercised (and unless exercised it cannot exist), is the sanctification. The sanctification, by our definition, is absolute *justification* plus the *power* of maintaining its perfect continuity. That is $S=J+P$.

To our definition it is further replied, "It is not, then, the fullness of the divine approbation bestowed *when we cleanse ourselves*, etc., *perfecting holiness*," etc. That is, this "approbation" of our definition is only that at justification, and not that higher approbation truly belonging to entire sanctification. But what our definition says is, that sanctification does retain that approbation graciously bestowed at justification; it does not deny that over and above that approbation required by our definition there may be actually bestowed at sanctification also a more abundant approbation than at justification, and a far more abounding assurance and joy; an accompaniment proper to be described in a full expatiation, but not properly to be included in a definition. God may truly approve and bless us at sanctification more abundantly, both because we have gained possession of the "power" and because we exercise it. Our definition mentions the *moment* of justification, not because that *time* is an essential point, but because that moment furnishes the example of a perfect approbation; a good measure of the *entireness* of the sanctification, and so an exact definition of what the entireness is.

Sanctification Does Not Destroy our Human Nature.

We have compared the sinward tendencies in us to that elastic upspringing of the flat iron rail in use on

our earlier railways, technically called a "snake-head," and said that sanctification consists in the power conferred by the divine Spirit to lay the snake-head on the level track. To this it is replied: "Entire sanctification takes away our sinward tendencies. The old, bent, rusty, rotten rail of depravity, which puts up 'snake-heads,' is removed, and the steel rail of purity, which *has no snake-like capabilities*, is substituted for it." But that, again, is anti-Wesleyanism, Calvinism, excluding the possibility of apostasy. For how can this "steel rail, which *has no snake-like capabilities*," admit a lapse into the old depravity? Does God, then, destroy the new steel rail, and create anew for the apostate the old rotten rail of depravity? That would be making God the author of sin, and so would land the unfortunate objector again in Calvinism. If the old man is utterly annihilated by sanctification and an immutable new man created, where does the old man of the apostate come from? Thus the Wesleyan-Arminian doctrine of the possibility of falling from grace is completely contradicted.

Test this high-flown talk by facts of experience. Years ago a minister professing a high sanctification, as unquestionably genuine as any other case, suddenly fell into awful licentiousness, lost his ministerial status, and died some years afterward profoundly penitent. Now, how did his nature, physical and mental, in such an *act*, differ from that of an unsanctified man? Were not his blood, brain, nervous system, sensations, etc., just like any other man's? Were not his reasoning intellect, his inflammable passions, his sexual sensitiveness, his corporeal appetites, all the same? The whole structure and substance of his physical system were the same; the whole structure and substance of his mental system were the same. He sinned, then, with the same personal

system and the same impulses that any unregenerate man would. What, then, is this "old rotten rail of depravity, which puts up snake-heads" and that has been all "removed?" If the railroad be, as we understand, the sensitive nature, and the snake-heads the sensitive impulses, they were all there, however closely laid upon the track, capable of up-springing, and had never been "removed," *for it was by and with them that this sanctified man sinned.* And how is it that "Jesus strikes death into the sinful life?" Was there not a sad "life" in this sanctified man's "seat of sinful life?" Did not the most heinous sin come from the living "seat of sinful life?" Now, let this learned objector understand that stirring metaphors like these will serve very well as emotional expressions; they are abundantly used in Scripture; but, like all metaphors, when you come to exact literal analysis, they muddle far more than they explain. And in Scripture exegesis it is one of the most important and difficult points to detect metaphor and obtain the bare and literal thought. All this sanctified man's sensitivities, which in themselves had the intrinsic strength and elasticity to spring up as lusts, were, through the aid of the empowering Spirit, held by his will under control, and kept in their proper and their rightful action, just as the iron elastic is kept in its place on the track from being a snake-head. The man, then, forgiven of his past sin, is perfectly right, all his nature being brought by the Spirit's power into complete control, and harmonized with the law of Christ. He was, therefore, entirely sanctified. The sensitivities, thus held in their true and natural symmetry, still had their true and natural strength, just as the fastened iron elastic had its natural spring. While thus held in place by gracious power they were not sinful lusts, just as *the iron in its place is not a snake-head.*

The railroad is not torn up, the metal *elastic*, capable of rising into a snake-head, has not been destroyed; but, all being held in its proper place and order, the elastic is no snake-head, and the rail-track, elastic and all, is a first-class, perfect rail-track. But let the man's free-will suspend or reverse its repressive action, and then let the blessed Spirit withdraw the repressive "power," and up springs the elastic into a snake-head; and, alas, it proves a live one, and bites the man to death! That is, let the watchful will suspend or reverse its repressive action, holding the sensitivities in their proper place; then will the Spirit withdraw the "power," and the hitherto pure sensitivities will *spring up into lusts*, and lusts will bring forth death. This is the plain, literal process, and he who understands this will have the key to the perplexities in which many minds are at this day involved. And nine tenths of all the difficulties arise from undertaking to *explain* with metaphors and other figures.

And when Mr. Wesley takes a literal case and uses literal language, he accords precisely with these views. Thus he says: "A woman solicits me. Here is a temptation to lust. But in the instant I shrink back. And I feel no desire or lust at all; of which I can be as sure as that my hand is cold or hot." Here all the natural sexual sensitivities belonging to man are presupposed as still existing. They are neither "torn up," "removed," "cleansed away," nor substituted by an entire new set. They have all the same natural excitability to the external object, the same correlation to the tempting thing. That is, the iron lies upon the track with all its inherent elasticity. But when the tempting object presents itself, the blended power of the divine and human spirit holds these springy sensitivities in repression. That is, the repressive power keeps the elastic iron lying on the

track. Otherwise the sensitivity would spring up into lust and sin, as the elastic iron would spring up into a snake-head. And that is John Wesley's entire sanctification.

The excessive use of metaphor in the discussion of this subject has, indeed, Mr. Wesley's sermon on *Sin in Believers* as a remarkable precedent. That sermon is figure and symbol from end to end. His opponents, as stated by him, argue against him in figures, and he refutes them in figures; so that the whole discussion was a battle of symbols and emblems. If any acute and well-trained psychologist will take that sermon and translate it into precise literal language, he will find the argument valid, the doctrine sound, and the conclusion perhaps more clear. The very title, *Sin in Believers*, is image. It images a believer as a sort of ancient leather-bottle, with a certain bad substance called *sin* in it. Then this *sin* must be "emptied out;" the bottle must be "washed," "cleansed," "purified;" and it is a great question among our figure lovers whether it can be emptied, cleansed, purified, in part without being "emptied," etc., in whole. Now all we have done is to divest the subject of figures, and *present Mr. Wesley's exact doctrine*, translated into the terms of modern psychology.

But these brethren make their powerful stand upon *regeneration*. And they quote a very vigorous figure from Toplady thus: "*Regeneration*, as Toplady says, is not 'the whitewashing of an old rotten house, but the taking it down and building a new one in its place—a temple for the Holy Ghost.'"

Now this figure of "the old rotten house" is, like the figure of the "old rotten railroad," very good Topladyan Calvinism. But, when the man apostatizes, does God build him a new "old rotten house?"

The Jews, when they had converted and baptized a Gentile, called him *regenerate*. The temperance men, by parity with the Jews, may call a man who signs the pledge, with earnest purpose to keep it, *regenerate*. And when a man, with perfectly earnest purpose, repents and is pardoned, then the first element of the Spirit's empowering aid given him to stay pardoned and in God's favor is *regeneration*. His justification is at that first moment absolute. He is *perfectly free from condemnation*. His justification remains absolute until, *by sins*, he shades the divine countenance, yet loses not thereby necessarily and completely his regeneration. His justification is, then, qualified ; and yet, dying at that moment, he would be saved, though he would be, perhaps, among the lesser in the kingdom of heaven. * But let the full sanctifying power of the Spirit come upon him, and he is not only restored to his absolute justification, but enabled, if he will, to maintain that absolute justification entire ; not, indeed, according to the Christless law, but according to the grace of God through Christ. And at his entire sanctification God may, additionally to the simple act of sanctifying, pour upon him new and richer effusions of love and blessedness than he ever before experienced, signalizing that experience as an *event* in his Christian life. And so the infant is, by the Spirit's power, enabled, if translated to a purer world, to be and act as pure as that world is pure. It will thus be seen that our whole sanctification is *the gift of power* ; "power to cleave to God," and cleave away from transgressing his law.

Abuse of Figurative Terms.

From this our readers will see the literal truth of our statement, that sanctification is "less the taking away any thing than the bestowment of a repressive power

over our inward tendencies." We do not say that the idea of taking away is excluded; but that the idea of bestowing is the predominant and literal, while the idea of *taking away* is the subordinate, inferential, and often metaphorical. When, for instance, a governor bestows pardon on a criminal, you can say, less properly, he takes away his guilt. And so of the sanctified man, as the Spirit enables him to live thus purely, you can say that "sin is all cast out," "evil tempers are abolished," lusts are wholly removed," "the roots of sin are plucked out," "our inbred corruption is ejected."

These metaphors, like all metaphors, are literal untruth, but they have legitimate place and use of rousing and inspiring our feelings and action. Only let them keep their place, and not be used in the process of exact analysis of actual realities. When we read that we are "washed in the blood of the Lamb," do not imagine that we are actually plunged into a sheet-iron blood-vat and soaked and rubbed. Understand simply that we are *pardoned through the atonement*. And when we are assured with an air of proof, that "an immense amount is taken away when *the blood of Christ cleanses us from all sin*," we reply, that the simple fact expressed is, that a man is enabled by the Spirit's power, purchased by the atonement, to keep himself in perfect evangelical justification before God; and as sin thereby disappears you can figure it, if you please, as a cleansing away with a liquid. And so in the words of Wesley, "The moment a sinner is justified his heart is cleansed in a low degree, yet he has not a clean heart," truth is perfectly stated in figurative language. The literal fact is: When a man is justified that measure of the Spirit is given him that he can, in a measure, keep free from sin, but not that measure by which he can avoid all sin.

Thus Wesley states it figuratively, and we have stated it, exactly the same thing, literally.

And so in regard to Wesley's definition of sanctification; it may be that the first clause means not "the deliverance from all sin" in its guilt by justification, but the deliverance from all actual sin. And then both propositions of his definition say the same thing, the former in a negative, the latter in a positive form. Just so one may say, "The sun disperses the shades of night and brings the day;" but then the latter clause fully expresses both; for the shades of night are but the absence of day. "The fire gives a deliverance from all cold, and produces a perfect warmth," is but two ways of saying the same thing. Just so Mr. Wesley's definition says the same thing twice. The deliverance from all sin, and the exerted power of avoiding all sin, are the same one thing. Wesley's definition says it twice, and ours says it only once.

The Spirit does not, indeed, operate as a dry mechanical power upon the springs of the will. He enables our *love* to fix upon God and his law, and lights our love up to a living, ruling *power*, which the will obeys. And that love divides itself off into various specific forms of goodness, excluding (or, as some would say, *cleansing away*), their various reverse badnesses. Love distributes into charity, long-suffering, benevolence, meekness, modest profession, truth, etc. Then, as love of God's law, it assumes a sterner form and goes into active life. There it becomes conscientiousness, integrity in business, chastity, observance of law, voting for honest rulers, abstinence from proscribing a good brother for doctrinal mistake, and fairness in theological discussion. Where these exist not, no profession of a man should induce you to believe he is entirely sanctified. Yet be not too severe with such a professor. . Admit that this

entireness is approximative, varying, or vibratory, with a great many exceptionals unable to stand before God's absolute law, or you may be obliged to feel that he deceives himself. Generally, our observation is, that very modest profession is best for all.

Liability to Apostasy from Entire Sanctification.

That we inherit from the fall a liability to sin and apostasy from even our entire sanctification is clear from: 1. The inferiority of our highest perfection to Adam, which must consist in a lesser power of resistance to temptation. 2. From the fact that whereas Adam could be saved by the Christless law of works, we, however sanctified, from constant transgressions against the holy law, need atonement, and these transgressions are unquestionably evidences of both moral debility and liability to fall. 3. How human bodies, impaired by the fall, weaken our persevering power, appears from these words of Wesley:

"But even these souls dwell in a shattered body, and are *so pressed down thereby*, that they *cannot* always exert themselves *as they would*, by thinking, speaking, and acting precisely right. For want of better bodily organs they must at times think, speak, or act wrong; not, indeed, through a defect of love, but through a defect of knowledge. And while this is the case, notwithstanding that defect and its consequences, they fulfill the law of love. . . . Yet as, even in this case, there is not a full conformity to the perfect law, so the most perfect do, on this very account, need the blood of atonement, and may properly, for themselves as for their brethren, say, 'Forgive us our trespasses.'"—*Works*, vol. vi, p. 515.

This being "pressed down" is plainly a pressure "down" into such sin as needs forgiveness; and so is in

the direction of possible apostasy; for every sin is a tendency from conformity to God's law. 4. Wesley maintains that the most sanctified commit "infirmities;" and surely these "infirmities" are "debility" (such as unfallen Adam, who kept the Christless law, had not); and undoubtedly if a sanctified man fall it is from this "infirmity" or debility, which we inherit, not from unfallen, but from fallen Adam. 5. The whole of Mr. Wesley's cautions and directions to the greatest professors are admonitions against falling through our "infirmities." They are cautious to "repress" such "snake-heads" as "Pride;" as "a dangerous mistake," "Enthusiasm," the leaving off "searching the Scriptures," "Antinomianism," "Indulgence," "Schism," etc. These cautions are greatly needed even now.

Example of George Bell.

George Bell was for awhile one of Mr. Wesley's most pious and useful ministers. But he ran into high exaggeration on the subject of sanctification. Supposing truly that *nobody can be too holy*, he caught the notion that *no theory and no profession of holiness could be too high*. Soon Wesley was not Wesleyan enough for him, and he denounced the grand common sense of that great man as "an enemy of the doctrine of holiness." His "high enthusiasm," as Wesley in his day called it—*fanaticism*, as we in our day call it—led the people into a wild religious delirium. Wesley was deserted, his London society largely broken off, and over the scene he had to begin to build anew. George Bell and his seceders went to ruin in due time. Mr. Wesley then saw that *his own overstatements of sanctification* had really commenced the mischief; and he proceeded, most wisely, to correct his own error. He published a tract intended for all Methodists inclined to Bellism,

entitled, almost sarcastically, *Cautions and Directions given to the Greatest Professors in the Methodist Societies*. This tract was afterward added to his previous manual, *Plain Account of Christian Perfection*, in order to modify the ultraizing influence of that manual as it previously stood. Still further, he appended to that manual some very significant notes, carefully and wisely lowering his own overstatements. With characteristic magnanimity and wisdom he left both his error and its correction on record for our ensample. It required some Christian humility for a man like him to append to his once jubilant language such notes as these: "This is too strong," "Far too strong," etc. To a penetrating eye it reveals the fact that Mr. Wesley himself, with no modern precedents to guide his course, came very near to swinging over into "enthusiasm." The state of the case as it now stands, is *holy life and modest profession with Wesley*, against *tall profession and "enthusiasm" with Bell*. For a goodly body of pious people among us, Wesley, if alive, would emphasize his address to the Bellites in the closing part of his invaluable *Plain Account*.

The longer and more extended our experience, the more we are impressed with the necessity of looking beyond lofty professions to attain true estimates of character. The great reason why this doctrine is so coldly, not to say skeptically, regarded by an immense majority of the Church, is the immense distance between the professional and the visible sanctity. The process is, *first*, a theory empyrean in height; *next*, a profession as empyrean; *next*, an immense visible distance between the empyrean and the professor's real altitude; and, last, a consequent reaction in the entire observant Church against the whole matter.

ESCHATOLOGY.

The Millennium through the Diffusion of the Gospel.

THE belief that the millennium is to be accomplished not by the spread of the Gospel through the agency of the Church, but by the sudden interposition of the visible person of the Son of man, smiting down the wicked and placing the saints in resurrection, exerts a romantic fascination over some minds. It gives a relief at the contemplation of the triumphs of iniquity and infidelity. It works a sweet and solemn subjective piety in the soul. But it is often adverse to the aggressive and campaigning spirit of our day. Our great modern Christian organizations and enterprises have been based upon faith in the world's conversion, and the belief that the burden of the work is laid upon the Church. It would be a fine task for some Christian philosopher to analyze how much of the philanthropic spirit of the age springs from this hope. On the contrary, the believer in the premillennial advent points to the failure of many a Christian enterprise, with a dangerous spirit of triumph, in proof that there exists not in Christianity the elements of a world-conquering power. The evidences of Christianity are debatable, and fail to convince many a fair and powerful mind. Time is attenuating their force. Science is in arms against the Bible. Iniquity is on the increase as population grows dense, and advancing science and civilization do but perfect the methods of wickedness and open new inventions of sin. What, then, can we do but withdraw our own souls from the evil that is in the world, and sweetly sigh and pray for the advent of the great Restorer?

And yet the outlook is that Christianity will become the religion of the world. Not only are antichristianities

fading away, but antichristian races are dying out. And is there not an infinite reserve of power in the divine Spirit when he shall please to come forth in power? May not science and the Bible soon be brought to harmony? May not Satan be bound by a divine hand, and so the adverse *temper* of the world be reversed? May not the minds and hearts of men cease to be blind to the sublimity of God and the glory of a glorious eternity, so that religion shall harmonize with the noblest and sweetest emotions of men? When progressive culture shall rightly attune the human faculties, religion will become the central harmonizer of the soul and of the institutions of men. And thus in the final blend of human development and divine influence do we recognize the hope of the latter-day glory. In the midst of all adverse omens the eye of our faith looks to a blessed future for our world in its march to a perfected Christian civilization.

Turning to the pages of the Bible, it is to be readily granted that, as read by some of the noblest Christian scholars, all the hope of a better state lies beyond the advent. The world is waning into ruin, inevitable but for the sudden rescue of the hand of Christ. Biblical scholars like Hengstenberg, Meyer, and Lüneman maintain it in Germany. Dr. Schaff's edition of Lange's *Bibel-werk* is on that side. In England a body of zealous students of prophecy enthusiastically maintain the theory. And yet so powerfully is the spirit of our Christian age embarked in Christian enterprise in behalf of the "world's conversion" that premillennialism stays a feeble specialty.

While numerous volumes have appeared on the premillennial side, the ordinary view now held by the Church has had scarce a single full and formal statement meeting the argument in its varied modern forms.

Jonathan Edwards, and Dr. Bellamy, of New England, both published admirable treatises on the subject, and established the views of New England Calvinism. On the other side, Dr. Breckenridge published an able essay, charging that the doctrine of the pre-advent millennium is destroying Calvinism. Calvinism teaches the predestinated limitation of the elect; while our millennialism has a universality about it that is eating out the vitals of predestinarian particularism.

The second advent is the terminus of human probation and the commencement of retribution. It is the transition point for our race and world from time to eternity. All the parts of God's earthly scheme converge to this focus. The Church, the completed elect, then, is presented as a pure and perfect bride to her groom. All the wicked shall then be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord. All the agencies and means of grace, the day of grace, the baptism, the Lord's Supper, the commission to disciple all nations, look to that advent as their end. The intercession of Christ at the right hand of God ceases when he descends from the highest heavens to the throne of earthly judgment. With this clear view we have a complete whole, a perfect unbroken picture of the scheme of God.

The *true evangelical theory* regards the preached Gospel as an indispensable instrumentality to induce repentance on a general scale among heathen nations. Here we argue the importance of missionary effort, and suggest the following points: 1. Millions who now reject the Gospel in heathen lands would be Christians if they had the full blaze of Gospel truth and the full power of Christian education upon them. They have light enough now to save them; enough to condemn them for rejection. And yet a larger amount would

save them. 2. Millions are now so ignorant as to be barely responsible. They can never be happy, but they will not be deeply miserable; but with the full Gospel they would attain eternal life. 3. The conversion of heathendom would react blessedly upon Christendom. Infidelity and unchristian secularism would cease. A stronger faith, a higher style of piety would arise. None would remain unconverted. And as all would then be Christendom, the millennial glory would be truly as intensive as extensive. 4. This millennium (predicted Rev. xx), we hold to be a prophetic year-day period. It is the long DAY of the Christian dispensation of which we have thus far had the *dawn* and are yet in its gray *twilight*. Blessed Saviour, what will be its *noontide*!

Premillennialism.

The theory of the pre-millennialists is based upon a most mistaken interpretation of the 19th and 20th chapters of Revelation. Their mistakes are *three*. FIRST, they identify the judicial advent of Matt. xxv, with the descent and going forth of Christ as "the Word of God," in Rev. xix, marching as a conqueror and subduing the nations to his triumphal sway, fulfilling the mission of Psalm ii. Their SECOND mistake is in confounding the life of the SOULS of Rev. xx, 4 with that of bodies. Why cannot these boasting literalists allow *souls* to be *literal souls*? John in his Gospel does most explicitly maintain that there is a glorified life of the soul—the *rita celestis*—above not only its unconscious *existence*, but above its conscious *life*, and contrasted with the *death* of the disembodied soul of the damned. This same John does in his Gospel (v, 25-29), distinguish the first and second resurrections to be successively the resurrection of the soul and the resurrection of the body. And of this first resurrection of souls, de-

scribed in his Gospel, exalted to its glorified state, does the same John catch a glorious pictorial glimpse in his Apocalypse. He lifts up his eyes into the high heavenly world, and beholds the *souls* of the triumphant martyrs and confessors enthroned with Christ himself in spiritual authority over the living nations of this world. Their thrones are in paradise, their sway is on earth. This picture has for us a double aspect. *First*, in its earthward aspect it stands as a symbol of the triumph of truth and righteousness. It stands in precise contrast with the *souls* of the martyred in Rev. vi, 9-11, whose condition symbolizes the suppression of religion and truth in the world. In the one case they lie under the altar; in the other they are exalted upon thrones. But let our literalizing brethren note that in both cases, first, it is *souls* and not *bodies* that are seen with the spirit's eye; showing that the apostle, by the word *souls*, means what he says; and, second, that the state of these souls represents the state of Christ's blessed religion on earth. *Second*, this scene in its celestial aspect gives us a specimen of the disembodied Church, "the spirits of just men made perfect," in its glorified state with Christ. The second death has no power over them; for though still detained in the intermediate state, they are waiting for the consummation of their embodied perfection, when the whole elect of God shall be gathered in at the universal resurrection of the body at the judgment scene of Rev. xx, 11, identical with Matt. xxv. This is perfectly consistent with verse 5: *the rest of the dead lived not again*. The word *again*, in the English, is spurious. They *lived not* the glorious life of the soul, like the enthroned spirits—they lived not the life of the body; they live neither life until the second resurrection. Then they will live the life of the body and die the second death.

The **THIRD** mistake confounds a corporeal earthly kingdom with the glorified reign of the blessed *spirits* with Christ in paradise over the sanctified earth, which will last a period symbolically designated as a thousand years. Thereafter the literal Antichrist (perhaps Satan incarnate, the devilish antithesis of Christ incarnate), of whom this same John tells us there are many lesser antichrist types in the world (1 John ii, 18), will come forth in deceiving power. Upon this last great apostasy the judgment will come like a thief in the night.

The Thousand Years' Reign.

As we are here still in the land of symbol, there is ample reason for applying the symbolic interpretation to this number. We have the number of universality, *ten*, raised to a cube, and producing, on the year-day principle, 360,000 years. The 1260 years of antichristic rule dwindle thereby to an insignificant extent in comparison with the earthly reign of Christ. Glasgow well says, "Against the hypothesis of the contracted millennium there lies this startling objection: that it assigns to antichrist a more extended reign than to Christ. But, if the reign of Jesus be 360,000 years, and the end of antichrist or heathenism be speedily approaching, their duration is of no moment, being at most, about 7,000 out of 360,000, or one five-hundredth part." We are then only in the morning dawn of human history. Progress is the law, not only in nature and in history, but in the Messianic kingdom. It is not the few only that are finally saved. Entirely correct is the inference drawn from the doctrine of the millennium by Dr. Bellamy, that the number of the lost in comparison to the saved may finally be as the number of malefactors now hung to the rest of society. See our work on *The Will*, p. 359.

Alford, on the passage, in insisting that this resurrection of *souls* is a bodily resurrection, makes two points. 1. If the *first resurrection* is "spiritual," so must be the second. To which we answer, If the first is not a "spiritual" resurrection, it certainly is a *soul-resurrection*; and a *soul-resurrection* is not a body-resurrection. It does not follow that if a *soul-resurrection* is spiritual, therefore a body-resurrection must, also, be spiritual. Professed "literalists" must render *souls* literally, and not figuratively, as bodies. 2. "Those who lived next to the apostles," says Alford, "and the whole Church for 300 years understood them in the plain, literal sense;" that is, forsooth, understood *souls* to mean bodies! And that is a very queer "literal sense!" This argument, based on the authority of the post-apostolic Church, comes with a bad grace from Alford, who persistently maintains in his Commentary, that the apostles themselves, even in their inspired writings, made the sad mistake of expecting the second advent to take place in their own day. And we call the attention of our readers to *this special point*: That this very mistake of expecting the advent in their own day is *identical with the mistake of placing the advent before the millennium*. Many of "those who lived next the apostles" did make this mistake. Bringing the advent into their own day, they, of course, thereby cut off the millennium, and placed it beyond the advent, and hence arose the errors of ancient Chiliasm, or premillennialism. This error was not held by "the whole Church for 300 years;" but, probably, by a decided majority of the post-apostolic Church. See the whole question of ancient Chiliasm discussed in our article on "Millennial Traditions," in the *Methodist Quarterly Review* for July, 1843.

In his commentary on the Apocalypse, Mr. Glasgow

has some ingenious methods of disproving the danger of millennial over-population. The fear of some is, that in 360,000 years of peace and prosperity the earth would be over-stocked with inhabitants. Glasgow first quotes many beautiful texts to prove the future increased fertility of the earth. "The wilderness shall be a fruitful field." "I will plant in the wilderness the shittah-tree, the myrtle, and the oil-tree." "He will make her wilderness like Eden, and her deserts like the garden of the Lord." "Break forth into joy, ye waste places." "The wilderness and the solitary place shall be glad for them, and the desert shall rejoice and blossom as the rose."

The mountains, deserts, and morasses, may be, he thinks, rendered a fertile plain, and the earth become a garden by geological changes, by a better distribution of waters, and a diffusion, truly possible, of warmth over the Arctic regions. Nay, there are supposable methods by which the orb of the earth may be enlarged and furnish a larger area of life. In all which he professedly and carefully states what *may*, and, for aught science can show, *can be*; not what certainly will be. The latest conclusion of science seems to be that the area of land is continually gaining upon the ocean.

But the most valid solution of this difficulty lies in what are now the known laws of population. In the animal creation it is found largely, that *low life is enormously prolific, and high life chary of over-population*. The fishes spawn and the insects breed in trillions, while the lion and elephant are generating a score. So, also, among mankind the poor, ignorant, and miserable are prolific, while the higher classes, the rich, the aristocratic, and the intellectually and morally cultured classes tend to sterility. The nobility of England would die out were it not replenished from the commons.

People who have few resources for enjoyment fall back upon the animal and domestic gratifications within their reach. As the higher faculties find full play in a variety of directions, these enjoyments are often deserted. As the passions of mankind become regulated, fecundity becomes moderate, and a perfectly balanced race would never over-populate the earth.

Genealogy of Premillennialism.

The notion that *the final thousand years of the world are to be preceded by the renovation and righteous resurrection*, wrenched from its associate accompaniments is the supposed stronghold in tradition of Chiliasm. And this doctrine is one of the most palpable plagiarisms of Rabbinism from Zoroastrianism. The Persian mythology taught the age of Adam would last 7,000 years. This is the great week of the Persian Simurgh. The *Sadder*, attributed to Zoroaster himself, says: "In our [Magian] religion, it is held for certain that God spake thus to Zoroaster: 'I created thee in the middle of the world's course; namely, from the age of Keiomasas to thine age are three thousand years; and from thine to the resurrection three thousand more.'"

These six thousand years terminate with the resurrection. The Jews at Babylon learned the doctrine from the Persians. To prove the foreign origin of this idea, it is only necessary to mention that it is a perfectly isolated notion, of which the Old Testament writers and the inspired age are perfectly clear; no way interlaced with their system, but floating in the later *post-captivitatem* traditions. And this was the prevalent form of Judaism in the time of our Saviour. The New Testament abounds with proofs that the doctrine which required that the Messiah, having appeared in the clouds, should establish his glorified kingdom, and rule for the

last great mundane period over the renovated world, cleared of the slaughtered nations, was the prevalent doctrine of Palestine. When the humble appearance and death of Christ had disappointed that expectation in the breasts of thousands predisposed to be his followers, the next demand would be, that his speedy second advent should, even in their own day (for prophecy and public expectation had designated that as the destined period), establish the true Messianic dispensation and kingdom—the glorified resurrection millenium.

The following from Barnabas exhibits the artificial process by which a foreign notion is superimposed upon the Old Testament system, and then imported, without a pretense of New Testament authority, into the Christian circle of tenets: "Consider, my children, what that signifies: 'He finished them in six days.' The meaning is this: that in six thousand years the Lord will bring all things to an end; for with him one day is a thousand years, as himself testifieth, saying, 'Behold this day shall be as a thousand years;' therefore, children, in six days (that is, six thousand years), shall all things be accomplished. And what is that he saith, 'He resteth the seventh day?' He meaneth that when his Son shall come and abolish the wicked one, and judge the ungodly, and change the sun and moon and stars, then he shall gloriously rest on the seventh day. Behold, he will then truly sanctify it with blessed rest, when we have received *the righteous promise*—when iniquity shall be no more, *all things being renewed* by the Lord."

Irenæus also says, "The Lord will come from heaven with clouds. . . . he will introduce the times of his righteous reign, that is, *the rest*, the *seventh day sanctified*."

Surely no stronger testimony than these extracts furnish can be needed to prove the identity of Christian Chiliasm with the Magian and rabbinical great mundane week. And but a very few words are necessary to identify both these notions with that great blunder, we may say **THE GREAT BEUNDER** of the primitive Church, the dogma that the second advent was to take place in their own day.

The *great blunder*, then, we repeat, which prevailed but too extensively in the Church of the second century, was this—that *the coming of Christ to dissolve the world was to take place in their own day*. We do not think that Gibbon is correct in considering this error as in any way founded upon the twenty-fourth chapter of Matthew, or upon any other part of the New Testament. It took its origin, as the extract from Barnabas shows, from the Judaic notion, that the commencement of the great closing sabbatic thousand years, to be ushered in with a renovation of the world and the resurrection, and forming the Messianic dispensation, was prophetically and chronologically at hand. And how stupendous, in point of fact, was this error! What a blank did it make of future prophecy! It annihilated about the whole Christian dispensation. The Apocalypse, which is now viewed as a map of events of, at any rate, near two thousand years of terrene Christian history, was to them a scribble of senseless reveries. Placing the second advent in their own day did, in the same act, prove their utter ignorance of the great page of prophetic events before them, and cut off the millennium from the train of terrene things, and drift it off into the regions of spiritual romance. It proved, at once, that on whatever other point of prophecy or doctrine their antiquity showed them infallibly "*right*," in regard to the real, great, final, mundane events they were

“adulterate.” If arbiters of all other truths, upon these points, they are, by demonstration, as worthless as the sheerest self-convicted ignorance can make them.

The Second Advent.

1. It is plain, from their own account, that not only the apostles, but our Lord himself professedly knew not *the day or the hour* of his second advent. Mark xiii, 32. *The times and the seasons the Father has reserved in his own power.* Acts i, 7. If then the apostles expressly intimate, as they do, that upon this subject no revelation is made to them, their ignorance or their error upon the subject could be no impeachment of their inspiration or authority upon any other point. 2. With regard to those passages which speak of the judgment as an impending event, St. Peter, in the third chapter of his second epistle, expressly furnishes the inspired solution. Scoffers, he says, should come in the last days and raise this very problem, that his *coming* does not according to verbal promise *immediately occur*. “But,” says St. Peter, in reply to this very difficulty, “beloved, be not ignorant of this one thing, that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day. The Lord is not slack concerning his promise, as some men count slackness. . . . But the day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night; in the which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise,” etc. Here it is plain that Peter recognizes the difficulty arising from the terms of immediacy with which the judgment-day is predicted, and furnishes the rule of interpretation. It is the language of the eternal God, and must be interpreted by the measure of his eternity. Language that implies the delay of a few days may thus designate a period of thousands of years. It is the mysterious language of the Father, who reserves the times and sea-

sons in his own power, revealing them neither to his angels nor even to the humanity of his Son.

And now the question may well arise, Why has inspiration thus used phrases of such nearness to designate an event which was to be, as near two thousand years' experience has proved, so distant? Or, to express the thought in higher terms, Why has a divine arithmetic been thus used to express such a distance to human minds? Our reply would be this: The Spirit's purpose is, to preserve in our minds an impressive conception of its nearness in spite of its distance. The divine intention is, to prevent our banishing it from our thoughts on account of its far futurity. In its momentousness to us it is nigh at hand, and time is no rightful factor in our calculations. Nay, the very greatness of its distance, far millenniums, perhaps, hence, demands that thought and language should bring it near. Sensible time is very relative. To us in the intervening spirit-world millenniums may pass with inconceivable rapidity. There ever is to us but a step, as it were, to the judgment-day. (See our note on Matt. xxv, 6.) Hence, Scripture uniformly points us, with warning, not to the day of death, but to the resurrection and the judgment-seat of Christ.

Again, in John xxi, 22, Jesus says of the apostle John: "If I will that he tarry *till I come*, what is that to thee?" From that expression, St. John tells us, a rumor was current among *the brethren* that he should not die. Now what "*coming*" was it here specified? We answer, it could not be the establishment of Christianity; for living until this coming specified implied perpetual exemption from death. Nor could it be Christ's coming to each man at death; for it implied that St. John, who should meet it, would not die. But it must be a *second coming which introduced the eternal state*;

so that he who lived unto it would never die. It is also curious to remark, that St. John is inspiredly noncommittal as to the meaning of the Saviour's words. He repeats them *verbatim*, but declines all attempt at interpretation. This is a unique proof, that an inspired apostle was *professedly* ignorant as to the approach of the second advent in his day. Finally, the current saying among the brethren that that apostle should not die, because he should tarry till Christ comes, clearly implied in his case a supernatural perpetuity of life. Hence the apostles could not very definitely have expected Christ's coming during their own life. They did not themselves expect to live until that event. It required a supernatural protraction of life to reach that event.

Resurrection of the Body.

Not a few thinkers at the present day identify death and resurrection with the successional waste and repair of our bodies by which our corporeal life is perpetuated. Particles in infinitesimal detail are displaced and replaced by their minute successors, until an entire change is made, and yet the organism is historically kept going, and is called *the same*. And hence it was lately said, in a theological journal, that there need not be a particle of the dying body in the body of the resurrection. But all that is confounding facts of very different nature. That great break-up of the body at death, specially appointed by divine authority, by which all corporeal continuity is destroyed, is in no way analogous to that stream of molecular conduction by which corporeal continuity has been preserved. The two facts are, indeed, in momentous contrast. The one is the assimilative work of the present and active life-power, transmitting its vitalizing and organizing energies by physical contact from particle to particle; the latter is the catastrophe of the

sudden withdrawal of the entire life-power, and abandonment of the organism to total disintegration and individualization of ultimate particles. Now, in order to a *continuity* which can constitute a resurrection of the *same body*, the life-power must go back to that aggregate of particles, and reorganize them into a new corporeity. It must go, like a divine voice, to the "graves;" it must waken the truly "dead;" it must quicken the "mortal bodies;" in short, it must effect a renewed continuity of the once living and dying body. This is altogether a different process from a construction from a new material—a creation. Every so-called "theory of the resurrection" which denies this molecular identity involves a misnomer; being truly a "theory" opposed to the "resurrection," and a denial of its reality. This is not "a theory of the resurrection," but the resurrection itself.

Dr. Wythe, being both a theologian and physiologist possesses advantages for skillfully handling the points of contact between religion and science. In his *The Argument of Science and Revelation*, the closing, and perhaps the best, chapter is on The Resurrection. We have first a short running sketch of the history of the doctrine, in which it appears beyond question that the reanimation of the body that dies is, and ever has been, the doctrine of the universal Church; opposed, especially, by the over-spiritualistic Gnostic heresy, but seldom questioned by any author or party of undisputed orthodoxy in the Church. He reviews some of the theories touching the body to be raised. The rabbis solved the difficulty by supposing that there is an indestructible bone in the body called *Luz*, which is the keystone of the new body; but modern anatomy has never been able to discover this incombustible vertebra in the human skeleton. On this important point Dr. Wythe

adduces a new and decisive physiological fact which will, we think, hereafter take a permanent place in the defense of the Scripture doctrine of the resurrection. We quote his words: "Much of the matter connected with our bodies during life is doubtless foreign, and not essential to their identity. Nine tenths of the human body consists of water—as has been shown by the weight of a corpse which had been desiccated in an oven—and of the remaining tenth part much is material in a state of decay, having been used by the vital processes, and now effete, or being cast off. So that but a very small proportion of the matter of our bodies can really be said to be our own.

"We have seen that of the total amount of material associated with our bodies, physiology shows a very small part only to be essential to their integrity.* That matter only which is in a nascent condition, or which is being applied to vital use, can be said to belong to our bodies. Supposing this small part to be indestructible, many of the objections to a resurrection drawn from the nourishment of other organized bodies will be removed, for both animals and vegetables are built up from the decomposition of other beings."—Pp. 258–260.

* Dr. Beale, a most eminent English authority in histology, says: "Some years ago I obtained evidence which convinced me that the substance of the bodies of all things living was composed of matter in two states; and I showed that the truly vital phenomena, *nutrition*, *growth*, and *multiplication*, were manifested by one of the two kinds of matter, while the other was the seat of physical and chemical changes only. From observation I was led to conclude that of any living thing but a part of the matter of which it was constituted was really *living* at any moment. In the case of adult forms of the higher animals and man, indeed, only a very small portion of the total quantity of their body-matter is alive at any period of existence."—*Life Theories: Their Influence upon Religious Thought*. By Lionel S. Beale, M.D., F.R.S., etc.

When the foreign elements are thus eliminated, and the true body remains alone, it is thereby reduced to one tenth of its apparent magnitude. But a still further reduction ensues, we may add, from the abolition of the alimentary and generative parts of the earthly human system, as both reason and the New Testament suggest. But while the material parts of the body are thus unchanged, and become the substance of the new body, the organism passes through a reorganizing and glorifying "change." The same in material, it is new in arrangements, properties, and capabilities. If we desire to know what these newnesses are, the sacred text gives us significant hints when we are told that there will be a "spiritual body," and that the body will be angel-like.

By the body's becoming a "spiritual body" we understand that it will be so subtilized, so adjusted to the pure spirit, and so subjected in every part and particle to the volition and power of the spirit, that while spirit becomes, so to speak, more substantiated, the personal unit of the two natures possesses all the capabilities that our thought usually attributes to the pure spirit. By volition it passes with lightning rapidity through nameless distance. It clairvoyantly sees, at volition, through a finite immensity. By volition it transfers itself to any shape, and invests itself with a countless variety of properties and phenomenal presentations. It can become as the dark rolling cloud, the flashing lightning, the solid rock. And yet it will have a normal figure and face, which will at once be the true expression of its essential nature (far more truly than human physiognomy now manifests the character), and will reveal to the intuition of the fellow-celestials the particular personality and perhaps the entire past history of the individual. When asked, Will the glorified bodies have

teeth? we reply, If they please; and eat with them, too, as the angels did who visited Abraham. If asked, Will they have hair? we reply, Yes, if they please; and "shining raiment," too, as the two angels did before the apostles at the ascension. Nothing is more clear, we think, than that varying phenomenal form and properties are more or less at the command both of the pure spirit, and of the unit of spirit and spiritual body.

Bishop Butler has finely shown that the resurrection, though supernatural to our own earthly system, may be *natural* within a wider system. The law by which the corporeity returns to its soul may belong to a more comprehensive system of laws, which, like a broader circle, incloses the lesser circle in which we are placed. If we could only have, not a little narrow Huxleyan earthly science, but the broad science that could take in the laws of the vast universe, which are truly the volitions of God, we should see that the soul re-invests itself with the drapery of its former body by as real laws, and under as genuine a science, as the first organism itself was shaped by the wonderful "plastic power."

Anastasis and Egersis.

Dr. Brown quotes from Richard Winter Hamilton a disquisition upon the difference between *anastasis* and *egersis*, the two Greek words by which resurrection is expressed in the New Testament, which indicates that both of these gentlemen were better theologians than exegetes. Hamilton tells us that *anastasis* means "the reinstatement of the entire humanity of the individual in his future existence," that it does not usually refer to the body, and that it expresses not so much the *act* of rising again as the resurrection state. The noun *egersis*, with its verb form, expresses the simple *act*; and he refers to a list of texts as corroborating this

interpretation. Now, in our view, this is a most erroneous piece of philology. The comparison of the two words is this: 1. *Anastasis* signifies, intransitively, an *uprising* from a previous lower *state* of the same subject. *Egersis* signifies, transitively, a *raising* of an object by some agent. It is only in its passive form as a verb, *is raised*, that it attains nearly the sense of *rising*; but even then the implication of the action of a causative agent is seldom or never quite lost; or in its middle form, when its meaning is *a raising of one's self*. 2. Neither *anastasis* nor *egersis* explicitly expresses the risen state, or permanent condition resultant from the rising or raising. Both express simply and explicitly *the act alone*; but both do occasion the idea of the sequent state by the mind's supplying the implication that after the *rising* the *risen state* is permanent. But neither word ever entirely loses its primary designation of the *act*. Thus the passive form of *egersis* is repeatedly translated *is risen*, as Matt. xxvii, 64, and xxviii, 6, 7; or *am risen*, xxvi, 32; where, the rising being explicitly expressed, the permanent *risen state* is implied. A large share of the instances of *egersis*, as well as of *anastasis*, are of this character. 3. Both are normally used of the resurrection act of the body; that is, of the actual rising or raising of the corporeal frame from its former lower state, the subject being the same in its previous fallen and its subsequent risen state.

The most curious part of the matter is, that these two writers construct this cumbrous pseudo-criticism to take away the idea of bodily resurrection from 1 Cor. xv, 12-19, where it does incontestably exist, since the reference there is to Christ's own bodily resurrection. These gentlemen plainly misunderstand the apostle's reasoning, and endeavor to correct misunderstanding by

misconstruction. The apostle's reasoning is this: It is dangerous for some of you to say there is no bodily resurrection; for if there be no bodily resurrection Christ has not risen; and if Christ has not [bodily] risen, the foundation of the Christian faith is destroyed, and all our Christian hopes are a dream. We who hoped for justification, resurrection, and eternal salvation through him, are in our sins; and even those who have died in Christ have gone to the perdition of unjustified sinners. They have gone to that perdition, whatever, in this wreck of Christianity, it may truly be; whether the Gehenna or the annihilation taught by the Jews, or the Tartarus of the pagan poets. And in this whole argument, the apostle has no occasion to affirm or deny the immortality of the soul, or even the possible resurrection of the body without Christ. What he does affirm is, that to deny the resurrection of the body is to destroy the foundation of Christianity, and thereby all hope of pardon and eternal life through Christ.

Dr. Brown is, in our estimation, to be numbered among those who say "there is no resurrection;" for his resurrection is not a re-rising of the same body, but the substitution of a new one by a positive new creation. He asserts the real resurrection to be "demonstrably impossible," but does not give us the process by which the impossibility is demonstrated. For a most satisfactory solution of all these *impossibilities*, we refer to Dr. Mattison's able work on the Resurrection.

When the soul appears before the judgment-seat of Christ, it must come furnished with an organized material body. Whence is the substance of that body derived? From what part of the universe are the particles gathered to form in concretion around the naked spirit? We answer, they may just as well be the par-

ticles composing the body that died as any other. It is just as easy to Omnipotence. If they are not the same substance, then we have a fresh formation, a new creation, a substitution, and not a *resurrection*, and the doctrine of the resurrection is denied. And all the subterfuges and writhing inventions to substitute something else besides the once existing body—some germ, some Swedenborgian phantasm, some outline sketch of a body contained in our present living body—are simply difficult efforts to remove difficulties in the actual doctrine of the resurrection which do not exist. That doctrine is contradicted by nothing in physics or metaphysics. So long as the doctrine of the indestructibility of matter—or, if you please, of “the persistence of force”—is true, so long the identity of matter through all ages is real, the identity of the body, consisting of sameness of substance, is a possibility, and, if declared by revelation, is a truth.

Dorner's Resurrection, a Germination.

What can be more fantastic than the following pronunciamento of Dorner, denying the resurrection of Christ, and substituting a transmigration? “Christ cannot have again assumed and transformed his body in the resurrection, but it must be held that he utterly laid aside and left in the grave his material body in prospect of his heavenly life.” Christ, then, must have had, at the moment of his emergence from the tomb, *two bodies*. What a “find” it would have been for the Jews could they have laid hands on the abandoned body! What became of it? It had no resurrection, and must have putrefied, and is now dispersed to the elements! “The mortal,” then, did not “put on immortality.” It disintegrated. The dead did not rise, for the spiritual body never was dead. The vile body was not *changed into* a glorious body; but the vile

body went into deeper vileness, and a glorious body was, as Dorner says, "generated by Christ's ethical process"—if any body knows what that means. And then, what a sharp deception Jesus played upon his disciples when he showed spurious wounds in his spiritual body to make them believe the falsehood that his present body was identical with his crucified body! The cheated apostles were permanently deceived, for they always maintained that Christ's crucified body came to life, and the fraud was perpetuated in the Apostles' Creed in the words "I believe in the resurrection of the flesh."* All this offensive blasphemy Dorner authenticates in order to evade the simple fact that Christ's real body might as truly rise into a glorious resurrection as it once rose into a glorious transfiguration on the Mount. For this denial of Christ's resurrection he gives no reason, scientific, theological, biblical, or metaphysical, but enunciates it as pure dictum.

Of the Church doctrine of the resurrection he, nevertheless, gives a true and fair statement. "Many teachers of the ancient Church, like Justin Martyr and Tertullian, suppose a complete identity of the resurrection body with the earthly one, inclusive of all the faults of the latter, which Christ will rectify at his second advent. A more spiritual theory is maintained, especially by Origen and his school, who even regard the present body as an evil and a hinderance to perfection. But since Augustine's day an intermediate view between the materialistic and spiritual has prevailed, and was taken over into the Evangelical Church. According to it the resurrection body has indeed an identity of *substance* with the earthly body, but not with the *form*. The latter will rather be a glorified one."

* So read the Latin and Greek forms, as did the English to the time of Henry VIII.—EDS.

But, distorting the doctrine of the Church, Dorner substitutes a *germination* in the place of a general *resurrection*. His excuse for this is the apostle's illustrating the resurrection by the case of the seed, which grows up not a "seed" again, but "grain." Plainly, however, the apostle is not there describing the secret underground process by which the resurrection is wrought. He does not mean that the body germinates like a seed in the grave. He is only arguing optically of what is seen above ground; that, as a humble seed buried springs up in renewed beauty, so the body buried springs up in strange glory. To make the apostle describe the subsoil process is to bring him into scientific error, for the seed does not literally "die." If, indeed, *new matter* is added to the resurrection body, as Dorner seems to think, that new matter is certainly no *part* of the resurrection. For the resurrection is a resurrection of the *dead*, and that supplement was no part of the *dead* organism. As Chrysostom says, "That rose which fell," but the addendum neither fell nor rose. That re-lives which dies, but this foreign element never died, so far as this antithesis is concerned.

And here we may, by the way, note that the late Dr. Summers remarked, that it is unnecessary to suppose in the resurrection the rising of the same corporeal substance; for the resurrection may be analogous to the new bodies that come into existence successively in the *growth* of our life. There are, it is sometimes said, several bodies in the life-history of every mature man. But such a statement is scientific error. There is not a succession of complete separate *bodies*, like a row of finished statues, in a man's career. Each successive corporeal mass is formed, not in distinct completeness, but by the gradual accretion of new particles into the old organism. The new body does not instantly expel

the old, and rush into its place a new formation. But the resurrection-change takes place in "the twinkling of an eye." And so, as the resurrection is not a substitution, nor a metempsychosis, nor a germination, neither is it a growth. It is a *resurrection, sui generis*, and nothing else. New to most of our readers is also Dorner's conception, enounced without proof-text or logical argument by pure dictum, that all dead corporeities are solved into a general reservoir, "like an ocean," and each soul at the resurrection appropriates from the common stock a *quantum sufficit* for itself.

Cooke's Resurrection a Substitution.

One spurious reconciliation of science with Scripture, by Professor J. P. Cooke, we must reject. He makes science accord with the doctrine of the resurrection of the body by really expunging that resurrection from the Scriptures, and substituting a something else which is not a resurrection. Surely the creating and interpolating a new body in place of our mortal and dying body is not a resurrection of the dying body. And, really, so far from his successfully refuting the doctrine of a true resurrection, we can find in the professor's own beautiful words the most striking scientific illustration of our doctrine. Says he, "Are you aware that the brilliant gem you prize so highly [the diamond] is the same element as these black coals? The diamond is simply crystallized carbon." Now our mortal bodies are as the charcoal, and our resurrection bodies are as the diamonds. A charcoal could be transformed, particle for particle, by mere rearrangement into a diamond. So a dead human body could be divinely transformed, particle for particle, by mere rearrangement into a glorified body. In the transformation of the charcoal to the diamond, the diamond is the same with

the charcoal in substance; it is different in properties and powers. So in the resurrection the glorified body is the same in substance as the dead body; it is different in properties and powers. It is *alter et idem*.

Our professor then goes on to unfold that wonderful "allotropism" so-called; wonderful to even scientific men; by which the same substance or aggregate of particles undergoes, by a change of arrangement, a new set of properties. His unfoldings are all to our point. Carbon may be either charcoal, graphite, or diamond. Our bodily resurrection similarly is simply an "allotropism." At his transfiguration the body of Jesus underwent an allotropic glorifying change. It was the same in substance in that glorification as it was in its normal state. It was *alter et idem*. The dead body of our Lord underwent a similar allotropic change. The material frame put on immortality and ascended, a glorified body, to the right hand of God. Nor should a writer who so splendidly portrays the glorious possibilities of matter as our author stumble at even this apotheosis of the God-man's body.

The professor holds the resurrection to be contradiction to the scientific fact that our bodies are changed in substance at least once a year. This year's body is entirely new; similar in form but different in substance from last year's body. But the successional changes in the body do not affect the question so long as we admit the great principle of the indestructibility of matter, and understand that it is the frame which dies that rises again. And here again we find, not contradiction, but illustration. Just as this year's body takes the last year's body and carries it into a formal continuance, so the resurrection goes to the body that has died, takes up its particles, and carries it into a glorified continuance. There is corporeal continuance in both

cases ; continuance by identity of form and variation of substance in one case ; continuance by identity of substance and variance of properties in the other case. In both cases we have a continuance with a variation ; an *idem* and an *alter*. There is, indeed, in the allotropism of the resurrection a long break ; an interval in which the charcoal is scattered to the four winds and has to be re-collected when the diamond change is ready. That interval is a violent, and, as we may say, an unnatural one. It was introduced by sin. In his higher unfallen nature man would have passed, unchanged in substance, into his transcendent state. He might have *grown* into the new resurrection state by a gradual "allotropism," and that allotropism, like the allotropism so well described in nature by our author, would have been a change not of corporeal particles, but of corporeal properties. And so at the coming of Christ the living will undergo a *change* ; not merely by a substitution of new bodies, but by putting upon their "mortal" the properties of "immortality." It will be what our professor well understands as an "allotropic" change.

We have elsewhere (on page 371 and in our note to 1 Cor. xv, 41), put a question which we here repeat ; repeat with emphasis, because it has never been answered, and, we believe, has no answer. When the undressed spirit is to appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, all, even our professor, admit that it is to be invested with a body. From the surrounding universe the elements must collect in corporeal accretion around that spirit. *Why, then, under the power of God, may it not be the elements of that frame which was dissolved at death, which shall again form around that same spirit, just as easily as any other elements ?* Our professor has not in his lectures un-

folded the wonders of magnetism. Had he done so, we should have thence drawn another illustration of the molecular identity of the body at death and the body of the resurrection. Between the soul and its forsaken molecules there may exist a quasi-magnetic attraction. At the sublime instant every individual particle, whether at the farthest pole, or at the antipodes, feels the irresistible draw, and in an eye-twinkle assumes its proper place in the new incorporation. And, in obedience to this final attraction, every particle of one body at death may be secured or withdrawn from incorporation with another dying body; so that all resurrection bodies shall be separate and individual. This spiritual magnetic attraction is not more wonderful than gravitation. It is not more wonderful than the various specific cohesions that hold each body in organic unity; not half so wonderful as those powerful, infinitely varied, elective affinities so vividly described in these lectures.

Our professor excels in quotation of beautifying texts, but not in his application of proof-texts. Thus he says, "the apostle declares that this body is not the body that shall be." Certainly not, we reply, for it now "is" charcoal, and it "shall be" diamond. "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God;" no more than charcoal can adorn the queen's coronet. "This mortal must put on immortality;" but, according to the professor, "this mortal" is to be scattered through the universe and abandoned to eternal dissolution. It is never to have resurrection. The "immortality" is to be worn by a newly created body that never was "mortal." But he omits one text often quoted by deniers of the resurrection: "God giveth it a body as hath pleased him;" namely, it "hath pleased" God to "give it" a diamond "body," instead of a charcoal one.

The Unseen Universe.

The authors of the work thus entitled move a profound question: What becomes of the stupendous amount of force expended, as the latest science tells, and poured into an unknown immensity by the material universe? The entire system of worlds is growing weaker as it grows older. Its fires are going out. Already our satellite, the moon, once a whirling fire-ball, is a cold, dark block. The planets, satellites of the sun, are losing their heat; and the sun, satellite of some other center, is wasting in space its vital fire. Meanwhile their orbits are narrowing, and they are all, slowly but surely, concentrating into one final fireless, rayless, lifeless, hopeless dead-head. Whither goes the universal force that is thus separating from universal matter? Our authors answer: These forces go into immensity in order to crystallize into an "Unseen Universe," which is that future state to which our faith is looking, including that "new heavens and new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness," of which an apostle utters "promise." And, negatively at least, theology may appropriate this key-thought to answer science when it asks, *Where is this heaven about which you talk and sing so sonorously?*

If *heat* be merely what Professor Tyndall calls it, "a mode of motion," then a mere *mode of moving* in space, with nothing to move, would not form a very tangible world. If, however, heat be a real entity, a self-subsistent force, then we have no difficulty in conceiving a purely dynamical system. If force is self-subsistent and "space-filling," then it may be made compacted and solid, and fulfill all the offices of matter; and a world so constructed would seem to be a veritable solid world.

What, then, becomes of the force-deserted dead-head? With this question the writers seem a little perplexed. If they accepted this dynamical theory in regard to our mundane matter, it would be easy to conceive that the dead head, composed of pure force, should dissolve, disperse, and go into other forms and uses. But this theory they reject. Yet we might here suggest that, as the authors believe in the existence of an Evil and a Gehenna even in the new eternal future, this dead-head may be the Gehenna they require. Inasmuch as the entire present worlds of matter, the whole present material universe, exhibit all the defects and scars which theology has hitherto viewed as the results of sin, so all may be under the doom of sin. Why, then, may they not forever stand, the dead-head monument of the evil of sin; the eternal monitor of the criminality of rebellion by God's free creatures against holiness and God? The Bible abounds in dim reminiscences of sin before man; of the fall of a more ancient order of beings, of whom the Satan, who instigated the sin of Eden, is a specimen. What the relation of the universal corruption of the material system, extending through the system as far as our knowledge can reach, may be to this earlier sin, we cannot fully know. But the sentence of destruction for sin may rest upon the whole. And so the final mass of earthly and stellar matter, including the resurrection bodies of the finally-lost men, may concentrate into one awful, eternal Gehenna. It may, indeed, be objected that by that theory the flames of "the lake of fire" are finally extinguishable. The reply is, that if fire is one of the images of the final penalty, "outer darkness" is another. Each may be, in its own way and time, true.

Our authors seem to imagine that the doctrine of a corporeal resurrection is irreconcilable with the nature

of the future unseen world framed from force. On that doctrine they attempt to fasten burlesque, in a style that indicates that witticism and sarcasm are not their gift. If we adopt the theory of the dynamical nature of matter, namely, that even our "hard matter" is fixed or "frozen" force, our bodies and the future world would then be con-substantial; for both would be dynamical. But, even on their view, that matter is a unique "stuff," our theory (which is also Paul's theory), of a material body suffused with spirit, supposes a body able to tread on the solid pavement of the New Jerusalem, if the force be compact enough. Nay, it would be what this theory demands. Our etherealized material body would then contain in its material elements a wonderful remembrance of a former world; an eternal memento that the man was once a sinner in a sinful earth. It would be a perpetual mark of man as a special order among the celestials, identifying him on one side with the lost material universe, and on the other with the glorified Man who wrought redemption.

Our authors fully appreciate that the human race must, according to the latest science, disappear from our globe long before its heat has departed. And thence we venture to reason from a first miraculous advent to a second. By some method, perhaps a miraculous separation of the oxygen from the nitrogen of the atmosphere and its use as an instrument of combustion, our planet is to undergo a fiery disintegration. Conflagrations of stellar bodies are no unknown event in the astronomic system. Even if they were, the ready instrumentalities are at hand upon our globe. A dissolution of the earth by fire is an article of ancient faith; generally including its renewal and beatification. But it is remarkable that the two passages of the New Testament which describe that event, avoid declaring

that the new heavens and the new earth are identical with the present globe. Both seem to intimate a new sphere of existence. 2 Pet. iii, 13; Rev. xx, 11; xxi, 1.

By the Scripture language concerning the *threefold biblical heavens*, we find that there are, first, an atmospheric heaven, the visible space below the stars; a starry heaven, including the entire stellar universe; but where is the third heaven, where God resides? Dr. Dawson suggests, the pure immensity of space that surrounds the stellar universe, assuming the stellar universe to be finite. And, according to the authors of *The Unseen Universe*, the energies of our present earth are thitherward flowing to crystallize into a new heaven and a new earth, and thither the resurrection will bear the spiritual bodies of the glorified. Or, alternatively, Dr. Dawson thinks the highest heaven may be the central sun, around which all other suns and systems revolve their orbits. Dr. Dawson seems to prefer the latter. But the latest dogma of astronomy is, that all the systems are both losing their heat and narrowing their orbits, destined in the far future to fall into the most central sun, all in due time to become a dead and frozen char. Unfortunately, this last theory makes the highest heaven coincide with this last central dreariness.

Let us then take the alternative view. The essential God encompasses the stellar system with its highest heaven, yet extending his omnipresence, and his volitions in the shape of laws, to the stellar center. All, then, seems in place. From the earth as our abode, the atmospheric space, the starry regions, and the circumambient immensity, are the first, second, and third heavens. The anthropocentrism of biblical theology, so much reprehended by Dr. Draper, then stands justified. But Dr. Draper will then ask in the name of sci-

ence, Where are Hades and Gehenna? The reply must then be, as heaven is *up* so hell must be *down*. And this points us to the earth, and brings us back to the doctrine of the old Puritan theologian, Dr. Ridgeley, that the "lake of fire" is the earth in conflagration. We can, then, surrender the earth to the fearful destiny pronounced by modern astronomy upon it. And this accords with the ordinary phrase of Scripture that finds the *infernium* in the subterranean, as it finds heaven far above us.

Our Knowledge of Immortality.

When Bishop Foster said that we do not *know* that our life survives the grave, that is, as the connection shows, with "absolute knowledge," excluding debate or doubt, the shallow newspaper paragraphists took it, isolated the phrase from its connections, and bruited it about that Bishop Foster said that "we do not *know* that we are immortal." And this unwisdom, we are ashamed to say, has been repeated in some of our own religious papers. Now, why is not the same fuss made because Professor Bowne tells us, in the *Methodist Quarterly*, that we cannot know, with absolute knowledge, that a personal God exists? His fundamental maxim is, that our proof of God is not the demonstration of a theorem, but the solution of a problem; to which problem the other solutions are "possible." The fact is, our word *know* and the psychological states it designates involve an immense number of gradations of certitude. Reduced to its ultimate, I only *know* my own present conscious thought. I know that I think. Every thing else is *inference* of more or less certitude. And it is to very various degrees of this certitude that, with more or less absoluteness, we apply the word *know*. For, in fact, we apply the word *whenever the evidence is so far clear that we feel content to repose the mind on the as-*

assumption of its certainty, and base our conduct in life upon it. Absolutely we do not *know* the sun will rise to-morrow; and yet practically we assume to know it, rest our whole system of life upon it, and with verbal truth always say we *know* it. Do we *know* our own immortality with the same absoluteness as we know the sun will rise to-morrow? Do we *know* with an equal certitude that the Bible is true? Do we *know* absolutely that our faculties do not deceive us? Yet we do again say *we know* a thing merely because we were told so by a neighbor. We *know* a thing because Bancroft's history narrates it. John Stuart Mill says we *know* that women are capable of military exploits because the examples of Deborah and Joan of Arc prove it. And so a physician may *know* a disease by its symptoms, and a geologist *knows* the whole structure of an animal by a single bone. All natural science is based upon such a *know*. And all geometry is based upon an assumption—the assumption that our faculties do not deceive us. And so, passing through our Christian experience, and basing ourselves on the great probability of the divine truth of the Scriptures, we do justly say with calm reliance, “We know that we have passed from death unto life;” “We know God;” “We know that when he shall appear we shall be like him.” All of which is no contradiction to Bishop Foster's *dictum*, speaking from the stand-point by him occupied, that we do not *know* our own immortality with an absolute knowledge, so but that discussion, reply to objections, clearing of difficulties, and massing of arguments, are necessary. Why need we discuss and try to prove what every body absolutely *knows*? The very fact that people listened to his proofs, and read his book, is proof that they do not pretend to know it beyond all debate. And the bishop very sensibly assigns the fact that we do not absolutely

know, as the reason why he is about to furnish the proofs of its reliable certainty.

Our immortal life, its present undeveloped state yet glorious assurance, its advancing stages, its dread alternatives, its transcendent consummation, are the main theme of his *Beyond the Grave*. Its leading point is that *the spirit is the man*. We are truly spirits enshrined in similar transparent vehicles.

We cannot consider the removal of the objection to man's immortality derived from brute soul satisfactory. It is, indeed, embarrassing for us that, after having builded a magnificent argument for man's immortality derived from the indestructibility of the thinking principle, we are suddenly brought to a stand with "But do not brutes think? And are they not then immortal?" The answer given is that God himself is the thinking soul within the brute, and the brute perishes forever by God's withdrawal. Are, then, the perceptions, the lively emotions, the energetic volitions of your dog, all the perceptions, the emotions, the volitions of God himself in the dog? That is a very expensive solution. It is very nearly the solution of Descartes, who held animals to be automata; but centuries have failed to render it acceptable to the public mind. We will venture another solution or two.

First. "Man is not immortal because he is a thinking substance, for brutes think; but because he is by God *placed in the conditions for immortality*. A lamp will burn forever if the conditions of carbon and oxygen are properly supplied. An animal would be immortal if placed by God in the conditions for its immortality." Now how easy the thought that paradise is rich with the atmosphere of life, the water of life, the tree of life! What better solution do we want? The tree of life in the original Eden was the preserver of immortal-

ity, and man was removed from it to prevent his living forever; but in the new Eden it is restored. In other words, man, unlike the brute, is immortal by being placed in the conditions of immortality.

Next, how beautifully coincides with this view St. Paul's trinity of man as *body, soul, and spirit*. Man shares the animal body and animal soul with the lower animals. That much he is an animal. Had he nothing more, there would be nothing to indicate but that he would, like the animals, perish forever. But we all know that over and above the set of mere animal faculties man has an overlay of *spirit*, in which reside his conceptions of infinity, eternity, immortality, with sublime premonitions that he is candidate for the high region to which these belong. He is as clearly destined for the region and atmosphere of immortality as the live chick in the shell is destined for the light of the sun. His going to a future perpetuity of woe in "everlasting fire" is a sad mistake; for that "fire" was "prepared for the devil and his angels."

The Specter in the Brain.*

PROFESSOR ADLER remarked in one of his lectures that it "is not probable that man has a specter (called

*The following note of February 9, 1885, was addressed to Dr. H. K. Carroll, one of the editors of *The Independent*: "I am endeavoring to occupy my mind during a slow and sorrowful convalescence with the thoughts that have for years possessed for me a profound interest. And at length I have got so far as to have penned, or rather penciled, an article which I conclude to offer to *The Independent* for publication. . . . It is entitled 'The Specter in the Brain,' an epithet applied by Professor Adler, the atheist's lecturer, to the soul. It is thence an argument for the immortality of man—an old subject, but, I trust, discussed in a manner somewhat new."

It was followed by "The Vanishing Specter," the last production of Dr. Whedon's pen, which was published in *The Independent* seventeen days after his entrance into the world so beautifully portrayed.

a soul), in his brain." It is, however, certain that man has a specter in his entire system, and perhaps several. First, there is the cerebral or nervous specter—namely, the nervous system itself, of which the brain forms a part. For, though these are material and, therefore, thought by superficial thinkers to be non-spectral, yet when we proceed to analyze what we call matter, we find it just as spectral and unreal as spirit. Among profoundest thinkers, some suppose matter to be simply a hard and solid unique; others to be mind-created illusions of imagery; and others, to be just mind itself, of a condensed and grosser essence. Hence, we may fairly say, in spite of Professor Adler, that man has a specter within him—namely, the whole nervous system. Nay, a little further analysis may show that man is a bundle of specters, in which respect he resembles most composite things.

Second, there is besides this substantive material specter, another specter, which we call the formative power. This power, like a mold in which a metal is run, shapes the nerve substance into its proper system, as well as, gradually, the whole body. This power determines whether procreative substance shall shape into a beast, bird, or man. For all these commence in the maternal matrix alike, with no visible difference of form, and gradually shape to the figure which the formative power assigns. This invisible power is no part of the substance, or being, shaped by its operation. The substance is the passive object; the power is the immediate agent; and the being is the completed result. This formative agent is, as it were, so much divine power set apart by the Supreme Power to take care of the nature of forms of creatures and things. This (the plastic power of Cudworth) is essentially distinctive creation; not primary creation out of nothing, but the secondary creation, namely, of new nature-forms out of

old material. It is distinct from all the shapings produced by man, and works only under the apparent spontaneities of Nature. This power is not only creation, but conservation, being the due amount of divine power set apart for maintaining the nature-forms permanent or changing, and it is therefore sometimes styled constant creation. It is by this power that like produces like in the world, so that beast propagates beast, and of man, man alone is born. To this power species owe their permanence or variability.

Of that formative power, the effect is life. For life is not a separate entity. Life, as effect in nature, is produced by the formative power, carrying the organism through the processes of growth, and through all its evolutions, during its living existence. Life as cause is the operating formative power itself. In the vegetable, life stops at itself; but in animals, it is the basis, as we hold, of soul; intermediate, that is, between the body and soul; the condition by which body is able to carry a soul. And so, when soul and body separate, animal life ceases.

The third specter is what we will call the nervous *fluidoid*. For the above-named nervous system so ramifies with its fibers throughout the body, that a map or sketch thereof looks like an outline of the body itself, seeming to form its attenuated ghost. But it is not these material threads themselves that form this true specter the third. Within these threads are what Herbert Spencer styles "the nervous currents," and, as a "current" can belong only to a fluid, or something fluid-like, so we have called it a *fluidoid*. And this nervous fluidoid is the specter in the fibers of the nerves and granulations of the brain, which is vehicle of the feelings or sensations, which are the primary elements of thought, and is what we commonly call the soul.

And does not this answer the question, Where is the soul, and what its relation to life and to corporeity?

Now, whatever changes this fluidoid undergoes, we know that it contains a witness and a certainty that within it is a central element of permanence. That witness is the memory, the wonderful power which attests our personal identity through the long lapse of years and changes. By memory the man of seventy knows that he is now thinking the same great ideas which he thought at seven. He knows that the thinker at both times is the same self. The thinking essence, the reflective element in the brain which thinks now, is the same as thought then. That thinking fluidoid, then, has a right to know itself to be the same soul at both points. Ask you why I know I am the same self as thought out eternity seventy years ago? I know it just as I know any thing; by memory. I remember that thought, I remember the self that thought it, and I know that that thought came from the same self seventy years ago. In the thinking essence, therefore, there is a permanent selfhood that may last through we know not what extent of time. In brutes that witness exists in an imperfect degree. The brute fluidoid soon loses the impressed sensation, however vivid, unless retraced by repetition and habit. It has no self-conscious ego, and knows not how reflectively to tie the past thought to the ancient self, and so is utterly unable to read the testimony of the witness. Man's self alone attests to itself its own identity.

The *anima*, or soul specter, is possessed, however, not by man alone, but by the brute creation; for in all creatures are nerves, brain, and thought. And, hence, many have concluded that there is no evidence to prove the immortality of man which does not also prove the immortality of lower beings. Yet it is intimated in

Gen. i, that the animal souls were poured forth by the divine fiat from the waters and "the earth," so that they came not from God directly, but circuitously and indirectly; for, though matter is not living, yet there is in earth that soul essence or vitalizing power by which not only the animal nature, but also the animal nature of man is procreated and nourished. The animal soul, whether in man or brute, is thus nature-born.

Let no one undervalue this fluidoid thus impregnating the nerve body. It is mind; and mind is lord of matter. In the individual man it rules through the volitions all the rational actions. In collective man it rules the public worlds. And, unless Atheism be true, in God it rules the universe. It up-sets and perverts the nature of things to make mind to be a mere incident or property of matter. If matter sometimes seems to rule, it is not rule but insurrection, disobedience, and usurpation, arising from its own inertia and impracticability. It is for the mind that the body exists; for the fluidoid that the nerve fiber exists; and the matter is of no value whatever, except as it serves the interests of minds. The humblest insect, with a spark of mind, is superior to a mindless planet. The body is but the vehicle in which the soul resides and issues its mandates, the organ for carrying out the plans and purposes of the reason and will.

Fourth, is the anthropic or human specter, belonging solely to man. For into man, by the breath of God (Gen. ii, 7), is infused a new nature, impregnating and identifying itself with his animal soul, and exalting it into spirit. This element of the divine dwells specially within the brain, enlarging and ennobling its powers, and so shaping the cerebral structure as to render it accordant for thoughts and ideas too high and vast for the animal soul. The human embryo passes through

the three stages in the womb—namely, the vegetable, the animal, and the anthropic. The two former merge into the latter; so that man's fluidoid is either soul or spirit, or both. Some evolutionists tell us that birds are evolutionally derived from snakes, which can be done only by the infusing a higher mental essence into snake mind, with a corresponding transformation of body to match. So is man, though not generatively descended from a brute pedigree, but created upon a higher platform in the plan of living beings, an animal with a soul exalted into a spirit, and a body reared from animal proneness to a human erectness, emblematically looking forward and upward as to an immortal destination.

The ideas which the spirit of man conceives, but which brute mind and brain cannot conceive or construct, are such as Infinity, Eternity, Immortality, Absolute Right. These are ideas that cannot be derived from impressions made upon a limited cerebral or nervous sensorium, but are formed above all matter level, in the region of pure spirit. A material object may be pressed upon the bodily sensibility and may be pictured upon a page, but not an eternity. An animal form may be stamped upon a wax tablet, but not an absolute right. Infinity cannot be graven upon the human flesh or fibers, and so cannot be reproduced from a memory-tablet of matter. These ideas, purely ideal, are in no sense sense-derived images; but are reproduced by the recollection as they were first produced by the conception, by an act of the pure spirit. And now, as we judge the purpose, use, and destiny of a thing, as, for instance, a machine, by its properties, so we must judge of mind. By its capacities and provisions we must decide whether it is to be temporary or permanent. The properties and operations of the snake mind accord with its earthy creep;

the properties of the bird mind accord with its ethereal soar. And so, analyzing the properties and operations of the brute *anima*, we see its sole sphere of life is earthy and perishing; and, judging of the human spirit by its ideas and anticipations, we must judge it to be aspiring to and calculated for the celestial and immortal. If both the perishing *anima* and the anticipating spirit be incorporated into one being, man, we judge him to be both mortal and immortal. We thus answer the question, What evidence proves the immortality of man which does not prove the immortality of brutes? Have we not a right to believe that man is threefold, as corporeal, psychical, and spiritual; that is, vegetable, animal, and angel-like, or, let us say, *angel-oid*?

And we must emphasize the fact that the immortality of man is predicted not only by his mental conceptions, but by his bodily structure. The body must be shaped to symbolize every substantive idea of the mind. The brute brain is not so framed as to allow the idea of eternity to be thought by the brute mind. The proof of man's immortality is, therefore, not purely psychological, but as truly also anatomical. The bodily organism attests not only the future immortality of the soul, but suggests its own future immortality at the resurrection. Brutes do, indeed, negatively, fear death or destruction, but yet the positive idea of immortality, eternity of existence, they cannot form. But the human race not only conceives immortality, but as a race seems to possess the positive universal idea, that immortality belongs to itself.

To the argument for the permanence of the selfhood amid all changes through life, which we have drawn from the faculty of memory, the reply has been made that a scar on the body received in boyhood is also permanent through manhood. The ever-succeeding

particles of matter so replace their predecessors as to perpetuate the scar form. It may be, then, that the mere material sensitive brain can retain the childhood impression, and so memory be but a record on a tablet of mere matter. To this we answer that the ideas of the pure spirit, as above argued, cannot be stamped on a limited material surface. An eternity cannot be scarred upon the brain. It has no form so as to be pictured, and is too immensely extended for so limited a surface. Yet even the child conceives the full idea of perpetuity when told that he will see his dead brother again—never. He thence realizes the positive idea of forever. It is only, then, as the higher element of spirit pervades the human soul that man's future eternity can be thought even by himself.

The being created with the clear, unique, indestructible idea of infinity must have some most important relations with the Infinite Being. The being created with the inborn idea of a future eternity has therein an inborn prediction of his own immortality. The being created with the absolute idea of obligatory right must be under the law of absolute right. Such ideas are the highest attributes of the mental nature. They cannot be useless and meaningless accidents in the being. They cannot be evolutionary remnants inherited from a former lower animal ancestry. And as these tokens of man's immortality exist in both mind and brain, so, as proofs of man's immortality, they are both intellectual and corporeal. And the proof suits both parts of man's nature. In the intellect we find the proof of the immortality of the soul. In the corporeity we find prediction of the resurrection of the body.

All these transcendent facts confirm the experience of the wisest and best of the human race, that the spirit of man may commune with the spirit of God in regard

to the realities of eternity. The human mind possesses all the faculties, the human brain all the apparatus for such communion. And the men who have in various ages and countries professed such experience are worthy of profound reliance. Jesus, Paul, Augustine, Edwards, Wesley, were no fanatics or enthusiasts, except in the noblest meaning of the epithet. And besides this fact of communion, there is that other fact of special inspiration by which the brain and voice and pen of man become an oracle declaring the truths of God to man. That inspiration may be more or less perfect. It may come forth, as in the words of Jesus, in absolute verity; or, as recorded by his apostles, with less perfection; or, as in the dogmas and Bibles of the ethnic races, with an authority largely diminished by the lower elements of man's nature. Yet the saints who commune with God appreciate the purely inspired, even in the ethnic *Biblia*. The possibility of these revelations arises from the harmony of the purified nature of man with the nature of God. So that communion and revelation are natural. And when we are asked, Is immortality proved by the light of nature, or by revelation? it is hardly a valid question. Nature and revelation are essentially one in affirming that great truth.

From this analysis of the combined properties of the brute body and soul, compared with those of the human body and spirit, we infer that the former are a united temporality, derived immediately from the earthly, and the latter a perpetuity derived immediately from God.

The Vanishing Specter.

What is death? Though here is a vale of mystery of which science knows and revelation reveals but little, yet the anxious mind legitimately seeks to sat-

isfy itself with the most probable conceptions. With the brute, death is a vanishing of the specter, an evaporation of the terrene soul, and its return to the world-soul whence it originated. With man, it is the emergence of the human spirit from the body into the region of spirits. So said the Hebrew philosopher in a dictum in which, for a rarity, and for sake of the antithesis, the word *spirit* is applied in Scripture to the brute *soul*: "Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth *upward*, and the spirit of the beast that goeth *downward to the earth*?" (Eccl. iii, 20.) That the writer's query—*who knoweth?*—expressed no doubt of man's *ascent* is clear from another passage, Eccl. xii, 7: "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was; and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it."

By this view the substance of the brute soul is not "annihilated" any more than the substance of the brute body. As the latter is resolved back into the chemical elements of the material world, so the former dissolves into the common reservoir of the world-soul. Its impersonal individuality is, indeed, forever effaced. Its capability of united thought has forever vanished. Its conformity of form to the form of the body is abolished. The water filling an urn is conformed to the interior form of the individual urn; but, pour it back into the spring whence it was dipped, and it loses its individuality in the fusion. The spirit "breathed," according to Moses, into the human organism, is not a part of the divine essence, as it is not of the world-soul; but is brought as a simple substance into an original existence by a divine volitional effluence and, as we conceive, can lose its pure personality only by a counter divine volition. That it may lose its consciousness we know by temporary experiences, as in our swoons and slumbers. It may have its consciousness, for aught we know, for-

ever effaced without losing its personality. And those who believe in a future temporary final punishment would find this (deconsciousization) a more tenable theory than annihilation.

The process of death with the redeemed man is the struggle of the spirit with the body to make its divine ascent. As it recedes, the formative-conservative power loses its grasp upon the organism, and leaves it to disintegration. Very probably the spirit leaves its signatures upon the particles of that organism, indicating their future reorganization in a future spiritualized body. Says spirit to body: "I will meet you at the resurrection." Things as wonderful really take place in God's kingdom of nature.

Inquirers are often perplexed as to the nature of the happiness of the blessed spirit realm. Most theorists have imagined a continuance in a great degree of the machineries and activities of our present life. But, primarily, there may be a most perfect happiness in a most perfect repose. There may be an absolute sweetness of simple existence, a transcendent delight in pure *being*. There may be no desire for pure action, but a perfect content in the consciousness. And in the perfect continuity of this reposeful bliss there may be no monotony, no nervous tire, no desire of change, but an eternity of complete satisfaction. So perfect may be this bliss of *being*, that time in fact loses all measure, and the interval between death and resurrection, though by earthly measurement an interval of immense ages, may be but as a brief, starry, reposeful night before the dawn of the glorious morrow. Scripture uses both these measurements in reckoning the time of the coming of the Son of Man to judgment. And thus, as the perceptions of the spirit are able to overcome distances of space, so may its conceptions override the distances of time. Yet

this intense bliss of pure consciousness is not the exclusion of the bliss of action, but its basis.

Emerging from the body, the spirit awakes into the pure ether of the region of bodiless spirits. This blessed atmosphere, we conceive, is, as it were, within the atmosphere of our outside troublous worlds. For there are worlds within worlds, enfolding and pervading each other without impeding, just as light can, without obstructing, pervade our earthly atmosphere. This paradisaic ether is an effluence from the divine essence, and the emancipated spirit bathes and swims and lives therein as his own native and genial element. Paradise may thus pervade our air above and around us, and, at death, the spirit enters thereinto as through a veil. Within that veil is the true world, of which our outside world is the coarse, hard shell, the crude, repulsive bark. Divine power can make the most solid masses of matter (which are really porous), move through each other, like tenuous clouds. Even the resurrect body of Christ walked through the solid wall of the house, and first revealed itself to the eyes of his disciples at the supper-table. And so the resurrect bodies of all his saints will be so pervaded by the spirit as each to be "a spiritual body," as they are now so pervaded by the *anima* as to be animal bodies. Within the turbulences of our earthly atmosphere this celestial ether is a pure tranquillity. The discords of the elements are here sweetly calmed. The discord between the nature of that ether and of that spirit has no existence. No pestilences infect, no darkness obscures, no Arctic icebergs can freeze, no volcanic fires consume, even if the spirit nature were susceptible of such evils. But so transcendent is his substance that he can swim in the glacier without chill, and repose in the lava bed and suffer no heat. Nay, it is probable that his will-power overmasters these ele-

ments, and brings their hostility to submission and sympathy. By a blessed concord between the infinite and finite wills is this ethereal loveliness created. So God, man, and the elements unite in a most holy peace.

From the fact that drowned persons who have been resuscitated were insensible during their drowned state, it has been inferred that there is no spirit survival. But such persons were not dead. The consciousness was repressed, as when one takes a dose of chloroform, or as in a sound slumber; but the spirit had taken no departure, and the drowned was simply recovered from a swoon which would have soon become death. The emancipation of the spirit from the drowning swoon, like an awakening from the slumber, is the restoration of the consciousness, and, in case of death, an introduction to the scene of the new life.

The struggle of the spirit's emergence from the body leaves behind it the lower elements of the *anima*, those holding stronger affinities with the body than with the spirit. The bodily appetites, the sexual, the nutritive, as well as the nervous susceptibilities to angry excitements, disappear. With them disappear the liability to the sins of the flesh. The lower temptations are no longer possible. "They neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are like the angels of God." Among the angels they are *angeloids*. To gross natures these departures of the animal elements may seem a deprivation; but there come in their place felicities of a diviner nature, pure from the shame intermingled even to earthly minds in our animal enjoyments. Nor does the withdrawal of the spirit from the bodily frame lessen its perceptions of the material world. Even here our senses are but the *organs* of the intelligence, not the intelligence itself. The eyes do not see, but are simply the spectacles through which the intelligence

sees. The hand is not the agent that feels, but is the tool with which the intelligence feels. The ear hears not, but is merely the conductor by which the vibration is brought to the intelligence residing in the nervous-cerebral system. Thought refers all these perceptions, not to the external apparatus, but back to the mind, the self, the thinking essence, the conscious ego. The organs are the machineries through which spirit is, during its earthly life, adjusted to matter, and becomes schooled to the material world. These limitations being dropped, the spirit becomes ready to understand both matter and spirit with unencumbered perfection. The intelligence sees with a new vividness, more or less undimmed by distance. And all the mental faculties are emancipated into a new power.

Whether the spirit has *form* is a question long debated among spiritual thinkers. Even Cudworth seemed to hold that there can be no spirit without body. But has *force* a body? Is electricity corporeal? Are not the mightiest agencies in nature, to our conception, bodiless? Yet, of all definite existences, there must be limitations. There certainly is a localization within us of the mental essence. It has a presence, where it is; and it has an absence, where it is not. And between the two, its being and its not being, there must be a boundary line or separating margin, and so an approach to *form*. But we hold that the formative power of the spirit is its own *will*. The conscious will is the center of the living being; and it is this which gives the spirit its constant or varying figure. Our human bodies are bounded, or, as we may say, *surfaced* by a *skin*. But the spirit is surfaced, and its individuality and continuity of selfhood are secured, by its own volitions. It needs neither body nor skin for its permanent definite entity. And yet such spirits may be conceived as able

to pervade each other, just as the perceptions of the gazers upon a scene. Their ocular visions pervade each other, perception crossing perception without impediment or confusion.

The entrance of the spirit into the spirit world will not be a lonely migration into a strange or dreary solitude. Eternity, immortality, are home ideas to him, and it is into their home he is now being introduced. He is thus no foreigner in Eden. Christ has whispered to him on his dying bed, "This day shalt thou be *with me* in Paradise." And angels ushered Lazarus to the Abrahamic banquet. The angels wait upon the angeloids. Of different origins and histories the two classes of immortals are happy associates. And wondrously peculiar is the history of the human immortal. He comes invested and white-robed in the unique glory of Christ's atonement. For this he is gazed upon as a rare variety in the living worlds. He stands also at the transition point between the animal and spirit worlds. He is the summit of material nature, with a column of living ranks beneath him, and at the base of the spiritual column, which, as spirit, is more entirely like God, though conceding man in the atonement unparalleled superiority. And who doubts that, as the individual man enters this new region, he will be met, by the beatified friends who have gone before him, with glorious welcome? And how wonderful the grand society which he now joins of the great and good in the world's history; the champions of truth and right in the earth, the glorious army of reformers, confessors, and martyrs, crowned with the presence of the Great Head! For though Christ be bodily enthroned in the highest heavens, yet is he *present* to the eyes, unimpeded by distance, of those glorified spirits. They are "with Christ," as Paul so earnestly desired.

And now, upon the perfectly happy consciousness which we have above described as the basis, how does our joyful anticipation build a wonderful superstructure of felicity in action, filling the completeness of the being and rendering it an ever-living rapture! To our faculties, enlarged into new power, there are treasures of glory, "an exceeding *weight*" (as if it were *solid*), "of glory" to be opened, which it might take an eternity to realize, enjoy, and exhaust, in which the redeemed will have their full active share. Nor does the blissful tranquillity of the inner, ethereal world contradict the possibility of *events* of transcendent magnitude and interest. The very phrase with which the New Testament designates our vast futurity, *εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων*, epochs of epochs, suggests the thought of evolutions and revolutions in which man is sharer. And these revolutions will be revelations; revelations not of dismay and disaster to him, but of glory and wonder; wonder at the boundless inventive wealth of the Infinite, ever fresh with sublime and divine novelties and surprises. Our eternity is, therefore, not to be thought of as a shoreless, stagnant sea, or as a placid, endless stream. But when our earth's "rolling years shall cease to move," the moving æons shall forever continue to roll on their stupendous cycles, filled with events that make the royal history of a universe and the divine biography of God.

THE END.

